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REVIEWS

*DAVID QUINT. *Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 433 pp. US\$ 49.50 cloth, US\$ 16.95 paper.

This excellent study of the entanglement of epic in problems of empire and imperialism is likely to establish itself as the standard work for a generation of scholars in a postcolonial world. Quint looks back to Achilles and to the fateful moment when Odysseus first set foot on Polyphemus' island. In a wide-ranging epilogue he also writes about MacPherson's *Ossian*, romantic theories of the epic, and Eisenstein's *Alexander Nevsky* as a film that powerfully works through many motifs of the epic tradition. But the chief focus of the book is on the European epic from Virgil to Milton, the kind of epic that used to be called "secondary" or "literary." For Quint, the epic is inescapably defined by questions of empire. The pre-imperial Homer therefore belongs to the prehistory of epic. And the history of epic comes to a fitting conclusion in Milton's radical opposition to empire, whether conceived in its external mode as territorial expansion or in its internal mode as the extension of state control over the individual.

Empire, unlike trade, is a zero sum game. The winners and losers of empire are therefore the inevitable subjects of the epic poet. This simple distinction provides the central framework for Quint, who sees the epic tradition as the interweaving of the epic of the winner and the romance of the loser. With many appropriate qualifications, the Virgilian tradition is that of the winner, whereas the losing side derives from Lucan, remembered best for his one-liner about Cato Uticensis, who in his suicide "chose" a classy defeat over a tawdry victory: *victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni* ("If the victor had the gods on his side, the vanquished had Cato").

Empire and poetry stand in an uneasy relationship. The triumph of empire would be the end of narrative, for "peace is poor reading" (Thomas Hardy). Fortunately or unfortunately, the triumph of empire or the end of history have never been and are not now anywhere in sight. In his splendid analysis of the shield of Aeneas, Quint shows how even in the epic of winners trouble and narrative resist pacification: the last item on Aeneas' shield, *ponem indignatus Araxes*, shows the wild river at the Easternmost stretch of the empire chafing under a bridge imposed recently but not for long.

Virgil and Lucan provide the framework for an exceptionally rich and

nuanced analysis of European epic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Quint's discussion moves within a set of perspectives defined by colonialism in the New World, the centralizing powers of European monarchies, religious schism, and the explicit articulation of the opposition of epic and romance in Renaissance criticism. These perspectives govern not only the analysis of the usual suspects, Camões, Tasso, and Milton, but they account for the inclusion of some "new" texts, the obscure early seventeenth-century epic *Historia de la Nueva Mexico* by Gaspar Perez de Villagra and the more famous late sixteenth century epic *Araucana* by Alonso de Ercilla.

In his discussions of these epics Quint establishes himself as a very subtle and responsible interpreter of individual passages, always ready to tease out the possibilities of a text, but never pushing beyond its limits without acknowledging that he is in fact going out on a limb. But he is also an excellent historian with a marked gift for lucid and economic exposition. His summary of the mid-sixteenth debates of Las Casas and Sepúlveda about the status and rights of the native American population is a model of his sketching skills. Finally, Quint has a knack for effortlessly combining his microscopic inspections and his broad sketches, and while the ethos and perspective of his work have many points of contact with new historicist work on the Renaissance, his work has none of the capricious use of evidence that is often a troubling aspect of work in that genre.

In the epics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the oppositions of Virgil and Lucan, victory and loss, the linear teleological narrative of epic and the wandering, fragmented narrative of romance are overbalanced toward the side of loss and romance. Even Tasso's epic, straining after assertion and victory, is most interesting where it remains caught in whirlpools of loss or rebellion. In Quint's analysis, Ercilla's *Araucana* appears as the most characteristic work of its period, and in some ways the analysis of this work is the pivot of *Epic and Empire*. The work portrays the resistance of an Indian tribe, the Araucanians, to the Spanish empire. For a modern reader not well read in the period, it may be at first surprising how clearly and deeply the poet sympathizes with the Indians and made this sympathy a subject for critical analysis in his preface. *Epic and Empire* shows very powerfully how deeply doubts about or downright opposition to the colonial enterprise were voiced from the very beginning. Indeed, an anti-colonial rhetoric is considerably older than the new world. If one cannot quite find it in the story of Odysseus and Polyphemus it is hard to think of a blunter critique of imperialism than the words that Tacitus puts in the mouth of Calgacus, a leader of the Britons who resisted the invading Romans:

raptores orbis, postquam cuncta vastantibus defuere terrae, mare scrutantur: si locuples hostis est, avari, si pauper, ambitiosi, quos non Oriens, non Occidens satiaverit: soli omnium opes atque inopiam pari adfectu concupiscunt. auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. (*Agricola* 30)

Robbers of the globe, once they have devastated all land, they turn to the sea. If their enemy is rich, they are greedy; if poor, ambitious. Neither Orient nor Occident satisfies them; they alone and with equal passion desire the wealth and poverty of everybody. To steal, massacre, and rape they call by the false name of empire, and where they have made a solitude, they call it peace.

But Quint shows not only that an anti-colonialist was always already part of the colonial enterprise; he also shows that it was not quite so disinterested or sympathetic a phenomenon as it appears at first sight. Nostalgic guilt had a self-regarding component, for the noble savage at the point of doomed rebellion is a mirror in which an aristocracy sees its losing struggle with the centralizing forces of a modern state. The external savage losers are glorified by the internal sophisticated losers — a process that appears equally in the Tacitean rhetoric of Calgacus, in Ercilla's Araucanians, and, one might add, in the powerful new/old rhetoric of the Elizabethan stage around 1600.

Quint's story reaches its climactic and heroic finale in the figure of Milton, who unlike Lucan or Ercilla saw through aristocratic nostalgia and out of his despair over the restoration of the monarchy wrote the most radical epic of loss. Quint's approach emerges most clearly from an analysis of a passage in *Paradise Regained* that he makes the pivotal point of his reading. The Old Testament tells the story of God's anger at a census carried out by David (2 Samuel 24, 1 Chronicles 21), and this passage troubled Milton's contemporaries John Graunt and William Petty, who were pioneers in "political arithmetic." In *Paradise Regained* Jesus chides Satan for having tempted David

to the pride
Of numbering Israel, which cost the lives
Of threescore and ten thousand Israelites
By three days' pestilence. (3.409-12)

This oddly prescient biblical passage becomes grist for a Foucauldian mill. Quint's Milton completes and destroys the epic tradition by seeing clearly that the first census was the beginning of the rot of state power with its pernicious maxim "survey and conquer." Milton's Jesus "defends his individuality from the observation and reckoning of external power and shows the way that paradise can be regained" (340). The move beyond the Virgilian epic of victory and Lucan's romance of loss and creates a new genre "informed by Milton's particular political vision — a vision no less political for its distrust of organized power" (340).

Considerable support for such a view can be found in a peculiar Miltonic allusion that more than any other measures the distance between *Paradise Lost* and the *Aeneid*. There is a scene in the *Aeneid*, in which Ascanius, the son of Aeneas, still a boy, kills his first enemy. The enemy is a boastful kinsman of

Turnus by the name of Numanus, and Ascanius punishes his presumption by shooting an arrow from a safe distance with the help of Apollo and to the applause of both heaven and earth. This very staged and hierarchic scene becomes the model for the rebellion of Abdiel in the War in Heaven. Abdiel is Ascanius, the faithful son who attracts the praise of God the Father. But his actions are those of Numanus, the upstart rebel, for Abdiel is a very junior officer who all by himself confronts the commander and chief to the scorn and derision of everybody around him. The implications of this scene are clear. The source of true authority is so radically removed and its secular representation is always already so deeply compromised that there could not be in this world any form of institutional or political authority that an honest or courageous man could obey with a clear conscience. If one thinks of David's census and Abdiel's protest as Miltonic signatures, that most exclusive, disdainful, and anti-populist of poets suddenly reveals a deep temperamental affinity with the political ethos of a generation of American literary scholars who through their experience of the Vietnam war reshaped a deep libertarian streak of the American political tradition.

Much as I admire *Epic and Empire*, I have both literary and political questions about it. It seems odd and counterintuitive to call the *Aeneid* an epic of winners. Quint is much too good a scholar to ignore this point, and in his explicit discussion of the *Aeneid* he is certainly aware of the fascination that the *Aeneid* has with phenomena of loss and mourning. And he shows in different places that the opposition of winning and losing is replicated within each epic. Nonetheless, in the discussion of Renaissance epics, the opposition of Virgil and Lucan forces Virgil into a "winning" position that is in that form too crude. It is of course the case that simplifications are unavoidable and useful for heuristic reasons, but even so in an age whose readers have little access to Latin it may be misleading to suggest even by implication that Renaissance readers or poets thought of Virgil as by and large singing the praises of winners.

Setting aside the question whether Quint always strikes the right balance with the *Aeneid* one might also ask whether there ever was such a thing as an epic of winners at all. "Epic loves a parade," Quint says, and rightly so, as the interminable roll calls from *Iliad* on demonstrate. But is there really a famous moment or scene in the European epic that could be set to the tune of the Radezky March? The true poet, to vary Blake, may always be of the loser's side without knowing it, and to the extent that the epic poet is a poet at all, winning may never be his forte. Ask a lover of the *Iliad* to recite a favorite passage, and it is not likely to come from the Catalogue. A much more likely response will be, for example,

a day will come when ancient Ilion falls,
when Priam and the folk of Priam perish. (*The Iliad*, Trans. Robert Fitzgerald [New York: Anchor Press-Doubleday, 1974] 6.448-69)

And even or especially the brilliant Achilles in his most reflective moments talks such language:

Come, friend, face your death, you too.
And why are you so piteous about it?
Patroklos died, and he was a finer man
by far than you. You see, don't you, how large
I am, and how well-made? My father is noble,
a goddess bore me. Yet death waits for me,
for me as well, in all the power of fate.
A morning comes or evening or high noon
when someone takes my life away in war,
a spear-cast, or an arrow for a bowstring. (*The Iliad*, *ibid.*, 21.106-13)

Nor are such preferences a modern taste. Sidney remembers Aeneas "in obeying the Gods commandment to leave Dido, though not only all passionate kindenes, but even the humane consideration of virtuous gratefulnes, would have craued other of him." And the single most famous Virgilian line may well be "sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt" (*Aeneid* 1.462) ("here are tears of things and mortality touches the heart").

It is of course the case that even if poetry loves a loser, the opposition of winning and losing may still be valid. Poems may be, relatively speaking, on the winner's or the loser's side. It is certainly the case that Virgil, with whatever reservations, followed the regime that Lucan ostentatiously opposed. Nonetheless, the relationship of epic and empire may be more fundamentally troubled than Quint in his more schematic moments would have his reader believe.

There is a second and frankly political question that I would like to raise about *Epic and Empire*. The authorial persona that emerges from the pages of this book is on the one hand that of a scholar with a judicious temper and a keen eye for shades of gray. But his voice also and unmistakably belongs to a generation of literary scholars who came of age during the Vietnam War and have a tendency to elide Acton's "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" into "any power corrupts absolutely." I do not belong to that generation, and my first encounter in 1945 with the power of the American empire was distinctly benign. I was six years old and living in a Bavarian town. My mother, a pediatrician, had put my sister and me in sick beds in the hospital where she was working to make sure that we were out of harm's way when the invaders arrived. We were strictly forbidden to say "Heil Hitler." The invaders arrived in the hospital, grinned, said "Heil Hitler" and distributed candy. Ever since it has been part of my political wisdom that to be liberated, or for that matter ruled, by the Americans was not the worst lot that could befall you in this world.

My political education had actually begun a little earlier. One of the standard meals in the hospital where my mother worked and I often ate, was *Schmarren*, a sweet dish made from batter. If the dish was made mainly from flour and water, it was known as *Hitler-Schmarren*, but on the rare occasions when there

were milk and eggs it was called *Kaiserschmarren*. Thus I was taught early to distinguish between the quality of regimes and distinguish them by criteria that were none the worse for being very prosaic.

How do these personal reminiscences bear on *Epic and Empire*? By writing about epic and empire Quint writes about politics and about the world in which we live, and to engage the book is to engage its politics in their adequacy *vis-à-vis* the epic tradition and *vis-à-vis* the world in which we live. From my Sancho Panza perspective of Emperor Schmarren, Hitler Schmarren and American candy, Quint's politics, exquisitely attuned as they are to the sensibilities of a whole generation of scholars, are colored by an innocent rigorism about power and a certain infatuation with the romance of the rebel and the loser. And I wonder whether the sensibility of "1968" has not dated in the light of the exhilarating and horrifying historical events in the wake of 1989. Quint admires Milton because Milton cannot see a use of power that is not an abuse. But the eye that is so keen to detect the abuse in any use may be curiously blind to much more consequential distinctions. There is a weary tough-mindedness to the Roman aphorism, repeated in the Renaissance, that the worst tyrant is better than civil war. And there are vast differences between anarchy or tyranny on the one hand and regimes that habitually and with some sincerity gesture in the direction of the rule of law and a market economy.

To speak about power, authority, and empire in the epic or, for that matter, in the world in which we live requires a readiness to see such distinctions and recognize them in their rough way as valid and important. Before one strips the mask of benevolence from the face of the tyrant (or centralizing state official) one needs to ask whether the mask is just a mask or a "habit" that is in its way a virtue. And if one strips masks from faces, one needs to be on the lookout for the thug underneath the romantic rebel as well. To return to Ascanius and Numanus, there is too much incense in this Virgilian ritual of authority for my taste. But what if the freedom fighter Numanus is indeed a violent and treacherous loudmouth? That is not a question one likes to discuss within the hermeneutical horizon of *Epic and Empire*, let alone the scholarly climate out of which it grows. It has become a very practical and a very difficult question for harried military or police authorities in various trouble spots of the globe.

There is, at least in the light of the experiences that shaped my politics, something unsatisfactory about a study of epic and empire that moves toward an apotheosis of Milton as a libertarian refusenik. Perhaps *Epic and Empire* is caught a little in the trap of its title. It is an irresistible title with its apodictic symmetry and slightly unhinged alliteration. But whether in *Epic and Empire* or in *The Empire Strikes Back*, empire is a loaded term that compels disapproval but makes it difficult to think about the phenomena of power and authority that are bundled under it. The European epics since Virgil have all been about imperialism in the narrow sense of the expansion of territorial command through military means. There is now wide agreement in Western democratic states that imperialism in that sense is no longer an acceptable practice and probably was a bad thing to begin with, as plenty of people said at the time. *Epic and Empire*

does a superb job of showing the different roles of epic in the cultural history of imperialism and colonialism. On the other hand, the European epic while often concerned with imperialism is also, and perhaps more centrally, a genre that plays out questions of war and peace, social order, justice, and political authority in Very Large Social Bodies, regardless of whether these bodies are in a narrower sense imperialist. Very Large Social Bodies are here to stay, and there is no process of gentle decomposition that will transform them into cuddly communities that can do without authority, rules of peace, and rules for the use of force. Virgil and the "winning" side of the epic tradition have a lot of penetrating and often melancholy things to say about *imperium* in this larger sense. The imperialist allergy that is so helpful in reading epics as documents of imperialism may turn out to be counterproductive in reading them as reflections on questions of power and authority that we can never move beyond. And however admirable, unflinching, courageous, and profound his vision may be, just how would one envisage a society of many Miltons? (MARTIN MUELLER, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)

*PAISLEY LIVINGSTON. *Literature and Rationality: Ideas of Agency in Theory and Fiction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 290 pp. US \$59.95

This book is a major contribution to the study of literature. It challenges both traditional dogmatic approaches and fashionable post-structuralist views. The alternative it offers is refreshingly constructive and thoroughly innovative. Livingston argues that the relationship between rationality and literature is a reciprocal one. On the one hand, theories of rationality are said to be of major importance to the study of literature. At the same time, the analysis of literary works may contribute in significant ways to our understanding of (ir)rationality. The basic assumption underlying rationality as proposed here is purposeful action, where 'action' is defined as behaviour "teleologically oriented toward future states of affairs" (16), springing from attitudes (desires, preferences, goals, etc.) that constitute and motivate this behaviour.

Recent post-structuralist views radically questioning such an assumption of purposeful action (and hence of rationality) are shown to be incoherent, inasmuch as they (intentionally) propose a theory denying the very possibility of such intentions. The opening chapter offers an impressive range of issues bearing on this epistemological question. Most of these have been debated in philosophy, economics, psychology and sociology, without literary scholars showing much interest, so that we should be grateful to Livingston for bringing home such precious gifts of information, presented in remarkably lucid language. However, there is much more than that in Livingston's book. It also points out weak spots in those various descriptions of the rationality principle. If, as Livingston convincingly demonstrates, many of these views break down even before we apply them to somewhat more complex notions vaguely resembling the kind of complexity one finds in literature, must one then not reject such approaches altogether, perhaps even the notion of rationality itself too? Yet that is not the course

followed by Livingston, as he is quick to point out the absurdity that follows from such abolitional moves. Instead, he alludes to the necessary part rationality must inevitably play in intentionalist psychology. This basic rationality heuristic is not posited as a synthetic *a priori*, but as "a *privileged but fallible* approach to the understanding and explanation of human behavior." (45)

In reading this chapter one becomes painfully aware of the fact that literary studies is at best twenty years behind the current developments in epistemology. Sure, many literary scholars profess to be engaged in such matters. The bitter reality, however, is that what one usually encounters in such writings are pretty much outdated speculations based on Kuhn's (1962) book. Not so with Paisley Livingston; in his hands the epistemological concerns are done full justice. Chapter 2 turns to the pertinence of rationality for literary studies, and argues (51) that: 1) rationality is highly relevant to enquiries concerning literature; 2) literature itself has an important cognitive value in studying questions of human (ir)rationality.

As to the first point, it leads to the insight already announced in the introduction: "No agency, no textuality" (10). Since texts are artefacts intentionally produced by authors, the question whether the properties of these texts are usually related to their authors' intentions, is a meaningful one. Although texts require prior agency, "No text literally has a goal in and of itself" (64). It is, rather, the strategic *interaction* between author, text, and reader that needs to be analysed in terms of rationality. As an illustration of this insight, Poe's *Mesmeric Revelation* (1844) is shown to satisfy the conditions of being taken as a realistic account, but also as a piece of fiction, and as a hoax. Poe emerges from this analysis as "a highly strategic writer whose plans and intentions were multiple" (77), thus refuting the atomistic view of intentionality.

This pragmatic analysis leads to a consideration of the interpretative practice in literary studies. Typical for such interpretations is that they adopt a particular psychological doctrine (most often some version of psycho-analysis), and then go on to demonstrate how the actions of characters in the work correspond to or illustrate the insights of this particular psychological theory. Livingston's analysis shows this to be a rather absurd enterprise. First, the interpretations do not help the respective psychological theory, for the illustrations come from works of fiction. By the same token, theories claiming the existence of demons, witches or unicorns could be given credit by providing "illustrations" of their claims from literary works. The most devastating argument, however, is that literary studies do not benefit from such interpretations either. What, indeed, is "explained" when a critic has shown that Hamlet's behaviour "fits" some theory? No insight into literary phenomena is furthered in that way, while the extra-literary aims served are either trivial or misguided.

There is, however, another possibility open to enquiry: it is the use of literary texts in an attempt to test existing theories of rationality. Precisely because such texts often depict more complex aspects of human affairs than the ones traditionally employed in other disciplines, literature presents us with an opportunity to enrich and develop such theories. This is the aim underlying chapters 3, 4 and

5. The first of these takes Dreiser's *The Financier* as a novel epitomizing the naturalist dogma, i.e. the (widespread) belief in "the overdetermination of human agency by other factors" (93). As an analysis of the various narrative discourses in the text reveals, however, the novel is a fine example of the kind of contradictions this views runs into. As Livingston writes: "what is in an assertive tone banished by the theories of naturalistic, supernaturalist, and semio-historicist dogmas is in fact not eliminated, removed, or reduced at all, the result being the flagrant inconsistency and implausibility of these doctrines" (98). Dreiser's hero turns out to be driven more by social learning than by a mechanical process outlined by the narrator (in accordance with the naturalist dogma).

Chapter 4 takes issue with the theories of atomic and minimal rationality, in an analysis of Dreiser's *Sister Carrie*. Although these theories are quite able to account for each of the actions separately, they are unable to cast light on the question why these "rational" decisions lead to the protagonist's doom. Livingston's analysis, by contrast, proposes that "although it is impossible to make rational evaluations of a particular desire or end taken in isolation, it is possible to evaluate the rationality of some collection of desires by asking whether they are combined in coherent, instrumental, means-end relations, and whether their joint realization is compatible." (143)

Chapter 5 takes Zola's *La joie de vivre* as a context for discussing the role of plans in rationality. Lazare, the novel's protagonist, is evidently someone involved in what at first sight looks like erratic planning. Livingston's analysis brings to light how the individual acts of decision and planning are characterized by a form of practical reasoning that is wholly inadequate.

An objection that could be raised against the kind of analysis exemplified in the preceding chapters is that it is still involved in what is essentially an individualistic perspective on rationality, when a wider, more supra-individual and social framework might provide a more promising context to study agents' reasons and interests. This objection is met in chapter 6, comprising an analysis of Stanislaw Lem's science fiction novel *His Master's Voice* (1968), examining the complex interrelationship between individual actions and social factors. Lem's novel suggests a more nuanced view than the postmodernist outlook on science, in that it incorporates moderate forms of realism as well as genuine (and beneficial) epistemic progress as the results of individual rationality.

The book ends with a *Coda*, in which Kafka's "Der Bau" ("The Burrow") is seen to epitomize the lessons to be learned from recent developments in epistemology. Kafka's creature is involved in a self-evaluation based on "an unrealistic and idealized standard of infallibility and certainty." (208) The fact that such infallible knowledge is absent in our actual beliefs and actions should not, however, be taken as an indication that such beliefs and actions are irrational. Modesty in our claims must not be confused with despair.

It is not possible in this short review to do justice to the exceptional richness of Livingston's book, and the summary presented here fails to capture the depth of insight offered by its author. This does not mean, of course, that the book has no shortcomings. I personally found the use of two separate bibliographies (one

"literary," the other "philosophical") unnecessary and confusing. There may also be a contradiction lurking beneath the surface clarity: if current interpretative practice is rejected on the ground that fictional texts cannot be used to test psychological theories, then how can Livingston be so confident in using such texts himself in his attempts to clarify the philosophical questions that he addresses? Such shortcomings may need ironing out, and I do not doubt that Livingston will have more to say about them in the future. For the time being, however, they do not diminish the value of *Literature and Rationality*. If, by some miraculous event, literary scholarship comes to realize the importance of the issue and to convince itself at last that here, in the analysis (and not just repudiation) of rationality, resides one of its most promising and most rewarding domains, it is to Paisley Livingston that it may turn for instruction and guidance. (WILLIE VAN PEER, UTRECHT UNIVERSITY)

*CAROL JACOBS. *Telling Time: Lévi-Strauss, Ford, Lessing, Benjamin, de Man, Wordsworth, Rilke*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 246 + x pp. US\$ 37.50.

"This," as Carol Jacobs assures us at the outset, "is not a book *about* time" or about telling time in the ordinary sense of the expression. It is rather about the *disjunctive* ("intransitive," "ruptured") relationship between temporality and narrative, where time is both the "condition of the possibility of telling" and "the crisis that it endures" (3), as well as the product of its differentially signifying rhetoric. The smooth transitivity of the title is a disarming blind: in the introductory "Prologue" the phrase reappears in properly fractured form as "Telling, Time": the comma makes all the difference.

Difference is prominently inscribed in the volume in more than one way, notably in its topics. As in Jacobs' previous books (*The Dissimulating Harmony* [1978], *Uncontainable Romanticism* [1989]) the chapters range widely, both generically and, yes, temporally, over "poetry, anthropology, the aesthetic treatise, fiction, and critical theory [from] four national cultures and some two-and-a-half centuries," extending from "Tintern Abbey" to *Tristes Tropiques*, and from Lessing's *Laokoon* to Ford Madox Ford's *Good Soldier* and Rilke's *Sonette an Orpheus*, with Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man added as theoretical epicenters. Five of the eight essays have, in fact, appeared elsewhere before, two as early as 1975 and 1978 (on Benjamin and Ford), and one (on de Man) first published in 1989 but written earlier under the immediate impact of its subject's premature demise. There is inevitably a certain look of the miscellany about this disparity, reinforced by the inclusion of two chapters on Ford in an overall pattern of one-on-one and by the seeming topical marginality of at least two of the essays (on Benjamin and Rilke). Disparity, however, is asserted to be the very point of the book. The individual readings are offered as tangents that outline an ultimately perhaps intangible central subject while pursuing their own trajectories. If time itself seems at times elusive, the volume, as the Borgesian motto to the "Prologue" suggests, is to be seen as a "garden of forked paths," a

Poststructuralist proclivities are evident not only in the concern with the "rhetoric of temporality" and in the commitment to a "decentered" critical discourse but in the book's differential vocabulary: terms of non-coincidence are legion, such as discrepancy, disintegration, disjunction, dislocation, disparateness, dispersal, and, of course, displacement (pride of place), along with Difference itself and such related figures as slippage and unhinging. At issue is how the delusive notion of linear temporality that shapes our naive perceptions is baffled not only by a subjective order of consciousness, recollection, and reflection, but by a textuality of even more abyssal free play of semiotic involution and reticulation. At issue is also the question of "primary" and "secondary" writing, the traditional privileging of poetry over criticism, original over translation. Of the eight essays, four deal with more or less "primary" texts, while the other four address various critical writings. The point is not simple parity but a more radical integration as the outcome of differentiation. The issue in the criticism is not merely theoretic, conceptual content (though conceptual appropriation goes on surreptitiously) but the way each argument subsists in textures of figuration that are deconstructible like any narrative. The inevitable corollary is that the academic critic's own discourse, far from being "tertiary," is but another filiated original in an ongoing process of signification, one more text among texts, perhaps even a closer approximation to a "supreme fiction" than its ostensibly anterior objects, but like them at once figure and ground.

Both the lure and the potential hazards of such implications are conspicuous in the (early) essay "The Monstrosity of Translation" on Walter Benjamin's "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers," a text which Jacobs had already cited in *The Dissimulating Harmony* (xvii) as an enabling pre-text for a theory of criticism as quasi-fictional prestidigitation with texts (90, 109, 114). In his essay, a preface to his translation of Baudelaire's "Tableaux parisiens," Benjamin argued that translation, far from being an act of mediation and communication, aims at a transcendence of an already essentially hermetic, non-mimetic and non-pragmatic, original in the direction of a Mallarmesque ideal of "pure language" — a language at once empty of all particular meaning and, like sacred scripture, constitutive of meaning as such. Translation, according to Benjamin, gestures towards an ideal of linguistic plenitude by virtue of its interlinguistic hybridity, as distinguished from the spare organicism of originals, whose language is merely the shell of the fruit of meaning. It "unfolds" the original by replacing the body stocking of the original language with a royal mantle of linguistic abundance. The proper aim of translation is not to achieve fidelity or equivalence to, but to transcend, the original, as a tangent "transcends" the circle.

Jacobs not only does not question this rather Faustian, Schilleresque apotheosis of the secondary and tangential — she herself invokes Schiller by drawing her motto for the essay from Schiller's *Aesthetic Education* (128) — but blithely appropriates it as a figure for criticism, something that Benjamin himself does not suggest (138). There is thus an irony in the fact that in her opening citations from Benjamin, Jacobs cavalierly confounds two different essays by Benjamin, the "Aufgabe des Übersetzers" and "Über einige Motive bei

Baudelaire," quoting bewilderingly from the latter as if it were part of the former (128). At the same time one looks vainly for any scrutiny of the Baudelaire translations themselves to see how Benjamin's theories might relate to his practice. One must add that translations, in the vulgar sense of the word (mostly from the German), are not always unexceptionable in the book, to wit Jacobs' rendering of Benjamin's *Aufgabe*, "task," as meaning also "surrender" (139), of *triffig* as "striking, fragmentary" because of its etymology from *treffen* ("to meet" or "hit" as a target) (136), of *Dichtung* ("poetry") as "piece of writing" (129), *gewaltig* ("powerful") as "violent" (130, 135), *darstellen* ("represent") as "perform," or *dem unendlich kleinen Punkte des Sinnes* ("the infinitesimal point of the meaning" [!]) as "an infinitely small point of meaning" (132). Similarly, *Streit* in Lessing's essay means "controversy" or "quarrel" rather than "struggle" (96), and *verschüttet*, as in Rilke's *verschütteten Körper*, means "buried" in the sense of "buried alive" rather than "shaken" (190, 192), while Rilke's "die Liebende" is not "the lover" but more precisely "the loving woman" (196). Here as always, the Faustian overlooks the devil that is in such poodle details at his peril.¹

For the most part, indeed, Jacobs blends historical fidelity with hermeneutic freedom in illuminating and provocative ways. Fittingly, the first, and longest chapter — and one of the three original ones — engages the fulcrum figure whom Jacques Derrida, in a seminal essay, had depicted as the exemplary post-structuralist *manqué*. Entitled "Architectures of Oblivion: Lévi-Strauss's *Tristes Tropiques*," the essay portrays Lévi-Strauss as a kind of Wordsworth in the Tropics, who vainly struggles for a privileged vantage from which to survey both the *ethnic Other* that is also a past Self and, at the same time, the *personal history* of that ethnographic venture, and who cannot but concede that knowledge inevitably destroys the object it seeks to reclaim — Heisenbergian Uncertainty married to Wordsworth's Murder-to-Dissect. Whatever form and structure we give to the ethno-/biographic object is directly proportionate to the observer's falsifying temporal/cultural distance from that object. Jacobs' deconstructive analysis focuses more on the problematics of Lévi-Strauss's frame narrative than on the actual accounts of the diverse cultural practices of the various South American tribes. Thus she shows how the famous "test-flight" description of the sunset at sea figures ethnography's repuscular dilemma between the immediacy of unreflected Being and differential Knowing, or how primitive totemic initiation ordeals reflect, for Lévi-Strauss, the ethno-grapher's own wild goose chase after an authentic fix on the elusive Other. The "sad tropics" are always also tropes, anthropology a figure of tropology — Lévi-Strauss himself punningly troped it "entropology" — a discourse in which, e.g., the ethnographic account of Caduveo body painting and its vertiginous interplay of symmetry and

asymmetry, figure and ground metonymically reflects on the general problem of representation and the natives' horror of biological reproduction prefigures the ethnographer's dilemma of having to displace what he seeks to recuperate. Where Derrida had portrayed a Janus-headed mind caught between nostalgia for a privileged truth and origin and a post-Nietzschean gay science of semiotic *bricolage*, Jacobs shows us a much more ironical Lévi-Strauss gaily negotiating a triste fun house of inescapably aporetic discourse.

The figure of the hall of mirrors yields to that of the labyrinth or maze in the chapters on Ford Madox Ford's criticism and the narrative divagations of *The Good Soldier*. Impressionism as Ford defines and deploys it demystifies the illusions of Realism not only by defining truth subjectively in terms of sincerity (truth of impression) but by, in turn, demystifying sincerity in terms of (self)consciousness. In its ironic exposure of the artfulness of artlessness and the fictionality of verisimilitude, of lies as "figurative truth" (in Ford's own formulation), Impressionism is shown to illustrate in exacerbated form a central problematic of poststructuralist epistemology: the impossibility of unmediated representation and the indecidability of the "difference between literal and figurative language" (89). Jacobs adds another turn of the screw by demonstrating how Ford's fictive consciousness is at work not only in his fiction but also in the critical writings themselves. She moreover draws the logical consequences of this indefinite regress in the second (but earlier) essay on *The Good Soldier* by herself adopting something of the bemused, meandering, disarmingly apostrophic voice of Ford's narrator threading a passage through the labyrinth of paradox with the help of an equally tangled skein of duplicitous anecdote ("You see, don't you ... I want to be as honest as 'the situation' permits, now that we are on intimate terms ... I hope to piece together for you ... Is this saying too much" [76, 79]): "And now I'm sure you finally have a clear insight into our amazing predicament. I have played the role of the omnipotent narrator, for according to our epigraph this figure is promised the mastery of the illusions of figurative truth, and who can resist the illusion of mastery?" (94). The critic as confessed prestidigitator, but also as amazed reader, who yet, like Ford's Mazie Maidon, the "maiden of the maze" (77), holds the key to the lethal trap of the text.

A taste for critical self-deconstruction characterizes also the essay on Paul de Man, the most evident "precursor" in Jacobs' concern with temporality (see, e.g., de Man's preface to Jacobs' *Dissimulating Harmony*). Having deconstructed the deconstructor by exposing his concept of temporality as itself a figure ("The Metaphor of Temporality: Paul de Man's Rousseau Essays and 'The Rhetoric of Temporality'"), Jacobs ironizes her account of de Man's account of "Irony and Allegory endlessly replac[ing] one another" by not only calling it a "digression" and "both a definition and a transgression" of de Man's text but by dismissing it as one that in de Man's own words, produc[es] "a darkness more redoubtable than ... [any] error ... [it might] dispel." But whatever I may have done in reading his text, if the reader will forgive the rhetorical question, would it not still be possible to assert that it is "Ah! encore de Man"? (158)

One writes about de Man, Jacobs had said initially, "for the purpose of

1 Among the few typos bedevelling this otherwise meticulously produced book, one should note a misplaced quotation mark in the long passage from Lessing on p. 97, whose second paragraph is actually *part* of Lessing's quotation from Winckelmann; and the erroneous

forgetting our foreknowledge of his total opacity" (143): not to irradiate that opacity, but to cover darkness with blackness, de Man with de Man ("encore de Man"), in an interminable spiraling free flight of "vertiginous ... referential aberration" — de Man's phrase (227n.) — of rhetorical analysis of rhetorical analysis of....

The classical demonstration that temporality is inseparable from literary representation is, of course, Lessing's *Laokoon*. In turning to that text in the chapter entitled "Fictional Histories," Jacobs again is not interested in representing Lessing's central argument — his famous distinction between the sister arts in terms of space and time, pictorial simultaneity vs. discursive sequentiality — on a totalizing platter but in deconstructing the unsettling "frame" (97) and the hermeneutic stresses and ruptures that make Lessing's disquisition itself a "fictional history." Thus Lessing's insistence on the priority of Vergil's Laocoon episode over the famous Rhodian sculpture group turns out to be a displacement of his own claim to originality *vis-à-vis* Winckelmann, who had assumed the greater antiquity of the sculpture in his early *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke*, but who also, as is well known, anticipated Lessing's famous generic distinction in his *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, published after the inception but prior to the completion of the *Laokoon*. Jacobs explores the *Laokoon* as a *Streitschrift*, whose focal object becomes in turn a metaphor for Lessing's serpentine polemic against Winckelmann, Spence, and Caylus, and whose championship of Virgil's originality has ulterior motives. The point at issue is not so much Lessing's deviousness as the fact that historical discourse is inevitably interested and scrupulosity itself is motivated by the power play we call interpretation.

Laokoon thus becomes a "lesson about misreading" (113), a polemic, whose seeming fixation "on its own literal content [gives] way to the unfixable ground of figural language" (110), in a "disfigurative mode of reading ... totally at odds with the principles [Lessing] wishes to draw from the text" (103). Polemic, in turn, means a text at war not only with other texts but with itself. The temporality of language, Lessing tells us, inevitably dissipates its object. It therefore cannot represent beauty without destroying it (while conversely it can deal with ugliness precisely because piecemeal enumeration serves to dissipate its repulsiveness). The logical extension is that texts also consume and dissipate themselves along with other texts, a conclusion that Jacobs herself implies in another self-destructing coda: "if I have clouded over Lessing's text with the result of making it disappear, as fixed and recognizable truth ... I ... am nevertheless strengthened in my respect for a writer to whom so much can be lent" (127): criticism as speculative investment, not to say buy-out!

The two final essays, both new, evoke Geoffrey Hartman's *Unmediated Vision* in their juxtaposition of Wordsworth and Rilke, as they present texts by these two poets as crowning examples, respectively, of the ironies of temporality and the self-dismantling reflexivity of poetic texts. "The Unimaginable Touch of Time," a reading of "Tintern Abbey," the "Intimations" Ode, and the Simphon Crossing in Book VI of *The Prelude*, constructs, not a Wordsworth either in the

Tropics or in Marjorie Levinson's economic jungle, but a kind of Lévi-Strauss in the Wye Valley effectively effacing both past and present in the act of thoughtful recollection, in which the light of sense goes out, and demystifying not only his past but, especially in the last section of "Tintern Abbey," his present as well, in the violent shift to a vicarious posthumous and retrospective future located in his sister Dorothy. Here, too, the text's re-visions are shadowed by the critic's own dilemmas in revisiting Wordsworth's much revisited poem of revisitation. In consequence, an abundance of fresh observation is at times dissipated by a subtlety tending to the elusive, not to say opaque, as well as by what seem to me some patent misreadings. What Wordsworth questions as perhaps "a vain belief" in l. 50 of "Tintern Abbey" is surely not the "blessed mood" of l. 37 itself, something therefore to be discarded as a "delusive sense of pure intelligibility" (171), but rather the direct "owing" of that mood to the recollection of the "beauteous forms" of Nature and the "language of the sense" (ll. 22, 108). Again, in the "Ode," are not the "obstinate questionings/Of sense and outward things" (ll. 141f.) themselves remembrances from the past rather than functions of a present, adult Imagination that acts by obliterating the past (168f.)? And if "crossing the Alps is a figure for the Imagination" (181), can one really isolate the moment of "usurpation" upon the "light of sense" altogether from the poet's subsequent reading of the features of the Gondo Gorge as "characters," "types and symbols" of an ongoing "apocalypse" (1850 Prelude VI.601, 639f.)?

The *mise-en-abyme* of no. II.3 of Rilke's *Sonette an Orpheus* ("Spiegel: noch nie") brings us finally face to face with the mirror as a figure for poetry but as one that radically questions traditional mimetic theories. Jacobs reads the sonnet in the light of the earlier poem "Wende" ("Lange errang ers im Anschau") from Rilke's correspondence, which proclaims the poet's turning away from the *Dinggedicht* toward the radical subjectivity of a "Narcissus able to love and possess what is within himself as other, of an Orpheus finally united with Eurydice" (198). The sonnet, in a radical "question[ing] of its own status" (203), dissolves subjectivity in turn in a "liberation from a temporality of presence and progress, and from much else as well" (204). Here again, however, the reading rests in part on questionable translation — the *noch* in l. 5 of the sonnet seems to me to function as the intensifier "even" rather than the temporal "still" (192f.): "squanderers even of the empty hall" — and in part on legerdemain, such as the ingenious but unconvincing assertion that "drüben" in l. 13 refers to the space in front of the mirror and therefore implies a sudden shift of vantage point from outside to inside in the baffling last tercet (201). I also missed some clarifying or corroborating attention to the mirror figures of the surrounding sonnets (II.2, II.4) and to the parallel of the virgin and unicorn of II.14. The mirror persuasively emerges as a figure for a non-mimetic poetry, in which Orpheus/Narcissus achieves release and dis-/solution in (his) Echo as Other (203). But something crucial seems, perhaps inevitably, glossed over more than glossed, figured over rather than "figure(d) ... out" (204).

"What holds together," Jacobs asks, in de Manian fashion, at the outset of the

book, "such generically, culturally, and historically disparate texts?"⁽³⁾ Her own answer is that "each text ponders the nature of its own enterprise in terms of a temporality ironically posited which it casts aside for preoccupations with ... theoretical questionings that are bound to undo [the] first order" (5). That formulation suggests that in a sense every chapter performs both an "encore" and an exorcism of de Man — until in Rilke's exemplary figure of the poem/mirror as a riddled gap in time, the rhetoric of temporality, both de Man's and Lessing's, appears absorbed, after all, in pure symbol, in *Gesang as Dasein* rather than as signifying performance. Perhaps the most exhilarating aspect of this subtle and ingenious, albeit sometimes abstruse, book is the vigor with which it ironizes its own, as well as others', ironies. (ERNEST BERNHARDT-KABISCH, INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

* MATEI CALINESCU. *Rereading*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 336 pp. US \$ 30.00

L'ouvrage de Matei Calinescu a pour objet l'élaboration d'une poétique de la (re)lecture ludique,¹ basée avant tout sur la distinction entre première lecture et relecture, deux constructions théoriques définies de la façon suivante:

first-time reading [is] a hypothetically linear reading, continuous, fresh, curious, and sensitive to surprising turns or unpredictable developments. (7)

rereading ... is the repetition of a previous act of reading, but more importantly it is the rediscovery of an already known text from a different vantage point, for example its reconsideration within intertextual frames whose relevance has become clear only after the completion of a first reading. (8)

La différence entre ces deux types de lecture tient essentiellement dans leur caractère temporel: d'une part, l'une précède l'autre dans le temps, et d'autre part, la première lecture est linéaire tandis que la relecture possède les traits de la répétition. Elles correspondent en fait à deux systèmes temporels opposés: le temps linéaire et le temps cyclique. La circularité de la relecture est particulièrement évidente lorsque l'on observe de près le fonctionnement de l'intertextualité: en obligeant le lecteur à parcourir simultanément plusieurs textes, l'intertextualité provoque non seulement une rupture dans la linéarité de la lecture mais aussi l'abolissement du temps historique puisque des textes appartenant à des époques très différentes se trouvent rapprochés dans un même acte de relecture. Cet examen approfondi de la temporalité de la relecture a pour effet de remettre en cause l'opinion largement répandue voulant que la relecture soit décrite en termes d'espace et non de temps.

En affirmant que l'opposition entre première lecture et relecture relève moins

d'une opposition entre temps et espace qu'entre temps linéaire et temps cyclique, l'auteur préconise, à la suite de Roland Barthes, une approche de la relecture axée sur la temporalité. C'est ce même auteur qui est à l'origine de l'accent mis dans la théorie de Calinescu sur la dimension du plaisir de la lecture. Ce dernier décide en effet de privilégier l'une des trois directions de recherche qui s'offrent à la poétique de la (re)lecture. En ce qui concerne la première, la description des instructions de lecture contenues dans le texte, Calinescu se contente d'indiquer sans véritablement les discuter les différentes notions auxquelles elle a donné lieu (narrataire, lecteurs inscrit dans le texte, fictif, rhétorique, implicite, modèle, compétent, etc.). La deuxième possibilité est d'examiner des catégories de textes très différents, allant du journal intime aux préfaces écrites par les auteurs eux-mêmes, ce à quoi l'auteur se livre à plusieurs reprises. Enfin, la troisième direction de recherche, la plus exploitée dans ce livre, consiste à étudier les rapports entre la littérature, la lecture, la relecture et le jeu. La première règle du jeu littéraire est la règle du plaisir: la lecture littéraire se définit comme une lecture faite avant tout pour le plaisir; quant à la "bonne lecture" d'un texte, c'est bien entendu celle qui procure au lecteur le maximum de plaisir.

Le problème de la première lecture est soulevé principalement en fonction des travaux du philosophe polonais Roman Ingarden. Si la plupart des critiques formulées par Calinescu sont fondées, on peut néanmoins déplorer la rapidité avec laquelle cette partie est traitée. Ingarden est présenté comme l'un des tenants d'un consensus prévalant encore aujourd'hui, qui privilégie la première lecture au détriment de la relecture: "The still-prevailing aesthetic consensus, based on the core of reading habits formed in school in contact with the classics of literature, tends to grant primacy to a first linear, ideally uninterrupted reading of a rereadable text" (32). Or, cette affirmation, qu'aucun argument ne vient étayer, va à l'encontre des observations faites par les historiens de la lecture, comme celles de Catherine Frier: "les différents prescripteurs de lecture (église, école, bibliothécaires) ont toujours favorisé l'idée qu'il y a de bonnes et de mauvaises lectures, qu'il faut lire lentement, souvent relire, etc."²

Il faut en outre rappeler que la première lecture n'est pas envisagée en tant que telle par Ingarden mais seulement parce qu'elle est un moyen d'accéder à une expérience esthétique. Celle-ci étant le lieu d'une émotion qui surprend le lecteur, le détourne de ses préoccupations et lui permet d'accéder à la "contemplation" de l'œuvre d'art (*The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* 175-223), il semble que c'est sur cette notion d'expérience esthétique, et sur le cortège d'émotions qu'elle est censée susciter, qu'il aurait fallu s'interroger, au lieu de conclure hâtivement que la première lecture obtient la faveur du théoricien en vertu de sa seule "franchise".³ Par ailleurs, Calinescu passe sous silence le

2 "Illettrisme: métissage culturel et rumeur sociale," *Regards sur la lecture: textes et images* (Grenoble: Éd. Ellug, 1989). 12 (cité dans Gervais [123]).

3 Voici ce que Calinescu dit à ce sujet: "We are left to speculate that Ingarden privileges the first reading of a literary work ... in the name of a freshness of impression, of a feeling of

1 "A poetics of ludic (re)reading" (127). Les parenthèses dans l'expression "(re)reading" ont pour but de mettre en évidence la circularité de la lecture. Lecture et relecture forment selon l'auteur les deux faces d'une même médaille.

deuxième type de "première lecture" signalé par Ingarden, très rapidement il est vrai, qui est la lecture non-esthétique. Si ce type de lecture est délibérément rejeté par Ingarden hors du champ d'observation, c'est parce qu'il n'offre aucun intérêt, parce que la jouissance du lecteur à laquelle il donne lieu ne peut être à la base d'une expérience esthétique, qui exige des lecteurs cultivés, ressentant des émotions plus nobles:

Au lieu d'entrer dans une relation spirituelle (*geistig*) à l'oeuvre d'art ... le lecteur recourt souvent à l'oeuvre d'art littéraire comme à un stimulus extérieur qui déclenche en lui des sentiments et autres états psychiques valorisés par lui, et ne laisse l'oeuvre d'art se montrer que pour autant qu'elle est susceptible de lui rendre ce service. ... Or l'attitude esthétique est caractérisée — à l'opposé de la forte émotion du lecteur peu cultivé — par un certain calme intérieur contemplatif, une disposition à "se plonger" dans les profondeurs de l'oeuvre qui nous interdit de nous préoccuper de notre propre vécu. (*L'Oeuvre d'art littéraire* 37-38)

Étant donné la place primordiale accordée au plaisir de la lecture dans la théorie de Calinescu, et le caractère éminemment discutable de la position d'Ingarden, on peut s'étonner que cet aspect de sa thèse n'ait pas retenu l'attention de Calinescu.

L'auteur s'en tient finalement à la critique suivante: on ne doit pas s'illusionner sur le caractère naïf, virginal d'une première lecture; une telle lecture n'existe pas, il s'agit ni plus ni moins d'une lecture idéale. Ceci est d'ailleurs dénoncé par Barthes, dont la conception de la relecture est beaucoup plus radicale. En effet, en postulant que tout est relecture, il ne conserve même pas la distinction première lecture/relecture (22-23).

La deuxième partie, "History, Psychology, Poetics", donne lieu à une nouvelle série d'oppositions, greffée sur la première. Calinescu reprend tout d'abord la distinction faite par les historiens de la lecture entre lecture intensive et lecture extensive, distinction qui coïncide notamment avec l'apparition d'un nouveau type de textes: le roman, et d'une nouvelle forme de lecture: la lecture pour le plaisir. Dans la tradition de lecture intensive qui a caractérisé l'histoire de l'Occident, tradition qui compte peu de lecteurs et peu de livres et qui s'étend jusqu'à la fin du 18^e siècle selon les historiens, ou seulement jusqu'au 16^e siècle selon Calinescu,⁴ lecture et relecture sont en continuité. Les deux termes ne s'opposent qu'à partir du moment où apparaît la lecture extensive, qui met à la disposition d'un public hétérogène de nombreux livres. Dans cette nouvelle situation, la première lecture n'entraîne pas automatiquement la relecture, c'est une lecture qui se suffit à elle-même. La lecture extensive permet donc la valorisation de la première lecture, alors que la lecture intensive a pour principe

essentiel la relecture. Le sens donné aux textes, la forme que prend la lecture, varient donc en fonction de l'histoire; l'auteur suggère de repenser la dichotomie première lecture/relecture en fonction de la situation culturelle: dans une société culturellement homogène (à cause du manque de matériel, d'un consensus, d'une autorité politique ou religieuse, de la censure), première lecture et relecture sont complémentaires, en continuité, alors que dans une société culturellement hétérogène, première lecture et relecture ne vont pas forcément de pair. Calinescu prend également en considération d'autres variables que l'histoire, telles que l'âge du lecteur, son sexe (féminin/masculin), ainsi que les conditions spatio-temporelles de la lecture.

La distinction première lecture vs relecture conduit malgré tout à une aporie, comme le signale l'auteur lui-même. Elle s'avère à la fois inévitable et insoutenable, particulièrement si on pense au phénomène de la "double" lecture:

the distinction between reading and rereading, which seems empirically and pragmatically so obvious, is theoretically both untenable and unavoidable. ... the first reading of a work can in fact be a *double* reading; that is to say, it can adopt, alongside the prospective logic of reading, a retrospective logic of rereading. (18, souligné par l'auteur)

Cette aporie pourrait être évacuée si, au lieu de poser la dimension temporelle de la lecture comme premier critère de différenciation, on observait la lecture en fonction du mandat que le lecteur cherche à atteindre et de la tension de lecture qui en découle. C'est ce qui est proposé par Bertrand Gervais dans son ouvrage *À l'écoute de la lecture*: "Ce mandat dépend de la tension établie entre les deux économies fondamentales de tout acte de lecture, la progression à travers le texte et la compréhension du texte" (29). Selon que l'accent est mis sur telle ou telle économie, on a affaire à deux types de lecture très différents: la lecture-en-progression, qui assure une compréhension fonctionnelle du texte, et qui correspond assez souvent à la première lecture d'un texte, et la lecture-en-compréhension, qui suppose un investissement plus important de la part du lecteur dans sa compréhension du texte, et prend généralement la forme d'une relecture. Ce modèle théorique est donc très proche de celui de Calinescu, à ceci près qu'il ne privilégie pas la relecture au détriment de la première lecture.

Le concept de jeu est envisagé selon trois perspectives: celle de la créativité intellectuelle, qui étudie notamment les aspects ludiques de la recherche; celle de la psychologie, qui amène une réflexion sur les notions de jeu symbolique et de jeu avec règles; et celle de la philosophie, avec la question de la fictionnalité. Curieusement, le chapitre consacré à la dimension créative de la relecture commence par présenter une analyse non pas de la lecture littéraire, faite pour le plaisir, mais de la lecture faite par un théoricien ou un scientifique pour des raisons professionnelles. Un jeu s'instaure entre le lecteur et l'auteur tel qu'imaginé par le lecteur, qui prend parfois l'allure d'une compétition, ou bien d'une coopération, un jeu qui permet en retour d'enclencher un processus d'écriture. Doit-on en conclure que Calinescu conçoit la relecture comme un dialogue, à l'instar de la tradition herméneutique, comme le fait par exemple Gadamer dans *Vérité et méthode*? Ce qui apparaît évident, c'est que la

4 Celui-ci considère que la lecture du roman de chevalerie, à une époque où sévit l'Inquisition, possède tous les traits de la lecture extensive: "they [chivalric novels] were designed ... for an early type of fast, involved, or 'extensive,' reading, rather than for a reflective, insistent, 'intensive' (re)reading" (63). Ceci est montré grâce entre autres à l'analyse de la scène de

très rapidement esquissé entre la lecture professionnelle et la lecture littéraire souffre d'un manque de rigueur. Les raisons d'un tel détour sont d'ailleurs difficiles à comprendre.

La partie la plus intéressante de cette discussion sur le jeu met en place une autre série d'oppositions. La première lecture est décrite comme un jeu de faire-semblant (*game of make-believe*), permettant l'adhésion (*involvement*) du lecteur: celui-ci s'investit émotionnellement dans sa lecture, s'identifie aux personnages, a l'impression d'être transporté dans un autre monde, etc. La relecture, quant à elle, ressemblerait davantage à un jeu avec des règles (*game with rules*): elle suppose un resserrement de l'attention, de la concentration (*absorption*): le lecteur est plus détaché, ne s'implique pas de façon aussi personnelle, notamment en ce qui concerne l'émotion; il s'agit d'un jeu purement intellectuel.⁵ Ceci est en fait assez proche des propos tenus par Bertrand Abraham dans son article "à propos de la relecture", quand il distingue entre avoir "prise dans" le texte ou avoir "prise sur" le texte. La "prise-dans" enclenche un mécanisme d'identification, un régime de lecture rapide, qui brûle le territoire, un processus de déterritorialisation: "Lire c'est déterritorialiser: faire passer sur le corps les flux, les pulsions, les mots d'ordre qui caractérisent le livre comme agencement" (94). Elle semble donc correspondre à l'adhésion (*involvement*), tandis que la "prise-sur" serait proche de la concentration (*absorption*), étant donné qu'elle permet au lecteur de s'appropriier le territoire, d'amorcer un processus de conceptualisation, de maîtrise et de compréhension (95-97).

En ce qui concerne la relecture selon Calinescu, les règles du jeu peuvent être établies dans le but de mettre à jour l'intertextualité, de réfléchir sur l'acte de lecture, ou encore de dévoiler le secret du texte, ce qui forme l'objet de la dernière partie de l'ouvrage. Relire pour le secret, c'est chercher à rendre compte d'une dissimulation calculée et sélective d'information, de l'existence d'un sens caché; on reconnaît là bien sûr le fonctionnement de l'allégorie. Dans la perspective de la relecture, ce n'est pas la découverte du secret qui importe mais bien la qualité de l'attention en elle-même.

Différents types de textes peuvent être mis en relation avec l'un ou l'autre mode de lecture, ce que fait Calinescu de façon parfois implicite. Certains textes, comme par exemple, les romans policiers, les récits fantastiques — ailleurs il parle des "gothic stories", des romans de chevalerie, de littérature populaire — semblent destinés uniquement à la première lecture: "certain types of difficulties or delays can enhance the first reading (as in the case of the detective story of

the puzzle type or in that of a fantastic story), often to the detriment of the text's rereadability" (32). Mentionnons à ce sujet l'article de Richard Saint-Gelais consacré à la relecture et à la "fausse première lecture du roman policier." Cette dernière, qui est "à la fois un premier parcours du texte, et une relecture, dans la mesure où certains éléments majeurs de l'intrigue sont déjà connus — nommément l'identité du coupable" (71), correspond tout à fait à la "double lecture" dont parle Calinescu. Cet article remet en cause la correspondance trop rapidement établie entre roman policier et première lecture et s'attache à montrer que la relecture du roman policier peut amener le lecteur à identifier de nouvelles énigmes, à aller de surprise en surprise lors de son retour sur le texte, bref à enclencher un processus herméneutique tout aussi palpitant que le fait une première lecture.

D'autres textes sont avant tout faits pour être relus. Il s'agit des textes post-modernes (ex. *Pale Fire*, de Nabokov, *Le Voyeur*, de Robbe-Grillet), les textes contenant des allusions intertextuelles (ex. *L'Aleph*, de Borges), ou encore les textes possédant un secret, proches de l'allégorie (ex. *The Private Life*, de James). Ils exigent du lecteur qu'il passe d'un jeu de faire-semblant à un jeu avec des règles. La relecture met en jeu à la fois une force centrifuge, car le texte invite le lecteur à parcourir d'autres textes, à jouer la carte de l'intertextualité, et une force centripète puisque la recherche intertextuelle se double d'une recherche de cohérence interne qui oblige à relire le texte de plus près.

La critique la plus importante que l'on pourrait adresser à cet ouvrage, par ailleurs remarquable à beaucoup d'égards, est de ne pas consacrer assez de place à l'étude de la première lecture. Étant donné que la relecture est définie en grande partie par opposition à celle-ci,⁶ il aurait semblé logique de s'y attarder davantage, à la fois sur le plan théorique et dans les analyses. En effet, seul nous est donné le résumé de ce qu'un premier lecteur du texte aurait pu trouver dans le texte étudié,⁷ il n'y a jamais de véritable analyse de ce que pourrait être la première lecture du texte. Si la plupart des textes choisis se prêtent plus à la relecture qu'à la première lecture, comme le dit l'auteur, on ne peut pas en dire autant du seul texte fantastique choisi, *The Turn of the Screw*, qui peut entraîner trois jeux différents: un jeu de faire-semblant (avec le choix entre croire à une histoire de fantômes ou à une histoire de dépression nerveuse), un jeu avec des règles et un "jeu fantastique," dont on ne sait pas exactement où il se situe:

The interpretation of James's short novel in terms of different levels of play — a double game of make-believe on one level, a "fantastic" game of hesitation between mutually exclusive hypotheses on another, and an intricate legal-epistemological game on a third level of more cerebral game with rules — clearly has the greater explanatory power (205).

5 L'auteur reprend ces concepts à Josephine Hilgard, qui les avait définis pour une étude de l'hypnose. Il est difficile de traduire les termes de "involvement" et "absorption," notamment parce qu'ils semblent désigner des phénomènes très proches. L'expression "être absorbé par la lecture d'un livre" (to be absorbed in a book) renvoie davantage à une première lecture qu'à une relecture; quant au terme "involvement," il pourrait tout aussi bien renvoyer à l'attitude purement intellectuelle caractérisant la relecture. Pour tenter d'éliminer cette ambiguïté, nous avons choisi de traduire "involvement" par "adhésion," dans le sens où le lecteur "colle" au texte, et "absorption" par "concentration," qui désigne une "application de tout l'effort

6 Voici, en résumé, la série d'oppositions découlant de l'opposition principale entre *première lecture* et *relecture*: temps linéaire / temps cyclique; lecture extensive / lecture intensive; jeu de faire-semblant / jeu avec des règles; adhésion, concentration.

Faut-il en conclure que le "jeu fantastique" se trouve à mi-chemin entre le jeu de faire-semblant et le jeu avec des règles? Il a lieu lors de la première lecture du récit, puisque c'est lors d'un premier parcours que l'effet d'ambiguïté est ressenti, mais en même temps il ne semble pas posséder les traits du jeu de faire-semblant, puisque Calinescu précise que celui-ci s'instaure quand le lecteur lit le récit comme une histoire de fantômes ou comme une histoire de dépression nerveuse. Il s'agirait donc d'une première lecture qui n'enclenche pas un jeu de faire-semblant. Quel est donc le statut de ce "jeu fantastique"? Il faut croire qu'au terme de cette investigation au cours de la relecture, la première lecture recèle encore des secrets que de futures relectures pourront nous faire découvrir... (RACHEL BOUVET, UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL)

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- "RICHARD P. SUGG, ed. *Jungian Literary Criticism*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1992. 439 + xix pp. US\$41.95.
- In *Jungian Literary Criticism*, Richard Sugg collects thirty-one articles and book excerpts dating from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. His declared hope is that "a tradition of Jungian criticism, nearly as old as the century itself" can "gain both a broader audience and a salutary clarification of its enduring interests and feasible objectives if the full range of its accomplishments is made visible in one coherent shape" (ix). There are certain difficulties in accomplishing this aim. The Jungian tradition has never been central to literary criticism, and much of the "broader audience" it might hope for today takes its psychoanalysis mainly in the shape of Freud and Lacan. There are also difficulties in giving the rich, knotty tradition of Jungian criticism much of a "coherent shape." However, for those open to the contribution of Jungian psychology to literary criticism, Sugg's anthology is a landmark collection, one that allows us some answers to three key questions: What are the main varieties of Jungian literary criticism? Which way is Jungian literary criticism developing? What is the main value of Jungian psychology for literary critics?
- Jungian Literary Criticism* is divided into three parts — the first a "historical sampling," the second on critical theory and the third on critical practice. These

critical continuities is a recurrent concern with the status of the trademark Jungian concepts of archetype and myth.

According to the *Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis*, quoted later in the anthology, an archetype is an "unconscious and irrepresentable outline or pattern" (187) that "wait[s] to be realised in the personality ... and ... carr[ies] a strong, potentially overwhelming charge of energy" (188), while myths "are stories of archetypal encounters. ... metaphor[s] for the working of the archetype per se" (190). In the mainstream of archetypal and myth criticism, whether directly Jungian or not, archetypes are seen to come from "outside" the writer's consciousness to form the literary work, and the critic's job is to show how the work reflects deep archetypal patterns. This view of the critical project informs the majority of the selections in Part I. Thus for example, in an extract from *T.S. Eliot: The Design of His Poetry* (1949), Elizabeth Drew points out how the "sequence in which the archetypal images arise" in T.S. Eliot's *Four Quartets* "reflects in a strange way the succession ... of the symbols which Jung has described as the archetype of transformation" (19). In different selections, the analysts, Joseph Henderson (1968) and Mario Jacoby (1969), both develop Jung's theory that archetypes that compensate for a society's one-sidedness first manifest in the consciousness and work of the artist.

Perhaps the most rigorous development of this "outside" theory of archetype and myth comes in Evelyn Hinz and John Teunissen's (1989) study of the "Ares/Aphrodite/Hephaestus Complex" in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. For Hinz and Teunissen, the "moral" of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* is that "mythic configurations inexorably shape our lives" (145), the history of the composition of the work "takes the form of [Lawrence's] reluctant surrender to the myth" (149), and readers who resist the mythic interpretation of the work "will simply be registering the same modernist reaction to myth that itself characterized the genesis of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*" (152).

Not all the critics in this historical section of Sugg's anthology accept archetypes and myth as 'absolute' patterns to which the writer surrenders. James Baird, in "Jungian Psychology in Criticism" (1976), sees such a theory as ignoring the problems of interpretation — "the play of [the critic's] own imagination on the material" (53) — and "the complex interplay of the artist's own variables within his intent" (53). In "Healing Fiction" (1983), James Hillman develops the bases of the new school of Jungian psychology he has founded, the school of imaginal or archetypal psychology; he argues that the "psychic reality discovered by Jung consists in fictive figures. It is poetic, dramatic, literary in nature" (131) and thus is affected by ways of telling, by what he calls "the rhetoric of the archetype" (135). Finally, Annis Pratt, in "Spinning Among Fields ... Feminist Archetypal Theory" (1985), tries to steer a course between those women Jungians who insist on the "absolute transcendence of archetypes" (158) and feminists who would throw out archetypal theory altogether; she argues that women "can adapt Jung's formulations to our own purposes" (158).

The division between those critics who would reaffirm Jung's vision of archetype and myth and those who wish to re-envision these concepts is evident

in the other two parts of *Jungian Literary Criticism* as well. In "Part II: Jung and Critical Theory," the five selections in section A are devoted to the elaboration of the concepts of myth and archetype in general Jungian usage, and their application to literature and aesthetics, while the three essays in section B., entitled "Imaginal Archetypal Criticism," take their inspiration from Hillman's approach. The emphasis in section A is functional, with well-known analysts offering useful definitions of myth, archetype and some of the constellation of terms surrounding them, while Morris Philipson, author of *Outline of a Jungian Aesthetics*, is represented by his discussion of Jung's distinction between art in the psychological mode and art in the visionary mode.

Section B. offers a fine opportunity to understand Hillman's work and to assess its value for literary criticism. In the opening article, Michael Adams likens the deconstructive philosophy of Jacques Derrida to Hillman's imaginal psychology. He sees a parallel between Derrida's critique of Western culture's tendency to privilege one side of various sets of oppositional terms, especially the opposition between signified and signifier, and Hillman's critique of the tendency of orthodox Jungian and Freudian psychology to privilege the concept over the image, reducing, for example, vivid dream images to yet one more manifestation of the anima, or the shadow, or the mother complex. We see what the possibilities might be for a literary criticism based on the image in Ralph Maud's exploration of the "journey through depression" (268) represented by some of Herman Melville's works. Maud's "Archetypal Depth Criticism and Melville" represents an intriguing combination of conventional and imaginal criticism, as when he tries, for example, to 'intensify' the image of Melville's Bartleby by summoning up for himself "*that something in you that wants walls, and is distressed by opportunities and riches*" (262, author's italics).

"Part III: Jungian Concepts in Critical Practice" presents the same division between approaches to archetype and myth, now refocused in slightly different subject areas. Sections A and B present, from a mainly orthodox perspective, practical criticism of, respectively, the archetype of the trickster (A) and the concepts of personality type and individuation (B). At least a couple of selections in these sections seem to justify Hillman's critique: Brown and Bennett on the trickster in Robertson Davies, and Messer on alchemy in John Fowles's *The Magus*, find in the works precisely the concepts of trickster and alchemy we might have already expected. The most interesting essay in section B is "Some Phases of the Jungian Moon," in which Canadians Fred Radford and Robert Wilson develop some very illuminating arguments about Patrick White's use of the Jungian concept of persona, and the areas of application, and non-application, of Jungian criticism in general. In section C, Karen Elias-Button, Annis Pratt and Albert Gelpi push forward the project of feminist redefinition of archetypes defined by Pratt in "Spinning among Fields," showing tantalising but — in these selections anyway — undeveloped signs of a marriage between archetypal analysis and historical and biographical concerns.

And now for answers to my opening three questions. Richard Sugg's excellent anthology shows that at least one of the ways of categorizing the variety of

approaches in Jungian literary criticism is to examine the variety of understandings of archetype and myth. The anthology also indicates the recent development of a strong minority criticism of conceiving these elements as transcendental patterns erupting into human consciousness from the "outside." And yet I find no critic who defines him or herself as Jungian and who is willing to give up all that is implied in Jung's conception of archetype and myth; Jungian critics seem willing to question the status of these elements, but not willing to identify them simply as social representations or illusive ego perceptions. Albert Gelpi, in the final essay in the collection puts the matter well:

I feel that one can work as a feminist to change patriarchal values and structures and still accept the authenticity of anima and animus not as metaphysical absolutes but as psychological factors whose images are, to some extent at least, culturally and historically conditioned but are actually operative in the psyche and need to be engaged and integrated. (378)

Jungian Literary Criticism, that is, lets us see that Jungian criticism is capable of responding to contemporary concerns with the nature of perception and signification, and with the distribution of power in gendered and historical situations. The anthology also shows us that, whatever this criticism's variations, it retains its respect for archetype and myth, spirit and soul, as to some extent independent forces that need to be respected, encountered, and, where possible, integrated in the individual's psyche. (CHRIS BULLOCK, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*HAROLD COWARD. *Derrida and Indian Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York P, 1990. 200pp. US\$ 44.50 hardcover / \$14.95 paperback.

This survey brings the thought of four Indian philosophers into contact with Jacques Derrida, especially in the matter of philosophy of language. An Introduction supplies what are very adequate justifications for the project: 1) Indian philosophy has exhausted its dialogue with the 19th-Century Germanic tradition, and should engage the current postmodernisms, especially the Hebraic Derrida; and 2) Derridean interest in language and negation makes his work particularly appropriate as a "bridge" between East and West. The first chapter, a propaedeutic to what follows, briefly describes Indian philosophy and also aims to situate Derrida in the context of European philosophy. Chapters 2 and 3 compare Derrida and Bharthari, measuring their thought in terms of such issues as "language and temporality," and "speech and writing." Coward in my opinion exaggerates likenesses. To claim Scripture becomes an "ontological ground" (78) for Derrida is surely misleading, as is the analogy between Derrida's treatment of an Apocalyptic "come let us go" (77) and Bharthari's "inner word" (72). Derrida's *viens* is the "apocalypse sans apocalypse," and the *sans*, Derrida tells us, "marque une catastrophe interne et externe de l'apocalypse" (on apocalyptic, 96). An "errance alCatoire" (*ibid.*, 97) breaks the dialectic of inside-and-outside. The next two chapters, comparing Derrida with Sankara and

Aurobindo respectively, rightly recognize that Derrida is committed to the inevitability of language and the former is not, and that Derrida deconstructs archaicism and vaticism whereas the latter of course does not. On the positive side, Coward sees that Derridean deconstruction, somewhat like Indian evacuation of the ego, reaches to the very principle of self-identity (93) and to this extent qualifies as a kind of ascesis. Chapter 6, a comparison with Nagarjuna, shows that Derrida parallels the radical Nagarjunist critique of all identity theory. While appreciating Coward's acknowledgment of my own book showing this parallel (125-26, 138), I do want to point out that he misrepresents the particulars of my claim: it is not a question of Derrida "needing logocentrism completion" (157), but of Derrida needing a justification for the logocentrism which he already grants is necessary (though radically flawed), given how the human mind works. I claim Nagarjuna's "two truths" can supply this justification. Nor is it proper for Coward to affiliate Nagarjuna to Vasubandhu's definition of *vikalpa* (135-6), when Vasubandhu is Yogacaric and Yogacara Buddhism opposes Nagarjuna's Madhyamika Buddhism. Likewise, to cite Nagao (135) as if he represents Nagarjuna is misleading, since Nagao actively revises Nagarjuna to fit into a Yogacaric paradigm. Coward's last chapter, "Conclusion," does a good job of summarizing the comparisons he makes. Despite the book's shortcomings (perhaps it was hurriedly written), it remains a useful introduction to "Derrida and Indian Philosophy." (ROBERT MAGLIOLA, NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY)

*MARLENE KADAR, ed. *Essays on Life Writing: From Genre to Critical Practice*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. 288 pp. Can \$ 50.00

New methodological perspectives and modes of investigation — Lacanian theories of the subject, feminist explorations of the politics of experience, poststructuralist claims about the discursive construction of reality, to name only some — have inspired a resurgence of scholarly interest in the writing of personal lives. *Essays on Life Writing: From Genre to Critical Practice* brings together a number of articles which explore emergent configurations in the study of life writing.

In her opening discussion Marlene Kadar sketches out three broad approaches to life writing, approaches which have been shaped and altered by transformations in contemporary theories, literary criticism and feminist politics. Her first category is the traditional genre constructed around the study of life writing, biography, along with its subgenre, autobiography. While the study of biographical and autobiographical writings was thereby legitimized within the canon, she suggests that these traditional classifications were not without serious problems. Commentaries more often than not assumed that a centred self emerged from the text and allotted a privileged position to narrative regularity; such presuppositions in turn tended to marginalize or exclude the fragmentary or experimental text from the genre. Kadar goes on to locate a second version of life writing in a feminist exploration of "the proliferation, authorization, and recuperation of autobiographical texts."

is valuable in the feminist recasting of the traditional genre is an inclusion of previously excluded texts; indeed, feminist scholars were especially drawn to the personal narratives in diaries, letters, testimonies, journals, all those forms of storytelling which had existed only at the margins of the traditional genre. If Kadar welcomes the feminist strategies which inform these ways of rethinking, she nonetheless finds problematic both the assumption of a female gender in life writing texts and an epistemology that stresses the distinction between fiction and non-fiction. She prefers a third conceptualization of life writing, one which shifts the emphasis from a literary genre to a critical practice. To open up texts of personal narrative in this manner is to envision them as forms of writing constituting and constituted by a writer's self. Life writing, she comments, can be seen best as "a continuum that spreads unevenly and in combined forms from the so-called least fictive narration to the most fictive" (10). Kadar always stresses a continuum, and it is at times difficult to discern where life writing might shade off into fiction: are Margaret Laurence's Manawaka novels, to take one obvious example, life writing or fiction? Nevertheless, her expansion of the traditional genre of biography/autobiography offers ample potential for new and challenging readings.

The essays which follow develop and explore this broadened concept of life writing. Some contributors take up theoretical issues implicit in this emergent critical practice. In a carefully nuanced argument Shirley Neuman examines the tensions between a reclamation of group identities which may turn out to be reductive of individual difference and an agency of the self which runs the risk of lapsing back into the older categories of an autonomous centred identity. Neuman's discussion of these tensions provides an important point of departure for anyone concerned with the writing of the self. In another theoretical exploration of a poetics of "auto/biography" Evelyn J. Hinz sets aside claims that life writing is primarily narrative, suggesting instead that its "internal dynamics are much closer to dramatic art, and the language of the stage affords us a much better vocabulary for describing the impact of this kind of literature than does the critical terminology of prose fiction" (208). Her article offers a useful commentary on the ways in which Aristotelean mimesis might be appropriated to illuminate the critical practice of life writing. Other contributors are interested in the specific dynamics of life writing texts. Eleanor Ty analyzes the "polarized subjectivity" (63) from which Mary Wollestonecraft wrote. As a woman intellectual in the late eighteenth century Wollestonecraft must speak through a masculinized language which inevitably distorts and represses her female subjectivity. In a chapter which moves away from literary texts, Elizabeth Cohen argues that Italian Renaissance court testimonies "offer a gallery of vivid, animated images of self" (83). By examining these alternative texts as life writing we are able, she suggests, to grasp a middle ground between discourse and world, a site which is capable of mediating the polarization of text and history.

One of the most challenging and successful chapters in the book is Janice Williamson's thoughtful reflection on Elly Danica's *Don't: A Woman's Word*.

a story which recounts her experience of harrowing sexual abuse at the hands of her father. Williamson's exploration of Danica's narrative considers the possibility of writing the unwritable. The abuse which she had suffered silenced Danica; Williamson indicates how in the courageous act of writing her story she is able to reinvent not only her past experience but also an active creative present world. What is especially striking about Williamson's chapter is her integration into the discussion of her own positioning as reader: she is an academic critic sometimes led to speak in the masculinized language of literary criticism and an abuse survivor whose own troubled memories are evoked by Danica's text. The title, "I peel myself out of my own skin," is taken from *Don't: A Woman's Word*, but it alludes equally to Williamson's effort to peel away the "skin" of academic objectivity and traditional scholarly writing.

Life writing problematizes the interrelationship of "fiction" and "world" in a special way for it often makes claims to testify, to bear witness, to tell a 'true' story. Indeed, life writing texts caught the interest of many feminist scholars precisely because they told stories which had been excluded from the traditional canon (think, for instance, of the slave narratives of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). That the narrative first person is always fictionalized had been recognized in the traditional distinction between autobiography with its emphasis on discursive models and the linguistic construction of the subject which grants an ever-increasing autonomy to language. At one point in *Essays on Life Writing* Kadar comments about the narrator of Daniel Defoe's novel, "Moll Flanders herself really did write it; she is not just a narrative device" (158). Perhaps. It is certainly true that Moll's exuberant narration can be read as a subversion of Defoe's authorial control in *Moll Flanders*. It is also true that her narration constructs and revises our knowledge of women in the seventeenth century and beyond. But she nonetheless remains a narrative device in a fictional text. To endow her with the status of an active agent is to simplify the complicated relationships through which the life writer negotiates the world in his or her text. Even if the human subject achieves agency only in and through language, the two terms are not equivalent, and it seems especially crucial that critics of life writing reflect upon the distinctions. *Essays on Life Writing* may leave the reader with a number of unresolved questions but for this very reason it is a useful and rewarding book. (PAMELA MCCALLUM, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY)

*ANTHONY PURDY, ed. *Literature and Money*. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993. 192 pp. £ 45.00

At a time when encroaching commercialization of our daily lives is rampant, Anthony Purdy assembles eight insightful articles on European literary works in which money is a key issue. He raises the question of (non)-value inherent in the money-based rationality, and the possibility of resistance "if we happen not to like the model and its more rebarbative ideological implications."

The "dull rationality of the monetary calculus" has provoked widely divergent

eight critical approaches taken. Purdy clearly proposes them as exemplars, though he leaves it to the reader to draw his conclusions, merely reserving for himself the final article of the collection. But the remarks of the introduction demonstrate his practical urgency at a time when Canadian books are subject to a new tax. Wryly commenting on the fact that most contributors feel the need to demonstrate their study's "relevance," Purdy emphasizes that the desired "usefulness" and "economic viability" of academic endeavors is indeed the controversial watchword for contemporary culture as seen by the publishing industry and by granting agencies.

Purdy's foreword introduces and summarizes the articles, outlining their broad perspectives. It is perhaps natural that the first two essays, dealing with the topic from the point of view of social history, have the greatest relevance to present-day cultural realities. Alexander Tumanov's starting point is post-Communist social chaos occasioned by the transition to a Western-style market economy. Offering a host of Russian literary illustrations, he argues that that country's intelligentsia, to a far greater extent than its Western counterpart, has always been deeply distrustful of matters relating to merchants and entrepreneurs, commerce, and power. But at the same time, Tumanov claims, "the meaning of the word has always been equivalent to the meaning of the deed" in Russian culture. It was the same Utopian Saint-Simon-inspired outlook which brought about the 1917 revolution. Unless the negative economic ideology engrained in the Russian psyche can be transformed, Tumanov warns, history may repeat itself.

In the second essay, based on Angela Carter's 1991 novel *Wise Children*, Bridget Elliott presents a nice foil for these assertions. In contrast to Tumanov's critique of an inflexible mindset, it deals with the shifting artistic and social values nurtured by the "merely commercial" British music hall entertainment of the 1890's, initially the bastard child of the high-class and 'high art' theatrical world where money was studiously ignored.

In the next two papers, Susan Brown and Claudia Klaver examine the intersection of economic realities in the Victorian era with questions of gender. Brown's reading of various poetic texts wittily highlights the ambiguous debate over women's exclusion from the public economic sphere in their assigned role as idealized guardians of private virtue. Similarly, in *Dombey and Son*, Klaver pursues Dickens' analysis of the feminine embodiment of individual moral value apparently independent of male capitalist society, but subtly necessary to its functioning. According to Klaver, the male-female polarizations, demonstrably unstable, turns toward colonization to form, as a counterweight to the home country, an alternate set of opposites in the patriotic capitalist framework.

In Patricia Reynaud's essay on *Madame Bovary*, the amused reader encounters a punning deconstructionist "comparison between political economy (as corrected by a playful feminist consciousness) and the laws of the unconscious" (138). Lacan, Goux, Bataille, and Derrida are imaginatively juggled and applied to Flaubert's work in pursuit of that *jouissance* which is in excess of a conservative academic's ordinary desire (to adapt Lacan's famous definition whereby "La

jouissance, c'est ce qui ne sert à rien"). In a variation on the Victorian gender interpretations propounded in the collection's previous essays, Reynaud reads Emma's story as a feminist escape from questionable male-imposed ideals of productivity.

The main text of Donald Bruce's study is *Jacques Vingtras* by Jules Vallès. According to Bruce, this book represents one of several symbolic substitutes for the subversive political activism of the suppressed Paris Commune. Adapting deconstruction methodology to his atypically unambiguous purpose, Bruce analyzes Vallès's rhetorical strategy by identifying the juxtaposition of incommensurable values in meaning. These mutually contradictory signals, he claims, denote the Communards' refusal to "buy into" the cash nexus on which the established meaning of language ultimately depends.

Galdós's *Misericordia*, set in turn-of-the century Madrid, portrays a very different outlook on society's ills, as Richard Young shows. The concept of personal Christian charity imparts a clarity of outline and independent weight to the destitute urban middle class protagonists which leave questions of collective guilt, political power, or class structure in abeyance. At the same time, Young discovers spatial patterns in the interactions of the characters which reflect their increasing marginalization and displacement from the center of power.

Purdy's own paper, masterfully paced, picks up the theme of social space and firmly links it with ideas which, at first glance, might appear to be unrelated. He traces the interaction between economic reality and quasi-visual representations of the world, pairing the nineteenth century concept of the world-as-exhibition with the post-modern one of the world-as-spectacle. Underlining their contrasting spatial movements, he compares Pierre Loti's centrifugal travel story in *Le Roman d'un spahi* (1881) with Michel Tournier's centripetal immigration novel, *La Goutte d'or* (1986). The search for picturesque exoticism abroad in the 1800's is replaced by the present-day arrival of a young Arab worker in Paris in search of his photograph. While these stories appear to escape the colonial ideology, Purdy argues that, in fact, they remain embedded in the dominant economic discourse, which commercializes portraits of "otherness."

Money is a protean metaphor. The reader of this collection may find it instructive to keep in mind money's peculiar functional analogy to language: as the universal term of comparison, it fascinates with its uncanny capacity to establish ordered, homogeneous relationships between disparate factors regardless of time and space, but frustrates in its ultimate inadequacy to do them justice individually. Frequent contemporary expressions of dissatisfaction with the act of writing have sensitized us to a venture like Purdy's, which examines the assumptions underlying an hierarchical, categorizing value system. While his stated aim eschews epistemological and linguistic implications and remains solidly anchored in the more immediate social issues, this group of papers, admirably contrapuntal, resonates in many ways. The collection is a welcome addition to Rodopi's series on modern literature. (ANJA PEARRE, DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY)

*RITA COPELAND. *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and Vernacular Texts*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 350 pp. US \$ 64.95

Translation theory is not exactly a hot new topic in medieval studies. Charles Homer Haskins did the massive primary research on medieval translation theory back in the teens and early twenties, and his *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (1924) continues to be an essential resource for work in the field (see Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924]). Werner Schwartz wrote a series of brief but influential period studies on translation theory in the forties, and his piece on classical and medieval theories in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, "The Meaning of *Fidus Interpres* in Medieval Translation" (1944), has been much quoted by later scholars — as has Guy Beaujolan's 1957 French article on "Medieval Science in the Christian West," translated by A.J. Pomerans for a 1963 collection entitled *History of Science*.¹ More recent work by David C. Lindberg, Sebastian Brock, and Marie-Thérèse D'Alverny in the seventies and early eighties brought new critical perspectives on, and new historical details to, the Haskinsian tradition without seriously challenging either its assumptions or its findings.² In 1989 Frederick M. Renner published his study of translation theories from Cicero to Tytler, *Interpretatio*, purporting to elucidate the single monolithic rhetorical and grammatical "system" underlying all theories of translation in his eighteenth century period. While his main focus remained the Renaissance, he did venture sporadically into the Middle Ages — and where he did, he underscored the importance of rhetoric and grammar for medieval theorists of translation.³

This is precisely the point where Rita Copeland picks up the thread in *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages* — but with a

1 See Schwartz, "The Meaning of *Fidus Interpres* in Medieval Translation," *Journal of Theological Studies* 45 (1944): 73-78; also "The Theory of Translation in Sixteenth-Century Germany," *Modern Language Review* 40 (1945): 289-99, and "Translation into German in the Fifteenth Century," *Modern Language Review* 39 (1944): 368-73. He also has a later book, *Principles and Problems of Biblical Translation: Some Reformation Controversies and Their Background*. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970. For Beaujolan, see René Taton, ed., *History of Science: Ancient and Medieval Science From the Beginnings to 1450* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 468-532.

2 See Lindberg, "The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West," in *Science in the Middle Ages*, edited by Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 52-90; Sebastian Brock, "Aspects of Translation Technique in Antiquity," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 20 (Spring 1979): 69-87; and Marie-Thérèse D'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, edited by Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 421-62.

3 Frederick M. Renner, *Interpretatio: Language and Translation from Cicero to Tytler* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989). See also my review of Renner, along with Eric Cheyfitz's *The Poetics of Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Tejaswini Niranjana's *Siting Translation* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1992), "Decolonizing Translation,"

difference. Haskins and his followers brought to their task the assumption that translation in the Middle Ages is a series of translators and texts and their commissioners and locales (King X sent Y-of-Z to Here-and-there to translate Such-and-such), and that translation theory in the Middle Ages is a debate between word-for-word and sense-for-sense. This assumption is all but gone in Copeland; where it appears, it appears utterly transformed by the exciting new questions she has asked. Renier brought to his task the assumption that everybody of any worth between Cicero and Tyler had internalized the same set of static rhetorical and grammatical principles (though they differed slightly in their application of those principles to specific cases), and that they all proceeded in their translations by first applying grammar as a "basic set of tools" (*proprietas, puritas, consuetudo, vetustas, auctoritas, ratio, perspicuitas*, etc.) and then applying rhetoric as "tools in ornamentation" (*electio verborum, tropes, figurae, periodus, ornatus, ratione materiae et personae*, etc.). This oppressively reified system is gone in Copeland too. Rhetoric and grammar inform Copeland's project from beginning to end, but never as a lockstep robotic operating system.

Rather, as Copeland says in her introductory formulation, her book "seeks to define the place of vernacular translation within the systems of rhetoric and hermeneutics in the Middle Ages. In serving this aim, its concern is not with a narrow pragmatics or theory of translation in the Middle Ages. Rather, it seeks to show how translation is inscribed within a large disciplinary nexus, a historical intersection of hermeneutical practice and rhetorical theory" (1). In pursuing this aim she eschews the methodological assumptions of both Haskins and his followers — "it is not by tracing the fortunes of these [classical translational] commonplaces that we can evaluate the theoretical conditions under which ideas about translation were mediated from antiquity to the Middle Ages" (9) — and Renier, whom (along with hundreds, perhaps thousand of others) she seems to be describing when she notes wryly, "Rhetorical theory has also been a notable victim of this kind of positivism. It has been viewed as a neutral preceptive system, a descriptive taxonomy of style, or as an academic discipline whose history is constituted by its manifest meanings and whose claims to truth about the nature of language and discourse are accepted on their own terms" (4).

Copeland avoids both of these methodological pitfalls by contextualizing her study within the clash between two medieval cultures, vernacular culture and Latin academic culture. One of her dominant premises is that "translation is a vehicle for vernacular appropriation of academic discourse" (3), and specifically for the vernacular appropriation of the very appropriative moment in academic discourse that works "to displace the very text that it proposes to serve" (3). Her agonistic model serves her well, allowing her to explore disciplinary conflicts as motors of change: translation theory in Cicero and Horace is generated out of a rhetorical opposition to the slavish copying of the grammarians; Cicero's appropriative transformation of the source text into an original target text is both recovered and repressed in patristic writings, especially Jerome's letter to Pammachius, recovered as a repressive hermeneutic that proscribes innovation, but returns in Augustinian preaching and later, and more importantly, in the very

exegetical tradition that was developed to control original thought. As Copeland puts it, in the early Middle Ages "The rhetorical value of translation is lost in the very discourses that carry over Ciceronian theories of translation; but hermeneutical practice itself takes over the functions of rhetoric and creates a new context in which a rhetorical model of translation can emerge" (6). *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages* is a fascinating ground where dualisms are continually in movement under the reader's feet, requiring constant alertness and great conceptual nimbleness — so much, in fact, that I hesitate to make any specific claims about just how Copeland says rhetoric and hermeneutics, *enarratio poetarum* and *exercitatio, expositio* and *inventio* shift and interflow throughout her period, because I am almost certain I will get it wrong.

The conceptual complexity that makes the book difficult to summarize, however, makes it exciting to read (at least for the reader with a good deal of interest in and knowledge of either the history of translation theory or the history of medieval criticism; this is not a book for the General Educated Reader). Medieval studies are not traditionally a hotbed of flashy theorizing, and Copeland is careful not to bombard her medievalist readers with trendy names and terms; but she is clearly well-read in theory, and she plies the complicating analytical perspectives of recent theorists (especially Roman Jakobson's now-canonical metaphor/metonymy opposition and the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur) with a good deal of suppleness.⁴ Indeed if the rather stolid work of Haskins, Lindberg, and D'Alvemy is any indication of medievalists' discursive expectations, the analytical wizardry that to me seems so intelligent and compelling in Copeland's book is likely to put many of her colleagues off; it is going to seem trendy and superfluous at worst, at best unnecessarily convoluted.

Still, within the segment of medieval criticism she marks off, "academic traditions and vernacular texts," it would be hard for a medievalist to dismiss her lightly. She is clearly a formidable authority on the traditions she explores: Cicero and Horace and generally Roman theories of translation in chapter one; patristic theories (especially Jerome) and the rhetoric/grammar clash of late antiquity in chapter two; the rhetorical nature of medieval exegesis, and Notker of St. Gall and the *Ovide moralisé* as examples of "rhetorical" commentary, in chapters three and four; French and English "receptions" and transformations of Boethius' *Consolatio philosophiae* in chapter five; and rhetorical invention within the hermeneutical tradition, and Chaucer and Gower as examples, in chapters six

4 For Jakobson, see "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances," in Jakobson and Morris Halle, eds., *Fundamentals of Language* (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 69–96. For Gadamer, see *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989). Copeland only cites Ricoeur once (61), from *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981), but his work is indebted to and congruent with Gadamer's. The only poststructuralist theorist Copeland mentions is Foucault, and only in passing, in reference to his concept of the "author-function" (116); but clearly, a good deal of the analytical work she does is

and seven. She quotes extensively, in the original languages and her own useful translations, from the primary texts, making her book invaluable not only as a commentary on, but as a source book of, medieval translation theories. Ph.D. students in medieval studies, and generally anyone looking for research topics in the field, would do well to comb her book carefully, as she generates exciting avenues for scholarly exploration on every page. It should go without saying that she has just barely scratched the surface in this enormously rich and complex period; the scratches she has made may well transform the study of medieval literature and criticism by placing translation at its very core.

The book also has some problems, one of which I broached earlier: it is difficult to read, for all the right reasons, to be sure — her steadfast attention to the complexity of the traditions she traces — but that is not likely to reassure the reader who feels, as I occasionally did, overwhelmed by the swirl of shifting categories. In her attempt to clarify that swirl for herself and for her readers, too, Copeland often lapses into sheer repetition: "also reflected the troublesome overlap between the concerns of grammar and rhetoric" and "there was much overlap between the practices of commentary, translation, and imitation, just as there was much overlap between the study of grammar and rhetoric" (10); "Within grammatical study, translation was considered to be a special aspect of textual commentary; within rhetorical study, translation was seen as a special form of imitation" and "When used as an exercise in grammatical study, translation represented a form of commentary; when associated with rhetorical study and the production of speeches, translation constituted a form of imitation" (10); "the object of translation is difference with the source" and "Thus in translation, the force of rhetorical invention should produce difference with the source" (30).

A more serious problem than repetition, though, is the obsessive dualism reflected in those repeated passages. Copeland has read enough poststructuralist theory to want to contaminate each side of any dualism she constructs with its opposite pole, and as I've been saying, she delights in showing how these dualisms constantly shift and settle through the years; but she also clearly believes in dualism, in the logical operation by which a complex field is split up into two opposite extremes and then mapped onto a "continuum" between them, and longs for more conceptual stability than she can tease out of her field.

More than that, she believes in dualistic idealization, in the abstract dualisms favored by structuralism and early poststructuralism as opposed to the more politically and historically grounded dualisms of later (Marxist, Feminist, and other) poststructuralisms. For example, she writes early on that "the transmission of classical and patristic theories of translation is not a history of continuity but a series of ruptures" (55), in effect *rupturing* the history of continuity that previous historians of medieval translation theory have wanted to construct. That is a good start, but talk of a "series of ruptures" does not really take us very far; it still sidesteps the ideological war that was being waged over the political unconscious at the time, the steady pressures being brought on translators from above to impose dogmatic meanings on their texts (and to thematize those dogmatic meanings as "transcendental," "divine," and to call the translations that

resulted sense-for-sense), and their tenacious resistance to those pressures through deepseated mystical fears of direct communicability. Copeland lacks a social psychology, a sense of the controlled collective and resistant individual and group motivations that drive things like tradition and innovation; there are ideological agents in her book, but they are vague, shadowy figures that flit uneasily in and out of her argument, peripheralized by large formal abstractions like primary and secondary translation, or metaphor and metonymy — a dualism that, reeking as it does of seventies structuralism, put me off most in the book. "In the case of medieval vernacular translations, this tension between metaphoric structure (difference, displacement, substitution) and metonymic structure (continuity and evolution within the same linguistic community) mirrors in reverse the structural pattern of the relationship of Latin commentary to Latin *auctores*" (129). Even for seventies structuralism metonymy has much more difference and displacement in it than Copeland will admit; the magic word "contiguity," applied to metonymy by Jakobson and all his structuralist followers (and capitalized on, and transformed in the direction of its difference and displacement, by Lacan and Derrida), never appears in Copeland's book, perhaps because she wants metonymy to signify tradition, historical continuity, the idealized image of stable generational succession that traditionalists see everywhere. Metaphor for Copeland is another word for innovation, the displacement of the old text by a new one, translation as rewriting or Ciceronian/Horatian imitation — a fairly lame tropology of translation that is absolutely crippled by its duality.⁵

Part of the problem is that Copeland does not really know or care (nor does anybody else, probably, but Copeland seems to be in the best position to *ask*, and does not) how her dualisms link up with larger historical (especially ideological, political-unconscious) trends. She seems to be intimating, but also repressing through the use of her abstract structuralist vocabulary, that there is a battle being fought here between forces of tradition and innovation, social / cultural / textual stability and unrest, political control and personal freedom — and that, while the sides keep changing and intermingling and stealing from each other, coopting each other, there is a certain large trend from freedom and innovation in chapter one (Rome — Cicero and Horace), through a period of repression in chapters two through five (maybe six), to a gradual recuperation of that freedom and innovation in chapter seven (maybe starting in six). It's the Renaissance myth, of course, the myth of the noble classical ideas lost in the night of the

5 My impatience here is fueled by my own work with *six* (and ultimately, potentially, an infinite number of) tropes of translation in *The Translator's Turn* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), which, since our books appeared the same year, Copeland cannot be expected to have read when she was writing her own. Many of her remarks about appropriate commentary, for example, suggest synecdoche far more strongly than either metaphor or metonymy. "The text can be 'rewritten' as formally unified because its meaning or cause has been discovered" (78), for example, or "While allegoresis figures itself — even modestly — as disclosure, it in fact operates as a deep recasting of the text as from within the text"

Middle Ages and recovered by bold vernacular writers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; but this is too pat or simple-minded an answer for a sophisticated intellectual historian like Copeland, so she buries it in disclaimers to the effect that "primary" and "secondary" translation do not necessarily mean that "primary" translation comes first and "secondary" translation second *historically* (93-94 — though it sort of does work that way), and disperses the broad outlines of the myth into proliferating dualisms like rhetoric and hermeneutics, *enarratio* and *exercitatio*, metaphor and metonymy, essentially turning the history of translation theory and practice from Cicero to Gower into a complex synchronic system whose "primary" and "secondary" qualities can be discussed in reassuring abstract terms — in terms of "affinities and innate characteristics" rather than "diachronic order" (94).

This is, clearly, only a first attempt at bringing complex theoretical perspectives to bear on the bewildering historical culturesscape of the Middle Ages — an unquestionably rich and valuable attempt that lays the groundwork for future inquiries.⁶ Copeland does not pretend to draw up the lines of force between developments in translation theory and social and political history; she does mention some class and profession indicators in passing in her discussion of the *Roman de la Rose* and elsewhere (the aristocracy and middle class as writer and reader), but a large-scale exploration of these matters is beyond the scope of her book, and remains to be written. We still need a social history of medieval translation theory in terms, say, of social class, economics, land management, birth order, and gender. We still need a political history of medieval translation in terms of shifting church-state relations, and the contested construction of the "individual" or the "self" (as obedient or innovative, as socialized or isolated) in the confluence of those relations; or in terms of conquest and empire, both within and at the borders of "Europe" or "the West," and the geopolitical consolidation of those entities through military conflict with Islam.

That *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages* is not one of these books is not a strike against it. In some sense, in fact, it would be difficult to write one of those books without Copeland's exploratory work to ground it. Copeland's book is part of a growing body of work in translation theory that is transforming not only translation theory but the historical periods, national literatures, philosophical methods, and political practices that it so restlessly explores. Just as German romanticism will no longer be quite the same since Antoine Berman introduced translation into it; just as Continental philosophy has looked different since Jacques Derrida theorized translation for it; just as the face of European colonialism has been changed by Eric Cheyfitz's *Poetics of Imperialism* and Tejaswini Niranjana's *Siting Translation* and the essays by Samia Mehrez, Richard Jacquemond, and Sherry Simon in Lawrence Venuti's *Rethinking Translation*; so too will medieval literature and criticism be

transformed by Rita Copeland.⁷

As part of that transformation, surely — the encyclopedic and yet severely circumscribed nature of Copeland's book makes this clear — we need most of all a comprehensive encyclopedia of translation, with entries not only on who translated what, when, how, and where, at whose behest, and how it was received, imitated, transformed by later writers, but also on rhetoric, grammar, and hermeneutics, on the word-for-word/sense-for-sense debate, on translation as a channel of empire, on legislation concerning translators' rights and duties, on specific translation theorists and schools and periods of translation theory, on the various histories of translation and translation theory that have appeared, and so on. We have the scholarly resources now to compile such an encyclopedia (although much primary research remains to be done); what we lack is a disciplinary consensus, a widespread feeling that we *exist* as a discipline and have certain knowledge that needs to be pooled and disseminated. Once that consensus is in place, a publisher will appear to undertake it and grant money will materialize to subsidize it.

And perhaps it is already beginning to happen. Routledge and Kent State University Press have new publication series on translation, and Northern Illinois University Press is contemplating one. A movement is afoot to make translation studies a division of the Modern Language Association. New paradigm-busting books on translation continue to appear, a dozen or so in the past two years and more on the way — including at least three anthologies of translation theory readings.⁸ In the past year I have met more translators who have become interested in, even excited about, translation theory than I did in the ten or fifteen years before that; as theorists increasingly spend more time exploring what translators do and less time making them feel guilty about it, translation theory comes to seem a project in which translators can participate. Translation studies

7 See Berman, *L'Épreuve de l'étranger: Culture et traduction dans l'Allemagne romantique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); translated by Stefan Heyvaert as *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). See also his "La Traduction et la lettre, ou l'auberge du lointain," in *Les Tours de Babel: Essais sur la traduction* (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 1985): 35-150. For Derrida, see "Des Tours de Babel," in Joseph F. Graham, ed., *Difference in Translation* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985), 209-48 (French original) and 165-207 (Graham's translation). Bibliographical information for Cheyfitz and Niranjana is given in note 3. In *Rethinking Translation: Discourse, Subjectivity, Ideology* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), Venuti collects Mehrez's "Translation and the Postcolonial Experience: The Francophone North African Text" (120-38), Jacquemond's "Translation and Cultural Hegemony: The Case of French-Arabic Translation" (139-58), and Simon's "The Language of Cultural Difference: Figures of Alterity in Canadian Translation" (159-76). I reviewed Heyvaert's translation of Berman's book in this journal ("Foreignizing Experience," 20.3-4 [1993], 417-33), and Venuti's book in *Genre* ("Subversive Translation Theorists," forthcoming).

8 See Andrew Chesterman, ed., *Readings in Translation Theory* (Helsinki: Finn Lectura, 1989); Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet, eds., *Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992); and Andre Lefevere, ed.,

6 I wish I had read it, in fact, when I wrote *The Translator's Turn*, which, as Copeland points

is in a state of fermentation that holds enormous promise for the future. (DOUGLAS ROBINSON, MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY)

*DIRK DELABASTITA and LIEVEN D'HULST, eds. *European Shakespeares: Translating Shakespeare in the Romantic Age*. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1993. 256 pp. US\$58.00

European Shakespeares is the result of a conference held at the University of Antwerp's Higher Institute for Translators and Interpreters in 1990. As the title indicates, the book deals with translations of Shakespeare in different European countries during the period normally described as romanticism. The volume contains 12 papers (two in French and the rest in English), which are subdivided into three sections: 1. Translations and national literatures, 2. Literary, cultural, and theatrical traditions taking shape, and 3. Shifting poetics of translation. Each section is concluded with a "Report," a summary of the main subjects mixed with critical remarks on the results. Those reports are a sensible way to elucidate which answers the papers have given and which questions and doubts they have raised, thus imitating a forum of discussion with the attempt to involve the reader actively. The attempt to give a communicative structure to the volume is, however, impaired by the fact that the division into the three sections is — thematically — not very convincing. The subjects of the papers in the different sections overlap and it is difficult to see why a certain paper could not as well belong to another section. For example, Dávidházi's paper on the Shakespeare-cult in Hungary is printed in the second section but could easily be classified as dealing with translations and national literatures or even the shifting poetics of translation. So the structuring of the essays seems to be more superimposed than naturally arising out of the contents. The volume is concluded by a round-table-discussion between the contributors about some of the main questions raised. It remains a mystery to the reader why all the contributions in the discussion are rendered in English except two, one in French and one in German. Presumably this is supposed to add a multi-cultural flavour to the discussion, but unfortunately the German contribution is presented in a German hardly understandable at all — a minor, but still annoying point.

The volume as a whole fulfills the task the editors postulate in the introduction (12): to interrelate the translation of Shakespearean drama with the wider historical frame. Most of the essays present translation as "intersystemic transfer" (12), trying to reach a "contextualisation" (Delabastita, 220) rather than a mere discussion of technical translation problems. It is a well known fact that translation is always an act of interpretation. The reception and translation of Shakespeare in particular underlines the fact that it has to be seen in the context of a whole cultural system. Dávidházi even goes so far as to talk about an "anthropology of literature" (146) that is needed to explain the phenomenon of the Hungarian Shakespeare-cult. Only few of the papers commit the mistake to get stuck with technical translation problems (as for example Fresco in his analysis of the unpublished Italian *Hamlet*).

translator as well as for the scholar concerned with the broader aspects of Shakespeare-reception in Europe. They give an acceptable survey of Shakespeare in Europe, telling more about the target culture of the translation than about Shakespeare himself. As Shakespeare's plays did not adhere to the rules of neoclassicism it is understandable why he became a model for the age of romanticism. But this still does not answer the question why this author has become a vehicle for poetological transfer like no other writer. The papers offer many examples for ideologically biased translations (e.g. Ranke's discussion about different versions of *Macbeth* in Germany), but the question remains open. What emerges after reading all the papers are common features of European translations of Shakespeare that still need a lot of research. In all European countries, these translations were part of the debate between neoclassicists and romantics. This battle was of course a poetological battle between France and Germany. Shakespeare's plays were mostly translated by either French (Ducis, Le Tourneur) or German (Wieland, Schlegel/Tieck) mediation, which is due to the problem of a missing literary tradition and/or a suitable language in some countries (see for example the situation in Denmark or the problem with the Czech language). Although Lambert in his paper strongly tries to prove the domination of the early French translations, it is quite obvious that German influence was much greater for example in the West Slavic or Scandinavian countries. Van den Broeck talks of "an overwhelming uniformity which almost obliterates national variations" (108) with regard to the French and German models for the so-called second-hand translations, which is, even if there are certainly common features, a bit exaggerated. As translation is seen as a part of a cultural system it should be considered that each nation used the French / German model for its own cultural or political purpose, thus modifying the "original" translation and endowing it with a new ideological impetus. There is a clear connection between the translation of Shakespeare and the forming of national identity in many countries — in spite of the French or German mediation. A discussion of Shakespeare translations almost inevitably opens up the wider context of linguistic, social, and political aspects which constitute a national or cultural identity, be it in Hungary where Shakespeare was promoted because of his "civilizing influence" (159) or in Poland where the translations induced the creation of a new national drama based on the Shakespearean model (67).

Another common trait of the translations is the distinction between page-oriented and stage-oriented translations. In most cases, page-oriented translations were not suitable for a presentation on stage, as the plays had to be adapted to the tastes and theatrical conventions of the target audience. The critical remark made by van den Broeck in his summary of the first section can only be underlined: "How can one possibly analyse these two different kinds of versions on an equal footing?" (106). Indeed a more clear-cut distinction between the two forms of translations would have been desirable.

The amount of information given in the papers should not blind against the fact that at least some essays completely lack a conclusion. Information is

presented but finally not evaluated (Schmidt, Levin). In the end the reader is left with a broad survey of European Shakespeares as well as an abundance of detailed insights into different translations — but both are hard to connect in the desired wider cultural framework. *European Shakespeares* opens up more questions than it finally answers, but still the reader is supplied with the inspiration for further investigation, which cannot be said of too many books on that subject. (UTE KAUER, PHILIPPS-UNIVERSITÄT MARBURG, GERMANY)

*GEORGE W. BRANDT and WIEBE HOGENDOORN, compilers. GEORGE W. BRANDT, ed. *German and Dutch Theatre, 1600-1848*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. xxx + 550 pp. £55.00

This volume is the third to appear in Cambridge University Press's series, *Theatre in Europe: A Documentary History*, whose stated purpose is to provide "a major reference work for studies in theatrical and dramatic literature." Like earlier volumes, this one gives source documents on contracts, regulations, and organization, the kinds and architecture of "playhouses and performance venues" (v), stage presentation, actors and acting, costumes, audience, repertoires, dramatic theory and criticism. The compilers provide a useful bibliography, brief historical introductions to the two parts of the collection (3-333 on the German lands; 337-499 on the Netherlands), and explanations of varying length for each document. These last are both verbal and pictorial. For this reason, one supposes, the book is printed on heavy paper, the reproductions are good, and — quite apart from the intrinsic value of its documents — the work is a pleasure to peruse.

That "intrinsic value," however, is clearly what matters. And one can only say that for English-speaking/reading historians of the theatre and drama, this anthology will become indispensable. The compilers have elected to print documents that are for the most part difficult or impossible to obtain in English. This wise choice makes the collection unique, and one can only be surprised at the vast number of essential documents, many by major artistic figures, that have been largely unknown and unused in the English-speaking world. One can of course nitpick. It might have been nice, for example, if George Brandt could have included chapter 5 of Martin Opitz's celebrated *Buch von der deutschen Poeterey* (1624) in his first part, instead of merely mentioning it in passing in his second (209). Although not specifically aimed at drama, Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft's "Reden van de waerdicheyt der poesie (Lecture on the value of poetry)" (c.1610-15) was a sufficiently early and important theoretical intervention by a major dramatist to warrant Wiebe Hogendoorn's including it in some form. But a work of this kind invites the pedantry of carpers.

Its two unequally long parts are themselves chronologically divided again into three parts, providing a sort of implicit history of drama in the two areas. Brandt makes a first division at 1726. The first five generations of his story were essentially marked by an insecurity and fragmentation in dramatic affairs matching that of the political and social situation. The importance of strolling English players in the first half of the seventeenth century and of French in the

indigenous German theatre (other than that of the schools, represented by the Jesuits and such as Andreas Gryphius and Daniel Casper von Lohenstein — although it is not clear that they may really be so qualified: 189n4). One rather wonders whether the selection of documents (mostly from printed sources) is not itself infected by the normative history of German literature that incorporates the Jesuits and other such authors. In 1727, the troupe of Caroline and Johann Neuber acquired the official approbation of a royal patent, and thus a security that players for the most part did not have before. Increasingly, arguments were made for a German drama, for "National Theatres," and for turning away from French examples.

Brandt's second division marks this change, running from 1727 until 1814, the end of the Napoleonic era. Given the importance of these changes and the evident growth in this century of an increasingly *German* theatre, it is neither surprising that this section is far the longest in the book (at 200 pages), nor that, within it, the part incorporating dramatic theory and criticism forms almost half its length. What may surprise more is the number of major (shorter) writings by even such as Goethe and Schiller that have escaped wide circulation in the English-speaking world. These are good texts to have readily available (at least, now, in libraries — since the price of this book will prevent most individual purchases). The last section, 1815-1848, emphasizes the rise of the theatrical director but the general sense of collapse after the great preceding age, despite the presence of such as Franz Grillparzer and C. F. Hebbel.

The sections on the Netherlands are briefer, but in some ways they are even more welcome than those on the German lands. The history of Dutch theatre is after all virtually unknown to English-speakers. Its sections are inevitably divided somewhat differently, and while Hogendoorn provides only one document from before 1600 (and that, of 1599: 363-64), he does make a point of stressing the earlier importance of dramatic productions (345). Unlike the German lands, Holland had a fixed professional "national theatre" in the Amsterdam Schouwburg as early as 1638, and Hogendoorn's first era takes us to 1664, when the first Schouwburg was torn down in order to build a new one whose stage would permit Italianate perspective ("with a proscenium arch and fully changeable scenery," 340) and be ruled by French classical taste. The overwhelmingly Dutch repertoire of the first period, which roughly coincided with what is known as the "Golden Age," was now assisted, as it were, by numerous translations. As in the German lands, the earlier period saw many English strolling companies, although the court of Orange at The Hague preferred French troupes.

The second period thus runs from 1665 until 1794 and the Napoleonic invasions (1793 in the south — modern Belgium; 1795 in the north), when this derivative and French-oriented age of Enlightenment came under many new regulations. The invasions also ended the two-centuries' long employment of theatre companies by the civic almshouses, they being henceforth governed directly by the cities. Given the political changes to which the Low Countries were heir in this last period (1795-1848) — French occupation until 1814, union

of south and north until 1830, separation thereafter, but not a little unrest, especially in the south (not that "Belgium" in fact gets a lot of attention) — it is no surprise that this era has only a few pages. One wonders if it would not have made more sense to enlarge the first section, and drop the third altogether.

There are a few errors and peculiarities that a second edition might correct. Right at the start particular attention is drawn to two requests for permission to play in Danzig whose similarity is emphasized, since one was "fifteen years later" than the other. But unless the dates are twice given incorrectly, these documents are separated by exactly one year (17-19). It is fun to know, too, that 30 September 1767 came later in Hamburg than did 21 March 1768 in Berlin (229). Valleran Le Conte indeed tried several times to make himself a permanent slot at Paris's Hôtel de Bourgogne, but never succeeded, and can certainly not be called "of" that theatre house (381). On the contrary, however fine an actor, he and his troupe were condemned, with minor and short breaks, to remain a touring company — hence their playing at The Hague and Leiden in 1613. (In any case, at this date, the Hôtel de Bourgogne only existed as a space one could rent from the Confrérie de Notre Dame. Only fifteen years later did a troupe become fixed there.) One wonders, too, whether it is always useful to guess at the identity of plays whose title was not clearly given in documents. There seems, for instance, small reason to credit the source given for John Green's touring company's *Prodigal Son* in Graz in 1608 (47). Since this was the first play they gave, a pleasant speculation might see this as John Palsgrave's 1540 *Acolastus*, translated from the Dutch Willem Gnapheus's 1529 play of the same title, which had also been done into German in 1534. At once a prodigal son and a kind of Everyman, this would have given their first audience (a German-speaking one after all) a familiar opening play.

But these are at most minor blemishes. Indeed, the last two cases already suggest the kinds of riches this collection holds in store — even if here their purchase is mere pedantry. The repertoire of touring companies, the kinds of regulations to which they were subject, the changes over the years in the composition, stability, professionalism, and artistic attention of theatre companies, in architecture and staging, in audiences and relation to their urban contexts, the growing sophistication of theory and criticism — all these things are traced out here in a quite remarkable diversity of unfamiliar documents. This is an essential collection. (TIMOTHY J. REISS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY)

*NORBERT REICHEL. *Der Traum vom höheren Leben. Nietzsches Übermensch und die Conditio humana europäischer Intellektueller von 1890 bis 1945*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 1994. 187 pp. DM 38.00

Kein Denker hat das Geistesleben des 20. Jahrhunderts so nachhaltig beeinflusst wie Friedrich Nietzsche. Gottfried Benn, einer jener zwischen 1860 und 1890 geborenen, die besonders rezeptiv für Nietzsches These waren, faßte den Einfluß des Philosophen so zusammen: "Eigentlich hat alles, was meine Generation diskutierte, innerlich sich auseinanderdachte, man kann sagen: erlitt, man kann auch

erschöpft, definitive Formulierung gefunden, alles Weitere war Exegese.... Für meine Generation war er das Erdbeben der Epoche." Zahlreiche Schriftsteller, nicht nur in Deutschland sondern in der gesamten westlichen Kultursphäre, wurden in ihrem Denken und Schreiben von Nietzsches Thesen beeinflusst. Elemente von Nietzsches Philosophie wurden in den Texten so unterschiedlicher Autoren wie Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse, André Gide, D.H. Lawrence, Jack London und Frederick Philip Grove als bestimmende Faktoren in zumindest einem Teil des schriftstellerischen Werkes identifiziert.

Sehr wichtig bei Nietzsche und zentral in der Rezeption ist das Konzept des Übermenschen. Nietzsche beschrieb diese Figur in zahlreichen Fragmenten als Person, die die Limitationen menschlicher Existenz überwindet und dadurch in die Lage versetzt ist, durch die Realisierung seines Willens zur Macht ein rein selbstbestimmtes Leben zu führen. Gerade die Aussicht, durch die Entwicklung eigener Stärke Beschränkungen im Leben zu überwinden, wurde von vielen Nietzsche-Rezeptoren begierig aufgegriffen, wobei allerdings anzumerken ist, daß dieses so vereinfacht geschah, daß aus Nietzsches Forderung, durch Selbstdisziplin und Selbstüberwindung zu neuem Bewußtsein nichts mehr übrig blieb als ein scheinbar philosophisch gerechtfertigter totaler Egoismus. Wie wichtig der Übermensch in der populären Rezeption war, läßt sich schon daran sehen, daß Leo Berg seine Studie *Der Übermensch in der modernen Literatur* [sic] bereits im Jahre 1897 veröffentlichten konnte. Der Traum von einem "höheren Leben," welches in der Lage wäre, die Unzulänglichkeiten der aktuellen Existenz zu überwinden findet sich vielfach in der Literatur der ersten Jahrzehnte dieses Jahrhunderts, in der die Lösung entweder im Rückzug in eine durch Distanz ästhetisch gewordene reduzierte Welt oder in der Überwindung der Realität durch das Erreichen einer höheren, "übermenschlichen" Existenz postuliert wurde.

In seiner Studie befaßt sich Norbert Reichel mit der Thematik des Übermenschlichen in der französischen und italienischen Literatur der Jahre 1900 bis 1930. Er beschränkt sich bei seiner Literaturswahl auf Texte von Valéry, Gide, Montherlant, Barrès, d'Annunzio, Marinetti und Fogazzaro, die aber in ihrem Spektrum eindeutig als repräsentativ für die Literatur jener Zeit gelten können. Gemeinsam ist ihnen, laut Reichel, das Schreiben als Reaktion auf an sich selbst wahrgenommene reale oder imaginäre Unzulänglichkeit: "Aus den erlittenen Grenzen leiten Intellektuelle die Eigenschaften ab, die den Typus eines Übermenschen oder zumindest eines mit übermenschlicher Kraft begabten Wesens konstituieren könnten, der sie angesichts ihrer Konflikte in der Welt sein zu müssen glauben. Je nach ihren Lebensumständen imaginieren sie diesen übermenschlichen Typus als Künstler, Philosoph oder Politiker" (113).

Im ersten der vier Abschnitte des Buches nähert sich Reichel dem Themenkomplex Übermensch über den Bereich der Grenzerfahrung. Ansatzpunkte sind die Reaktion auf Krankheit und Tod, die als Unterscheidung zwischen narzistischer Schwäche und potentieller Übermenschlichkeit dienen kann. Allerdings leidet das Kapitel unter einem früh erkannten Problem: "Die Begriffe des Übermenschen oder übermenschlicher Eigenschaften lassen sich empirisch nicht belegen.... Daher sind auch sämtliche Versuche, sie mit logisch

eindeutigen Inhalten zu füllen von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt" (3). Zur angemessenen Einschätzung der in Texten wie Gides *L'Immoraliste* oder d'Annunzio's *L'Innocente* gemachten Beobachtungen wären jedoch derartige Inhalte vonnöten, um die Reaktionen der Figuren für mehr als lediglich außergewöhnlich zu halten. Wahrscheinlich hätte dieser Abschnitt besser in einen späteren Teil des Buches gepaßt.

Im zweiten Teil des Buches, "Die Lebensbedingungen des Intellektuellen," analysiert Reichel den Themenkomplex "Intellektueller und Realität" aus drei Richtungen. Durchgängig ist das Problem, daß die äußere Realität ein nicht zu leugnender Bestandteil dessen ist, womit sich der Intellektuelle auseinandersetzen muß. Bücher, Geld und Politik erscheinen als verlockende Ablenkungen und gleichzeitig als konstituierende Elemente des Weges zum Übermenschen. Bei seiner Analyse mehrerer Texte von Valéry, Gide, d'Annunzio und Marinetti verdeutlicht Reichel, daß vieles von dem, was als übermenschliche Errungenschaft gepriesen wird, wenig mehr ist als narzisstische Pose. Nietzsches Konzeption des Übermenschen existiert als stille Autorität im Hintergrund, wird jedoch nur selten im Zentrum der Erörterung dargestellt, was angesichts des Untertitels der Studie zumindest überrascht.

Die Eigenschaften des Übermenschen können, wie bereits zitiert, nicht empirisch festgeschrieben werden, sie lassen sich lediglich aus den untersuchten Texten deduzieren. Im längsten und wichtigsten Teil seines Buches versucht Reichel eine derartige Deduktion anhand mehrerer Schritte: der sprachlichen Utopie der Übermenschlichkeit; des Willens, die Distinktion in der sozialen Dimension zu realisieren; der Aufrichtigkeit im Vorgehen; des Problems der Vorbildfunktion für Schüler wie Lehrer; und, als wichtigstem Punkt, der Basierung der Handlungen auf eigenen Werturteilen. André Gides Werke, Reichels bedeutendste Quelle, deuten die Limitationen einer Definition des Übermenschen durch Literatur an. Die Figur Menalque in *L'Immoraliste* kann sehr wohl als Person gesehen werden, die auf dem Weg zur Übermenschlichkeit Fortschritte gemacht hat, aber letzten Endes bleibt eine Definition unrealisierbar, das Gide "nur diejenigen als potentielle Übermenschen definier[t], die aus eigener Kraft bereit und in der Lage sind, sich von den psycho-sozialen Zwängen ihrer Umwelt, für die beispielsweise eine Person stehen kann, zu befreien. Aber dies bleibt offen wie die Zukunft" (122). Auch hier fällt auf, daß Reichel nur selten direkte Bezüge zu Nietzsche herstellt. Lediglich im letzten, überzeugendsten Abschnitt, in dem es um die Umwertung aller Werte als Maxime des Übermenschen geht, ist Nietzsches Werk illuminierender Ausgangspunkt und Referenz. Gerade in diesem Kapitel werden die Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Schriftstellern deutlich. Während bei d'Annunzio und Barrès der Eindruck entsteht, "der neue Mensch, der Übermensch, soll mit Gewalt provoziert werden" (126), beschreibt Valéry Übermenschlichkeit als etwas, das mit "Poesie" (131) assoziiert wird.

Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung im abschließenden Teil ist die Erkenntnis, daß "eine übermenschliche Existenz eines sozialen Raumes [bedarf], in dem sich übermenschliche Eigenschaften entfalten können" (138). Angesichts der bereits

beschriebenen Definitionsprobleme ist es logischerweise schwierig, den Übermenschen in Raum und Zeit zu lokalisieren. Es gelingt Reichel jedoch, Gemeinsamkeiten in den untersuchten Texten zu systematisieren. Räumlich befinden sich die literarischen Übermenschen durchgehend in überhöhten Orten, seien es herausragende Monumente oder besondere Gärten, in Schutzräumen also, abseits von der allgemeinen Realität. Der angesprochene soziale Raum ist also höchst stilisiert und nur entfernt als realistische Umgebung zu betrachten. Die Zeit spielt in den Texten eine Rolle nur noch insofern als sie die Differenz zwischen Ist und Soll anzeigt ohne eine eigene Bedeutung zu haben. Genau hier setzt jedoch für Reichel die eigentliche kreative Energie des Traums vom höheren Leben an: "Der Widerspruch zwischen Ist und Soll der Welt wird im Drama des Weges zum Übermenschlichen produktiv aufgelöst" (152).

In seiner Studie analysiert Norbert Reichel die Funktion des Übermenschen in einem angemessenen thematischen Ansatz. Es ist jedoch negativ anzumerken, daß seine Beispiele aus der französischen und italienischen Literatur häufig zu punktuell und bruchstückhaft sind, um den durch den Untertitel des Buches implizierten Überblick zu ermöglichen. Die Blicke auf die Behandlung individueller Themen durch die verschiedenen Autoren sind häufig zu gerafft. Es irritiert sehr, daß Reichel zwar in der Auswahlbibliographie auf Sekundärwerke verweist, sich in seiner eigenen Analyse jedoch kein einziges Mal auf bereits existierende Arbeiten bezieht. Dadurch wird sein Text zwar in sich geschlossener, dieses Vorgehen verhindert jedoch die Positionierung des Buches im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs zum Thema. Trotz dieser Vorbehalte und eines mitunter sehr komplexen Stils ist *Der Traum vom höheren Leben* ein bedeutender Beitrag zur Analyse der literarischen Nietzsche-Rezeption. (AXEL KNOENAGEL, UNIVERSITÄT HAMBURG)

*RICHARD A. YOUNG. *Octaedro en cuatro tiempos (texto y tiempo en un libro de Cortázar)*. Ottawa: Université d'Ottawa, Ottawa Hispanic Studies, 1993. 265 pp. Can \$ 28.00 cloth; Can \$ 14.00 paper.

The Ottawa Hispanic Studies series has added another volume to its already impressive collection of excellent inquiries. Eleventh in the series, Richard Young's *Octaedro en cuatro tiempos (texto y tiempo en un libro de Cortázar)* contributes significantly to a better understanding of time's intricate function in an important work by Julio Cortázar. Young offers a clear, in-depth study of how time becomes text and how text becomes experience in the eight short stories that make up *Octaedro*.

Divided into six chapters and four facets, this study begins with an examination of the formal aspects that stem from the moment of narrative enunciation mediating narrator and narration. It then moves to explore the concomitant chronological order of narrated events. The third facet focuses on the characters' perception of time in the narrative world while the final facet situates the stories in an intertextual network of narrative relations covering a broad spectrum of time and space.

narrator's standpoint in "Los pasos en las huellas," "Cuello de gatito negro," "Verano," and "Lugar llamado Kindberg" while homodiegesis offers a general category in which to view "Los fases de Severo," "Manuscrito hallado en un bolsillo," "Ahi pero dónde, cómo," and "Liliana llorando." However, Young is careful to point out that these are general categories and that important fluctuations among heterodiegesis, homodiegesis, and autodiegesis are present in key stories. These fluctuations challenge any absolute classification of the stories in homodiegetic or heterodiegetic terms. A thorough examination of metalepsis, shifters, and each narrator's implicit perception, allows Young to determine the temporal relation each narrator maintains with the narrated events. This facet of Young's inquiry describes time in Cortázar as "a system of measurement whose epistemological function permits the identification of particular groups of relations among phenomena, be these human or natural, in such a way that it is possible to organize and understand them in terms of the order in which they occur and of the sequences they engender" (69).

Although the order of narrated events is carefully scrutinized, Young appears more interested in how time that has become text emerges again as human time through the experience of each narrative. To explore this process, he turns to the Augustinian notion of time as outlined by Paul Ricoeur in *Temps et récit*. After a lucid analysis of the strategies of creation and reception revealed by each story's emplotment, Young concludes that the "need to create a context for central events of the story figures as one of the factors that has greatest influence on the order of plot in the stories of *Octaedro*" (86). He tells his readers that reiteration, duration, the superimposing of events as well as the tension arising from the order mediating past, present, and future all work together in Cortázar to subordinate the sequence in which events actually may have occurred to a new meaning generated by the temporal relations in the order of emplotment.

Having examined the text "from the outside," Young moves to explore the temporal relations mediating events as perceived by the characters within each narrative world. In this third facet of the study, he traces the trajectory of the characters' temporal experiences in order to elucidate the metaphoric significance of each plot. Again Augustinian theory plays an important role in explaining how the changing sensation of time helps structure subjective experiences. Young's interpretation of "Manuscrito hallado en un bolsillo" is particularly rewarding because it shows how this story offers a theory of time echoing the Augustinian notion that time is a function of the human spirit. An anticipated future, a marked struggle against time, and an incapacity to confront problems brought on by existence in time emerge as central attributes of *Octaedro*'s characters.

The absence of a regular chronology in Cortázar's stories helps create the impression that they exist as autonomous units. Nevertheless, Young successfully argues that the stories are not completely autonomous. He demonstrates that the characters' ideolects and the narrative worlds' references to non-fictional times, places and people tie the stories to the first-order world. Moreover, *Octaedro*'s stories can be interpreted as renewed expressions of experiences that have already been brought to light by important works such as Goethe's *Faust*. Occupying

himself with the texts' symbolic, figurative, archetypal and mythical dimensions, Young relates Cortázar's stories to the art of John Henry Fuseli, René Magritte, Remedios Varo, Piet Mondrian; the poetry of John Keats; the prose of Edgar Allan Poe and Jean Potocki; modern cinema, as well as popular legend. Throughout his intertextual reading, Young looks for the deeper issues and meanings brought to the fore by a need to resolve the metaphoric tension inherent in the temporal incongruities of the stories and by the tension between image and written word in the art works he examines. This tension, he claims, allows the narrative worlds to transcend their references to modern time and space and achieve an atemporal quality.

If Young looks to Ricoeur for a theory that relates time, text, and experience, it is to Mikhail Bakhtin that he turns in consolidating his conclusions. These conclusions call into question discrete heterodiegetic and homodiegetic categories and point to deeper issues such as the interplay between the standpoints of narrator and character understood as "I" and "other." Although Young denies attempting to make a theoretical statement in his study of *Octaedro*, he does contribute to moving narratology toward a more flexible standpoint while simultaneously demanding rigorous standards of textual analysis from hermeneutic phenomenology. The result is an approach that promises productive readings of additional Latin American short stories.

Octaedro en cuatro tiempos (*texto y tiempo en un libro de Cortázar*) successfully shows why time is essential to the narrative texture of Cortázar's short stories and how time provides the means by which the stories' meanings are achieved. By rejecting the idea of complete autonomy for the narrator, the characters, or the readers and by arguing for an interrelatedness of these narrative dimensions, Young also succeeds in situating the stories within a larger literary system that textualises human experience. He offers a clear, well written and carefully structured analysis and interpretation of this notable work by one of the world's great storytellers. *Octaedro en cuatro tiempos* is indispensable for students of Cortázar and it will constitute a valuable addition to the libraries of Comparatists and Hispanists alike. (DANIEL F. CHAMBERLAIN, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY)

*HORST SCHMIDT. "It's Good to be Back." *Ein Outsider und seine deutschen Leser: Die Rezeption Charles Bukowskis im deutschen Sprachgebiet* (1968- 1986). Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1988. 157 pp.

Die Rezeptionsgeschichte von Autoren in verschiedenen Ländern zeitigt bisweilen recht sonderbare Blüten. Ist einem Autor im eigenen Sprachbereich ein nur mittelmäßiger oder schwacher Publikumerfolg beschieden, läßt sich in einigen Fällen beobachten, daß sich dieser Sachverhalt mit Übersetzungen grundlegend verändern kann. Die überwältigende Rezeption Hermann Hesses in den Vereinigten Staaten in den sechziger Jahren, der im eigenen Land den Verdacht des Bedenklichen nie abschütteln konnte, ist eines der hervorragenden Beispiele.

Ein anderes Beispiel ist der USA Exportartikel Charles Bukowski, der im

vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten einen vergleichbaren Erfolg verzeichnen konnte. Seit 1974 ist der gebürtige Deutsche Bukowski ein deutscher Bestsellerautor. In keinem anderen Sprachgebiet ist er so intensiv rezipiert worden, beobachtet Schmidt, wie im deutschen (7). Seinen vergleichsweise bescheidenen Buchauflagen in den Staaten, die in der Alternativpresse fast alle vom Black Sparrow Verlag in Santa Barbara versorgt wurden (der Verlag wurde um 1965 vom Herausgeber John Martin speziell für die Publikation der Arbeiten Bukowskis gegründet), stehen beachtliche Verkaufsziffern in den ersten Häusern der deutschen Verlagsbranche gegenüber, bei Hanser, Fischer, Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Heyne, Bertelsmann und beim Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag. Bukowskis Roman *Das Schlimmste kommt noch oder fast eine Jugend* (deutsche Ausgabe 1983 im Hanser Verlag) erlebte beispielsweise bereits 1991 im Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag in München die siebte Auflage. Der bislang ausstehenden Aufarbeitung der Rezeption Charles Bukowskis im deutschen Sprachgebiet ist die vorliegende Studie Horst Schmidts gewidmet, eine genaue, materialreiche, lesenswerte und unterhaltende Arbeit, die zwischen den Eckdaten 1968 und 1986 angelegt ist.

Die Methode der Darstellung ist konservativ chronologisch. Es wird ausführlich und lang zitiert. Die Zitate jedoch sind auf eine Weise montiert, daß die den Verlauf der Darstellung nicht unterbrechen, sondern ihn mit den aufgeführten Materialien effektiv und informativ ergänzen. Daß auf diesem Wege für die behandelten Jahre zwischen 1968 und 1986 noch zusätzlich eine fast peinliche Geschichte der deutschen journalistischen Literaturkritik skizziert wird, sei nur nebenher vermerkt.

Der an Bukowski Realien interessierte Leser wird Schmidts Darstellung zu schätzen wissen. Darüber hinaus jedoch ist die Arbeit auffallend unkritisch, sowohl den Dokumenten zur Rezeption als auch der Dichtung und Biographie Bukowskis gegenüber. Noch in seinem Untertitel stilisiert Schmidt den "heißgeliebten Drecksack" (59), den "drunk without apology" und *poète maudit* Bukowski als "outsider." Aber schon in der Einleitung hätte mit dem Hinweis — eine "vollständige Sichtung und Aufistung des quantitativ schier unübersehbaren [Bukowski] Materials aus den USA, Kanada, Brasilien und beinahe sämtlichen europäischen Ländern" konnte aus Zeitgründen nicht stattfinden (7) — deutlich werden müssen, daß von einem Outsider im Kontext einer derartig verblüffenden Breitenwirkung nicht mehr die Rede sein kann.

Immerhin jedoch werden die noch ungelösten Probleme deutlich, die nach den Gründen dieses erstaunlichen Erfolges Bukowskis fragen, in dessen Werk, so der Herausgeber der Anthologie amerikanischer Underground-Literatur mit den ersten Gedichten Bukowskis unter dem Titel *Fuck you* (!). Underground-Gedichte (1968), Ralf-Rainer Rygulla, "der Abscheu vor dem intellektuell abgewichensten Akademismus der Literatur der 'Anderen'" deutlich wird (11). Und warum allen anderen Ländern voran besonders Deutschland Gefallen an diesem Dichter gefunden hat, der die Welt frauenfeindlich durch die Perspektive seines Schnaps-glases beschreibt, könnte der Ansatz einer interessanten Studie sein, deren Methodologie in der kritischen Theorie der Frankfurter Schule oder in der französischen semiotischen Theorie bereits vorgegeben ist. Mit oberflächlichen literatur-

soziologischen und -psychologischen Argumenten ("Die Stories, die ins Deutsche übersetzt worden sind, passen genau in das Image des Säufers und coolen Typen, das beim deutschen Publikum so ankommt." Zitat einer Buchbesprechung Bukowskis nach Schmidt, 108) läßt sich der große kommerzielle Erfolg Bukowskis nicht erklären.

Die deutsche Rezeption Bukowskis wird von Schmidt in fünf Zeitabschnitten behandelt. Nach der Schlußbetrachtung folgt im zweiten Teil eine Bibliographie der Primär- (Originalausgaben und deutschsprachige Editionen) und Sekundärliteratur. Die Darstellung und Schweibweise ist zügig, faktisch, sie verzichtet auf Reflexion und Analyse, und aus diesem Grunde eignet sie sich auch als Dokumentation im Zusammenhang interdisziplinärer Fragestellungen, die sich mit Rezeptionsproblemen beschäftigen. Abschließend schreibt Schmidt, es sei auffallend, "daß Bukowski, trotz seiner offensichtlichen Beliebtheit bei den Lesern und bei der Literaturkritik, bislang von der Literaturwissenschaft — und zwar weltweit — geschnitten wird" (124). Diese Tatsache zumindest scheint nicht erstaunlich zu sein, denn das Phänomen Bukowski ist vielleicht weniger von Interesse als jener Mechanismus, der es auslöste. (HOLGER A. PAUSCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*H. RICHARD OKADA. *Figures of Resistance: Language, Poetry, and Narrating in the Tale of Genji and Other Mid-Heian Texts*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991. 400 pp. US \$ 52.95 cloth; US \$ 23.95 paper.

The proverb of the forest and the trees comes to mind. In Western scholarship of classical Japanese literature, so much effort is spent in the domain of discerning particular trees. In this work, by means of Western contemporary critical perspectives, feminist, linguistic, narratological, deconstructionist, and post-modern combined with an encyclopedic review of Japanese scholarship, Richard Okada provides a satellite photo view of this especially lush forest, mid-Heian literature. At the same time, Okada's close readings of selected texts reveal extraordinary specific detail. It is like having the satellite photo magnified so that you can see the veins on the leaves.

With this powerful range of perception, Okada explores a body of mid-Heian texts that are originary for classical Japanese literature. Here is a list of the texts and some of the issues explored in connection with them: the *Taketori Monogatari* (Tale of the Bamboo Cutter), the issue of Chinese writing/Japanese discourse in the creation of a vernacular prose style, the *Kokinshū* (Anthology of Modern and Ancient Verse, the creation of a communal body of imagery and the importance of an incantatory quality in classical Japanese poetry, the *Ise Shū* (Poetry Anthology of Lady Ise), conflation of life and fiction in personal poetry anthologies and *Ise Monogatari* (Tales of Ise), and the mapping of the sexual / textual politics underlying this literature. The larger part of the book is given over to engagement with the *Genji Monogatari* or Tale of Genji in which all the previous lines of inquiry as well as new ones are threaded through and amplified. Okada writes in a self-acknowledged revisionist mode.

My purpose ... is twofold: to question ... previous readings of Heian period texts performed in the context of the institutionalized discipline of Japanese literature, or "Japanology," which has both sanctioned and maintained practices fully complicit with both patriarchal and colonialist discourse, and to reread and rewrite Heian period texts in order to trace the contours of resistance they present to the employment of Western canonical terms of appropriation (novel, lyric, hero/heroine, [fully rounded] character, plot, first/third-person narration, and so on) deployed in unquestioned and only ironically unmasked strategies of reading. (6)

The question is, what does his re-vision allow us to see? I would present his treatment of the *Ise Monogatari* as an example. The *Ise Monogatari* is typical of many classical Japanese texts in that it does not fit traditional Western literary categories. It is indeterminate in genre — half poetry anthology, half a collection of narrative vignettes. It intimates a biographical connection with one poet, Ariwara Narihira, but is inconsistent in maintaining that biographical line. A plethora of variant texts offer different beginnings. The text confounds us with its non-linearity. Truly, it is a text that, as Okada remarks, "effectively resists recuperation by any and all totalizing and unifying maneuvers" (131). Consequently, from a traditional Western perspective it tends to appear insubstantial and its honored place in the canon of Japanese literature seems frankly baffling.

Okada begins by doing a brilliant close reading of the opening sequence of the *Ise Monogatari* that displays the full complexity of the text. As Okada spins out the threads of intertextuality and genealogy, the *Ise Monogatari* comes to life; we see the interwoven worlds of the text. The relation between poetry and prose in the *Ise Monogatari* has until now in Western scholarship been cast in terms of the prose providing the context and the poems being the crystallization of the emotion evoked in that setting. Okada's attention to intertextuality yields a radically different interpretation:

By laying bare its mechanisms, the *Ise* intertextuality openly denies diegetic movement. Rather than "culminating" points as is commonly thought, poems represent a denial of teleology and a dispersal of signification. Waka are constituted by signifying networks that always enable further textual moments. (138)

When one views the Japanese classical poetry tradition from this perspective, it is no longer so puzzling why poets found ample space to create even though they kept to short forms and a narrow range of topics and treatments. In short, one feels as though a new door of perception into this literature has opened up. What Okada does for the *Ise*, he also does for the *Genji* and other texts as well.

This work is the first attempt in English to convey the specificity of the language used in the Heian texts. Okada describes in some detail the function of the modal narrative suffixes *ki* and *keri* in classical Japanese in order to explain the phenomenon of "tenselessness" in Heian narratives. Here is a place where he recapitulates his description.

refers to prior moments, but they are always anchored to the spatiotemporal coordinates of the particular moment in question. What happened once has relevance not as an always already reified, abstractable past point in linear time, but as the narrating moment continually represents it in a deictically determinate now. (179)

This discussion may not be easy to follow for those unfamiliar with classical Japanese but Okada's descriptions themselves should intrigue and his translations of excerpts do give some sense of how this can be modelled in English. Here is an example of Okada's version of the opening of the *Genji*.

In which/whose reign [might it be/have been]? Among the many senior consorts (nyougo) and junior consorts (kaui) in attendance stands one not from the highest ranks and blessed far more than the others with the emperor's affection. The various women who have harbored high hopes for themselves from the beginning of their tenure at court look down upon the amazing upstart with feelings of resentment; even more restless are those junior consorts equal in rank to her or lower. (183)

Compare this with the translation of the same passage by Edward Seidensticker,

In a certain reign there was a lady not of the first rank whom the emperor loved more than any of the others. The grand ladies with high ambitions thought her a presumptuous upstart, and lesser ladies were still more resentful. (qtd. in Okada 184-85)

I trust this suffices to show that we are missing something quite critical in the narrative style when the story is reconstructed into the simple past. Indeed, Okada's renderings, though one might not want to emulate the thickets of brackets, suggest fruitful paths for experimental ways of translating Heian Japanese.

Okada also throws light onto the issue of female authorship in the Heian period. His first chapter on the *Genji* is entitled, "Situating the Female Hand" and in it he emphasizes the importance of the *zuryo* "provincial governor" class background to the author of the *Genji* and her audience. He picks up the thread of genealogical connections first introduced in the chapter on the *Ise Monogatari* and suggests how the women of the *zuryo* class were connected in sympathies with members of aristocratic families who had been persecuted by the Fujiwara clan. These women may be seen as resisting Fujiwara hegemony even as they served it. Okada brings out the salon atmosphere in which the *Genji* was produced, drawing on the works of the Japanese scholar, Tamagami Takuya, to emphasize the oral quality of the tale literature in the Heian period. The fact that the tale was read aloud may explain why there are so many variant texts of the *Genji* since the readers may have added exegesis or comments that worked their way into the text. Thinking outside the traditional Western notion of the sole author/creator enables us to picture a much livelier literary scene than previously imagined. Throughout this section on the female hand, Okada avoids treating the author and her cohort either anachronistically as proto-feminists or describing them stereotypically as oppressed, rather he attends carefully to the very

As the title of the work indicates, Okada's key point of focus is the notion of resistance. He states in his introduction,

I find in the three texts a position of "resistance," a term that I employ as a mutual emblem for many of the issues with which I deal throughout the present study. In one urgent sense of the term, the Heian texts themselves have almost always presented resistances to their appropriation by both Japanese and non-Japanese readers; the issue becomes even more timely now in the context of cross cultural readings, interdisciplinary questionings, and postmodern, poststructuralist problematics. In another obvious sense the texts represent or situate figures who *openly* resist, who assume (or are made to assume) positions of resistance, or who participate in resisting configurations that govern their narrative constructions. (14)

The point about the texts representing figures who resist is well substantiated by Okada's study. I take issue however with the statement that the Heian texts presented resistance to their appropriation by Japanese and non-Japanese readers. First, to deal with appropriation by Japanese readers, it can be said be that the *Ise Monogatari*, for example, has been appropriated by Japanese readers for centuries. It is woven into the *Genji* in many places. Moreover, it has provided material for waka poets and screen painters, even gardeners, right up to the present. I suppose what is in question here is the relation between intertextuality and appropriation.

Then, looking at the case of resistance to appropriation by non-Japanese readers, where is the resistance actually located? I would say the resistance is in the Western reader as a result of a culturally set way of viewing the world. In another place, Okada says:

The *Ise monogatari* text also enacted resistance to commonly accepted ways of collecting poems (public and private): it created and moved within an eccentric poetic space that self-consciously destabilized such notions as biography, history and fiction, and poetic authorship.

Okada does not make specific the source of these "notions" but they must be the Western ones. Does not having the texts presented as resisting our Western notions still hint of valorizing the Western positions? It is also somehow anachronistic to think of the texts resisting Western notions, because at the time of their composition they unfolded into a universe where those clearly defined categories did not exist.

Something else that is a little disturbing is the equation of appropriation with colonization; this usage risks making any interpretive move the equivalent of an act of violence. What of Okada's own elucidations? I feel they open these texts up so we get a sense of their infinite plenitude and wondrous "difference." Does this too become the slippery path down to "colonizing" them? On the other hand, perhaps it is Okada's intention to have his work occasion just this sort of inquiry. Engagement with this notion of resistance keeps us in the question and does not allow us to come to comfortable closure.

own key term, it resists easy summation. The back jacket quotes Edward Fowler as saying this is "one of the two or three most important studies of Japanese literature ever written" and I would agree. However, it is not a book one would blithely recommend to one's undergraduate students. Scholars of comparative literature who are familiar with the theoretical approaches informing the book but unfamiliar with Japanese literature will find that the study gives them tantalizing views of a literature which is quite "other" and yet seemingly in synch with the postmodern situation. Scholars of classical Japanese literature, on the other hand, may find themselves more open to theoretical approaches they might have been resisting or simply not have explored yet. In this way, the book lays down a solid brick in the bridge between cultures. (SONJA ARNTZEN, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*JEAN-MARC MOURA. *Lire l'exotisme*. Paris: Dunod, 1992. 238 pp. FFR 88.00

Le projet de Jean-Marc Moura s'annonce de taille: tenter de suivre l'évolution de la notion même de l'exotisme à travers les âges tout en soulignant les aspects théoriques aussi bien que les traits stylistiques et poétiques. Dans le contexte qui lui est donné, l'auteur essaie tant bien que mal de couvrir l'immense panorama relatif à la littérature exotique allant du Moyen Âge à la période contemporaine, ce qui justifie une abondante anthologie commentée des textes essentiels de ce genre particulier où se cotoient des auteurs aussi éclectiques que Racine ou Jean-Marie Le Clézio. Le livre, lui-même peut se diviser en trois parties, si on laisse de côté l'anthologie. La première partie examine les notions mises en jeu par la représentation de l'étranger (exotisme). La deuxième partie est consacrée exclusivement à une histoire de la littérature exotique tandis que la troisième partie analyse les traits stylistiques et poétiques des oeuvres. Plus précisément, cette partie se donne pour but de cerner les particularités de toutes les écritures de l'exotisme.

Dans un premier temps, Jean-Marc Moura nous montre que l'exotisme repose sur la dialectique même/autre où l'objet étranger devient l'objet même de la recherche souvent développée dans le contexte d'un voyage. À partir de là, il dégage deux types, l'un étant lié aux stéréotypes qui abondent dans la littérature contemporaine et l'autre représentant une forme narratologique où l'auteur s'efface pour décrire l'altérité. Notons qu'il introduit par cette occasion la notion de l'altérité duelle qu'il élaborera dans la troisième partie du livre. La structure qui unit et consolide le travail de Moura demeure l'histoire et il y revient constamment pour élaborer des concepts différents tels que celui de l'espace et de la temporalité qu'il va illustrer dans un système littéraire chronologique. En effet, selon l'auteur, l'exotisme littéraire (comprendons qu'il s'agit ici d'une littérature qui trouve son origine presque exclusivement en Europe) est basé sur la culture européenne et ses conceptions fondamentales par rapport à l'espace et au temps. En d'autres mots, la notion de voyage qui constitue à un certain niveau, une notion spatiale, évolue à travers le temps. Ainsi dans les textes médiévaux, l'espace textuel n'est pas celui de la perception sensorielle mais il obéit à une hiérarchie des valeurs, des temps et l'espace

gardent presque totalement une dimension mythique. Le voyage se fait dans un espace clos où les valeurs ne sont qu'une projection de l'idéal humain hanté par les dieux. Dans ce contexte, la notion de la couleur locale est inexistante, ce qui fait que l'exotisme au Moyen Âge se réduit à rien.

Avec Rabelais, l'espace littéraire va correspondre à la perception et le temps va être celui de la datation et de la mesure. Ainsi, le mot "exotique" va apparaître pour la première fois dans le *Quart-Livre*. Le XVIII^e siècle va être témoin de notions géographiques, topologiques et botaniques telles qu'elles sont présentées dans *Paul et Virginie* de Bernardin de Saint-Pierre. L'espace s'humanise à tel point qu'au XIX^e siècle, nous aurons jusqu'à un certain point, l'exotisme du réalisme. Finalement au XX^e siècle, Moura développe l'idée selon laquelle l'espace exotique contemporain est poétique et métaphysique, cela grâce à l'étendue du progrès technologique en termes de communication. Cette première partie s'achève sur une classification des différents types d'exotismes allant de la fantaisie exotique où survient les clichés et autres stéréotypes à l'écriture de l'altérité telle que la conçoit Victor Segalen. Entre ces deux extrêmes, Moura développe deux autres types: le réalisme de l'étrange qui englobe une conception traditionnelle de l'exotisme et le réalisme rêveur où nous retrouvons des auteurs tels que Baudelaire ou Bernardin de Saint-Pierre.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, plus mécanique, a pour tâche d'examiner de plus près la notion de l'étranger à travers différentes périodes. Moura nous démontre que le monde géographique médiéval se restreint au bassin méditerranéen et à la civilisation islamique et que l'arabe est perçu comme l'infidèle. La découverte de l'Extrême Orient en littérature ne fera que confirmer la notion selon laquelle tout être non-européen est un objet de curiosité. La Renaissance sera le témoin d'un changement très lent mais aussi très profond de la mentalité européenne où la conception médiévale d'un monde connaissable et théologiquement fixé sera abandonnée au profit d'une perception différente de la réalité physique et humaine. L'Orient théâtrale du XVII^e siècle comme illustré dans *Bajazet* demeure un décor sans épaisseur. Le classicisme qui prône l'idée de l'impersonnalité et de l'universalité, explique ce refus de la couleur locale et ce n'est qu'au XVIII^e siècle que les récits de voyages inciteront la comparaison avec les autres civilisations. Au delà de la mode, les philosophes vont se servir de l'exotisme comme distanciation par rapport à leur société. Jean-Marc Moura déduit qu'il y a un changement dans le roman "qui va cesser d'être simple thématique de l'imaginaire pour s'intéresser à la réalité dans ce qu'elle a de concret" (67). De ce fait, le paysage n'apparaît pas pour lui-même mais aide à prôner l'idée de la fidélité au spectacle de la nature.

Au XIX^e siècle, les romantiques et les parnassiens vont cultiver le thème exotique mais la fin-de-siècle verra un certain désenchantement dans ce domaine. D'un côté, il y a les récits où le pays étranger est un espace régi par le seul principe du plaisir et de l'autre, règnent les clichés de l'occident novateur versus l'Orient endormi d'où la thématique de la supériorité occidentale qui va de paire avec l'expansion coloniale. Dans cette évolution de la notion d'exotisme, Moura souligne les débuts de l'exotisme intérieur où "les thèmes du voyages et de

l'exotisme ont moins pour fonction de témoigner d'une expérience précise que de signifier les valeurs spirituelles dont ils sont l'enjeu" (79). Bref, le périple exotique devient un moyen d'échapper au spleen. Si au début du XX^e siècle, l'exotisme glorifie la politique d'extension, la deuxième moitié du siècle verra l'inspiration exotique demeurer à l'écart des grands mouvements littéraires français.

La troisième partie, plus théorique, a pour but de cerner la problématique de l'écriture exotique en examinant les caractéristiques formelles de la fantaisie exotique et du réalisme de l'étrange. Puis, en examinant la fonction de la description dans les oeuvres relatives à l'exotisme, Jean-Marc Moura mettra en évidence le style ainsi que la poétique du réalisme rêveur et de l'écriture de l'altérité. En d'autres mots, cette partie examine plus en profondeur les quatre types d'exotisme: la fantaisie exotique, le réalisme de l'étrange, le réalisme rêveur et l'écriture de l'altérité.

La fantaisie exotique, illustration parfaite d'un exotisme primaire, est composée de traits définissant par avance l'étranger tels que les clichés et les stéréotypes. Notons que l'auteur rattache cette utilisation du cliché à un projet idéologique notamment à l'utilisation d'un lexique relatif à des notions de pouvoir, de religion et de moeurs. L'auteur poursuit son exposé en y joignant une analyse de la fonction de la description qui a, entre autres, pour but de transformer le lisible en visible, ce qui nous mène au réalisme rêveur qui n'est autre qu'une recherche poussée du pittoresque. Cependant, c'est en abordant la notion de l'écriture de l'altérité que Jean-Marc Moura exulte car se basant sur les théories de Victor Segalen dans *Essai sur l'exotisme*, il déclare qu'on ne peut décrire l'autre s'il est vraiment autre. À ce niveau, l'exotisme en recherchant l'authenticité de l'autre de même que son impénétrabilité ne peut que demeurer une littérature de mystère. Transcender les barrières qui procède d'un souci de représentation de l'autre qui échappe aux conventions du pittoresque traditionnel ne pourrait que rapprocher l'écrivain de l'ethnologue. Selon Moura, quand l'écriture de l'altérité rejoint l'ethnographie, on est proche de quitter les lettres pour les sciences humaines. D'ailleurs, il annonce que l'avenir de l'exotisme moderne résiderait plus, par la force des choses, que dans l'évocation du lointain intérieur. (BRUNO CUNÑIAH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*JÁNOS RIESZ et ALAIN RICARD, eds. *Semper aliquid novi. Littérature Comparaée et Littératures d'Afrique. Mélanges offerts à Albert Gérard*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1990.

The *Festschrift* as a genre is in itself a *mélange*; articles written in honour of a person may or may not have any interconnection; they may or may not have a theme in common. The editors of this particular *Festschrift* have, however, been able to bring together articles that, by and large, focus on a few common areas. This is achieved by making Albert Gérard the centre point.

The opening articles place Gérard's research in the history of scholarship and systematize it into three categories: Renaissance and Baroque literature; Compara-

de genèse et de développement des genres." Here, the editors have found the structure of the *Festschrift*. Theories in Comparative Literature, then, provide the thread connecting most of the articles, and since several articles take Gérard's work as a starting point, a unity is achieved that is unusual for a book of a genre normally characterized by fragmentation. The articles pay tribute to Albert Gérard by demonstrating his immense importance to Comparative Literature and to African literature. The best articles combine these two fields.

Thirty-five articles, presented in three languages (French, English, and German), are distributed over four sections, of which the sections on "Théorie et méthodologie de la littérature comparée" and "Littérature d'Afrique" are the most substantial in more than one sense. Articles in the former section often choose African material as a point of departure for a theoretical discussion, and, similarly, the articles in the latter section often explicitly relate their comparisons to general theory. Thus, the unity of the book is further enhanced and makes a reading from the first page to the last worthwhile, not only for a reviewer.

In the section on "Théorie et méthodologie de la littérature comparée" the contributions range over a vast area, from basic concepts and strategies of interpretation to handy quantitative charts for evaluating the *reputation* of individual authors. The issue of language is discussed from different angles. The notion of national literature rests on the assumption of a mono-lingual nation state with a written literature. Some articles, such as James Arnold's "Caribbean Literature/Comparative Literature" and José Lambert's "À la recherche de cartes mondiales des littératures," amply demonstrate, however, that certain literatures cannot be seen as national in the sense used by a Eurocentric body of theory. As long as the present Western notion of national literatures is upheld, many literatures and oratures are evaluated by irrelevant standards or simply brushed aside by comparatists.

Language is central also to another problem addressed. Priscilla P. Ferguson's "Littérature comparée et francophonie" and Michel Hauser's "Rabearivelo critique" show that French as a colonial language is above all the language of the army, the administration and education, and that it forces users stemming from other national literatures to work with and reflect attitudes, values and cultural forms particular to this type of language. Even against their explicit aim, francophone African writers are forced to succumb to the French national identity advocating "l'universalité de la culture française." It seems, then, that an Amos Tutuola would not be possible in French.

Several articles can be understood as addressing questions like "What is comparable to what? And what does it take to make comparisons?," and gradually the articles that do not address these questions make the reader do so. As could be expected, various answers are indicated, but already the scepticism expressed by the authors towards their chosen method is gratifying, and so a clear answer is not always to be preferred to a tentative one or to leaving the issue open, which would make the reader, too, question his/her own assumptions.

A reading of the entire section on theory and methodology makes obvious the

shortcomings of general — read Eurocentric — comparative methods when applied to non-European material. Eurocentrism comes across — and is made to come across — clearly.

In the section on "Littératures d'Afrique," I have read two articles with special interest; one is Jean Derive's "L'Oralité africaine ou 'La littérature en kit'." Derive joins the scholars who question the notion that the only difference between orature and literature is the act of writing. Derive's studies show that it is not possible to deduce the genre to which the text belongs from the properties inherent in the discourse alone; the context is equally important. This context is often not verbal at all but expressed entirely in non-verbal, social codes. In such cases it is then the understanding of the listeners that helps establish the genre, and understanding is generated by the event as a whole. As a result, Derive can explain why certain phrases or even whole stanzas recur in texts belonging to different genres, where the genres have been established internally by the audience. Markers indicating a genre are found not on the semantic level of the text, as in Western literature, but in the social event generating the text.

In his "Orality, literacy and African literature" Abiola Irele, too, discusses similarities and differences between orature and literature. Do the different ways of communicating the texts — orally and in writing — reflect different modes of thought or modes of culture as well? Like Derive, Irele concludes that literature is defined in relation to a context, not in relation to its form of communication alone. He concludes that "orality proposes a dynamic conception of literature, one which envisages literature as *text in situation*." It is the communal event as a whole that makes orature (according to Derive, it is this whole that establishes the genre), and orature is no less valuable than literature. It is just that it operates according to a quite different set of rules. Therefore, literature and orature cannot be compared just like that. But, says Irele, a new and creative tension is generated when African authors try to make literature communicate the same message as orature, not only as a coded message but also as an event.

It is a pity that the section on theatre does not address this kind of problem. We lose sight of Albert Gérard, and, as a consequence, the connecting thread is lost too. The articles strive in all directions, and we are left with the typical *mélange* of the *Festschrift* genre. In the theatre section Erika Fischer-Lichte's article is the only one of interest from a theoretical point of view, and Jeanne N. Dingome's from an African point of view. Fischer-Lichte analyses the internal needs which have informed the *mise en scène* of plays from other cultures, whether they be Ibsen's plays in Japan or Japanese plays in Germany. Her interest is not focused on the transition from oral to written communication, or from written to oral, as in a staging process, within the same culture, but on the transition occasioned by importation from an alien culture to one's own. Even so, her neat distinction between cultures and her needs-based analysis could be used far outside her chosen scope.

Dingome's article "Ritual and modern expression in Cameroon: the plays of Werewere-Liking" touches upon the negative effects stemming from the reliance

on European models. Again, it is pointed out that French conventions embedded in the French language make writers "adopt an outsider's perspective." In Werewere-Liking's work Dingome finds an outstanding exception. Linking's frequent use of rituals in her dramas is seen as an African hallmark; a means to promote a national identity; and a main contrast to the present-day European theatre striving towards realism. In her enthusiasm, however, Dingome tends to over-emphasize the differences between Liking's ritual dramas and European theatre, which makes the reader reluctant to agree with her at times. The concept of ritual as related to theatre and drama is frequently discussed by scholars in different fields, but in Dingome's article there are no traces of these discussions. This entire field is, however, highly interesting and promising, and much remains to be explored on a larger scale.

It is areas such as basic comparative strategies, relations between orature and literature, and transitions from oral to written or from written to oral communication, treated in many of the articles, that lend a unity to the *Festschrift* to Albert Gérard and make reading it worthwhile. (KACKE GÖTRICK)

*LÉON-FRANÇOIS HOFFMANN. *Haïti: lettres et l'être*. Toronto: Éditions du GREF 1992. 371 pp.

Haïti: lettres et l'être, quatrième volume de Léon-François Hoffmann sur la littérature et la culture haïtiennes, se présente, au mieux, dans la tradition des travaux d'érudition et de dissémination consacrés aux littératures francophones d'Auguste Viatte et de Robert Comevin; et, au pire, dans celle d'un curieux dilettantisme hérité de Charles de Montesquieu. L'objectif recherché depuis le premier volume, *Le Roman haïtien* (1982), et poursuivi dans *Essays on Haitian Literature* (1986) et *Haïti: couleurs, croyances, créole* (1989), est didactique et bienveillant. Il s'agit de valoriser l'image d'Haïti aux yeux d'un monde indifférent ou hostile: "je voudrais en même temps faire mieux comprendre et mieux connaître cette société haïtienne (*Le Roman haïtien*, 9); "at least counterbalance somewhat the negative image foreigners have of the country" (*Essays*, 10); "mieux faire connaître ... la culture d'un pays dont le cinéma, la presse, les informations radiophoniques ou télévisées perpétuent et renforcent complaisamment une image placée, pour des raisons bien précises, sous le signe de l'insolite et du dérisoire" (*Haïti: lettres*, 7).

D'entrée de jeu dans son plus récent volume, M. Hoffmann se défend de faire œuvre de "contre-propagande" (9). La perspective privilégiée est de comprendre une culture par le biais de sa littérature conçue non pas "comme un exercice gratuit de l'imagination créatrice" (10) mais sous l'angle d'un discours social intégrant toutes les disciplines humaines se servant de l'écrit. De dire l'auteur: "Dans cette optique l'histoire, c'est-à-dire la façon dont les hommes imaginent et interprètent ce qu'ils retiennent de leur passé, ne me semble pas différer intrinsèquement de la fiction" (10). Le "regard sur l'étranger" (10, en italiques dans le texte), c'est-à-dire l'Haïtien, fonde l'approche et il est proposé comme

lien thématique de l'ouvrage dans le positionnement du sujet devant l'objet d'analyse: le "je" regardant, mais ne se confondant pas avec, "l'autre." Cette dialectique de la distance du double renvoie aux dichotomies littérature-culture, paraître-être, qui problématisent la perspective: "Si mon sous-titre est "lettres et l'être," ce n'est pas seulement pour le plaisir de faire un jeu de mots facile. J'ai voulu indiquer que j'espérais cerner "l'être," autrement dit la réalité haïtienne, derrière le "paraître," dont les lettres sont l'expression privilégiée" (10).

L'enjeu, dont nous venons de résumer l'*avant-propos*, est de taille. Après une introduction qui juxtapose francophilie et nationalisme culturel, il est développé sous quatre grandes divisions: thèmes; oeuvres; Haïti et les Français; histoire. La première regroupe trois essais sur l'image de la femme dans la poésie; l'étranger dans le roman; et l'Afrique dans l'"imagination collective." La seconde se subdivise en quatre volets: un premier a pour objet le plus ancien roman, paru en 1859; et, subséquemment, suivent une analyse d'un roman de Jacques Roumain, *Gouverneurs de la rosée*; une autre d'un récit de Jacques-Stéphane Alexis; et une description de la production romanesque de 1979 à 1988. La troisième division rassemble deux textes: l'un traitant du regard de Lamartine et de Michelet sur Haïti; l'autre, de celui de Victor Hugo. La dernière division comprend deux essais sur le vaudou et ses incidences sur la révolution haïtienne, suivis de la reproduction du "journal intime" d'un négociant américain tenu en 1807 dans une ville de province. Cette note clôt la thématique "[qui] permettra de constater que le regard d'un commerçant anglo-saxon peut ne différer guère de celui d'un homme de lettres français" (11), affirme l'auteur.

On aura compris qu'*Haïti: lettres et l'être*, à l'instar de ses deux prédécesseurs immédiats dans les travaux de M. Hoffmann sur le même sujet, est un recueil d'essais. Ces essais, dont plusieurs se retrouvent en traduction dans *Essays on Haitian Literature* (e.g. l'image de la femme dans la poésie; l'analyse du roman de 1859; l'étranger dans le roman), et en version originale dans *Haïti: couleurs, croyances, créole* (e.g. l'Afrique dans l'"imagination collective"; francophilie et nationalisme culturel; le vaudou et la révolution haïtienne), ont d'abord paru dans des revues telles que *Présence africaine*, *Études littéraires*, *Esprit créateur*, *Notre librairie* et d'autres au cours des trente dernières années (le plus ancien, "l'image de la femme dans la poésie haïtienne," en 1960-61, dans *Présence africaine*). Pour quiconque s'interrogerait sur la pertinence de regrouper des écrits moins que récents et déjà publiés sous forme de volumes, l'auteur s'en remet à son éditeur: "C'est lui qui m'a persuadé de l'opportunité de mettre à la disposition des amis d'Haïti des essais *difficiles à réunir*" (13, c'est nous qui soulignons). Pour quiconque, averti de ces travaux disponibles sous forme de volumes ou revues en librairie ou, du moins, en bibliothèque, il se manifeste une nette impression de redondance et de dilution intellectuelle de la valeur de la bienveillance, au détriment de la nouveauté dans l'éclairage.

Dans son *avant-propos*, seul texte original de l'ouvrage, M. Hoffmann fait une brève référence à une approche moderne, post-structuraliste, "déconstructrice," qui depuis quelques décennies a renouvelé non seulement l'approche critique du texte mais aussi la dialectique du culturel impliquant sujet et objet, surtout

lorsque cette dernière s'inscrit dans une problématique de la *différence*. Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Todorov, pour ne citer que les principaux théoriciens et praticiens de cette approche, ne sont pas nommés mais c'est bien leur influence qui est reconnue: "Ce n'est pas dire que les meilleurs textes littéraires haïtiens soient indignes de l'attention déconstructrice prêtée à ceux de la métropole" (10). L'auteur de poursuivre: "bien au contraire, et il faut souhaiter qu'on ne tarde plus à la leur accorder. Mais là n'est pas mon propos" (10, c'est nous qui soulignons). Pourquoi pas? Une réponse à cette question serait inhérente à la chronologie des textes regroupés dans *Haïti: lettres et l'être*, dont la majorité paraissent durant les années soixante-dix. Elle serait fallacieuse dans la mesure où les principales thèses post-structuralistes (*Mythologies*, de Barthes; *L'Écriture et la différence*, de Derrida; *Les Mots et les choses*, de Foucault) précèdent et sont largement répandues dans cette décennie. Même la notion du "regard," centralisé dans la problématique de l'*avant-propos*, ignore la révision proposée par Todorov dans *La Conquête de l'Amérique: la question de l'autre* (1982).

Plutôt, il y a double choix ou préférence de la part du chercheur: le modèle positiviste adopté de Viatte et Cornevin, et celui du voyageur du Siècle des Lumières; le premier est défendable, à la rigueur, le second le serait moins. Évoquant l'héritage de Montesquieu (ses *Lettres persanes*, de 1721, auxquelles le sous-titre *Lettres et l'être* fait évidemment allusion), M. Hoffmann substitue "l'être haïtien" à "l'être persan" et pose un regard nul doute fasciné et curieux, comme son modèle, sur l'*étranger*, l'*autre* distinct de soi, mystérieux sinon "insolite." Pour Todorov, même si "je est un autre. Mais les autres sont des je aussi: des sujets comme moi, que seul mon point de vue, pour lequel tous sont là-bas et je suis seul ici, sépare et distingue vraiment de moi" (*La Conquête*, 11). On chercherait en vain une telle remise en question dans l'amalgame culturel fait de "l'autre" dans *Haïti: lettres et l'être*, réduit au vocabulaire de "psychologie collective" (79, 81), "imagination collective" (129) ou "mentalité collective" (144).

Par ailleurs, s'en tentant aux faits et non pas à des extrapolations abusives et impressionnistes, l'ouvrage de M. Hoffmann reflète les acquis du positivisme en histoire littéraire: travail minutieux d'archives (la "trouvaille" du journal d'un commerçant américain); la vérification des faits (l'historique du "serment du Bois-Caïman"); le souci de la continuité (l'expression "amis d'Haïti," 13, faisant écho à la "Société des amis des Noirs" anti-esclavagiste, fondée en 1753); et, finalement, le projet de dissémination de la connaissance.

Haïti: lettres et l'être est un livre divisé dans sa démarche et méthode. Un des termes de la dichotomie méthodologique, son "regard" anachronique, met à risque une somme de travail néanmoins exemplaire quant à l'effort consenti et l'intérêt indéniablement soutenu pour son sujet. (MAX DORSINVILLE, MCGILL UNIVERSITY)

*ROBERT LECKER, ed. *Canadian Canons: Essays in Literary Value*. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991. Can \$ 16.95

La problématique de la canonicité des oeuvres littéraires connaît depuis quelques années un nouvel engouement dans le milieu de la critique universitaire américaine et canadienne qu'il faut sans doute attribuer, pour une bonne part, au processus de repositionnement disciplinaire des études littéraires sous l'influence, notamment, des "Cultural Studies" et des divers procès de déconstruction qui jalonnent cette entreprise de critique de la tradition. Coïncidant avec la crise plutôt générale de l'humanisme considéré longtemps comme fondement du discours culturel et académique, cette critique des divers canons littéraires sert de point d'ancrage à la critique universitaire pour réfléchir non seulement sur son passé, mais aussi sur les enjeux éthiques posés par la transmission des oeuvres de la littérature contemporaine. On peut ainsi reconnaître dans cet intérêt le symptôme d'une crise institutionnelle de l'objet littéraire traditionnel bousculé par l'évolution même du discours épistémologique dans les sciences humaines. À l'horizon de cette crise se situe la question toujours ouverte du sens de l'histoire succédant, pour le dire comme Lyotard, à la fin des méta-récits de légitimation inhérente à la structure épistémologique du capitalisme avancé.

Le livre édité par Robert Lecker sur la formation du canon canadien montre pertinemment les enjeux que l'on peut dire éthico-esthétiques de ce passage entre une conception humaniste, nationale et mimétique de la littérature et, une autre, jouant de l'incertitude des frontières entre les genres, les parodiant également pour déstabiliser le discours dominant qui règle la représentation du sujet (canadien) dans l'histoire. Cette rupture constitue, comme le remarque R. Lecker, l'un des fils conducteurs des analyses contenues dans ce volume: "We have seen that the canon is frequently viewed as representing a dream of national unity, hierarchical tradition, or centralist notions of coherence and order. The assumption behind this reading of the canon is that representation itself is a 'value'" (14). À cet égard, les analyses de L. Surette ("Creating the Canadian Canon") et de D. McCarthy ("Early Canadian Literary Histories and the Function of a Canon") sont très convaincantes. Les études de D. Salter et de R.P. Knowles sur le théâtre canadien montrent également la prédominance de l'inscription nationale dans le procès de la représentation. De même, dans une perspective féministe, C. Gerson retrace la position essentiellement phallogocentrique du discours canonique canadien. Sur la scène québécoise, S. Simon, analyse très bien comment s'opère cette coupure épistémologique entre le national et le pluralisme dans le discours de P. Nepveu. Dans l'ensemble, on peut donc dire que cette critique de la mimésis traditionnelle rejoint le discours de la déconstruction de la métaphysique de l'identité en soulignant avec emphase que l'objet de la représentation (littéraire ou autre) ne relève pas d'une *nature*, mais d'une *construction* et que, ce faisant, il implique des jugements de valeurs qui sont fondés, pour l'essentiel, sur le principe d'une subjectivité parfaitement autonome quant à son inscription dans le monde. Position que l'on dirait aujourd'hui être celle d'un sujet moderniste alors que l'espace social et politique

canadien a changé pour se faire multiculturel déjouant ainsi la mise sur pied d'un certain procès identitaire.

Cette réflexion sur le canon canadien intervient donc au moment même où, sur la scène institutionnelle, le discours de la postmodernité s'impose de plus en plus comme la nouvelle valeur d'usage de la littérature. Il s'agit donc d'un livre très riche d'enseignement en ce qu'il se propose de faire l'archéologie du discours de la fondation littéraire canadienne depuis le XIX^e siècle. J'ai tout particulièrement apprécié l'article de S. Scobie qui démontre aussi pertinemment l'incertitude de l'opposition modernisme/postmodernisme lorsqu'il s'agit de lire les oeuvres de P. Webb et de L. Cohen.

Cela dit, cette opposition mimésis-construction ne risque-t-elle pas de retomber dans les apories du discours relativiste où le sujet a du mal à trouver des critères pour fonder la valeur d'une construction imaginaire et discursive (plutôt qu'une autre) pour la transmettre au fil de l'histoire? Question que je laisse ouverte pour souligner la difficulté où se trouve la critique aujourd'hui de se faire à la fois anti-métaphysicienne et anti-relativiste. La postmodernité n'est-elle pas d'ailleurs ce champ de bataille des discours contre la mimésis identitaire affirmant, au contraire de cette dernière, le pluralisme des identifications et la dissémination des discours dans l'histoire? Or le discours du pluralisme et du respect des différences semble aujourd'hui le discours dominant. Cela n'est pas cependant sans créer des effets quelque peu pervers où, au nom de la différence, le discours redevient censure, comme c'est le cas notamment avec le mouvement "politically correct." On a sans doute raison d'affirmer le pluralisme comme valeur fondamentale du *socius*, mais du même souffle ne surgit-il pas la question du jeu de langage (du jugement) susceptible de lier légitimement ces divers discours sur une place publique ou un forum où ils peuvent encore s'entendre au nom d'un projet commun? Difficile question s'il en est une et qui demeure peut-être sous-jacente aux combats exacerbés de la reconnaissance des différences. Comment, en d'autres mots, tenir le discours du lien, serait-il minimal ou celui d'une communauté inavouable, sans se faire accuser à la minute même de totalitarisme?

Sur un plan purement philosophique, cette opposition du Même et de l'Autre (du centre et de la marge, de la totalisation et du fragmentaire) qui traverse tout le discours critique sur le processus de canonisation me semble problématique par endroits dans la mesure où l'on soumet la lecture des oeuvres au seul jugement de la philosophie de l'histoire sans trop se préoccuper aussi de la logique du désir qui déterminent ces oeuvres. Cela nous donne sans doute une nouvelle histoire de la littérature anti-totalisante, mais qui ne se préoccupe guère de faire entendre la singularité d'une voix qui advient par l'écriture. De ce point de vue, j'aurais aimé retrouver dans ce livre une étude textuelle proprement dite par où aurait pu se dire *aussi* comment il arrive que l'oeuvre littéraire ré-invente la langue, là où précisément elle n'est peut-être que le désir de cet événement sans cesse recommencé dans l'histoire.

Pour le dire comme Proust, dialoguant avec Sainte-Beuve, l'écrivain écrit aussi depuis un autre moi plus profond par où se révèle à lui l'événement de sa

propre écriture comme une «langue étrangère». Proust constitue en effet un bel exemple pour dire cette ré-invention de la langue qui s'oppose, dans son phrasé, à toute l'idéologie canonique de la langue française contenue dans les manuels de l'enseignement de l'écriture. Phrase à la fois trop longue, torsadée, agglutinante et pourtant syntaxiquement rigoureuse où l'objet disparaît et réapparaît comme une anamorphose. Comme si la littérature plutôt que de re-produire ici *ipso facto* le canon de son inscription historique, ré-inventait la langue pour en faire une nouvelle production signifiante issue d'une irréconciliable tension entre la sujétion de l'écrivain au *socius* du discours et l'invention, l'exploration des possibles contenus dans la langue. Il s'agit là peut-être d'une autre perspective qui, plutôt que de mettre d'emblée l'emphasis sur la sujétion de l'écrivain aux formes canoniques du discours, retrace, à même le travail sur la langue, la reconfiguration du monde par l'écrivain.

C'est ce que R. Barthes appelait, par-delà l'indispensable critique de la canonicité, *le texte de jouissance* qui affirme son hétérogénéité, sa singularité ou sa différence irrécupérable. Le texte de plaisir serait peut-être en effet à situer ici, selon Barthes, du côté du canon en ce qu'il est "celui qui contente, emplit, donne de l'euphorie; celui qui vient de la culture, ne rompt pas avec elle, est lié à une pratique *confortable* de la lecture"; alors que le texte de jouissance serait plutôt "celui qui met en état de perte, celui qui déconforte (peut-être jusqu'à un certain ennui), fait vaciller les assises historiques, culturelles, psychologiques, du lecteur, la consistance de ses goûts, de ses valeurs et de ses souvenirs, met en crise son rapport au langage" (R. Barthes, *Le Plaisir du texte*, Paris, Seuil, coll. "Tel Quel," 1973. 25). Ce serait là bien sûr une histoire un peu différente où la lecture viserait davantage les effets de rupture de l'écriture. De là on pourrait aussi penser l'enseignement de la littérature comme une histoire des ruptures et des inventions qui l'accompagnent. Certes, Proust appartient au canon littéraire de la littérature française; mais il y appartient paradoxalement parce qu'il a déstabilisé pour toujours un certain usage de la lecture (de l'écriture) du monde. La question de la problématique du canon canadien et québécois pourrait ainsi se mesurer à celle-ci: qui ré-invente la langue, qui est toujours-déjà celle d'un *socius*, pour en faire quelque chose d'inouï transgressant le mot d'ordre du discours? (JACQUES CARDINAL, UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL)