

- "Einleitung: Zur Geschichte des Utopiebegriffs," Klaus L. Berghahn and Hans Ulrich Seeber, eds. *Literarische Utopien von Morus bis zur Gegenwart*. Königstein: Athenäum, 1983a. 7-23.
- "Bemerkungen zum Begriff 'Gegenutopie'," Klaus L. Berghahn and Hans Ulrich Seeber, eds. *Literarische Utopien von Morus bis zur Gegenwart*. Königstein: Athenäum, 1983b. 163-71.
- Servier, Jean. *Histoire de l'utopie*. Paris: Gallimard, 1967.
- Slusser, George E., George R. Guffey, and Mark Rose, eds. *Bridges to Science Fiction*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1980.
- Staicar, Tom, ed. *Critical Encounters II: Writers and Themes in Science Fiction*. New York: Ungar, 1982.
- Suvin, Darko. "On the Poetics of the Science Fiction Genre," *College English* 34.3 (1972): 372-83.
- "On What Is and What Is not a SF Narration: With a List of 101 Victorian Books that Should Be Excluded from SF Bibliographies," *Science-Fiction Studies* 5 (1978): 45-57.
- *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre*. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1979.
- Todorov, Tzvetan. *Introduction à la littérature fantastique*. Paris: Seuil, 1970.
- Tuzinski, Konrad. *Das Individuum in der englischen devolutionistischen Utopie*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1965.
- Ueding, Gert. "Literatur ist Utopie," Gert Ueding, ed. *Literatur ist Utopie*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978a. 7-14.
- Ueding, Gert, ed. *Literatur ist Utopie*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1978b.
- Walsh, Chad. "Attitudes toward Science in the Modern 'Inverted Utopia'," *Extrapolation* 2 (1961): 23-26.
- Zgorzelski, Andrzej. "Is Science Fiction a Genre of Fantastic Literature?" *Science-Fiction Studies* 6 (1979): 296-303.
- "On Differentiating Fantastic Fiction: Some Supragenological Distinctions in Literature," *Poetics Today* 5.2 (1984): 299-307.
- Zgorzelski, Andrzej, and Marc Angenot. "An Exchange on the Absent Paradigm," *Science-Fiction Studies* 7 (1980): 239-42.

Feminist Deleuzions: James Joyce and the Politics of "Becoming-Woman"

How, finally, should a feminist reader approach Joyce? ... From certain parallax perspectives, Joyce's postmodern *oeuvre* can be envisaged as contiguous with the projects of feminist fabulation. Like *écriture féminine*, his writing annuls classical notions of identity and origin, of metaphysical authority and textual closure. Exploring those schizoid gaps between socially constructed binary oppositions, it plays with an endless dissemination of sexual difference that eludes the Oedipal configurations of patriarchal power.¹

The author of the passage above aligns herself with those readers of Joyce who would reclaim his avant-garde text for feminism, arguing that his writing is not just anti-patriarchal, but "contiguous with the projects of feminist fabulation," "like *écriture féminine*" (cf. Benstock, 1985; Christine Van Boheemen, 1987).² What Suzette Henke's *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* adds to the analyses of French feminists Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva, and to critical applications of their analyses by primarily American scholars, is a reading of Joyce through the anti-Oedipal writings of French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Cixous, 1968, 1984; Kristeva, 1974, 1978, 1980). Henke's celebration of the "schizoid" Joyce³ and the androgynous Bloom, Joyce's "new womanly-man," claims, in part, to present a Deleuzian reading/recuperation for feminist Joyceans. Given that feminists

- 1 Suzette Henke, *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990. Pp. 288 US\$ 14.95) 211. References to this work will be hereafter cited in the text.
- 2 In her entry on Joyce in *The Gender of Modernism* (1990) Bonnie Kime Scott notes that these critics together with Suzette Henke (*Politics of Desire*) "have applied post-structuralist theory, including its feminist versions by Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray [sic], and Hélène Cixous, to Joyce's presentation of the family romance and the writing of a feminine language" (199).
- 3 Henke's use of "schizoid" in the opening quotation is one of several references to "the schizoanalytic positions of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari" (10), that is, to their most celebrated work, *L'Anti-Oedipe* (1972). See also 106, 111, 120, 122, 162.

on either side of the Atlantic and in Australia are just beginning to cultivate an interest in the work of Deleuze and Guattari,⁴ and given my own fascination with the critical implications of their counter-culture strategies, this reading of Henke's book will focus primarily on its challenging introduction to these other French authors.

A JOYCE FOR FEMINISM ... IN THEORY

Certainly one reason which warrants a serious review of this book is its willingness to negotiate a variety of theoretical positions for feminist literary criticism. While applications of theory generally pose methodological, if not ideological, problems for the rigorous critic, Henke risks compromising both theoretical accuracy and critical simplicity to weave new interpretive positions between theories.⁵ Though her interpretive emphasis occasionally shifts from psychoanalytic summary to loosely-based materialist critique, and from theoretical paradigm to close reading, she generally manages an illuminating critical interplay. Her gravest shortcoming is an impressionistic use of different psychoanalytic discourses, mixing references to incompatible projects in sweeping, panoramic statements. For reasons not made clear, the critic adopts a bewilderingly liberal and exhaustive approach:

I make use of a feminist/psychoanalytic methodology that draws freely on the theories of Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, while not excluding other psychological and critical models. Re-visioning Joyce's work from the perspectives of radical feminism, I refer to the writings of Sigmund Freud, Luce Irigaray, and Jane Gallop, as well as to the object-relations psychology of Nancy Chodorow and the schizoanalytic positions of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. I use the term "politics" in the context of "sexual politics" to delineate those struggles and manoeuvres involved in the psychosocial construction of gender. (10)

She points further to her appropriation of such strange political bed-fellows as anti-Freudian humanist Kate Millett, post-structuralist Freudians Hélène Cixous and Alice Jardine, and the Freudian-inspired materialist Toril Moi

(10). But with psychoanalysis, Henke casts her nets wide, and is able to cover all of Joyce's major prose writings with workable notions of desire.

Other good reasons for giving *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* a thoughtful read are the questions it re-poses for those sceptical feminists among Joycean scholars — primary questions such as *why reclaim Joyce for feminism?* — which Bonnie Kime Scott mystifies and suspends in *Joyce and Feminism* (1983): "Reclamation work is one of the core definitions of feminist criticism; it needs to be done early to prepare for new visions" (Scott, 202-03).⁶ Visions notwithstanding, Henke repeats the question, asking "how can a feminist begin to approach the writings of James Joyce?" (1), offering variable approaches and answers throughout the discussion of each chapter. In place of feminist mystique, she argues for strategic ambivalence:

Despite the fact that Joyce has earned a notoriously ambivalent reputation among feminist scholars, I have taken as my premiss the assumption that a reader sensitized to contemporary issues of sexual politics can successfully insinuate her/himself into this particular author's fictional microcosm both as sympathetic narratee and as skeptical respondent. (11)

Accordingly, the feminist reader might appreciate Joyce's gender-bending polymorphous and bisexual perversity while remaining sceptical of his intent to undermine conventional, misogynous stereotypes. Unable to criticize Joyce outright for his "pornography," since this is precisely the device he uses to shatter the pious stronghold of phallogocry, Henke establishes a sympathetic but critical distance from her subject. Unlike Scott, she resists identification with Joyce's vision of women,⁷ and sharpens her double focus on a text that is possibly as anti-woman as it is anti-patriarchal.

Should feminist critics act as Joyce's apologists? Should feminists not overlook but look beyond the evident misogyny of Joyce's text and seek out the other, "feminine" Joyce, thus appropriating a small but significant portion of the male avant-garde canon from which we feel otherwise exiled? Henke recalls the troubling ambivalence of Joycean feminists that Scott supposed she had addressed and resolved:

6 Scott takes her cue from Elaine Showalter who urges feminist critics to "find a new language, a new way of reading that can integrate our intelligence and our experience, our reason and our suffering, our skepticism and our vision" (8).

7 Scott outlines the mimetic specularity of *Joyce and Feminism*, explaining that it "deliberately shifts from contexts to individuals to texts in order to provide a re-vision of women and Joyce, in a fullness of diversity that seems appropriate to Joyce's own shifting vision" (8).

4 Compared to the feminist reception of Derrida, Deleuze has been given very short shrift indeed. Henke is unusual in that she figures Deleuze (and not Derrida) among the theorists whose work she finds most useful to her style of Joycean criticism. Of the few feminist (not always favourable) readers of Deleuze I could find, there are: Jardine (1985); Braidotti (1981); Clément (1980); Irigaray (1977); Studlar (1988); Grosz (forthcoming).

5 Critical ventures which attempt such intertextual theorization are rare. In feminist criticism, De Lauretis (1984) demonstrates most powerfully how different theories may be woven into an effective reading practice.

Feminists from the start have appreciated, with a light suggestion of discomfort, Joyce's depiction of human or female nature — the latter of a culturally induced, stereotypical sort. What they value most in him is not his baffling intricacies, but his mythic, otherworldly, lyrical voice, in which woman transcends her stereotypes. This is readily identified with an alternate female order, which counters male authority and language and predates the father figure that has proved so dominant in twentieth-century society (1983, 132).

Her persistent doubt — *how can a feminist approach Joyce's writings?* — is aimed precisely at this otherworldly certainty. Rejecting feminism's ready seduction by the textual aura of an "alternate female order," Henke insists that we look for the revolutionary poetics; instead of a charismatically feminine Joyce we should discover the politically feminist Joyce, the avant-gardist capable of "forging new psychosexual subject positions in a controversial discourse of desire" (10).⁸ The avant-garde Joyce is the more appropriate subject for enlightened feminists: they can read for the production and representation of "new subject positions" without fear of projecting images of the goddess onto the text and cultivating an uncritical, outmoded essentialism.

In the preliminary pages of Henke's book, the Routledge editors offer their own answer to "Can Joyce be reclaimed for feminism?": "*James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* offers the first feminist/psychoanalytic reassessment of the Joycean canon in the wake of Freud, Lacan, and Kristeva." They point to what must be the most selling reason for giving this study attentive reading: its demonstration of how feminist criticism might extend its use of psychoanalytic theory.

It is not surprising that Henke should make extensive use of Kristeva; Kristeva easily lends her semanalysis of Joyce to feminine/feminist psychoanalytic criticism with statements like this:

Il faut attendre la fin du XIX^e siècle et Joyce, plus que Freud, pour que cette double maternelle, incestueuse, se dise risquée et affolante à même le corps, à même le sexe et que, dans un langage qui "musique dans les lettres", elle reprenne dans le discours

les rythmes, les intonations, les écholalies de la symbiose mère-enfant, intense, préœdipienne, antérieure au père.... (Kristeva 137-47, 145, [1980: 148-58, 157])

More surprising is Henke's use of Deleuze and Guattari, since their "schizoanalytic positions" on desire, while rendering Joyce's fluid language most approachable, hardly rests easily with Kristeva's Lacanism. How do we reconcile the passage quoted above with ones like these from *L'Anti-Oedipe*?

Il est vrai que rien n'est pré-œdipien, et qu'il faut reculer Oedipe au premier âge, mais dans l'ordre d'une répression de l'inconscient. Il est non moins vrai que tout est anœdipien dans l'ordre de la production; qu'il y a du non-œdipien, de l'anœdipien qui commence aussi tôt qu'Oedipe et se poursuit aussi tard, sur un autre rythme, sous un autre régime, dans une autre dimension, avec autres usages de synthèses qui nourrissent l'auto-production de l'inconscient, l'inconscient-orphelin, l'inconscient joueur, l'inconscient méditatif et social (1972, 119-20).

La question qui se pose ici n'est nullement celle d'une importance relative de ce qu'on peut appeler *pré-œdipien* par rapport à Oedipe (car "pré-œdipien" est encore en référence évolutive ou structurale avec Oedipe). La question est celle du caractère absolument *anœdipien* de la production désirante (1972, 53).

By invoking both Kristeva and Deleuze as suitable models for feminist critics, Henke can hardly be charged with being overly doctrinaire. Instead, she raises further questions for feminist ventures in psychoanalytic criticism. Does she advocate reading Joyce, through Kristeva, as the "reprise du territoire maternel dans l'économie même du langage" (Kristeva 149-72, 163; [1980: 124-47, 137]), or, through Deleuze and Guattari, as the "deterritorializing" of desire, the body, the *socius*, and their recordings from the Oedipal (including the so-called pre-Oedipal) domain? Does she advocate a Deleuzian reading of Joyce as schizoanalysis, contrary to the structures and procedures of psychoanalysis, or, does she somehow align Deleuze with Kristeva in a much more modest critique of Oedipal narrative? Does she mistakenly identify the anti-Oedipal with the pre-Oedipal in a move which would conserve the very textual foundations she wishes to show Joyce subverting? Where does she draw the limits to her own analysis which she conceives as revolutionary?

THE CHARACTER OF JOYCEAN TRANSGRESSION: PRE-OEDIPAL OR ANTI-OEDIPAL?

But the voice of authority is radically diffused in the carnivalesque atmosphere of 7 Eccles Street and disrupted by the "thousand break-flows" of pre-Oedipal (and anti-Oedipal) desire that revels in libidinal viscosity: "Flows ooze, they traverse the triangle, breaking apart its vertices." This anarchic ménage brings us, in Deleuzian terms, "yet

8 In *The Gender of Modernism*, Scott programmatically notes those passages in Joyce's oeuvre for readers who have a "particular interest" in "feminine language." She points first to "the most obvious" "Penelope" chapter in *Ulysses* as well as to the section where Gerty Macdowell "takes on the discourse of women's magazines and novels." She claims that "in *Finnegan's Wake*, the language of and about the mother figure, Anna Livia Plurabelle (ALP), merits attention as feminine writing," underlining the parts of the text where ALP "has the final words of the work," "is discussed extensively by gossiping washerwoman," "and as a hen, issues her own mamafesta, which reappears in altered form through much of the work" (199).

another code: everyone is bisexual, everyone has two sexes" in a schizoid world of polymorphous perverse "desiring machines." (162)

From this passage in Chapter five, "Molly Bloom: The Woman's Story," the reader might expect a schizoanalytic reading of Joycean narrative as a whole. But Deleuzian terms are only sporadically (and parenthetically) introduced in Henke's text. Here, as in other chapters, there is a shifting from (Freudian, Lacanian and Kristevan) psychoanalysis to schizoanalysis as if the two analyses were perfectly continuous. In one Deleuzian instance she argues that *Ulysses* "mockingly reproduces the Oedipal triangle of 'Daddy-Mommy-Me' only to shatter and disrupt the dictates of its culturally embedded scenario," followed in the next instance by a reinscription of that crisis in Freudian and Lacanian phantasmatic structures: "Molly and Leopold reciprocally occupy complementary subject-positions of beneficent phallic mother and blissfully dependent *infans*. Each oscillates, by turn, between a subjective articulation of polymorphously perverse desire and the valorizing role of Lacanian *objet a*" (162). Such psychoanalytic polarization and recuperation of desire is precisely what the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* vehemently criticize:

Tout se passe donc comme si Oedipe avait par lui-même deux pôles : un pôle de figures imaginaires identificateurs, un pôle de fonctions symboliques différenciantes. Mais, de toute manière, on est oedipianisé: si l'on n'a pas Oedipe comme crise, on l'a comme structure.... C'est pourquoi ... on a beau remplacer le papa-maman traditionnel par une fonction-mère, une fonction-père, nous ne voyons pas bien ce qu'on y gagne, sauf à fonder l'universalité d'Oedipe au-delà de la variabilité des images.... On sera à peine étonné d'apprendre qu'Oedipe comme structure est la trinité chrétienne, tandis qu'Oedipe comme crise est une trinité familiale insuffisamment structurée par la foi: toujours les deux pôles en raison inverse, Oedipe *for ever!* (1972, 97-98)⁹

It appears that Henke regards the "schizoid position" as one of the two extremes of Oedipus: that is, as its pre-oedipal minimum, tending towards the maternal/material imaginary, the *jouissance* of presence which is the other face of God, the sub-version of the Father's Law of lack and difference. While the Blooms are said to inhabit "a schizoid world of polymorphously perverse 'desire machines,' they are also said to "handle the

9 The authors proceed to elaborate what they view as the Oedipal double bind: "Oedipe trouve ici ses deux extrêmes, son *minimum* et son *maximum*, suivant qu'on le considère comme tendant vers une valeur indifférenciée de ses images variables, ou vers la puissance de différenciation de ses fonctions symboliques. 'Quand on se rapproche de l'imagination matérielle, la fonction différentielle diminue, on tend vers des équivalences; quand on se rapproche des éléments formateurs, la fonction différentielle augmente, on tend vers des valences distinctives'" (98).

Lacanian experience of radical 'lack' by nostalgically endowing one another with theological wholeness and plenitude" (162): accordingly, schizoid desire is but one pole of Oedipal desire, the other being properly phallic.¹⁰

In classical (Freudian) psychoanalytic criticism, the focus is turned on the narrator and/or characters who are then analyzed as mirror reflections of the author's psyche.¹¹ Though avowedly more interested in the Lacanian practice of tracing the displaced phallic signifier, Henke tends to apply the classical approach, psychoanalyzing not desire in language so much as the desiring subject/character (whose perverse and schizoid fantasies she assumes are authorial reflections). Thus Chapter four's curious title, "Uncoupling of *Ulysses*: Joyce's New Womanly Man," indicating a Deleuzian "uncoupling" of desire (against the heterosexual, male-female/mother-father, Oedipal norm) alongside the invention of a new Oedipal subject. Joyce's new man supposedly incorporates male-female, mother-father in one "person," the womanly man, while retaining a unary, psychoanalytic logic (71)¹² and practicing a perversely Oedipal (but surely not schizoid) bisexuality.¹³

Leopold Bloom is the subject of Chapter four's analysis. Henke examines his "polymorphous perversity," his "androgynous ... temperament [and] libidinal orientation" (106), his "schizoid position" and his "masochistic

10 Henke's reading warrants Deleuzian protestations: "Combien d'interprétations du lacanisme, ouvertement ou secrètement pieuses, ont ainsi invoqué un Oedipe structural pour former et fermer la double impasse, nous reconduire à la question du père, oedipianiser même le schizo!" (98)

11 Cf. Wright for a more elaborate description of this form of psychoanalytic criticism.

12 "Il y a là un paralogisme proprement analytique (... dans la théorie du signifiant) et qui consiste à passer de l'objet partiel détachable à la position d'un objet complet comme détaché (phallus). Ce passage implique un sujet ... qui vit nécessairement comme un manque sa subordination à l'objet complet tyrannique. Il n'en est peut-être plus ainsi lorsque l'objet partiel est posé pour lui-même sur le corps sans organes, avec pour seul sujet, non pas un 'moi,' mais la pulsion qui forme avec lui la machine désirante, et qui entre dans des rapports de connexion, de disjonction, de conjonction avec d'autres objets partiels La castration comme opération pratique sur l'inconscient est obtenue lorsque les mille coupures-flux de machines désirantes, toutes positives, toutes productrices, sont projetées en un même lieu mythique, le trait unaire du signifiant."

13 There are no "persons," no unities or totalities such as "man" or "subject" in schizoanalysis, only partial objects and desiring-machines and their productive process. "L'inconscient ignore les personnes. Les objets partiels ne sont pas des représentants des personnages parentaux ni des supports de relations familiales; ils sont des pièces dans les machines désirantes, renvoyant à un procès et à des rapports de production irréductibles et premiers par rapport à ce qui se laisse enregistrer dans la figure d'Oedipe" (54). Schizoid bisexuality deterritorializes Oedipal desire, not by relocating two sexes in one subject, doubling "his" sexuality yet confining it to the Oedipal grid, but by traversing the subject with homosexual, and heterosexual, male and female desires which resist organization into personal orientation.

subservience" (111), his "phallic lack" and his "passive, homosexual, or feminized subject-positions that demand a posture of phallic subjugation" (113).¹⁴ While she argues that Bloom's "only hope of escape from psychic breakdown resides in the schizoid position of mental flow, process, viscosity, and disruption" (113), she can only imagine this "position" as "an infinite regress of substitutability in the family's sex-stereotyped scripts" (122): that is, as *Oedipal schiz*.¹⁵ But consider Deleuze and Guattari:

C'est cela, l'incurable familialisme de la psychanalyse, encadrant l'inconscient dans Oedipe, le ligaturant de part et d'autre, écrasant la production désirante, conditionnant le patient à répondre papa-maman, à consommer toujours du papa-maman ... s'ouder la folie à un complexe parental.... Si bien que c'est pour tous les cas que nous posons la règle suivante: le père et la mère n'existent qu'en morceaux, et ne s'organisent jamais dans une figure ni dans une structure capables à la fois de représenter l'inconscient, et de représenter en lui les divers agents de la collectivité La famille n'engendre pas ses coupures. Les familles sont coupées de coupures qui ne sont pas familiales.... (1972, 110, 115-16)

While Henke would claim that "the final chapters of Joyce's novel mock what Deleuze and Guattari identify as Oedipal imperialism," it would rather seem that her analysis of *Ulysses*' "uncoupling" is mock-Deleuzian.

Other chapters in Henke's reading of Joycean transgression also psychoanalyze the characters by proceeding to disclose pre-Oedipal (and anti-Oedipal) desires before concluding with a Lacanian or Kristevan pirouette. Chapter two, "Stephen Daedalus and Women: A Portrait of the

Artist as a Young Narcissist," examines Joyce's protagonist in relation to his mother and other females as they come to acquire significance in his life. "In true Oedipal fashion" (57), Stephen is said to fetishize his mother and to ponder obsessively the "inscrutable mysteries of Oedipal desire for an idealized mother whose sexual difference is a source of repressed masculine anxiety" (56). As well, he "reverts to pre-Oedipal attachment," wishing for maternal sanctuary while casting himself in exile from the *paterfamilias* (54). Henke submits this character's psyche to aggressive examination, summarily diagnosing his narcissism (50), his sense of abjection (50, 64), his fetishism (61), his projected fear of the uncanny female (65), and his scopophilia (75). She concludes with a feminist apologia. Joyce's *Portrait* figures the artist as narcissistic and misogynist in order to show those subject positions he must abandon on his way to becoming the poet-hero: towards a "new model" that "recognizes the need for the intellectual artist to make peace with the mother-lover of his dreams" and to incorporate her image in his "masterful" semiotics (84). But is this a need that feminist critics must recognize? To my mind, such "incorporation" of the maternal suggests aesthetic colonizing and neutralizing of the female body. Here again, we are in Oedipal territory.

Chapter three, "Interpreting *Exiles*: The Aesthetic of Unconsummated Desire," focuses on Richard's sado-masochistic habit of corrupting/subverting conjugal conventions and, in particular, his symbolic embodiment of the Law of the Father. But it is rather more condemning than affirming of this character, concluding that desire for aesthetic mastery and paranoia in the face of incertitude are the driving forces behind his Nietzschean pretensions to a self-transcending transvaluation of values. Though Henke explains persuasively how Richard makes Bertha an accomplice in his perverse practices,¹⁶ she finds Joyce defensible on the grounds that here ("as in all of his works") he gives the woman the last word. But the last word is actually what Joyce puts in the mouth of woman, not to be confused with women's own speech. When she does speak, it is not so much words but with "the fluidity of female desire and ... the semiotic rhythms of unconsummated passion that burst forth in explosive discharges of creative energy" (105). Bertha accordingly offers Richard a pre-Oedipal fantasy of rebirth, "a tantalizing invitation to resurrection and emotional renewal so that, together, the couple might strive for, but never fully achieve, a prelapsarian (and wholly imaginary) experience of transcendent *jouissance*" (105). Accordingly, the play concludes with a figure of masochistic desire

14 Henke's conceptualization of homosexuality is here clearly Oedipal: Bloom's "feminine desire" does not constitute an independent sexuality but merely a negative reversal of the one, phallic desire/masculine sexuality. Can Joyce really be entertaining sexual "schizzes" when, according to Henke, he subjects Bloom to such phallogocentrism. Within the domain of Oedipus, there is only Man's sex-hom(m)osexuality; Bloom apparently resides here, even when he abandons himself "masochistically" to Circe as man's womanly (negative) counterpart. Compare this conceptualization of homosexuality with that of *Anti-Oedipus*: "le grand Phallus, le Manque aux deux faces non superposables, est purement mythique Il faudrait dire le contraire: à la fois il n'y a rien de commun entre les deux sexes, et ils ne cessent pas de communiquer l'un avec l'autre, sur un mode transversal où chaque sujet possède les deux, mais cloisonnés, et communique avec l'un ou l'autre d'un autre sujet" (70).

15 "If Bloom assumes a maternal subject-position in his friendship with Stephen, he adopts a similar stance in relation to Molly, while simultaneously exacting nurture from his spouse in the role of benevolent phallic mother. The voyage of Bloom/Odysseus leads to Nostos, a nostalgic return to the bed of Mother-Molly and the womb/tomb of both conjugal and filial affection.... Molly inhabits Bloom's emotional world in the guise of maternal *image* and Circean seductress — an archetypal projection of male need and erotic demand elevated to the wholeness and plenitude of imaginary (M)Other" (122).

16 "After nights of erotic revelry, he habitually courted the practice of rousing Bertha with detailed penitential confessions, then hysterically begging her forgiveness: 'I cried beside her bed; and I pierced her heart.' His self-abasing acts of contrition were clearly designed to make Bertha a spiritual accomplice in his sado-masochistic practices" (95).

coupled with pre-oedipal fantasy, engendering a redemptive revival of non-conjugal, Oedipal fidelity.

As critical supplement to Henke's psychoanalysis of this drama, the feminist critic might consider Frances L. Restuccia's study of Joyce's Masochian masochism (Restuccia 1985).¹⁷ Restuccia reads *Ulysses* and *Dubliners* with reference to Deleuze's study of masochism, but her analysis might equally apply to *Exiles* (Deleuze [1967]; Deleuze and von Sacher-Masoch [1989]). She argues that Joyce uses female figures to attack and humiliate his sense of father-right, thereby delivering his art from a constrictive superego.

Through his writing, Joyce devised a way to rid himself of his resemblance to his fathers, a way to obtain certain pleasures — of language, of play — that the law of the father had forbidden. It is not that he felt that he had transgressed against the father(s), as Freud proposes about the masochist in general, or that his guilt was induced by a sense of an Oedipal crime, a parricidal urge Joyce was too shameless for this; the Deleuzian masochist, moreover, is not interested in placating the father ... "the formula of masochism is the humiliated father." (Restuccia 109 quoting Deleuze 1967, 53)

In Deleuze, Restuccia explains, the masochist uses the mother to beat the father off and drive him away: "the victim invests 'the totality of the law ... upon the mother, who expels the father from the symbolic realm'" (Restuccia 110 quoting Deleuze 1967, 78).¹⁸ Whereas a Deleuzian reading of *Exiles* would consider Bertha as an anti-Oedipal, anti-patriarchal device, Henke's Freudian reading regards Bertha as a "Mater Dolorosa," a Phallic Mother, before whom the sado-masochist abases himself in hysterical acts of contrition and from whom he demands "continual succor" (95).

In *Ulysses*, Restuccia contends, "Molly is Joyce's oral mother" whose "pen serves as her whip" with which she flogs his phallogocentric discourse. "Unlike the stern fathers of Dublin, Molly promotes play ... and desire She doesn't fret over getting the facts right. Her pronouns, especially 'he,' are often jumbled She puns She rhymes She dismantles and transforms words We can identify her as Joyce's literary Venus in furs. Molly punishes Joyce in his capacity as the writer of [phallic] realism [T]hus Joyce derisively, parodically, uses the law of the fathers — punishment

— to void those fathers and their law" (Restuccia 1985, 114-15). Likewise, in *Exiles*, we find a flogging mother in Bertha, though she is not oral so much as a "primitive, uterine, hetaeric mother, mother of the cloaca and the swamps".¹⁹ she is unmarried, as Henke says a "whore' through elopement" (97), and the rainy bog of Ireland, her motherland, is where the play is set. It is this wild, uterine (birth/Bertha) mother who serves as Richard's masochistic agency, beating off his Oedipal/patriarchal desire to have exclusive possession of her, and to have her now, as is his conjugal/phallic prerogative. She wounds, but not so much with "the phallic weapon of triangulated desire" (104), the Oedipal doubt of infidelity, as with her stated amoral sufficiency. Her final words are intended to flog the Oedipal conscience which insidiously re-occupies Richard's unconscious, despite his Nietzschean resolves: "I want my lover. To meet him, to go to him, to give myself to him. You, Dick. O, my strange wild lover, come back to me again!" (105)

Restuccia cannily questions Joyce's capacity to represent female desire, thereby setting herself apart from Henke's concluding affirmations ("Bertha cuts through the 'pornosophical philotheology' ... by persistently and triumphantly expressing the perdurance of female desire" [99].) While Joyce's mothers may serve his masochistic fantasies, they hardly inscribe a feminine discourse, Restuccia observes. "Rather than relinquish [the pen/ the word] to Molly, Joyce merely loans it to her so that she may help carry out his masochistic desire ... to exorcise the fathers" (Restuccia 1985, 116).

In the last two chapters, Henke argues further that Joyce is a writer of female desire. Alluding to Luce Irigaray, Molly's chapter, Chapter five, claims that Joyce holds the mirror up to woman's imaginary, that his inscription of "the Penelope episode" is a "speculum of the other Molly" (126). Here Henke flings whatever Restuccian reservations to the winds: "Although Molly's sinuous prose-poetry flows from a phallic pen, it nonetheless offers a linguistic paradigm of *écriture féminine*, as *jouissance* is deferred by the free play of a woman character's imagination over the elusive terrain of sexual difference" (127). But despite its promise of libidinal free play, Molly's is not a sexual/textual body of desiring-production: hers is a

19 "Three fundamental mother images dominate the writing of Masoch," Restuccia explains, quoting Deleuze (1989): "the primitive, uterine, hetaeric mother, mother of the cloaca and the swamps"; the Oedipal mother, the image of the beloved, who becomes linked with the sadistic father as victim or as accomplice; and in between these two, the oral mother, mother of the steppe who nurtures and brings death [to the old regime]" (110 quoting Deleuze 49). She proceeds to identify Bella Cohen as representative of all the "hetaerae" in *Ulysses*, Mary Daedalus as Oedipal mother, "whom Stephen loves and hates (she, like some of Joyce's repressive fathers, wished to bind him to the Church)" (110), and Molly, as oral mother.

17 Henke does not refer to this article although Scott includes it in her selected bibliography in *The Gender of Modernism*.

18 She adds, "in Deleuzian masochism, the masochist's disavowal of the world of the father(s) is 'a process of liberation' that relieves him of 'the pressures of the superego' and 'that transfers to the oral mother the possession and privileges of the father'" (112 [109]).

symptomatic discourse which the critic variably diagnoses as hysterical (127, 130, 161), melancholic (130), narcissistic (130, 141), pornographic ("living in a neurotic social environment and confined to Edwardian sexual scripts, she has become addicted to masculine validation of feminine self-worth ... she unconsciously tries to imitate the alluring temptress portrayed in popular pornography" [138]), "fearfully phallographic" ("determined by the pervasive presence of a male register of desire" [130]), "mentally-split and schizophrenically-fragmented" ("because she sees and judges herself through a fantasmatic grid of male surveillance, [and] reads her own sexual experiences 'against herself' that gives startling evidence of emotional alienation from the matrifocal ground of feminine desire" [128]). This is not Deleuzian schizophrenia, where desire escapes and shatters repressive structures, but oedipalized — neuroticized — schizophrenia.²⁰

But repression, Henke qualifies, is also part of Molly's story, and it is only realistically, as well as subversively, mimetic of Joyce to have "Penelope" slowly emerge as an "epic articulation ... embedded in a male master-narrative" (139). Even so, the "story" she produces is full of missing women — the missing mother ("bereft of the mother that everywhere fills the landscape of her unconscious, Molly continues to enact a scenario of perpetual bereavement" [130]), the missing daughter ("because Molly's notion of female parenting was defined negatively, by detachment and insouciance, she has a great deal of difficulty relating successfully to her own adolescent daughter" [154]) and the missing "female self" (127) who takes comfort in a regressive fantasy of maternal presence:

The emotional gaps in Molly's past engender, throughout "Penelope," a subversive feminine discourse that defies logocentric boundaries, borders on the margins of hysteria, and, in its melancholic quest for the absent (M)Other, longs to suture the wound of pre-Oedipal separation. In being "not all," Molly evinces a supplementary *jouissance*, a *jouissance* of the body ... beyond the *phallus*. (161)

However transgressively Kristeva this "feminine discourse" may be, defying logocentrism, bordering on hysteria like utterances of the maternal *chora*, it nonetheless conforms to the mythic structures of Lacanian desire

and reflects a *jouissance* that is the manic by-product of Freudian melancholia. "In being 'not all,'" lacking symbolic castration, Lacan's woman cannot signify her desire in words, but offers the man a fantasy image of unmediated pleasure. In any case, Molly's desire is not specifically female. Nothing in Henke's analysis unveils the other woman's auto- or homo-eroticism; and accordingly — in keeping with the Freudian view of woman's self-consciousness — even her narcissism is subjected to a pornographic male gaze. Nor is her desire Deleuzian, for according to *L'Anti-Oedipe* "le désir ne manque de rien, il ne manque pas de son objet" (1972, 34).²¹

Moreover, for all her polymorphous perversity and her real and fantasized infidelities, Molly's sexual imagination, like Bloom's, functions only within the realm of Oedipus. Whether she fantasizes playing surrogate mother to Stephen (159), or enjoys Bloom's maternal affections as pre-oedipal daughter (133), or submits herself to the properly Oedipal, paternal attentions of Boylan, Molly never leaves the domain of Oedipus. In fact, "from a psychoanalytic perspective, the Molly-Leopold-Boylan triangle figuratively reinstates, with a difference, the Oedipal relationship at the heart of familial association" (133). While in Freudian terms Henke would describe Molly's "psychosexual quest" as "problematic," ("while searching for the lost mother of childhood fantasy, she is simultaneously compelled to re-enact the family romance of Oedipal attraction" [135]), in Deleuzian terms, this description simply fits a standard Lacanian analysis of desire's oscillations between two poles of the Oedipal structure, and is not very problematic or subversive at all. Chapter six, "Reading *Finnegan's Wake*: The Femininity Which Breathes Content," makes little or no schizoanalytic intervention into what otherwise reads as a standard psychoanalytic *explication du texte*. Periodically, Henke attempts to present Anna Livia Plurabelle as a figure of pre-oedipal, maternal jouissance (206-07) only to reinscribe her character as "not-man," figure of feminine lack, within the Oedipal formula: "In terms of Joyce's post-Freudian pornosophical philotheology, the 'hole' of the female conjoins with the penile 'whole' of the male to create a 'holipoli' (or holy city/family)" (190). While "femininity" suggests a cross between bestiality, femininity and familiarity — it hardly signifies the imaginary of the other woman. And, while it may be true that in the *Wake*, as in *Ulysses*, Joyce "sets up a repressive Oedipal

21 Lacan actually theorizes desire in two ways, whose polarization and hierarchization Deleuze and Guattari protest. "L'admirable théorie du désir chez Lacan nous semble

avoir deux pôles: l'un par rapport à 'l'objet petit-a' comme machine désirante, qui définit le désir par une production réelle, dépassant toute idée de besoin et aussi de fantasme; l'autre par rapport au 'grand Autre' comme signifiant, qui réintroduit une certaine idée de manque" (34 n. 23).

20 "Ce que le schizophrène vit spécifiquement, génétiquement ... [est] la nature comme processus de production" (9). Deleuze and Guattari make the distinction between schizophrenia as process of desiring production and as a repressive curtailment or neuroticization of that process: "Sommes-nous malades de la schizophrénie comme processus — ou bien de la continuation du processus à l'infini, dans le vide, horrible exaspération (la production du schizophrène-entité), ou encore de la confusion du processus avec un but (la production du pervers-artifice), ou encore de l'interruption prématurée du processus (la production du névrosé-analyse)?" (80).

triangle in order to mock, destroy, and obliterate it (164)," in Henke's analysis he perpetually "reinstates" this structure — as a masochist, perhaps, with a desire to flog the Father who insists on making his conscientious return, but not as a schizoid, freely abandoning Oedipus.

After re-reading these chapters with the purpose of finding new and persuasive critical feminist applications of Deleuze, as well as a convincing, non-apologetic, reading of Joyce as a woman's writer, I would conclude that given her *political* failure to distinguish schizoanalysis from psychoanalysis, pre-oedipal from anti-oedipal, female desire from male phantasy, anti-patriarchal masochism from pro-feminist eroticism, *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* might better be named *James Joyce and the Psychoanalysis of Desire*. This is not to say that there are no politics at work in this book — I have no criticism to offer of Chapter one, "Through a Cracked Looking-Glass: Desire and Frustration in *Dubliners*," since I find its class analyses wholly illuminating and convincing. However, in light of the precedence this book awards psychoanalysis over politics, further inquiry into Henke's psychoanalytic feminism is called for.

JOYCE-LACAN AND THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF DESIRE

Feminist readers must negotiate play between theory and critical practice even though their stakes in sexual politics may be perfectly clear. Henke presents her negotiations with psychoanalytic theorists as open, and she appears to have little methodological anxiety over invoking such disparate thinkers as Irigaray, Kristeva, Chodorow, Deleuze and Carl Jung in her explanation of approach (cf.n.6 above). She perhaps uses these theorists in the belief that Joyce's polymorphous postmodern text can only be covered by a polymorphous application of theory, and yet she does not avoid a certain theoretical reductiveness. Ultimately, she appeals to Lacan as if these other theorists share with him a common base, neglecting to indicate where they make or attempt to make their radical departure. How then does this unquestioned Lacanism limit or extend feminist analyses? Without taking into account the differences in their departures from Lacan, how can she make use of Irigaray, Kristeva, Cixous without critically abusing their sexual politics? How, moreover, can she convincingly embrace for feminist criticism the anti-Lacanian thinking of *Anti-Oedipus*?

The opening pages of *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* present a further problem for the feminist reader. We are asked to accept as given Lacan's phallogocentric description of the world/word and Joyce's writing as playful undermining of that description. In short, we are to read Joyce and Lacan as participants in one and the same project, understanding the former

to be playfully testing the formulations of the latter.²² In reading Joyce this way, do feminist critics not also become collaborators in the Lacanian enterprise? How, for instance, are we to read Joyce's Lacanian figures of "the woman":

In Joyce's canon, woman is both desirable object and subject of desire — the incomparable Other who remains mysterious and enigmatic. His female characters frequently embody that imaginary maternal presence that the unconscious constructs as a corollary to the pleasure of infantile need. A fantasmatic figure of satisfaction and plenitude, woman, as Lacanian "symptom," proves defiant of either knowledge or appropriation. Her physiological blood-flow symbolizes the magical process of gestation and a curious sacramental alterity. She is mother, *mater*, matter, and *materia* — the symbolic ground of being from which all life flows. But she appears, simultaneously, as a threatening and perplexing *imago*, a chimera of fantasized phallic power that might, at any moment, overwhelm, engulf, and castrate the male. The figure of woman is perpetually abducted from a mimetic frame and framed by the sexual differences imposed by an idealized, matrifocal text. (2-3)

Is it in the feminist critic's best interest to pursue Joyce's/Lacan's symptomatic representation of woman as she figures in male fantasy? Why proceed with "framing" woman in this way? Why not hold up the mirror to masculinist specula(riza)tions as Irigaray does with Lacan/Freud, thereby producing a symptomatic reading of the phallogocentric *poet* and his matrifocal masquerades? Or, instead of looking for mirror images, why not look for revolutionary "schizoid" moments where the text records a voluptuous flow of heterogeneous, non-disjunctive desires without reference to lack or fantasies of plenitude? What gain is there for feminism to read Joyce's "women" as specular reflections of patriarchal paranoia, as imaginary females serving either to screen or to threaten castration? Why not look for textual instances of deterritorializing desire traversing the body without organs? Consider Deleuze and Guattari on feminism and the psychoanalytic unconscious:

La castration comme l'opération pratique sur l'inconscient est obtenue lorsque les milles coupures-flux de machines désirantes.... Nous n'avons pas fini de chanter la litanie des ignorances de l'inconscient; il ignore la castration non moins qu'Oedipe, comme il ignore les parents, les dieux, la loi, le manque.... Les mouvements de libération des femmes ont raison de dire: nous ne sommes pas castrées, on vous enmerde.... On doit reconnaître que les mouvements de libération féminine portent à

22 "If one accepts Lacan's psychoanalytic definition of the phallus as Logos — presence revealed in speech — then, metaphorically, at least," Henke posits, "Joyce would seem to occupy an exalted place in the logocentric and phallogocentric pantheon of twentieth-century writers" (1).

l'état plus ou moins ambigu ce qui appartient à toute exigence de libération: la force de l'inconscient lui-même, l'investissement du champ social par le désir, le désinvestissement des structures répressives. (1972, 71-72)

Instead of looking for the perverse couplings of male and female within the bounds Oedipus, why should feminists not look for the text's coupling of unconscious desire and social revolution?

RESISTING READER OR SCEPTICAL FEMINIST?

Henke's approach of strategic ambivalence to Joyce is not helpful; it derives, I suspect, from a failure to distinguish between anti-patriarchal and feminist positions and from a hesitation to criticize the double displacement of woman.²³ Ambivalence does not enrich so much as confound her critical procedure. Early in her introduction she argues that "by comically deflating sex-role stereotypes of masculine prowess and feminine passivity, Joyce tends to advocate more enlightened principles of androgynous behaviour in the complex politics of desire that governs sexual transactions" (4). A few pages later she announces that she "will not risk a defense of Joyce as 'protofeminist' or attempt to recast his image as Woolfishly androgynous" (9). Begging the question, Henke argues that, while Joyce is neither as feminist nor as androgynous as Woolf, we should appreciate him just the same. Is androgyny in Woolf "proto-feminist" while it is something else in Joyce? Why should bisexuality be the key to a feminist appreciation of any writer? Does it signify a liberation from patriarchal assignments of sexual identity or a masculine colonization (by the rebellious son) of femininity? (Why is there no androgynous female counterpart to Bloom, a "new manly woman"?) A mere fluidity of sexual subject-positions is not, according to Deleuze, a deconstruction of Oedipus, but just a phantasmatic reassembly. It is in any case unclear how Joyce's anti-patriarchy clears the way for feminine desire, how "male master narrative gives way to a fluid female story" (8), particularly when that "story" (Molly Bloom's, Anna Livia's) is said to be androgynously, hom(m)osexually, or hysterically "male-centered." Joyce's woman's narrative perhaps does constitute a text of bliss, recorded in the continuous present of desire's phantasied satisfaction and ever "blooming" in the perverse omnipresence of phallic affirmation. But as man's carnival what female story does woman have to tell?

23 I borrow the phrase "the double displacement of woman" from Gayatri Spivak to refer to the exclusion of women from self-signification in traditional humanist discourses (the discourses of "Man") and the exploitation, by male writers, of figures of femininity to criticize, expand, subvert, explode, play upon these discourses.

Why should feminists go to Joyce to find "feminine" articulations of desire in language, female textual bodies, feminist sub-versions of patriarchal discourse? One of the problems with *écriture féminine*, which has seen its critical heyday among Anglo-American literary circles, was its almost exclusive analysis of the texts of established men of letters, of men's presentation of the pre-Oedipal realm of the maternal-semiotic, of decentering female *jouissance*, feminine "plurabilities." A call for feminist readings of avant-garde texts written by women need not invoke essentialism, but may recognize a subtle political distinction between anti-patriarchal and pro-feminist writing, between writing that subversively deconstructs a discursive logic opposing and hierarchizing masculine and feminine categories and that which transformatively reconstructs positive figures and discourses of femininity. Feminists would be wise to recognize that Joyce's politics of desire may serve less the interests of women and feminism than those of the bastard-son; though his revolt against the discursive father solicits the support of a fantasy-mother, and though the various female figure may signify a decentering libidinal force, it is arguably the potency and pleasure of the poet-narcissist, not Molly Bloom's or Anna Livia's or Nora Barnacle's sexual alterity, in which the parricidal son (unconsciously) invests.

PSYCHOANALYSIS, SCHIZOANALYSIS AND FEMINIST ANALYSIS

In her last chapter, "Ricorso: Anna Livia Plurabelle and *Écriture Feminine*," Henke argues conclusively that, as especially seen in *Finnegan's Wake*, Joyce's writing anticipates Kristeva's psychoanalytic semiotics or semanalysis (207), and Deleuze's and Guattari's schizoanalysis (211). And her own critical practice attempts to apply these analyses to reading Joyce as if they were methodologically/ politically compatible. But Deleuze and Guattari clearly think otherwise:

La schizo-analyse ne se propose pas de résoudre Oedipe, elle ne prétend pas le résoudre mieux que ce n'est fait dans la psychanalyse oedipienne. Elle se propose de désœdipianiser l'inconscient, pour atteindre aux véritables problèmes. Elle se propose d'atteindre à ces régions de l'inconscient orphelin, précisément "au-delà de toute loi, où le problème ne peut même plus être posé. (1972, 97).

In the *Wake*'s textual unconscious, as in the author's, (pre-)Oedipal images and structures abound: "the phallic patriarch" (208), "the castrated Father" (208), "a Viconian Father-God, a transcendental signifier of authority and mastery" (208), "the symbolic law of the Father" (209), "the name of the Father" (210), "the discourse of the Father" (210), "the archetypal patriarch" (210), "maternal/pre-Oedipal pulsions" (210). Instead of de-oedipalizing the unconscious, Henke's Joyce de-centers or displaces Oedipus with pre-

oedipal, pre-verbal pulsions. Though Joyce's writing, she argues, "explor[es] those schizoid gaps between socially constructed binary oppositions, [and] plays with an endless dissemination of sexual difference that eludes Oedipal configurations of patriarchal power" (211), she draws the line at promoting the *Wake* as schizoid literature. At its disruptive most, this text features — in the figure of Anna Livia — a "source of an explosive, hysterical bisexual discourse" (209). She draws the line just where Deleuze and Guattari designate their point of departure:

Retenit l'hypocrite avertissement: un peu de névrose, c'est bon pour l'oeuvre d'art, une bonne matière, mais pas la psychose, surtout pas la psychose ; nous distinguons l'aspect névrotique éventuellement créateur, et l'aspect psychotique, aliénant et destructeur.... Comme si les grandes voix, qui surent opérer une percée de la grammaire et de la syntaxe, et faire de tout le langage un désir, ne parlaient pas du fond de la psychose et ne nous montraient pas un point de fuite révolutionnaire éminemment psychotique. (1972, 159).

Henke ostensibly gives the last word of her book to Anna Livia but in fact she gives it to Lacan, interpreting the *Wake*'s ending on the isolated definite article "the" to be an eternally deferred appeal to "The Logos" (212). In celebrating the openness of the poetic text while lamenting the necessary closure of scholarship and individual lives,²⁴ she further limits her analysis of desiring-production by severing the artistic and revolutionary machine from the analytical machine and by denying the possibility of social and individual transformation in favour of an aestheticized revolution restricted to poetic language. Deleuze and Guattari would protest:

Car ou bien la machine artistique, la machine analytique et la machine révolutionnaire resteront dans les rapports extrinsèques qui les font fonctionner dans le cadre amorti du système répression-refoulement, ou bien elles deviendront pièces et rouages les unes des autres dans le flux qui nourrit une seule et même machine désirante, autant de feux locaux patiemment allumés pour une explosion généralisée — la schize et non pas le signifiant (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 162).

James Joyce and the Politics of Desire prompts the feminist critic not only to re-question her (hidden) investments in Oedipal structures but also and most importantly to clarify her theoretical self-deceptions.

24 "Linguistic longing remains unsatisfied, and the text refuses closure in a way that a scholarly study, or an individual life, cannot" (212).

FEMINIST DELEUZIONI

After reading *James Joyce and the Politics of Desire* the question remains: what, if anything, do Deleuze and Guattari offer feminism as a reading practice and/or counter-culture that the psychoanalytic theories of Kristeva and Lacan do not?

To my mind, the most promising chapter in the collaborative writing of these two authors is to be found in *Milles Plateaux* (1980), where they outline a "micropolitics" of "becoming-woman" ("une politique féminine moléculaire" [338]). Subsumed under the manifestos of schizoanalysis in the earlier *L'Anti-Oedipe*, the schizoid, nomadic "war machine" of "becoming-woman" in the later work is foregrounded in the context of feminism's positive, existential and historical project. After reading *Mille Plateaux*, it becomes clear that what Deleuze and Guattari mean by "becoming-woman" is not at all what Henke means by "the new womanly man." For Henke, Bloom occupies the position of the androgynous; the man who would mime woman, the transvestite who would take on both male and female parts. Bloom is subversive in a strictly Lacanian sense: his masochistic feminine desire *to be* the object (the phallus) of sadistic masculine desire subverts the normal masculine desire *to have* the phallus. However duplicitous, his desire still centres on phallic lack, instituted by a phallographic / psychoanalytic symbolic order to which woman is doubly subjected. But for Deleuze and Guattari, "becoming-woman" is first and foremost the liberation of libidinal abundance specific to the repressed corporeality of woman; "becoming-woman" is the prime prerogative of women who undertake to deterritorialize the body politic they occupy as the "molar" entity woman:

Ce que nous appelons entité molaires ici, par exemple, c'est la femme en tant qu'elle est prise dans une machine duelle qui l'oppose à l'homme, en tant qu'elle est déterminée par sa forme, et pourvue d'organes et de fonctions, et assignée comme sujet. Or devenir-femme n'est pas imiter cette entité, ni même se transformer en elle. On ne négligera pourtant pas l'importance de l'imitation, ou de moments d'imitation, chez certains homosexuels mâles; encore moins, la prodigieuse tentative de transformation réelle chez certains travestis. Nous voulons seulement dire que ces aspects inséparables du devenir-femme doivent d'abord se comprendre en fonction d'autre chose : ni imiter ni prendre la forme féminine, mais émettre des particules qui entrent dans le rapport de mouvement et de repos, ou dans la zone de voisinage d'une micro-féminité, c'est-à-dire produire en nous-mêmes une femme moléculaire, créer la femme moléculaire. Nous ne voulons pas dire qu'une telle création soit l'apanage de l'homme, mais, au contraire, que la femme comme entité moléculaire a à *devenir-femme*, pour que l'homme aussi le devienne ou puisse le devenir. (1980, 337-38).

"Becoming-woman" is, in the first place, for women, a strategic reterritorializing or, at least deterritorializing, of the space they occupy in

the body politic as *woman defined by man*. "Becoming-woman" for women means articulating a new body of intensity and power independent of man's organization of bodies and power. "Becoming-woman" promises to be a radical process of reclamation, but in this case, what is to be reclaimed is not man's other, the feminist mystique which Bonnie Kime Scott reclaims in Joyce; nor is it Bloom's "womanly," the inverted or bi-sexuality of Henke's phallo-feminine man. "Bisexuality n'est pas un meilleur concept que celui de la séparation des sexes," Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly assert. "Miniaturiser, intérioriser la machine binaire, est aussi fâcheux que l'exaspérer, on n'en sort pas ainsi" (1980, 338). For these authors, it is woman's unexpressed libidinal/semiotic potential, her sublimely powerful and inarticulate corporeality, that is to be reclaimed by *woman* in moving beyond man's globally oppressive boundaries.

"Becoming-woman" has always been colonized by the imperial discourses, disciplines, and desires of man (under the guise of humanism) but once women reterritorialize woman, then men can begin to reterritorialize man. Here the authors are insistent: the lead must be taken by the minority: becoming-woman is a minority strategy, a becoming-minoritized for minorities, who then instigate a radical self-subversion of the majority:

Pourquoi y a-t-il tant de devenirs de l'homme, mais pas de devenir-homme ? C'est d'abord parce que l'homme est majoritaire par excellence, tandis que les devenirs sont minoritaires, tout devenir est un devenir-minoritaire. Par majorité, nous n'entendons pas une quantité relative plus grande, mais la détermination d'un état ou d'un étalon par rapport auquel les quantités plus grandes aussi bien que les plus petites seront dites minoritaires : homme-blanc adulte-mâle, etc. Majorité suppose un état de domination, non pas l'inverse.... On se reterritorialise, ou on se laisse reterritorialiser sur une minorité comme état; mais on se déterritorialise dans un devenir. Même les Noirs, disaient les Black Panthers, ont à devenir-noir. Même les femmes, à devenir-femmes. Si les juifs eux-mêmes ont à devenir-juif, les femmes à devenir-femme, les enfants à devenir-enfant, les Noirs à devenir-noir, c'est dans la mesure où seule une minorité peut servir de médium actif au devenir, mais dans des conditions telles qu'elle cesse à son tour d'être un ensemble définissable par rapport à la majorité. Le devenir-juif, le devenir-femme, etc., impliquent donc la simultanéité d'un double mouvement, l'un par lequel un terme (le sujet) se soustrait à la majorité, et l'autre, par lequel un terme (le médium ou l'agent) sort de la minorité. (1980, 356-57)

While Henke's heralding of Joyce's "new womanly man" is echoed by men in feminism,²⁵ it does not satisfy Deleuze and Guattari's agenda for

liberation. However much Bloom fails to conform to the stereotype, he does not suffer the minority status woman. Even as a Jew, he enjoys the majority status that is the exclusive privilege of men. Dublin's phallocratic organization (or organicity) of the body politic offers Bloom double access to pleasure: he can enjoy a degree of public recognition/notoriety among his fellow man and he can take pleasure in naughty/transgressive (disorganizing) behaviour. In short, he can have his kidneys and eat them too. His perversions, while they might playfully put his masculinity into question, do not threaten to dehumanize him: Bloom's double life is secured by his primary identity as a man. However feminine and visceral his interior life, however underground and perverse his private life, his most outrageous transsexual fantasies are accommodated by a psychosexual order which exclusively privileges the desires of men. According to Henke, women's perverse pleasures in *Ulysses* are neither specific to women as *differentiated subjects of desire* nor are they accommodated in any civic space outside of adultery. Since they are framed within patriarchal boundaries of marriage, the family, the church and the city-state, Molly's adulterous and/or polymorphous fantasies hardly amount to deterritorialization and reterritorialization of woman's body politic. Her transgression of marriage is not a radical withdrawal from the order of marriage itself, nor do her most free-flowing fantasies mobilize a sexuality that catapults the orbit of phallic desire.

Molly, moreover, can hardly be called feminist. At the same time that she indulges in an ungrammatical semiotic of feminine fantasy, a semiotic that does little to displace her objective position as man's woman, she does not cultivate a "molar politics" that could effect this displacement. Deleuze and Guattari are instructive on this point: "Certainement il est indispensable que les femmes mènent une politique molaire, en fonction d'une conquête qu'elles opèrent de leur propre organisme, de leur propre histoire, de leur propre subjectivité: 'nous en tant que femmes'" (1980, 338).

For this strategy of reclamation to be thoroughly revolutionary, what women have first to reclaim is the body of the GIRL. "C'est que la question n'est pas, ou n'est pas seulement celle de l'organisme, de l'histoire et du sujet d'énonciation qui opposent le masculin et le féminin dans les grandes machines duelles. La question est d'abord celle du corps — le corps qu'on

whose womanly multiplicity is intended less to excite derision than to provoke admiration. Because the feeling of masculinity in males is less strong than that of femininity in females, there has been an ancient prejudice in most cultures against the womanly man; and if any being was more diminished than woman by imperialist culture, that being was a womanly man. In the writings of Wilde, Shaw and Synge, such a figure was presented for approbation, but in the slightly strained mode of camp comedy: it was Joyce who rendered the womanly man quotidian" (6; cf. Kiberd 3-6).

²⁵ Henke is not the only one to herald the arrival of the new womanly man as cultural liberation. Bloom's androgynous character is the subject of celebration in Declan Kibberd's introduction to the new Penguin edition to *Ulysses* (January, 1992). "He represents," Kibberd writes, "a wholly new kind of male subject in world literature, a man

nous vole pour fabriquer des organismes opposables. Or, c'est à la fille qu'on vole d'abord ce corps: cesse de te tenir comme ça, tu n'es plus une petite fille, tu n'es pas un garçon manqué, etc. C'est à la fille qu'on vole d'abord son devenir pour lui imposer une histoire, ou une pré-histoire" (1980, 338-39). In Henke's account of *Ulysses*, the girl, Milly, is well on her way to *being* a woman, a double of Molly, without Molly's regressive fantasies. That their names are distinguished by a single letter, suggests a minimum of symbolic differentiation as conditioned by Joyce's/man's phallic imaginary which views all women as one phantasmatic (m)other. If Joyce were concerned to cultivate the liberation of women, as women, he would have given his female characters substantial symbolic autonomy. Moreover, if he were concerned to cultivate the liberation of men through women, he would have begun with woman's reclamation of the girl; instead, he concentrates on the colonization of the girl by (patriarchy's) woman. Deleuze and Guattari explain:

Sans doute la jeune fille devient-elle femme, au sens organique ou molaire. Mais inversement le devenir-femme ou la femme moléculaire sont la jeune fille elle-même. La jeune fille ne se définit certes pas par la virginité, mais par un rapport de mouvement et de repos, de vitesse et de lenteur, par une combinaison d'atomes, une émission de particules: heccéité. Elle ne cesse de courir sur un corps sans organes... La seule manière de sortir des dualismes, être-entre, passer entre, intermezzo, c'est ce que Virginia Woolf a vécu de toutes ses forces, dans toute son oeuvre, ne cessant pas de devenir. La jeune fille est comme le bloc de devenir qui reste contemporain de chaque terme opposable, homme, femme, enfant, adult. Ce n'est pas la jeune fille que devient femme, c'est le devenir-femme que fait la jeune fille universelle.... (1980, 339).

What do we then, as feminists, make of this strategic imperative of "devenir-femme" by woman "pour que l'homme aussi le devienne ou puisse le devenir"? How, in the final analysis, do we read the position of these authors on the Women's Movement which they support with the claim that it must necessarily be accompanied by a "politique moléculaire" that "se glisse dans les affrontements molaires et passe en dessous, ou à travers" (1980, 338). For one thing, their brand of avant-garde feminism allows us to see through Henke's strategic ambivalence, just as psychoanalytic feminism allowed her to see through the feminine mystique of Bonnie Kime Scott. Through Deleuze, we see Henke's blind spots about Joyce and, instead of overlooking his probable misogyny and specular in-difference, we are even more critical. We are not at all persuaded that Joyce's "avant-garde" articulation of his desire to transgress the father's "no" and to extend man's entry into/colonization of the (m)other is a revolutionary articulation of minority desire to deterritorialize and reterritorialize the body politic of woman *for women*. But can we, conversely, be so sure that Deleuze and Guattari have women's politics uppermost at stake when it would appear to

be the *becoming-woman of man* that is their most urgently articulated aim? Might we, as feminists, be deluded in thinking that this strategy of de-sublimatory micropolitics must necessarily accompany a politics waged on the plane of history and subjectivity? In acting on this thinking, do we not risk subverting our own existential project? Perhaps these reservations are best expressed by the French feminist, Luce Irigaray:

Et la "machine désirante" ne tient-elle pas encore lieu, pour une part, de la femme ou du féminin? N'en est-elle pas une sorte de métaphore utilisable par les hommes? Notamment en fonction de leur rapport au techno-cratique?

Ou encore: cette "psychose" peut-elle être celle "des femmes"? Si oui, n'est-ce pas une psychose que les empêche d'accéder à la jouissance? Du moins à *leur* jouissance? C'est-à-dire à une jouissance différente d'une jouissance abstraite — neutre? — de la matière sexuée. Cette jouissance pouvant constituer une découverte pour les hommes, un en-plus de jouir, dans un "devenir femme" fantasmatique, mais étant, depuis longtemps, familière aux femmes. Le corps sans organes, pour elles, n'est ce pas une condition historique? Et ne risque-t-on pas, une fois de plus, de reprendre à la femme ces/ses espaces non encore territorialisés où pourrait advenir son désir? (Irigaray 1977, 138).

The questions which Irigaray poses in 1977 seem to be precisely those which the authors of *Mille Plateaux* address in 1980: as if moved by her refusal to be distracted from women's primary project of symbolic self-determination/differentiation, Deleuze and Guattari insist that there must be two fronts for women's strategic territorialization, and that the feminist front can not be understated. ("Certainement il est indispensable que les femmes mènent une politique molaire, en fonction d'une conquête qu'elles opèrent de leur propre organisme, de leur propre histoire, de leur propre subjectivité: 'nous en tant que femmes'" (1980, 338). These assurances notwithstanding, feminists must determine whether these two fronts are not the double-play of a singular façade. Should we not suspect these authors of presenting a false feminist front which, while it concedes the need for a period of women's "coming into their own," devotes most of its avant-garde energy to analyzing the potential usefulness of women's massive withdrawal from the binary machines of difference *for men in their war against technocracy*? Do Deleuze and Guattari support feminism as a guise to recruit women's support in the production of postfeminist cyborgs? While it is unclear whether women's participation in culture and society would be enabled or disabled by their subscribing to this strategy of "becoming-woman," it is certain that *feminism must create an avant-garde of its own* if for no other aim than to mobilize women's entry into history where women's desire for a new body politic can be articulated and cultivated to their critical satisfaction.

Works Cited

- Benstock, Shari. "Nightletters: Women's Writing in the Wake," Bernard Benstock, ed. *Critical Essays on Joyce*. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1985. 221-33.
- Braidotti, Rosi. "Féminisme et philosophie," Diss. University of Paris 1, 1981.
- Cixous, Hélène. "L'Exil de James Joyce ou l'art du remplacement." Paris: Grasset, 1968.
- . *The Exile of James Joyce*, Sally A.J. Purcell, trans. New York: D. Lewis, 1972.
- . "Joyce: the (R)use of Writing," Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer, eds. *Post-Structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984. 15-30.
- Clément, Catherine. "Post-face 1980: de *L'Anti-Oedipe* aux *Mille Plateaux*," *L'Arc* 49 (1980).
- De Lauretis, Teresa. *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema*. London: Macmillan, 1984.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Le Froid et le cruel: présentation de Sacher-Masoch*. Paris: Minuit, 1967.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Masochism: An Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty* (together with Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, *Venus in Furs*, Jean McNeil, trans. New York: George Braziller, 1989).
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. *L'Anti-Oedipe*. Paris: Minuit, 1972.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. *Mille Plateaux*. Paris: Minuit, 1980.
- Grosz, Elizabeth. "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics," (forthcoming).
- Irigaray, Luce. "Questions," *Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un*. Paris: Minuit, 1977. 138-39.
- Jardine, Alice. *Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- Kiberd, Declan. "Bloom the Liberator," *Times Literary Supplement* (January 3, 1992): 3-6.
- Kristeva, Julia. *Polylogue*. Paris: Seuil, 1977.
- . *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*, Leon S. Roudiez, trans and Thomas Gora and Alice Jardine, eds. New York: Columbia UP, 1980.
- . *La Révolution du langage poétique*. Paris: Seuil, 1974. [*Revolution in Poetic Language*, Margaret Waller, trans. New York: Columbia UP, 1984.
- . *Pouvoirs de l'horreur*. Paris: Seuil, 1980. [*Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, Leon S. Roudiez, trans. New York: Columbia UP, 1982.
- Restuccia, Frances L. "Molly in Furs: Deleuzian/Masochian Masochism in the Writing of James Joyce," *Novel* 18.2 (1985): 101-16.
- Scott, Bonnie Kime. *Joyce and Feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1983.
- . ed. *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990.
- Studlar, Gaylyn. *In the Realm of Pleasure: von Sternberg, Dietrich and the Masochistic Aesthetic*. Urbana: Illinois UP, 1988.
- Van Boheemen, Christine. *The Novel as Family Romance: Language, Gender, and Authority from Fielding to Joyce*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987.
- Wright, Elizabeth. *Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice*. London: Methuen, 1984.

GERALD HILL

bardés d'apotropes: Anglo-American Responses to "Le Rire de la Méduse"

Regarde, les Persées tremblants avancer vers
nous bardés d'apotropes, à reculons! Jolis dos!
Hélène Cixous, "Le Rire de la Méduse."

This essay surveys the commentary that approaches, one way or another, the call to action so gloriously sounded in Hélène Cixous's "Le Rire de la Méduse." Needless to say, Cixous's readers have every reason to translate and evaluate her writing. Its very power would either enable important feminist practice or, in its essentialism, as some commentators would have it, constitute a powerful setback. I will try to show that to accommodate Cixous¹ — to read her and theorize her contribution — subsequent theorists have practiced a rhetorical moderation that extracts temperance from imbalance, dialectic from rhetoric, the grounding of reason from the flights of eloquence, "facts" from "emotion." Such attempts to guide the rhetoric of Cixous's text into a critical practice wherein its arguments may be refitted result in a disruptive calming. I suggest, of Cixous's generative "storms." The theoretical translation and evaluation of *écriture féminine* is one thing, the ex(cess)orising of Cixous quite another.

"Le Rire de la Méduse" was first translated in 1976 in the journal *Signs*. Two years later, also in *Signs*, Elaine Marks, in her survey of French feminist writing since May, 1968, attends to "all the neologisms raging and colliding in Paris" (841). Two of these, "phallogocentrism" and "logocentrism," still require quotation marks in Marks's text. Her remarks are mildly parodic — "where American women cry out 'male chauvinist pig,' the French women [a diverse group: Cixous, Kristeva, Irigaray, Herrmann, Leclerc] inscribe 'phallogocentric'" (841) — but she does not dismiss the writing of Irigaray

1 Throughout this essay I will speak of "Cixous" as if the word included "Le Rire de la Méduse," *écriture féminine*, and the theoretical positions of Hélène Cixous herself — as if, in other words, those three signifiers share a textual "home" so that any one of them may be said, however temporarily, to "occupy" the others.