

RWANDA: A TIME¹

Lauren van der Rede

University of the Western Cape

Just over two decades ago, the world watched as thousands of military personnel, militias, and civilians bore arms and killed hundreds of thousands of their countrymen, neighbours, and family in what was an attempt to “rid” Rwanda of the Tutsi minority. The violence of 1994, however, was recognized legally as genocide only toward the end of the infamous 100 days of its peak. A symptom of this is that, as Mamhood Mamdani asserts, “Rwanda is recalled as a time when we thought that we needed to know more; we waited to find out, to learn the difference between Hutu and Tutsi, and why one was killing the other, but it was too late” (*Saviors* 3). I want to take seriously here the provocations imbedded in Mamdani’s language and think of Rwanda as both a call and a time, and explore some of the implications of this in relation to the ways in which reconciliation in Rwanda is represented by Sasha Longford’s untitled animated film. 569

The film, released to mark the twentieth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, was produced by Snapdragon Studios, and released by the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development (CAFOD) via *YouTube*. The palette of the film, with its hues of yellow, red, brown, and black, condenses the genocide and its lingering traumas into its almost four minutes. Narrated by an anonymous Tutsi woman,² the film offers an account of how the hatred and division that would culminate in genocide began, and how it continues to sear Rwandan society, which finds itself still in the infancy of the period that the film calls peace.

The animation begins with a frame filled with a disproportionately large, golden sun, foregrounded by silhouetted hills and trees. The silent breathing of the portrait is disrupted by the sound of a typewriter as the word “Rwanda” is etched onto the sun. Suddenly, by as abrupt an interruption as the typing of the typewriter, the film cuts to a canvas of yellow, on which the physical space of Rwanda is demarcated and filled

with bands of red, yellow, and a dark colour. This cut is accompanied by a voiceover, as the narrator explains that it was “since the time of colonial rule” that “hatred and division between the Hutu and Tutsi people of my country has been built up; fuelled by those in power” (Longford). The historical accuracy or inaccuracy of the narrator’s account of the origins of the social divide in Rwanda, for the purposes of this intervention, is of less significance than the disjuncture between the epoch invoked visually and that invoked sonically.

570 The bands of red, yellow, and, let us assume, brown³ that fill the shape of Rwanda render an image reminiscent of the first flag of the kingdom of Rwanda (1959–61). The flag, although then identical to that of Guinea and its colours associated with pan-Africanism, is, in relation to Rwanda, synonymous with the Rwandan Revolution, a conflict in which the violence of the social divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi became politicized as ethnic. It was also during the period of the Revolution that Rwanda transitioned from a kingdom (and a United Nations trust territory), ruled by and through the Tutsi minority, to an independent republic. Colonialism and indirect rule, however, began in 1890, when Rwanda was declared a part of German East Africa, and lasted until the aforementioned revolution. Thus, through both its visual and sonic narratives, the film begins to temporalize Rwanda, and continues to do so, as the narrator sweepingly moves from colonialism to the assassination of President Habyarimana, which would sound the start of the genocide of Rwanda’s Tutsi. She says, “and then the President’s plane fell out of the sky. Shot down. It was April 1994” (Longford). Thus, Longford’s animation temporalizes Rwanda into three periods marked by three breaks, each of which represents a sociocultural shift in Rwanda. Moreover, these epochs are presented by the film, incorrectly, as discrete units of typological time,⁴ and perhaps even more problematically, relegate Rwanda to the confines of the time of its genocide, and in so doing Others it.

In the animation, the date 1994 is crafted with and within the smoke rising from the spot at which the President’s plane had crashed. The image is that of a smoke signal, a symbol of the primitive, of the traditional, of the past. On the one hand, thus, the film may be suggesting that it was the shooting down of the presidential plane and the president’s resulting death that signalled the start of the genocide. However, on the other hand, the text’s temporalization of Rwanda as past, traditional, and primitive—as in a different time and space from the film, its viewer, and even its narrator—produces Rwanda, its peoples, and their culture(s), as the Other of the text and the culture it represents. The film itself was released in 2014, and is as such much closer to the “now” than the Rwanda that it presents, creating temporal distance between itself and its subject; and in so doing, it treats Rwanda and its culture(s) as what Claude Lévi-Strauss calls a “cold” culture or society (*Story of Lynx* 239; see also *Race and History*): static, available to be studied as it is and as it always will be, genocidal.

Although the film refuses to name the violence it narrates as genocide, it delineates that violence in the moments when the hands that line the top of the frame drop sick-

les, each of which lands in such a way that they form the faces of the fallen. The choice to use the sickle rather than the machete as representative of the intimate nature of the physical violence of the genocide is, to my knowledge, unique, and as such is presumed to be deliberate. The sickle may be a reference to the discourse perpetuated in the years prior to the massacres of 1994, in which the Tutsi were cast as communists; or perhaps it is a reference to the Interahamwe, the government-funded militia who did the “work” of the genocide, “to clear the brush” and “cut the tall trees,”⁵ for the sickle was part of the crest at the centre of their flag. The ambiguity of the sickle may thus be considered a reflection of the ambiguity of the genocide, specifically with regard to the politics of the categories of perpetrator and victim.

What may be inferred from the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is that the perpetrators of the genocide were only Hutu, and that victims of the genocide were exclusively Tutsi—far too simplistic a formulation as we know from the work of scholars such as Mamdani. The film, however, accepts this categorization, and marks it through colour, for the hands which drop the sickles are dark, while the complexion of the fallen is yellow. As such, the film reproduces the very terms that polarized Rwandan society and produced the violences of the genocide. As the scene draws to a close, the hands fade into what looks like clouds and the mists of rain—April marks the beginning of Rwanda’s rainy season. This representation of the genocide is repeated later in the film, although its brightness is veiled, its edges softer than before.

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The narrator refers to that which is represented in this scene as “the killing,” not the “genocide,”⁶ as noted earlier. Genocide entered jurisprudence in 1944, at which point Raphael Lemkin published *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*. In this text, Lemkin delineates genocide as a *delicta juris gentium*, which Lemkin defines as “offences against the law of nations” (n.p.).⁷ *The Law of Nations* (1758), written by Emerich de Vattel, was born, claims Lemkin, of “the interdependent struggle of the civilized world community against criminality” (n.p.), and is based on the principles of universal repression and “*forum loci deprehensionis*” (n.p.).

According to Lemkin, the principle *forum loci deprehensionis* is the “principle that an offender can be brought to justice in the place of where he is apprehended” (n.p.), which provides for the apprehension of a perpetrator independent of “where the crime was committed and the nationality of the author” (n.p.). He explains further that “an offense of this type is committed on the territory of State A, and the author is apprehended on the territory of the State B, it is State B which will judge him for an offense committed elsewhere. This is because such a perpetrator is regarded as the enemy of the whole international community and in all States he will be pursued for crimes universally harmful to all the international community” (n.p.).

However, as Lemkin makes clear in “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations,” a paper he presented at the Fifth Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid from October

14-20, 1933,⁸ the principle of universal repression does not apply to all crimes but only those considered *delicta juris gentium*, proving, as he claims, that “there is a legal conscience of the civilized international community” (n.p.). Thus, what Lemkin suggests is that *delicta juris gentium* are offences not only against the law of nations, but those that offend the conscience of the civilized, international community—the westernized world. This sentiment is echoed by the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948),⁹ a treaty of the United Nations, whose Preamble¹⁰ reads as follows:

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations¹¹ and condemned by the civilized world,

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and

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Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required... (1948)

The tone of the Preamble implies the moral superiority of those who had produced it, and thus the peoples and world that they represent. By stating that genocide is contrary to the spirit and aims of the UN, the *Genocide Convention* makes clear that genocide and those who commit genocide are the Other of those whom the UN represents—the subject, which is the center of the “civilized world,” or more concisely, the West, which by implication suggests that the non-West is genocidal. The subject, as we know from thinkers such as John Locke, is an adult male who has sacrificed some of his freedoms in exchange for protection of his rights and property, and possesses the attributes of reason, autonomy, consciousness, agency, and sovereignty. Thus, the *Genocide Convention* characterizes the genocidaire as the Other of the subject as unable to enter such a negotiation and contract, and she who is incapable of reason, autonomy, agency, or being conscious. Furthermore, it posits that the genocidaire is the savage or rather barbarian she who must be ruled, not unlike the discourse of that bloodless genocide to which Frantz Fanon referred (238).

Moreover, the condemnation with which the civilized world and its subject respond to genocide thus suggests that genocide is in itself a senseless crime. Furthermore, the language of the *Genocide Convention* suggests that the crime is committed by the uncivilized, by the irrational, by the feminized, or to borrow from the Preamble, “an odious scourge.” The word “odious” characterizes the perpetrator as hateful and abominable, or perhaps more accurately as a hateful monster. The word “scourge” refers to a plague or bane, or perhaps even a combination of the two: a plague of pests. Thus, the *Genocide Convention*, despite its mask of morality, actually dehumanizes perpetrators of genocide, and so is itself guilty of at least one component of the process of genocide that Gregory Stanton has articulated.

Upon incorporating genocide and the definition thereof articulated in the *Genocide*

Convention, the *Rome Statute* of the International Criminal Court (ICC) perpetuates the notion that genocide is the “crime of all crimes” (Schabas, *Genocide*) by listing it above Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, respectively Sections 7 and 8 of the *Rome Statute*. I note this not to necessarily disagree with the gesture, but rather to point to the ordering of genocide as not only the more offensive of the three textures of violence, but as indicative of genocide being rendered insurmountable, in the sense that it is placed, at least seemingly, at the very top of the list of international crimes and priorities of the ICC. This gesture, in turn, points us toward the question of trauma theory.

The idea of trauma is a longstanding one that stems from psychoanalysis, emerging first in Freud’s *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), in which he conceptualizes trauma as precipitating phenomena to which symptoms can be traced (3). This conceptualization of trauma has textured the way in which trauma theory thinks its object, in that trauma as theory “emerged from an originally fragmented (psychiatric, psychoanalytical, and sociological) discourse on reactions to catastrophes in the wake of the Vietnam War, and received its more solid status as topic of inquiry at the moment of its codification, in 1980, as PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder)” (Toremans 333). It is perhaps thus not coincidental that Shoshana Felman claims in “Education and Crisis, or the Vicissitudes of Teaching” that we live in a “post-traumatic age” (54). Extending this, in “Trauma and Literary Theory” James Berger explains that “the late twentieth century is a time marked, indeed defined, by historical catastrophe” (572), offering various examples as evidence, including “World wars, local wars, civil wars, ideological wars, ethnic wars [...] the cold war, genocides, famines, epidemics, and lesser turmoils of all kinds” (572). What is noteworthy here is again the relation of genocide to other textured violences, for he, like the *Rome Statute*, posits them as “lesser” than genocide. Moreover, what is clear from the works of both Felman and Berger, along with a number of other traditional trauma theorists such as Cathy Caruth and Kali Tal, is that trauma is delineated temporally, for the “post” of the post-traumatic presumes an end. Furthermore, trauma, is, according to Freud, insurmountable at the time, and will therefore be repressed. However, he also notes that “repression leaves symptoms behind it” and that these symptoms are “indications of a return of the repressed” (2984) that has the “compulsion to return” in the form of “the symptom” (2984), which in literature is read as the representation. What traditional trauma theory thus does is to think trauma as phenomena, events that repeat, that extend into the present as repetitions of the past in the present, and a return that, perhaps, the literary facilitates. As such, the discourse of international law, anthropology, and trauma theory necessarily etches out a break so as to establish its object and consequently, albeit unconsciously, the symptom(s) thereof. This, however, is, again, to mistake that which manifests, the object, for the thing-in-itself, to borrow from Kant. Moreover, it does not account for what was, at the conference hosted at the Woodland Cultural Centre in Toronto at which a version of this article was presented, referred to as the intergenerational trauma of genocide.

The definition of genocide enshrined in international law etches its limits at the edges of genocide's bloodiness. By this I mean that the genocide of international law accounts only for its manifest attacks on a protected group as a physical entity, but does not engage its more latent violence, such as the attempted destruction of culture through the prohibition of indigenous languages. This was an issue that I think was highlighted in the discussions within and around a conference hosted at the Woodland Cultural Centre in Toronto, which saw scholars from both the Centre for Humanities Research at the University of the Western Cape and the Jackman Institute at the University of Toronto engage the question of transitional justice. What was clear from these discussions was that the genocide that unfolded in Canada was an attempt to destroy the cultures, or rather civilizations, of First Nations peoples. This, as we heard from one of the survivors and from other participants, was achieved by progressively stripping children in the reservation school system of their identities, particularly those markers that may be considered facets of culture. The prohibition on indigenous languages was one technique through which this was to be achieved. The effects of this genocidal policy, which was enacted through the reservation school system, persist today, as there are many, too many, First Nations peoples who simply cannot speak the language of their people. There is, however, a movement within the First Nations attempting to redress this problem, and to articulate their stories in their own tongues, and the atrocities that took place within the reservation schools have now been recognized as "cultural genocide" by the Canadian State, which held a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2015. However, attempting to address the genocidal violences that unfolded within these schools, which were not without their bloodiness, is to treat only the symptom and not the problem in its entirety.

Longford's film is a "trauma narrative" preoccupied with the event, the trauma, and its symptoms, which consequently produces Rwanda as its spatial and temporal Other; and as such it perpetuates the Eurocentrism of the language of genocide, as *delicta juris gentium*, trauma, and the cultural practice of the Other, despite refusing its name. Perhaps, however, it does not need to articulate the name "genocide" explicitly, for it is already called up within the name, the signifier, Rwanda. The narrator explains that "sometimes" memories of the genocide are like "shadows" that overwhelm the mind, articulated aesthetically as a web, or as I prefer, a network of interconnected strands that have neither beginning nor end. This interconnectedness is something to which the notion of intergenerational trauma, invoked at the workshop hosted at the Woodland Cultural Centre, speaks. Although my understanding of intergenerational trauma differs to some extent from the conceptualization thereof presented as part of the workshop, I certainly would agree that the traumatic effects of genocide, and its more latent violences, permeate well beyond its timestamp. One of the examples used at the conference to illustrate the intergenerational impact of the genocide endured is the high alcoholism rate within First Nations communities. On this particular subject, a colleague at the workshop, as did Joseph Boyden at an associated event elsewhere, spoke of the attempted suicide of eleven members of a

First Nations community in Ontario, all within one day. So extreme a return, or perhaps more accurately an extension, of the repressed should serve as an urgent call not only to action, but also to a reconsideration of how the problem of genocide is thought and, indeed, approached. What the conversations within and around the workshop I participated in demonstrated is that the atrocities suffered during Apartheid, or the genocides that unfolded in both Canada and Rwanda, are not discrete, nor can they be traced along a linear path of development. Rather, as Longford's film illustrates, they are entangled within themselves and with each other, such that no individual strand can be moved without its movement being felt by every other thread within the network.

As the network entirely overwhelms the woman who slips into sleep, the narrator disrupts the narrative, regressing to a time, held supposedly in her memory, of what is often referred to as the time "before" the genocide. She says, "But, I can also remember, in some quiet part of my heart, how it was before we knew that anybody had put this label of ethnicity on us" (Longford). However, as Mamdani notes in his text on the Rwandan genocide, the categories of Hutu and Tutsi share a relation that is much more nuanced as their difference was racialized rather than ethnicized, in the sense that the Tutsi people were considered a race (a foreign, settler group), whilst the Hutu and Twa people were considered indigenous ethnic groups. He explains that it was through colonialism's ideological discourse of the Hamitic Hypothesis that "Belgian reform of the colonial state in the decade from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s [...] constructed Hutu as *indigenous* Bantu and Tutsi as *alien* Hamites" (*When Victims Become Killers* 16), which consequently led to the Tutsi being relegated to a space between what he refers to as "settler citizens" and "nativized subjects" (*When Victims Become Killers* 16). The film, however, arguably collapses these two "markers," as the narrator would put it, which is perhaps symptomatic of the ICTR of the ICC, which labels the Tutsi an ethnic group.

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Although there is much to be said about the politics of indigeneity entangled in the term ethnicity, what concerns me is how the discourse of bodies of international and transitional justice (both international and local), like that of Longford's film, denies Rwanda coevalness, positing its past as its present, always, and condemning it to be present only in its past. This, in turn, points to the politics of these mechanisms of justice, a politics in which Rwanda, as a site of genocide and as such, traumatic tension, is produced as an Other, and through which justice is delineated as that which is moral and should be desired.

According to the transcripts of the *Kayishema and Ruzindana* case (Trial Chamber), held on May 12, 1999, "An ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture; or a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self-identification); or, a group identified by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)" (par. 98). However, in another case, that of Akayesu (Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, the Chamber acknowledged that the "Tutsi population does not have its own language or distinct culture from the rest of the Rwandan

population” (Human Rights Watch 33), but held that, despite this, the Tutsi population is an ethnic group because it did “constitute a stable and permanent group and were identified as such by all” (Human Rights Watch 33), thus qualifying the Tutsi as a protected group under the *Genocide Convention* and the *Rome Statute*.

Victims of acts of genocide must belong to a protected group. The Hutu who died during the 100 days that claimed “a million lives or more,” as the narrator asserts, are not protected by the legislation or these bodies of international and transitional justice. The *Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze* case, which came before the Appeal Chamber of the ICTR, in November 2007, noted that:

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[T]he acts committed against Hutu political opponents cannot be perceived as acts of genocide, because the victim of an act of genocide must have been targeted by reason of the fact that he or she belonged to a protected group. In the instant case, only the Tutsi ethnic group may be regarded as a protected group under Article 2 of the [Rome] *Statute* and Article 2 of the *Convention and the Prevention of the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, since the “Hutu political opponents” or the group of Tutsi individuals and Hutu political opponents does not constitute a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group under these provisions [...] the killing of Hutu political opponents cannot constitute acts of genocide. (par. 469)

Thus, the narrative of the genocide that is constructed through the register of the ICTR and its discourse is not unlike the narratives of many a First Cinema representation of conflict in Africa in that it centres on the bloodiness of such a conflict without necessarily taking into account its *longue durée*; it presumes that its resolution lies in the West; and that there are clear heroes, victims, and villains. Moreover, and perhaps most problematically, it posits a clear division between those who are considered perpetrators, members of the Hutu group, and those who are considered victims, members of the Tutsi group. The account of the genocide purported within the discourse of international law is that of genocidal violence erupting between the two larger ethnic groups of Rwanda, which in 100 days devastated the small African country, resulting in up to one million victims dying. This account, however, flattens many of the textures of the genocide which unfolded over the last century, missing much of the nuance of the problem, precisely because of its narrow definition and understanding of the question of genocide. Moreover, the players within this narrative are clear and absolute: it is the UN and its actors who are the protagonists of the narrative (Colonel Romeo Dallaire not least amongst these), and it is the Tutsi population who are the victims of the Hutu minority who are marked as the villains of this narrative. However, the lives lost were not only those of Tutsis, but also Hutus, Twa, and foreign nationals (UN soldiers). What the narrative of the genocide that is delineated in international law does is allow for the positing of Rwanda’s Tutsi population as a protected group, whilst the Hutu population of Rwanda, its Other, must be labelled the genocidaires. Moreover, to script the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa, the peoples of Rwanda, as groups that are stable and permanent, and as such unchanging, “old” objects for study, is to Other Rwanda as a whole as still being at a past moment from

which the civilized, Western world has progressed.

The discourse of the Organic Law which provides for a different body of transitional justice, the Gacaca court system of Rwanda, avoids the pitfall of texturing the categories of genocidaire and genocide victim with the labels that helped to animate the *delicta juris gentium*. Its discourse is fundamentally different from that of the ICTR, distinguishing instead between “witnesses” and “prosecuted persons” (*Organic Law No. 40 of 2000*, 26/01/2001).¹² This is not to say that the Gacaca courts were not problematic or should not be problematized. President Paul Kagame, on behalf of the Transitional National Assembly, notes in what may be considered the Preamble to *Organic Law No. 40*:

Considering that such offenses [the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity] were publically committed before the very eyes of the population, which this must recount the facts, disclose the truth and participate in prosecuting and trying the alleged perpetrators;

Considering that the duty to testify is a moral obligation, nobody having the right to get out of it for whatever reason it may be... (*Organic Law No. 40/2000*)

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What the legislation fails to acknowledge in its opening paragraphs is that the atrocities were not only committed in front of the people, but by the people. As scholars such as Mamdani, Linda Melvern, William A. Schabas, and Helen Hintjens have made clear, it was the “intimacy,” to borrow Mamdani’s term, of the genocide that made monumental its trauma. Furthermore, the legislation makes clear that everyone is a witness, and as such is obligated by law to testify at the hearings. Moreover, as is provided for in Article 32 of *Organic Law No. 40*, “[a]ny person who omits or refuses to testify on what he/she has seen or on what he/she knows, or makes false or slanderous denunciation, is prosecuted by the “Gacaca Jurisdiction” [... and] risks a prison sentence from 1 to 3 years maximum” (Article 32, *Organic Law No. 40/2000*). In contrast, prosecuted persons are those who stand accused by either the state or witnesses of having committed acts offensive to the *Genocide Convention*, the *Geneva Convention* (1949), and what it names as “the Convention on Imprescriptibility of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,”¹³ all three of which were ratified by Rwanda. These prosecuted persons were ordered according to four categories, ranging from what were judged as the most severe crimes (category 1) to crimes of less severity (category 4). Punishment corresponded with the severity of the crime, but Chapter 2 of *Organic Law No. 40* provides that the prosecuted person(s) “shall enjoy commutation of penalties in the way provided by this organic law” (Article 54, *Organic Law No. 40/2000*) such as the reduction of jail terms, or in some instances, the commutation to community service. However, one of the conditions of this provision was that the prosecuted person apologize for the offences the “petitioner has committed” (Article 54, *Organic Law No. 40/2000*).

This dual process of transition enabled by these two legislative bodies is not engaged in Longford’s film, although, in its silence, it does offer a comment on it. The aim of the Gacaca courts was to facilitate a process of national reconciliation,

in hopes of achieving sustainable peace. Reconciliation is produced as a fallacy and a fantasy in the film. In the scene in which the narrator explains that a community house was built where people could seek medical assistance and where her sister Ester began taking peace studies, there is an image of the house standing on top of a deep divide, on either side of which is a sickle etching out the face of a slain Rwandan. The house is positioned at the base of a tree, like many of the trials administered by the Gacaca courts, suggesting perhaps that the Gacaca courts were merely superficial sutures over the fissure left by the genocide. The commentary offered by the image of the community house being built over the wound of the genocide is invoked more directly through the story of the narrator's sister, Ester, and the man she wished to marry. The two met and became betrothed while Ester was learning about peace studies at the community house. However, Ester's parents would not permit the marriage, because she is a Tutsi and he is a Hutu. The present tense formulation posits that the categories of Hutu and Tutsi are still the categories into which the people of

578 Rwanda are classified, as the Twa are rarely referenced in literary works that attempt to narrate the trauma that is the genocide, relegating it and its peoples once again to 1994. This sentiment is also expressed in the metaphor of the disk on which three faces are drawn, individually identified as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, overlapping each other. This image is accompanied by the voiceover of the narrator explaining that she has convinced her parents that "we are all one human race: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa" (Longford). In this oxymoron, the text returns Rwanda and its peoples once again to the terms of 1994, ossifying it as Rwanda.

The Kagame regime, however, denies that there are Hutus and Tutsis, as its official discourse is that of citizenship. This is discernible from the register of the *Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003*,¹⁴ which uses the terms "population," "nationality," and "citizens." The diction of the *Rwandan Constitution* (2003) at first includes "nationality," in specific relation to Rwanda as nation-state, but changes abruptly with the first sentence of Article 8 to use instead the term "citizens." This sudden shift in register may be read as the seamless substitution of one category and concept for another, suggesting that in the rhetoric of the *Rwandan Constitution* of 2003, nationality and citizenship are interchangeable, and as such the categories of national and citizen are collapsed as synonymous. This is suggested, further, by *Organic Law No. 30/2008 of 25/07/2008* Relating to Rwandan Nationality (hereafter referred to as *Organic Law No 30/2008*), presumably the Organic Law to which the *Rwandan Constitution* refers in Article 7. Let us then assume that, in so far as both are constitutionally recognized as legal categories, in Rwanda nationals are citizens, and citizens are nationals,¹⁵ for as is provided for in *Organic Law No. 30/2008*, nationals in Rwanda have rights and responsibilities, attributes more commonly associated with the legal category of the citizen. Of the conditions to be met in order for one to become a Rwandan national, what concerns me here are but two: the conditions for Rwandan nationality relating to naturalization (Article 14) and the conditions for Rwandan nationality by parental descent (Title II, Article 6 & Article 7). In rela-

tion to the latter, one may become a Rwandan national if one is 18 years of age or older, and can prove that either parent is or was Rwandan. However, a number of sources make it clear that acquiring nationality is dependent on the father being a Rwandan national. One of these is the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, according to a telephone interview on January 25, 2001, during which “a representative of the Rwandan embassy in Washington, DC, told the Research Directorate that if persons who have attained the age of majority and who have lived all their lives outside Rwanda have a Rwandan father, they are automatically Rwandan citizens unless they have renounced their citizenship”¹⁶ (Canada/Refworld n.p.). Moreover, “the father’s Rwandan passport, Rwandan identity card, birth certificate, or baptismal certificate” (Canada/Refworld n.p.) are sufficient to prove citizenship. This may be read as a trace of the legacy of the patrilineal ordering of Rwandan society, both prior to and during the genocidal violence of 1994, which traced a person’s ethnicity, race, and indeed, as such, nationality through the father. In this way, the register of the *Rwandan Constitution* and the discourse of the Kagame regime, in collapsing the categories of nationality and citizenship, have recycled a technology of the genocide and the ideology that textured it, despite enshrining in its supreme law that any “foreigner applying for the Rwandan nationality by naturalization [...] must] not be characterized by the genocide ideology” (*Organic Law No. 30, 2008*). Despite the silence on what “genocide ideology” actually is, the irony through which the *Rwandan Constitution* deconstructs itself sounds clearly.

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The concern about the constitutional discursive collapsing of citizen and national into one subject labelled as Rwandan is precisely that it suggests, or at least may be read as suggesting, that statutory rights and their accompanying responsibilities are reserved for Rwandans only, a characterization that one must be able to prove. Moreover, despite its claims to strive toward the “eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promote national unity” (Article 9, *Rwandan Constitution*), the state of Rwanda, through the discourse of its contract with the people of Rwanda, has essentialized the category “Rwandan” as a national and cultural identity (Article 14, *Organic Law 30/2008*), fortified with the charge of the citizen—the power to “exercise rights and [enjoy] freedoms,” and specifically positive freedoms: freedoms of, as opposed to freedom from; as Articles 33, 35, 39, and 40, amongst others, make clear. It is this, Rwanda, this national, this citizen’s “duty to participate, through work, in the development of the country; to safeguard peace, democracy, social justice and equality and to participate in the defence of the motherland” (Article 47, *Rwandan Constitution, 2008*).

Peace is the name the film gives to that which is desired by transitional societies, such as Rwanda is considered to be by virtue of its not having reached an epoch that marks a new sociocultural shift. The narrator explains that “when peace was achieved, I thought it’s like a baby [...] that] needs constant care for so many years” (Longford). By describing peace as an infant, the film suggests that it does not just need constant care, but is unable to sustain itself, and needs to be protected and pro-

vided for. It is provided for by the *Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda* of 2003, whose Article 47 states that “[a]ll citizens have the duty to participate, through work, in the development of the country; to safeguard peace, democracy, social justice, and equality and to participate in the defence of the motherland.” Thus, peace is an obligation, like witnessing, not of the state, but of its citizens, who are charged with the responsibility of nurturing and safeguarding the peace through work. Later, however, the narrator claims that Rwandans “must plant a seed of peace” (Longford), the associations of which, as a metaphor for peace, are not dissimilar to those produced by the metaphor of the baby. However, there is a strange shift from the past, acknowledging that peace has been achieved, to the future: Rwanda is still preparing for it. This shift denies Rwanda a present and as such renders it as always “there” and “then,” desiring always to be “here” and “now,” never present, and as such always an object, always static, always genocidal.

580 Longford’s film animates not only a “Rwanda” that cannot be thought outside of 1994, but also a problematic discourse of anthropology. It does so by situating Rwanda and the genocide in a time different to that in which it was produced, denying it coevalness. However, to think Rwanda as a time is to place the Rwanda of 1994 precisely within the paradox of an indefinite period; a space in which Rwanda becomes a call, the letter, the signifier Rwanda, into which the *longue durée* of the genocide, its violences, and its traumas are condensed. It is, as I have argued earlier, a call within a network of significations, and as such cannot be sounded without it invoking the signifier genocide, the juncture at which Rwanda, the Holocaust, the reservation schools of North America, and far too many more intersect.

NOTES

1. This paper is part of a larger doctoral research project, which I have been able to undertake through the generous support of the DST-NRF Flagship in Critical Thought in African Humanities, of the Centre for Humanities, at the University of the Western Cape, where I am an Early Career Scholar, to which all credit must be given. I also wish to thank the Jackman Institute, University of Toronto, for their support and the invitation to be a part of this collaborative project between the two institutions.
2. She tells us that her parents will not allow her sister, Ester, to marry the man she loves because he is a Hutu and she is a Tutsi. Prior to the genocide, ethnicity or race was traced through the father, and as such, if Ester is Tutsi, so is the narrator.
3. The colours blur together to produce a darker colour, closest to brown, so it cannot be discerned with certainty that it is or is not brown.
4. Typological time, as conceptualized by Johannes Fabian in *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*, refers to the ordering of history into periods, which are “measured, not as time elapsed [...] but in terms of socioculturally meaningful events, or, more precisely, intervals between such events” (23).
5. There are various references to these phrases, amongst others, denoting the killing of Tutsi persons, propagated by Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). See, for example, Bennett and Cho, *Cut the Tall Trees*; George, *Hotel Rwanda*; and *Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco*

Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze.

6. There are a number of scholarly definitions of genocide, including Lemkin's expansive conceptualization, but this article uses the definition of genocide held by international law as delineated by the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948) of the United Nations and the *Rome Statute* of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
7. *The Law of Nations* is a two-volume doctrinal text and work of political philosophy by Emerich de Vattel, first published in 1758.
8. Hereafter referred to as the *Madrid Report*.
9. Hereafter referred to as the *Genocide Convention*.
10. Hereafter referred to as the UN.
11. The "spirit and aims" of the UN are outlined in the *Atlantic Charter* of 1941.
12. *Organic Law No. 40/2000* of 26/01/2001 set up the Gacaca jurisdictions, and the organization for prosecutions of "offenses constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity between October 1, 1990 through to December 31, 1994." Hereafter referred to simply as *Organic Law No. 40*.
13. Formally known as the *Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity* (1968).
14. Hereafter referred to simply as the *Rwandan Constitution* of 2003.
15. It should be noted, however, that this is not to be presumed normative, as quite often although nationals (a category intertwined with and often textured by ethnicity or race) are citizens, not every one person who acquires citizenship within a state is necessarily a national thereof.
16. See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Rwanda: Procedure for obtaining Rwandan citizenship for persons who have lived outside Rwanda all their lives and whose father is Rwandan*.

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