

13. GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX

- Davidson, Arnold E. "Review Essay: The Canonization of Canada's Women Writers." Rev. of *Private and Fictionalized Words: Canadian Women Novelists of the 1970s and 1980s*, by Coral Ann Howells. London and New York: Methuen, 1987; *Critical Essays on Margaret Atwood*. Ed. Judith McCombs. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1988. *Al/Mazing Space: Writing Canadian Women Writing*. Ed. Shirley Newman and Smaro Kamboureli. Edmonton: Longspoon/NeWest, 1986. *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 19.2 (Summer 1989): 203-10.
- Hutcheon, Linda. "Letters in Canada." Rev. of *Gynocritics: Feminist Approaches to Writing by Canadian and Québécois Women / La Gynocritique: Approches féministes à l'écriture des canadiennes et québécoises*. Ed. Barbara Godard. Toronto: ECW Press, 1987. *University of Toronto Quarterly* 59.1 (Fall 1989): 144-5.

REVIEWS

DIETER HENRICH und WOLFGANG ISER, Hsrg. *Funktionen des Fiktiven*. Poetik und Hermeneutik X. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1983. Pp. 567. No price

Der Begriff Fiktion ist jenen Grundannahmen des theoretischen Diskurses zuzurechnen, die eher auf Rahmenbedingungen und Kontexte verweisen und isoliert nur mit großen Schwierigkeiten, wenn überhaupt, zu handhaben sind. Angesprochen sind die Konzepte Dasein, Kunst, Glaube, Erkenntnis, Liebe, Zeit u.a. Wie diese Termini verweist auch der Begriff Fiktion auf einen Bereich von ungeheurer Breite. Ja, es ist sogar denkbar so weit zu gehen, ihn als allumfassend zu bezeichnen.

Das *Philosophische Wörterbuch* von Georg Klaus und Manfred Buhr bietet die wohl knappste Definition der Fiktion, und zwar die drei Wörter 'Annahme; Erdichtung; Unterstellung.' Immerhin wird damit auf die kunst- und wissenschafts-theoretische Funktionskomponente der Fiktion verwiesen. Der sprachliche Ausdruck der Fiktion ist somit vorzugsweise die Konjunktion 'als ob,' ihr Bereich die Als-Ob-Philosophie. In diesem Zusammenhang spielt Kant eine bedeutende Rolle, der moderne erkenntnistheoretische Begriff der Fiktion wurde jedoch von Nietzsche geschaffen, der später Vaihingers *Philosophie des Als Ob* (1911) anregen sollte.

Zunächst führt der Begriff in seiner Geschichte ein bescheidenes Dasein. Sachwörterbücher der Philosophie und Literatur beschäftigen sich mit ihm, wird er nicht übergangen, nur ungen und knapp. Das *Handbuch literarischer Fachbegriffe* von Otto F. Best glaubt auch noch in der erweiterten Neuauflage von 1986, bis auf den einschränkenden englischen Terminus 'Fiction,' ohne Fiktion auskommen zu können. Die *Brockhaus* Ausgabe von 1968 allerdings widmet dem Begriff einen kürzeren Artikel von einer halben Spalte, in dem die Funktionen der Fiktion in Dichtung, der Erkenntnistheorie und Ontologie und im Recht knapp skizziert werden. Einen nicht unerheblichen Einfluß, den Begriff in die deutschsprachige literaturtheoretische Diskussion einzubringen, hatten die Komparatisten René Wellek und Austin Warren mit ihrer Darstellung *Theory of Literature*

(1942), die erst später in den sechziger Jahren den Diskurs belebte. So geriet der Begriff, besonders auch im Zusammenhang der Problemstellungen der linguistischen Poetik, die sich bemühte, Wesenseigenschaften der dichterischen Sprache zu erfassen, mehr und mehr in das Zentrum der Diskussion. In dieser Atmosphäre weckte der Begriff das Interesse der Forschungsgruppe 'Poetik und Hermeneutik', die den *Funktionen des Fiktiven* ein Kolloquium und den 10. Band ihrer Arbeitsergebnisse widmete. Diese Reihe ist bisher wegen der Qualität der geleisteten Arbeit beachtenswert und wichtig gewesen. Damit entstand ein Anspruch, der auch im vorliegenden Fall nicht enttäuscht wird.

Gegliedert ist der umfangreiche Band in drei Teile. Zunächst entwickeln die Herausgeber im Vorwort die Fragestellung, es geht um die 'Entfaltung der Problemlage.' Mit diesem verhältnismäßig kurzen Text wurden die Teilnehmer zum Kolloquium eingeladen, die nun im Rahmen der hier entäußerten Problematik Arbeiten verfaßten, in denen die Funktionen des Fiktiven in drei Umkreisen untersucht werden, und zwar in der philosophischen und literaturwissenschaftlichen Theorie (5 und 4 Arbeiten) und im Bereich der Analyse von Sprachen und Werken' (5 Arbeiten). Im dritten Teil des Bandes setzen sich die Teilnehmer kritisch mit den vorgestellten Arbeiten auseinander. Ihre 'Beiträge' enthalten Stellungnahmen, Einwände, Überlegungen oder erweiternde Vorschläge, die die Arbeiten in einem größeren Diskussions- und Problemzusammenhang verankern. Zusätzlich enthalten die 'Beiträge' nachträgliche Reflexionen über die in den Arbeiten aufgeworfenen Probleme, die das Netz des theoretischen Kontextes hinsichtlich seiner Implikationen erweitern helfen. In den zwei Hauptabschnitten werden somit die Themenbereiche behandelt: Fiktion und Wirklichkeit, Fiktion und Wahrheit, Fiktion und Glaube, Fiktion und Imagination, Fiktion und Utopie; es geht weiter um das Fiktive in Bildender Kunst, Literatur, Kulturformen, Alltagsrede, Diskursen, Geschichtsschreibung, Rechtsvorstellungen, Begriffs- und Theoriebildung; schließlich werden die Strukturen der Fiktion behandelt, und zwar im Kontext der Bezüge Schein, Illusion, Täuschung, Lüge, Wunder, das Irreale, das Ästhetische und das Imaginäre. Fiktion nämlich, schreiben die Herausgeber im Vorwort, 'kann nicht isoliert, sondern muß im Umkreis von anderen Grundtermen verständlich gemacht werden. Zu diesen gehören vor allem 'Imagination' und 'Realität', aber auch solche wie 'Halluzination, Traum, Illusion und Täuschung' (p. 9).

Es ist nicht möglich hier den im vorliegenden Band ausgebreiteten Forschungs- und Theoriestand zum Problem des Fiktiven im Bereich der behandelten Themen einzeln zu besprechen, zumal sich integrative Strukturen und Problemzusammenhänge nicht entwickeln. Die vorwiegend

explorativ verlaufende Diskussion,' so Wolfgang Iser in seiner Schlußbetrachtung 'Das Fiktive im Horizont seiner Möglichkeiten,' führte 'nicht zu bestimmten Ergebnissen, vielmehr hat sie die Verschiedenartigkeit der Dimensionen sichtbar gemacht, zu denen sich das Phänomen des Fiktiven entfalten läßt' (p. 547). Die in der Einleitung formulierte Annahme, Fiktion erfolge um eines Gebrauchs willen, der von ihr zu machen sei, und dieser bestimme ihre Funktion, wird in den Arbeiten und Beiträgen weitgehend bestätigt. (p. 9) Als ein isoliertes Phänomen lasse sich Fiktion allerdings nicht fassen, 'es sei denn, man charakterisiert es als eine Leerform, die — weil sie nach einer Besetzung verlangt — höchst unterschiedlicher Füllungen fähig ist, woraus sich eine Streubreite ihrer Beschaffenheit ergibt, die von den Erfordernissen abhängt, welche das Fiktive jeweils zu erfüllen hat.' Von solchen Erfordernissen aber sei es nicht ablosbar, weshalb eine Kennzeichnung des Fiktiven nur über kontextuelle Einbettungen gelinge (p. 547) Und damit erweise sich das Fiktive als ein 'kontextgebundenes Phänomen, das sich je nach der 'Gattung' solcher Kontexte immer anders konstituieren wird' (p. 548). Über Fiktives sei also nur im Rahmen seiner Verwendung sinnvoll zu reden.

Dieter Heinrich verknüpft in seinem Beitrag 'Versuch über Fiktion und Wahrheit' Fiktion eng mit den Konzepten Imagination und Bewußtsein. Im bewußten produktiven Akt des Fiktionalisierens organisierte Fiktion insbesondere die Imagination, 'die in ihren Bildern präzise, in ihrer Verlaufsform aber diffus ist, in ein Ganzes, das zugleich als irrational und als zwingend gewußt wird' (p. 518). Indem jedoch — im Lichte dieser Perspektive — Fiktion als jeweils vom Kontext bedingtes Organisationsprogramm der Imagination verstanden wird, ist sie fast schon als Metapher des Denkens zu begreifen, die in der Definition Wolfgang Isters als Leerform nicht mehr zu bezeichnen scheint, als offene Möglichkeiten des bewußten Seins. Wolfgang Iser versucht sich diesem Dilemma zu entziehen, indem er seine Betrachtung mit dem Satz beendet: 'Zwar fällt das Fiktive weitgehend mit seinem Gebrauch zusammen, doch das ist erst die halbe Wahrheit, da das Fiktive selbst nicht dem Kontext seines Gebrauchs entspringt' (p. 557). Hier nur gelangt die Reflexion wieder an die bekannte Grenze, die das Problem der Hintergebarkeit der Sprache stellt, die Frage nach dem sie produzierenden Programm. Eine immer wieder frustrierende aber auch beruhigende Grenze, die auch dem vorliegenden Band genügen muß der — und mit diesen Worten ließe sich ein Ende finden — unbedingt in jeder Bibliothek und einschlägigen Büchersammlung zu finden sein sollte. (HOLGER A. PAUSCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*KATHY EDEN. *Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1986. Pp. 198. US\$28.00

Despite grammatical eccentricities and infelicities of style that disrupt the reading, the author has produced an excellent book worth having for those interested in the rhetoric of persuasion and its poetic expression. The term 'legal fiction' has a precise meaning for a lawyer: an assumption of fact used as a basis for curial decision. But this meaning does not oust the elements it retains in common with the meaning of the term ascribed to it by a literary scholar, for both literary and legal scholars deal with legal fiction as a contrived situation, properly created, for the purpose of disposing of a matter. That disposition is a matter of truth telling and persuasion.

The book is divided into four chapters, plus Appendix, dealing with Aristotelian contributions (via RHETORIC, ETHICS, POETICS, DE ANIMA) to the traditional connection between argument (legal) and expression (poetic), and ending with Renaissance theories of literature (Augustine and Sidney). Chapter headings themselves are evocative; e.g., Ch. One, 'Legal Proof and Tragic Recognition: The Aristotelian Grounds of Discovery.' As in legal texts, the author is prodigious with footnotes which often reveal a great deal more than is anticipated in the main text.

One of the ironies in a study such as this by Kathy Eden is that it deals simultaneously with texts on legal and poetic persuasion which are also texts that gradually assume a prescriptive character. So called poetic laws, therefore evolve to guide the development of poetic expression. A literary theory then begins to emerge as much as a philosophy of law emerges from the same texts. The author states that the indissoluble link between the POETICS and the RHETORIC has been ignored until now: insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that Aristotle refers his discussion of tragedy to his discussion of proof. The forensic and the poetic are complementary.

Tragedy for Aristotle is not merely mimesis, it is 'imitation of human action according to the strictest formal and logical method' (p. 61). The poetic fiction, therefore, reveals motives and causes, not merely by an appeal to the universal but also by individualization accomplished through the application of equity to particular situations in order to temper the universal. That is, it is the equitable remedy that causes individual understanding. A naked representation of the universal is simply a representation of a random sequence which without focus on the particular cannot achieve a prudential end. In close affiliation with forensic enquiry, fiction in the POETICS is the literary complement of equity in law or ethics.

A judgement is made at the end of the tragic fiction. An enquiry has been made concerning the soul, one conducted through images.

Image and imitation (p. 112), the author says, is Aristotle's contribution to Christian literary theory. The legal concept of human action residing in Aristotle's psychology is adapted into Christian literary theory. Augustine places the soul at the centre of things and continually makes man the image of his maker. From this philosophy begins to develop a Christian poetics. The *imitatio dei* is transformed into dramatic imitation taking its image from a forensic model. Augustine raises Aristotle to an unprecedented status by adapting imitation (POETICS) and image (DE ANIMA) to Christian purposes. Sidney compares and contrasts law and poetry in his Apology to demonstrate the latter's ascendancy; he does so to counter Aristotle's allegation that poets are liars (POETICS 24.18). Poetry thus mates the general and particular to expose both knowledge and the soul; the exemplar of this method is the parable-sayer, Jesus — the poet shares the method in imitation. As it did for Aristotle, the fictional method is used to express both the ethical and poetic formulation of human action.

The author gives a practical demonstration of her findings by reference in the Appendix to HAMLET, a play which provides an excellent example of the forensic and poetic together. 'Designed to explore the imperatives of judgment and action' (p. 183), the play is a perfect adaptation of the enquiry method to its object. The same might be said more moderately about the author's good book. (FRANCIS M. MACRI, EDMONTON)

*SURA P. RATH, ed. *South Central Review* 3.4 (Winter 1986). Special Section: Game, Play, Literature.

Content: 'Game, Play, Literature: An Introduction,' Ronald E. Foust, 'The Rules of the Game: A Para-Theory of Literary Theory,' Robert R. Wilson, 'Rules/Conventions: Three Paradoxes in the Game/Text Analogy,' Anna K. Nardo, 'George Herbert Pulling for Prime,' and Roy Chandler Caldwell, Jr., 'The Interplay of Fiction and Interpretation in Kafka's *Castle*.'

In the 'Table of Contents' of this journal issue, a dark line forms a box around the four articles and the introduction which constitute a special section on 'Game, Play, Literature.' This visual sign of coherence is necessary, for even after reading the articles, the Foust and Wilson ones excepted, there is little evidence that the authors have been reading the same literature, primary or secondary, and consequently, little sense of a common poetics. Guest editor Sura P. Rath's introduction provides a brief history and

survey of game/text discourse, but the journal's material is too diverse in scope and approach to be easily contextualized. That the first two articles are theoretical and the remaining two 'practical' becomes evident, and that the articles eschew obvious 'play' writers, that they extend the relevance of play theory and practice, and that they use "conventional critical methodology" and [avoid] neological abstractions' is true enough but hardly compelling rationale for either inclusion or arrangement. Not that the articles *should* have a plotted coherence, but by drawing boundaries — even literally — the journal certainly invites our looking for it.

Foust's article is placed first, perhaps because it is the most general, arguing that a poetics of play could succeed where formalism and structuralism have failed: in establishing a literary poetics. In the scope of its hopefulness, if not in its substance, the argument is reminiscent of those formalist anatomies and structuralist grammars which attempted to legitimize literary study by giving it the respectability of science. For Foust, this respectability will come about almost parasitically because game theory, by virtue of its applicability — its primariness — to human nature, to culture, and especially to linguistic competence, will show the 'similarities' between literature, literary study and 'other social phenomena' (p. 12). The resultant discourse would clarify both the relationship between fiction and fact and the reader's ('player's') role in the literary game. Most ambitiously of all, it would redefine genre criticism: realism and fantasy, 'meaningless simplisms,' would be bettered by a system which would 'classify fictions on the basis of the type of mental operation any text demands from its reader to sustain a minimal suspension of disbelief' (p. 13). Perhaps. The argument for this super-anatomy, however, seems more hopeful than helpful, even, I suspect, to those who might already be pursuing such a line of inquiry.

At Foust's level of generality, the typology is, not surprisingly, tentative and crude. Foust departs from Roger Caillots' 1961 typology of games by devising a specialized typology for literary games. He locates four kinds: *synecdochical* (games as games in the text); *structural* ('conflicts that create a story's formal component, its plot, and that generate the suspense ...' (p. 8); *logos game* (linguistic self-reflexiveness or intertextuality); and *anagogic game* (a very general category, large enough to include that 'serious game conducted between the absent author and the present reader' (p. 9). Since this fourth category includes all texts, it is not of the same order as the first three, and the synecdochical category needs a much finer description if it includes, as Foust claims, such varying examples as the chess game in Nabokov's *The Defense* and sporting events in Hemingway's fiction. Clearly, however, Nabokov's novel is a chess game in a way that *The Sun Also Rises* cannot possibly be a bull fight. What attempts to be a literal structuring

game in the former novel is metaphorical only in the latter. Even when refined, as presumably Foust's typology can be, the question of its usefulness remains. Typologies and anatomies should be more than descriptive dictionaries — the complaint of the anti-formalists; they can provide critical perspective and working knowledge. Anatomies allow us to group like parts into systems and functions; they explain how something works and even how it can be manipulated. Game theory, however, has not yet devised anything so sophisticated, certainly nothing as ambitious as some of the structuralist grammars, for example, the work of A.J. Greimas.

In the meantime, Wilson gives us some very good reasons for proceeding with caution. Anatomies of literature as game may not be easy because of a difference, and in a discourse intent on establishing likeness, this article provides a welcome balance. In an important sense, texts and games are unlike: texts have 'conventions,' whereas games have 'rules.' The failure to understand this principle, claims Wilson, has led to confusion, to, what he calls, a 'black hole' that 'swallow[s] up all distinctions' (p. 18). While never denying that, in some larger sense, texts and games are analogous, Wilson explains that it is more helpful to distinguish between the geometric, axiomatic, invariable and prescriptive rules of games and the looser, less abstract, more flexible and implicit conventions of texts. To borrow his example, if one takes away the knight's move from chess, little remains of the game, but a pastoral may still be a pastoral with or without the convention of sheep. Wilson goes on to clinch the distinctions syllogistically. If texts are game, then three paradoxes emerge. First, we must learn the rules before we can 'play' the text. But whereas absorption in the text is never dependent on abstract formulations of rules, for games they are indispensable. According to Wilson, 'there is thus a division between knowledge and experience in reading literature that runs counter to the fusion of the two in game-playing' (p. 23). Second, 'an underlying pattern ... cannot be recovered by direct inference from the literary text' (p. 22). That is, no one structural pattern can be proven to be generative. If uninitiated players of Chinese checkers were to formulate the rules of the game from inference, they would agree, whereas uninitiates of *Middlemarch* could hardly be expected to locate agreeing generating principles. Third, 'if literature is a game ... then its rules must be learned in an inverse order' (p. 25). That is, we can only state the rules of *Middlemarch* after we have read it. But what kind of game is it that we can play but do not know the rules until we have finished? It should be impossible to 'play' a text without first formulating its rules, but obviously, we can. Wilson's plea for precision in these matters might seem gratuitously rhetorical were it not for the fact that Foust commits one of the very 'brash confections' about which Wilson

complains. Play, says Foucault, paraphrasing Caillois, 'is governed by rules [indeed, the rules of the game itself, the conventions, once accepted, are binding for the duration of the event] ...' (p. 7). 'Convention' in this context is very close to elegant variation for 'rule.' To preserve a distinction between the two terms is important, according to Wilson, so that we may know more about 'either the structure or ontological status of literary texts' (p. 26).

Ann K. Nardo's article does not need to wrestle with the ontological status of either game or text, because in the poetry of George Herbert she finds such a good example of the literary game as subject — 'synecdochical' game according to Foucault's typology. Thus, the only justification she needs for the thesis that Herbert's poetry plays games is textual evidence, of which there is ample. By identifying Herbert's use of the card game 'primero,' Nardo explains how Herbert puns with such game terms as 'most take all,' 'rest,' 'pull,' and 'pull for prime' in a game of wits with God. Herbert projects both an other self and a God in his poetry, a God with whom this self plays various kinds of games, contests, and combats. The speaker plays and wins, paradoxically, by losing or by being won by God.

Nardo attempts, however cursorily, to establish a psychological context for Herbert's gamesmanship, which is, she claims, explained partly by his illness, partly by his 'imposing family,' partly by the matriarchal 'control and sophistication' of his mother, partly by passion, and partly by the pressure to compete with the successes of his numerous brothers and his illustrious ancestors. Herbert, thus, needs *agon* to establish an authentic and separate projected self, a need fulfilled, in part, by the games in his poetry and his poetry which is game. The projected self encounters an even larger projection, a 'Presence' which, in Nardo's one brief paragraph, is explained in terms of Jung ('the achievement of "self" after trials of individuation' and after the 'integration of the archetypes of the collective unconscious'), in terms of Buber (a greater 'Thou'), and in terms of Christ ('where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I ...' Matthew 18:20). And while this hardly satisfies as psychological, philosophical, or Christian construct to explain game, it does, nevertheless, suggest that there are to be drawn portraits of artists as young gamesmen which go beyond the generalized and developmental models of childhood or adolescent game behaviour.

When the discourse shifts from game to play, as it does in Caldwell's article, the boundaries are obscured considerably, yet the distinction between game and play is an important one. As Wilson reminds us, games involve a 'preludory' attitude, a sense that a goal will be achieved, a result accomplished. The same cannot be said of play; Caldwell quotes Gadamer: 'the movement which is play has no goal which brings it to an end; rather

it renews itself in constant repetition. ... Play is contemplation of movement as such' (p. 43). Perhaps, then, the looseness and flexibility of play makes it conducive to conventions, while the prescriptiveness of game necessitates rules. Certainly, for Caldwell, indeterminacy is a defining feature of play or 'free play,' although the Derridian overtones of that term are, in this article, mute. The indeterminacy of free play frustrates both readers and players who are intent on formulaic, rule-bound interpretations. For Caldwell, the critic and the reader are like K. in Kafka's *The Castle* who attempts to 'read' the castle. But in what sense reading and playing are synonyms is never made clear. Implicit, perhaps, is the point that Kafka's or K.'s 'play' has no referent; similarly, free play lacks a referent. It is movement for the sake of movement, without an end, result, goal, or completion. In the same way that Nardo's article illustrates a nexus between game theory and psychoanalytical theory, Caldwell's, because it emphasizes the role of the reader/player in the construction of the game/text, illustrates a nexus between game theory and reader-response theory.

The range of these articles — Herbert to Kafka — is rationalized as a show of the range of game theory discourse, and the balance between the introductory, theoretical, and textual is, no doubt, calculated. Yet, although Wilson's article is eloquently persuasive and although Nardo's is carefully and ambitiously exegetical, this issue of the journal is not likely to supersede either the seminal *Yale French Studies* special issue on 'Game, Play, Literature,' No. 41 (1968) or *The Canadian Review of Comparative Literature's* special issue 'Game and Theories of Game' 12.2 (June 1985). There is not much evidence that either Nardo or Caldwell is aware of the state of game theory — neither, for example, acknowledges the *Yale French Studies* issue. Of course, to suggest that they should have, is, perhaps, to bind the discussion with rules rather than to open it to convention. What the writers in this issue do share is a formal imagination; indeed, one senses that game theory retains or develops some legacy of that formalism which was swept aside or over-shadowed by the French criticism of the seventies and eighties. One reason may be that, as with archetypal formalism, linguistic bedrock is never far from the surface of the discussion, for whether one speaks of rules or conventions, games or texts, one implies a grammar of behaviour. That grammar may focus on the board, the player, or the interaction itself, but in each case, the critic is attempting to conclude something about the systems and structures of an interactive discourse. The vocabulary is different, to be sure, from that of Todorov, or Greimas, or for that matter, Frye, but the manoeuvres are recognizable. (BRENTON MACLAINE, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*LISELOTTE GUMPEL. *Metaphor Reexamined. A Non-Aristotelian Perspective*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984. Pp. 304. US\$27.50

Im vorliegenden Beitrag zur Metapherntheorie wird nicht lange gezögert, den Leser mit dem eingenommenen Standpunkt, dem Titel gemäß als 'non-Aristotelian perspective' bezeichnet, vertraut zu machen. Liselotte Gumpel geht davon aus, daß die Auswirkungen des aristotelischen Denkens in der Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Metapherntheorie eher verstellt als begünstigt haben. Diese Tatsache — 'so closely has criticism in this area adhered to Aristotelian ideas' — motiviert die terminologische Entscheidung, die Tradition der metaphorischen Reflexion von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart als 'neo-Aristotelian' zu bezeichnen (p. xi). Nähere Aufklärung wird zunächst nicht gegeben. Zwar erwähnt die Verfasserin, die Problematik der Metapherntheorie sei in dem Umstand zu suchen, daß ihr bisher die Entfaltung aus dem Bereich der Rhetorik in den der Semantik nicht gelungen ist (eine Gegebenheit, die in der vorliegenden Darstellung berichtigt werden soll), auf konkrete Verweise wird allerdings auch noch an dieser Stelle verzichtet. Somit der folgende Hinweis.

Angesprochen ist die Assoziationspsychologie des Aristoteles, mittels der er das Sprachphänomen und seine Bezeichnungsfunktion als Medium der Erkenntnis zu erfassen sucht. Dabei zieht er das sprachphilosophische Fazit: 'Es sind also die Laute, zu denen die Stimme gebildet wird, Zeichen der in der Seele hervorgerufenen Vorstellungen, und die Schrift ist wieder ein Zeichen der Laute. Und wie nicht alle dieselbe Schrift haben, so sind auch die Laute nicht bei allen dieselben. Was aber durch beide an erster Stelle angezeigt wird, die einfachen seelischen Vorstellungen, sind bei allen Menschen dieselben, und ebenso sind es die Dinge, deren Abbildungen die Vorstellungen sind' (De interpretatione I, 16 a 1). Dieses Zitat verweist also, neben den Platonischen Ideen, auf das zweite bis heute nachwirkende Paradigma, in dem es um die Erklärung der Bedeutungen in der Sprache geht. Mit anderen Worten: seelische Vorstellungen erhalten im Produktionsvorgang der Sprache Wortkörper als Identifikationszeichen, wodurch der Bedeutungsgehalt eben dieser Zeichen fixiert wird. Den Theoriebereich beider Paradigmen bezeichnet Liselotte Gumpel als 'neo-Aristotelian.'

Die im Grunde belanglose Argumentationsschwäche im Vorwort des Bandes hätte ohne weiteres vernachlässigt werden dürfen, wäre sie nicht symptomatisch für die gesamte Darstellung. Konkreten Beispielen und terminologischen Erklärungen abhold findet die Diskussion auf einer Ebene statt, die — ich bin dazu versucht — fast als kommunikationstechnisch

beschrieben werden könnte. Sollten die transparenten Argumentationsketten und Reflexionen eines de Saussure, Ullmann, Peirce oder Cassirer gar keinen Einfluß gehabt haben? Die Autorin versichert zwar, 'methodologically, I apply a Cartesian reduction by taking absolutely nothing for granted' (p. xi), dieses Versprechen jedoch erwies sich nicht als der Leitfaden der Argumentation. Ist nämlich der Leser — um wenigstens einige Namen zu nennen — mit den Klassikern der modernen Semiotik (Peirce, Morris, de Saussure, Bühler, Jakobson, Sebeok) oder mit Humboldt, Cassirer, Husserl und Ingarden nicht vertraut, wird die Lektüre für ihn recht bald schon zu einem bedenklichen Erlebnis. Mit Mühe findet er schließlich unter einem Berg problematischer Materialanhäufungen den folgenden Leitfaden.

Den Ansatzpunkt liefert die Behauptung, daß das traditionelle Konzept der Metapher in der Sprache nicht nachweisbar ist, da Sprache allein auf sich selbst verweist und allein mittels kontextueller Bezüge Bedeutung erzeugt. 'Its (the thesis) primary aim is to grasp metaphor through an exhaustive understanding of meaning in language ...' (p. xiii). Die Grundlage dieser These ist das Sprachkonzept, daß die Funktion der Sprache im wesentlichen darin besteht, Vorstellungsinhalte in einer Sprachgemeinschaft zu vermitteln. 'Words are vehicles for speech; their primary task is to "name" what it is speakers wish to "say"' (p. 3). Wenn also beispielsweise eine Maschine nicht richtig 'arbeitet', dann finde keine metaphorische Begriffsübertragung aus dem Bereich einer menschlichen Tätigkeit statt, sondern der metaphorische Gehalt der nicht richtig 'arbeitenden' Maschine entstehe vielmehr durch das spezifische kontextuale Bezugsspiel einer Sprache und nicht durch außersprachliche Verweise. Selbst onomatopoetische Begriffe seien keine sprachlichen Übernahmen der empirischen Wirklichkeit in den Bereich der Sprache, vielmehr folgten auch sie dem gegebenen Regelspiel der muttersprachlichen Voraussetzungen. Es bestünde, ontologisch gesehen, keine Verbindung zwischen dem empirisch-physikalischen und sprachlichen Bereich des Seins. In dem so gesehenen Bereich der Sprache als einem autonomen Regelspiel ohne Fremdverweise entwickelt Liselotte Gumpel im Hauptteil der Darstellung ihre Metapherntheorie der Kontextbezüge, der innersprachlichen Verwicklungen und Zusammenhänge mittels eines semiotischen Begriffsinstrumentariums. An den drei Beispielen Brecht, Dickinson und Celan exemplifiziert sie den Hauptteil abschließend die Theorie.

Es ist nicht einfach, das Gewicht dieser Theorie zu bemessen. Im Grunde handelt es sich um die semiotisch-systematische Beschreibung von Textzusammenhängen, die endlos fortgesetzt werden könnte, ohne, wie die Beispiele zeigen, zu einem greifbaren Ergebnis zu führen. Allerdings ist ihr

Sensibilisationswert gegenüber sprachlichen Zusammenhängen nicht zu unterschätzen, wobei jedoch zu bedenken ist, daß das Fundament der Theorie, nämlich die Unterscheidung zwischen sprachlichen und außersprachlichen Bereichen des Seins, wohl nur das ist worum es geht, eine Metapher. Und da liegt dann auch die Crux des theoretischen Ansatzes, den die Verfasserin in der Einführung mit den folgenden Worten skizziert: 'In sum, non-Aristotelian semantics systematically puts the linguistic before the extralinguistic domain, broad meaning before idiosyncratic metaphor, function before form, holistic context before content taxonomy' (p. xii). Wäre es nämlich möglich, eben diesen außersprachlichen Bereich zu fassen, einen Bereich also, der nicht versprachlicht ist, wäre die moderne ontologische Reflexion seit einiger Zeit schon umgeschrieben worden. Ohne diesen — leider undenkbaren — Bezugspunkt jedoch finden die metaphorischen Bezüge in der traditionellen Theorie (neo-Aristotelian perspective) auch nur im Feld einer funktionierenden Sprache statt, auch wenn dies anders gesehen worden ist. Ob damit nun metaphorische Bedeutungen durch kontextuale Vernetzungen (holistic context, non-Aristotelian perspective) oder semantische Übertragungen aus entlegenen sprachlichen Feldern und Zusammenhängen (context taxonomy, traditionelle Theorie) entstehen, führt bei der Analyse des metaphorischen Phänomens wohl kaum zu einem 'Erkenntnisruck.' (HOLGER A. PAUSCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*MIEKE BAL, *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press 1985. Paper Cdn\$11.95.

Textbooks in literary theory are rare specimens and an altogether risky business owing to the lack of consensus on any existing paradigm of methods, terms and concepts. Writing a textbook in narratology is an even riskier enterprise. Narratology is probably the most articulated part of literary theory. Moreover, relative to other domains, the research into the nature of narrative texts has been continuous and in many respects methodologically consistent. From the early works of the Russian Formalists through the writings of French and American Structuralists to most recent narratology, one may sense an evolution with a clear underlying deep-structure. In other words, researchers in narratology are relatively in agreement as to the definition of basic concepts and procedures: narrative levels, narrative structures, temporal order, causality, perspective, types of narration, etc., form a firm ground for narratological studies.

The well-developed state in which we find narratology, however, puts specific demands and constraints on any attempt to represent this field of

research adequately. Narratology contains a sophisticated *methodological* system, ranging from formal modes for representing plots, through models that account for the oppositional relations between narrative agents to logico-semantic methods for classifying discursive structures. Yet as a conception of literary texts, structuralist narratology implies, some would claim, a naive and an almost outdated view of the nature of literary texts. The a-contextual view of narrative concepts, the belief in the self-sufficiency of texts and the playing down of referentiality, fictionality and readership, are all suppositions which create an obvious discrepancy between the 'ideology' behind the structuralist paradigm and its methodological appeal. In recent years, however, important contributions have augmented our understanding of narrative texts. While accepting the major structuralist tenets, constant attempts are being made to 'authenticate' the plausibility of structuralism as a philosophy of literary texts. This change from traditional structuralist to current narrative theory is reflected in new conceptions of the interaction between texts and readers and of the nature of readers' competence, in the re-introduction of representational and ontological issues and also in more sophisticated definitions of the semantics of narrative texts and of text-stylistics; these enable us today to see the potential in both narratological practice and theory.

Mieke Bal's introduction to narratology (or to the study of narrative texts), reflects in its structure the familiar Genettian model of three narrative strata: the first part is dedicated to elements of the *fabula* (*histoire*), the second part is about the story level (*récit*), and the third about the level of text (*narration*).

The *fabula*, a highly abstract construct, consists of the story materials (events, actors, time and location) in their elementary structural relations. *Story* refers to the more concrete level on which the *fabula* undergoes transformations according to specific principles of ordering: events are arranged in a sequence which may deviate from 'natural' chronology, elements of the *fabula* are allotted a duration and a degree of emphasis in the narrative, actors turn into individual characters and locations become places, relationships among various elements are established and a choice is made from among the possible points of view. On the third level of *narration*, the story is put into words. This transition requires a selection of a narrating stance (that is, the identity of the narrator and levels of narration are determined), of modes of narration (narrative, descriptive, scenic) and of motivations for these textual selections. Bal's systematic account of a theory of narrative is basically an elaboration on this three-decker model and hence on what the shifts from one narrative level to another involve. Bal does not claim to exhaust the field, excluding from her account other trends

within the theory of narrative (those other fields are, presumably, more linguistically or logically oriented studies in narratology). Her aim is to provide beginners with a set of tools 'as a means to express and specify one's interpretative reactions to a text' (p. x). Bal does, however, present an up-to-date picture of narratology insofar as she incorporates very recent discussions regarding concepts such as focalization (to the theory of which she has been an important contributor), free indirect discourse, *mise en abyme* and others.

From the opening remarks of the book, it is clear that the author attempts to get around the gap between method and ideology by disentangling the method from the ideological implications of structuralist poetics. She maintains that 'one need not adhere to structuralism as a philosophy in order to be able to use the concepts and views presented in this book. Neither does one need to feel that adherence to, for example, deconstructionist, Marxist, or feminist view of literature hinders the use of this book' (p. x).

Although on the face of things Bal embarks on a relatively safe game, one can only regret that narratology is portrayed in her book as no more than an arsenal of *descriptive* (in its narrowest sense) working tools; this empties narratology, in my opinion, of most of its claim to viability. The limitation of this system of analytic tools is particularly striking since Bal does not elude the more problematic phenomena in narrative texts; she just does not develop the appropriate means for dealing with them. Moreover, since narratology is not, in her view, a comprehensive theoretical system (as explicitly claimed in her preface to the English translation) theoretical-conceptual changes and modifications in narratology, of the type described above, are totally left out of her discussion. (Indeed, judging by Bal's book, structuralists have been peacefully resting on their laurels since the early 70's while introducing occasional improvements into a well-delineated, self-sufficient system.)

A typical example of the limited capacity of such a uni-dimensional model can be seen in the section dedicated to the shift from actors (on the level of fabula) to characters (of the story-level). A lack of conceptual theory behind the analysis results in something which oscillates between the trivial and the theoretically irresponsible. For instance, in a subsection titled 'predictability' characters are classified according to their referentiality. Referential characters (like Napoleon and Santa Claus) enter slots in frames of reference and are therefore more *predictable* than unreferential characters (such as Anna Karenina). This argument seems rather dubious since a fictional character named Miss Marple is also treated as referential (being a stereotype of spinsters). The lack of theoretical underpinning as to the

nature of fictionality and of a clear notion of what the predictability of narrative elements entails (or of what is the difference between the predictability of a stereotype and that of a character with a concrete counterpart in reality) and a cryptic definition of frames of reference result in a simplistic description which can hardly assist us in understanding narrative. To put it differently, Bal, equipped with a very basic actantial model, addresses complex narrative phenomena for which the given model cannot account. The apparent discrepancy between the theoretical concepts and actual narrative manifestations, is not however to be explained by the shortcomings of current theory of narrative but by the author's narrow employment of existing theory.

An occasional negligent treatment of concepts is also noticeable. In the same section, for instance, Bal describes narrative sources for constructing an image of a character. She enumerates four such sources: repetition, accumulation of characteristics, relations among characters (similarity and contrast) and character change. Whereas the first element (the *textual* repetition of the character's features) belongs foremost to the level of narration, the others belong to the story-level. In a study that so emphatically insists on distinguishing between narrative levels, it is striking that, in practice, these levels are not kept apart and that the boundaries between them are so blurred. Bal also makes questionable generalizations which contribute little (if anything) to the narratological framework. To quote just one example: 'explicit qualifications shed more light than implicit ones. ... Implicit, indirect qualifications can be interpreted differently by different readers' (p. 90). Here, again, Bal touches upon crucial problems which literary texts, as channels of communication, obviously raise. The nature of explicitness, the lack of correlation between a degree of explicitness and the load of information carried by textual elements, questions concerning implicatures, etc., are tackled by Bal with the simple dichotomy explicit/implicit; the use she makes of this dichotomy amounts to no more than a preliminary intuition. Narratology surely has something more to offer, even to the novice!

Likewise, in a section about commentary and ideology, non-narrative commentary is defined as argumentative discourse that refers to something of general knowledge outside the fabula. Bal goes on to claim that argumentative parts of the text often give explicit information about the ideology of the text. Under this heading of non-narrative commentary, Bal finds it fit to include phrases like 'water boils at 100 degrees' and 'fortunately' which are both, in her view, 'visions of reality' (p. 128). But surely the difference between the two phrases should not be overlooked. While the first may indeed be argumentative (and external to the fabula),

the second seems like an expression of the ideology of the text and an integral part of the narrative. I find it disappointing that in the current state of narratology, different semantic and narrative phenomena such as commentary, ideological statements and textual evaluative devices, should be thrown so off-handedly into the same basket. (RUTH RONEN, TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY)

*CLAUDIA J. BRODSKY. *The Imposition of Form: Studies in Narrative Representation and Knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987. Pp. 344. US\$38.00

Brodsky offers us yet one more effort to eliminate from our minds the traditional terms of literary criticism and scholarship, and to implant there the jargon of 'narratology.' Unlike the common varieties of narratologists, however, she bases her thesis (and I suspect that her book was indeed a Ph.D. thesis) in her reading of Kant, principally of the three *Critiques*, various terms from which she applies to Goethe's *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*; to three novels of Jane Austen; to novels of Balzac and Stendhal; to Melville's *Pierre*, or the *Ambiguities*; and to Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu*. Her ambitious effort, then, is to find new readings of texts mainly familiar and surely literary through the thick spectacles of Kantian philosophy and recent 'theory.'

Brodsky takes pains to assert that she is not undertaking a Kantian analysis of narrative, but that Kant's struggle to describe the 'critical necessities and difficulties in composing any understanding of knowledge' somehow will aid her to sort out 'the particular problems inherent in the composition and understanding of narrative' (p. 24). In yards of quotation from such as Colletti, Lyotard, Derrida, Jameson, *et al.*, the writer seems to consider that narrative and Kantian epistemology are one and the same, for Kant's theory of cognition 'de-emphasizes' (p. 35) the epistemological opposition between true and false. Brodsky reads Kant accurately and well, but I find her trying on a certain hocus-pocus when she assures us, with help from Valhinger and Professor Ralph Freedman, that Kant raises the issue of fictionality 'not in terms of fiction itself, or of error, but ... under the category of reliable statements of knowledge, "definitions"' (pp. 36 ff.). She nevertheless applies her reading to narrative fiction, teasing and torturing a notion of representation in fiction along her route, slapping the wrists in her copious footnotes of pre-postmodern critics (R.P. Blackmur, whom she misreads, excepted [p. 233, note]), and arriving at aesthetically skewed judgments through manipulation of the vocabulary of narratology.

Unlike many in her school, Brodsky places her narratives historically, although her history is the history of natural science and of philosophy, not of literature. She chooses the elements in her textual salad for their 'problematising' (p. 104) challenge. She finds, or forges, a link between Goethe's *Zur Farbenlehre* and *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*, and in so doing, she misses both the satirical comedy of the novel, and its highly conventional elements. One quotation from her chapter on Goethe may suffice to illustrate her verbal manoeuvres upon her other selections:

If ... Goethe's narrative is as compelling as it is obscure, it is because the events of errant passion composing the novel's story also compose the way in which that story is understood, by the novel's characters, the subjects and objects of its action, and its narrator, their discursive source. Structured like their understanding, those events are available to discursive analysis as narrative moments representing differing discourses upon (and of) errant passion: figural representations making the movement of Eros appear meaningful. For in order for 'errant' relations of meaning, for 'color' to appear, the language as a mode of reference must substitute for its referents, made them into its medium. (p. 98)

Even after changing the intransitive verbs here used transitively, I cannot parse, conjugate, or paraphrase the passage. The writer substitutes an aura of meaning for clarity, here and throughout.

That aura is thickest in the discussion of Melville's *Pierre*, or the *Ambiguities*, the sole ambiguity about which, I think, is how Melville convinced his editor to publish it. Conventional criticism has been more polite about it, but never enthusiastic. Brodsky finds special virtue in that novel because of what conventional critics read as defects, but her reasons are so involved, ingenious, so centered on isolated words and significant images, that her chapter defies brief analysis.

It is remarkable to find a teacher of the young at Princeton writing this sort of thing: 'That is why, once the narrator's story of time regained in Combray has been gotten smoothly underway ...' (p. 272). When Derrida fiddles with the French language, he appears to have fun doing it. His followers, who coin words and distort both diction and idiom, are humorless, as in Brodsky's 'arisa' (p. 33), 'to concord' (p. 55), 'to collapse' [analyses] (p. 56), 'self-referentiality' (p. 265). Narration is always 'ongoing' and conclusions are modified by 'most importantly,' to cite from a long list.

In trying to equate the results of an artist's imagination in fiction with Kantian epistemology, Brodsky deadens and loses what most fully matters in fiction. However impossible to define, the novel of our canon has been the work of a writer of spontaneity and insight, his narrative the product of reflection upon experience, necessarily personal, a sifting of that experience

for the particles that create meaning for both writer and reader. Experience is the sum of action, reflection, and observation of the writer's own time; that sum becomes knowledge, but not primarily knowledge derived from the application of philosophical jargon, as *The Impostion of Form* would have it. The artist's knowledge becomes itself historical, while it embodies valuable data for history, indicating how a given writer has seen and reacted to his time, no matter what his stylistic, formal medium.

I am tempted to call *The Impostion of Form*, in which we never learn exactly who is doing the imposing, an example of the higher balderdash one encounters in some art and film criticism. It is a pious work for the converted who stand in the apostolic succession from Saussure, Lévy-Strass, Chomsky, Barthes, and Derrida. To the septic, the book is a maddening, anti-literary and potentially anti-intellectual, reductive exercise, written in anti-English. It is beautifully made, over-priced, and contains an inadequate index. (JOHN MCCORMICK)

*ROBERT ALTER. *Motives for Fiction*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1984. Pp. 248. US\$20.00

The sixteen essays in this collection were originally published in various journals between 1968 and 1982. The earlier pieces, dealing with Dickens, Mailer and Sterne, are fairly straight forward textual exegesis, (the 'this is what it's all about sort of criticism'); the latter ones, quite often review articles, are more often concerned with broader literary issues and are far more interesting. In his preface, Robert Alter is quick to qualify the structure and intent of this book by claiming that he is not going to 'fall into the fashionable pretense of presenting these essays as chapters of an integrally conceived study' (p. vii). However, even though they have not been integrally conceived, they do all deal with 'the problem of representation' (p. vii), or in other words mimesis, and so really do belong together. What we have then, is a 'book,' as it says on the dust cover, which 'explores various different sorts of novel ... to illuminate both the text in question and the general issue.' So that we won't fail to recognize what this general issue is, the 1978 article 'Mimesis and the Motive for Fiction' is placed first. What we have then is a book on authors as diverse as Dickens, Sterne, Stendhal, Flaubert, Proust, Fowles, Nabokov, Barthelme and Barth, all of whom are considered in the context of realism.

What really binds this book together, more than any supposed or 'real' idea about what mimesis is and therefore what motivates fictions, is Alter's elucidation of his attitudes towards what constitutes good literature. What

really binds this book together is the exposition of one man's intuited taste and his justifications for the 'reasonableness' of that taste. In the last sentence of 'Literary Lives,' the last essay in the book, Alter, discussing literary biography, writes: 'biographical criticism, may be doomed to give us no more than brilliant approximations, always bound to a particular viewpoint, but ... the effort is far from frivolous' (p. 220). While this is meant to justify the intuitive impressions of the mature and wise critic, the man of practised common sense (and might therefore be accepted as his final attitude towards all criticism which, as he writes in the preface, is nothing more than the "mediator of imaginative literature" [p. viii]), it ironically relativizes the authority of his role as mediator. One man's brilliance is another man's drivel. Where are the standards he cherishes in this world of approximations and subjectively limited viewpoints? Perhaps this is a very cagey genuflection to the sort of relativeness that he claims he really cannot accept.

The judgements here are markedly unequivocal. Alter is all for discipline, discrimination and selectivity, all of which must be based in sound moral awareness. He hates 'improvisation' which demonstrates 'a deliberate looseness of form' (p. 22). Thus Barthelme is a 'shrewd writer if ultimately a trivial one' (p. 28). John Barth's '*Giles Goat-boy* slowly recedes into the detritus of failed experiments' (p. 30). Thomas Pynchon's '*Gravity's Rainbow* is a 'lamentably flabby novel,' which demonstrates 'a lack of selectivity ... [and] the unwillingness to make differential judgements' (p. 33). Alter dislikes anything that is levelling: levelling of history and the lessons to be drawn from it, levelling of politics and the lessons to be drawn from it. Literature must be able to demonstrate the qualitative differences of human existence. 'A good novel ought to be able to make nice distinctions and complex judgements' (p. 40). There is 'an expectation of moral seriousness in literature' (p. 61); it must deal with the enigmas of human experience (p. 43).

Any literature, and correlatively, any literary theory which privileges any literature which relativizes human and moral values, and thus in Alter's view levels human experience, is therefore no good. And this brings us to mimesis. Literature as nothing but discourse levels. Literature cannot represent only its own artifice of representation. It must represent something external to itself. It must represent the truths of experiential reality. Artifice, Alter claims, with what comes across as a tongue-in-cheek naïveté, 'operates with a tacit agreement between author and audience that these artifices are the necessary and efficacious vehicle for conveying the truth ... our chief interest is in the personages and events they convey to us, not in the nature and status of the artifices' (p. 19). He is careful to explain that he is not

against haunted artifice; he is only against it when it is self-indulgent (p. 35). Barth and Barthelme are self-indulgent; Nabokov is not because his anti-realism 'probes the roots of real experience'; in Nabokov Alter finds a rigorous self-consistency and not indulgent improvisation (p. 65). A self-conscious awareness of artifice is part of our literary tradition and therefore acceptable: 'The history of the novel may be thought of as a dialectic between two traditions, one self-conscious and the other realist' (p. 12); one is 'intermittently illusionist,' the other is 'consistently illusionist' (p. 13). The main point is that they are both, at base, illusionist and therefore both, at base, realist. They are both parties to the contract.

But while literature must respectfully represent the real and therefore be responsibly motivated by a discriminating and complex understanding of history and politics, it must be careful of ideology. Ideology means conviction, and conviction is synonymous with closed-mindedness. Literature happens when 'the imagination is not fettered to a doctrine that assumes we know what reality is, or ought to be' (p. 189). There seems to be a large chink in the integrity of his attitudes and values here. As I read this book it is largely concerned with just such a literary ideology. Even if he is not trying to define reality in all its particulars, he is certainly trying to define his concept of how we can best represent the 'truth' of those particulars. A bad ideology, one that is fettered by convictions, seems to be one that he is not convinced by. He does not, however, feel in the least fettered by the ideology he does accept, the one he most unabashedly expresses in these essays.

This double standard arises out of a conflict between common sense and abstract theorizing. Even if we cannot scientifically arrive at the truth, as abstract theorizing warns us, we can, Alter insists, intuit its presence. For Alter, everything seems to depend upon this 'necessary intuition of presence' (p. 219). John Fowles is praised because he is trying to represent that presence through 'the recovery of the real' from the past (p. 150). (In my reading of Fowles any such recovery is presented as a problematized theme.) At one point Alter asks himself the question: 'how is one credibly and effectively to *narrate* anything that seems real, when everything, by virtue of being an object of consciousness, threatens to be infinitely unstable, infinitely filiated with other things for which there is no room in the narrative?' (p. 14). His answer is to draw up a contract of illusion and accept it as real. This does not seem to me a credible way of reading and therefore mediating a story. If credibility is even an issue (when the words 'real' and 'true' must always be placed in inverted commas), then the strategy must include the doubts embedded in any level of credibility. Even a 'consistently illusionist' narrative is still illusionist. This is not to deny that we feel and

experience things in 'real' life. It is simply to admit, as Alter in fact does, that our experience of these experiences is always mediated by consciousness.

In many ways Alter is like the Edmund Wilson of the thirties who wrote *To The Finland Station*. During the early Depression years Wilson was very interested in Marxism; he felt that capitalism had come to a dead end. But when he went to Russia in 1935 and saw the gruesome reality of Stalin's purges, he changed his mind and decided that Marxism, although appealing in many ways, demanded too much moral blindness in the name of a future good to be acceptable. *To The Finland Station*, which began as a sympathetic attempt to bring Marxism into the main-stream of Western Humanism ended by arguing against it. Alter seems to have had a similar sympathetic initial response to abstract theorizing. *Partial Magic* appears to begin with a sympathetic leaning but to end with a disaffection. Alter was said to be somewhat upset by the way supposed theorists warmly accepted that book. Alter does not totally deny the usefulness of theory. For example, he qualifies the value of Alfred Kazin's literary criticism by saying that he had no skill at, or use for, formalistic textual analysis. But he is wary of its unreasonableness and the questions it raises about the relativity of moral values, in other words, about the solidity of reality. Like Wilson, he became uneasy with something that was initially appealing and turned against it. Relative value becomes a bogey man equal in horror to Marxism. All of these essays are footnotes to this uneasiness.

The appeal here is almost that old emotional, American anti-intellectual appeal: intellectuality is alright as long as it only means an encyclopedic memory and a facility for connection and allusion. But as soon as it begins to challenge our common sense view of who we are and what we are, as soon as it enters the realm of abstract inquiry it becomes somehow threatening and so is condemned as flabby, indiscriminating, unselective. A book like this will be well liked by those who are made uncomfortable by the ontological implications of recent theorizing. They will praise it as outspoken but fair and judicious. They will talk about the maturity and sureness of voice and invoke all sorts of other clichéd sentiments to help them feel more comfortable with themselves when the lights are out. (ALAN R. KNIGHT, MCGILL UNIVERSITY)

JAMES S. HANS. *Imitation and the Image of Man*. Cultura Ludens Ser. Series 3. Philadelphia: John Benjamins 1987. Pp xviii + 163. Hardcover US\$36.00, paper US\$24.95

Two chief ambitions of this book are to restore validity to imitation and to discredit 'the Kantian notion of an aesthetic domain separate and discrete

from everyday life' (p. xv). To satisfy the first ambition, Hans redefines imitation in terms of a model that is dynamic rather than static. Imitation is not the thing *after* the object or the event but the process or the activity whose goal is understanding rather than representation. To satisfy the second ambition, the author assumes an interdisciplinary stance, working with, what he calls, a 'mélange of materials' in an attempt to bring literary texts out of their privileged and isolated state and into a more immediate and contextualized relationship with everyday life. This strategy of intellectual decentralization explains why the book moves with daring, though less frequently with deftness, from Faulkner, to love, to the essay genre, to education, to fundamentalism, to consumerism, to Pynchon and Bellow, to Oz, to sex, and so on. The discussion of modern theorists is just as wide-ranging and unsystematic. Though from the title, one might anticipate a discussion of mimesis and man in literary culture — from Aristotle to Auerbach and beyond — the book, in fact, is neither introduction nor survey. Walter Benjamin, Foucault, Heidegger, Gadamer, Lukács, Girard (especially Girard), Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and others who are, according to Hans, unacknowledged, appear in these pages in a kind of theorists' menagerie. It is as though the book goes to market picking and choosing its way among the stalls of literary, political, sociological and psychological ideas, showing, if nothing else, that humanistic eclecticism is still capable of appropriating continental theory.

This description need not be a criticism if one allows Hans his argument that an interdisciplinary approach best accommodates the position of the *bricoleur* (Chapter seven, the last) whose life, whose writing, whose criticism — we are forced to make such elisions frequently — embrace the preferred stance of play and possibility in a field of infinite imitation models. Such a strategy replaces the traditional, unreliable, and potentially damaging strategy of 'linearity,' by which Hans means an excessive and obsessive Western rationalism, 'the logic of analytic truth,' and its accompanying assumptions of man-as-God and the righteousness of fact. According to Hans, linearity finds its extreme not only in grasping American materialism and careerism (buttressed by notions of 'property rights'), but also in the nihilistic and narcissistic Sartrean view of identity, that burdensome responsibility to find an 'original' self. The latter notion is central because it concerns Hans's attempt to restore imitation to intellectual respectability by pointing out that imitation is primary and natural (as evidenced by childhood) and that it is the method by which we 'try on' various strategies in a field of possibilities, models of personality, behaviour, career, and presumably, intellectual leaning. Thus, imitation is not a re-presentation of something, but an activity directed towards growth, understanding and value.

Hans's discussion of this century's distrust of imitation, essentially because it collides with our view that originality must avoid repetition, is, perhaps, the most ambitious in the book. That discussion not only reveals important biases and limitations of our age but also invites a theory of literary and cultural history based upon the ways in which authors and texts imitate.

The nature of imitation is best illustrated, for Hans, in Faulkner, who occupies a privileged position in the book because his characters and his fiction so successfully avoid the traps of linearity and move instead in patterns of play, dialogue, exchange, and circle (Hans's version of the hermeneutic one) towards understanding and love, and finally, to value. Relying heavily on a conversation in *Absalom, Absalom!* between Shreve and Quentin who 'overpass to love where there might be paradox and inconsistency but nothing fault nor false' (p. 5), Hans insists that we must follow their example to relax the usual demands of analytic truth which lead to the tyranny of system and exclusion rather than to the benignity of openness and understanding. Thus, to 'overpass' with a text is to establish a relationship of mutuality, modification, and correction, 'some happy marriage of speaking and hearing' (Faulkner), a model which Hans enlarges to include man's relationship to his world.

At its simplest, Hans's argument is a restatement of the truism that relativism is a defining feature of modernism: thus, Hans reminds us, rather unhelpfully, that 'the stable world of Newton gave way to Einstein's relativistic cosmology only because Einsteinian physics can explain more, because it reflects more precisely our understanding of the process of nature, and because it clearly feels right ...' (p. 16). What is not so clear is why Hans is so selective about the modernists who create relativistic cosmologies. One reason may be that he underestimates the Romantic tradition of 'overpassing,' as though Faulkner were the first or only writer to circumvent the 'traditional conception of the novel, [which] stresses the importance of the "facts" ...' (p. 9). If the Brontës do not 'overpass' fact, or Dickens in *Hard Times*, then Virginia Woolf certainly does in *The Waves* and in her essay 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,' in which she claims that the tools of the factual novelist are 'death.' Given Hans's emphasis on 'overpassing' to supra-linguistic understanding, one wonders how he could avoid novelists such as Woolf, or Forster, or Joyce, or Proust, all of whom concern themselves with one or another aspects of circumventing the limitations of rationality. At the very least, we need a brief explanation of the limitations of the systems to which they have 'overpassed,' if indeed, that is Hans's position. The poets fare no better; 'among modern poets, only Williams is regularly capable of accepting the multiplicity of his location in the world ...' (p. 123). Pound, Yeats, Eliot and Stevens are guilty of defecting to systems.

Hans is just as selective and even more critical of the post-modernists. There are passages of excellent exegesis of poems by A. R. Ammons and of Saul Bellow's fiction, and an especially entertaining analysis, à la Barthes, of some journalistic prose on the space shuttle. One would think that Pynchon would be a good ally in Hans's project of exploding systems, for Pynchon's pose, after all, is that of the marginalized *bricoleur* whose systems are both decentred and multiple. Hans approves of *Gravity's Rainbow* inasmuch as it shows the limitations of dualistic thinking, the 'either/or' gridlock of system and chaos, inasmuch as it is an easy illustration of his thesis that linear thinking leads to the cult of violence and death, and inasmuch as it shows that living outside systems means living with risk. Yet, inexplicably, he claims that, while Pynchon's portrayal of contingency is accurate, '[i]ts apparent absurdity allows us to sublimate its message and retreat to comfortable ground' (p. 67). The bottom line seems to be realism, though, arguably, much of Faulkner is as bizarre and as absurd as Pynchon (the Benjy section of *The Sound and the Fury* is the obvious example); why Faulkner's vision is less alienating than Pynchon's is not clear. Perhaps Hans underestimates those parts of Pynchon's novels which, though bizarre and dreamlike when looked at through one lens, constitute the realism of fright and the horror of moral violation when looked at through a quite different lens. Not that we must make a moral realist of Pynchon, for why, indeed, should fantasy and the absurd be genres banished from the 'field of multiple locations' in the first place?

Much of Hans's book is a lament for the failure of the post-modernists, with the exception of Bellow, who have dropped the flag of Faulknerian modernism. In this regard, Hans is pragmatic: the function of fiction is to show us how to live. Such a desire to make literature useful and responsible is consistent with the occasional evangelicism of the book, notwithstanding Hans's very insightful analysis of that force in American society. Chapter three ('Imitation and Entropy'), for example, concludes with an urgency beyond the usual rhetoric of chapter endings: 'We have lived in the Culture of Death for quite some time now, hoping that someone — the ideal father — will show us how to create a Culture of Life. It is time for us to find it ourselves. It is past time' (p. 79). The book, then, is an unusual mixture of post-structuralist theory brewed with social comment and a nostalgia for value and moral purpose. Scarcely have we said goodbye to Derrida and Girard than the ghosts of Matthew Arnold and F.R. Leavis appear. These ideas may be and should be expressed more flatteringly: Hans attempts to rescue post-modernist reflexivity — relativism in the service of narcissistic literature — by restoring 'valuation' and moral authority. Play no longer serves the narcissistic self or the narcissistic novel; rather, it becomes a

strategy for imitation. In a field of possibilities — lexical or behavioural — we imitate, not that we may find ourselves, but that we may understand other selves, other texts, and other worlds.

Explicit in Hans's ideology of imitative play is a critique of dominance. In a non-system there can be neither centre, not goal, nor Father, nor end — only relative behaviours and investigations. Thus, in pursuit of knowledge, we must keep closure and certainty in abeyance by remaining provisional and exploratory so that we avoid being 'shut within repetitions of what we already know.' And yet, projects, ambitions and enterprises, by nature, seem guided by some principle of direction and control. Writing a book, for example, is an aggressive act, an attempt to establish authority, and for all its variety and interdisciplinary manoeuvres, Hans's book does assume authority, even as noted, evangelically. In other ways, however, Hans has been a successful, if reluctant, *bricoleur* by virtue of the unexplained organization and sequence of the chapters and the variety of the subject matter and sometimes the tortuous discussion within each chapter. Such imbalances and proportions are calculated, I suspect, as example of the *bricoleur's* non-linear 'play' on the field, visible proof that understanding is more eclectic and circular than scholarship has cared to admit; Hans says as much in the introduction: 'we need to concentrate on the manner in which different kinds of textual materials interact with one another, as I have attempted to do here' (p. xv). There is some danger that such an attempt will be misconstrued as laxity, which would be a regrettable injustice to a book which, whatever its limitations as a spoiler of discreteness, speaks with an eloquent, sincere, and informed voice. (BRENTON MACLAINE, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*KATHRYN HUME. *Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western Literature*. New York and London: Methuen 1984. Pp. xvi + 213. Paper US\$11.95

Since Aristotle and Plato, Kathryn Hume argues in *Fantasy and Mimesis*, the tendency in literary criticism and theory has been to value only the mimetic representation of reality, and to relegate fantasy to a position of inferiority. Yet despite its dismissal by critics and theorists, in the literary works themselves fantasy has remained central, 'an element in nearly all kinds of literature' (p. xii), an impulse 'not inferior in priority, scope or significance to the mimetic impulse' (p. 24). Hume believes that 'it is the fantastic elements which allow literature to convey most of its varied senses of meaning' (p. 28), and her aim is to examine the ways fantasy is used and the

reasons for its use, while helping to develop the means for scholarship 'to handle fantasy critically' (p. 20).

What little critical attention fantasy has received, Hume maintains, is chiefly concerned with setting the limits of the field, with exclusiveness. Hume's own definition is simple and inclusive, for she defines fantasy as 'any departure from consensus reality' (p. 21), and her domain includes all works of literature in which such a departure is in evidence, from the daydream fantasy of pastoral and pornography to the mythology of *Genesis* and the new or future worlds of science fiction. She divides fantasy literature into four categories, according to the reader's perceptions of the relationship between the fantasy world and consensus reality. To the first category, the literature of *illusion*, belong various forms of popular escape literature — adventure and detective stories, tales of horror and the uncanny, pornography — all of which afford the reader entertainment and a sense of disengagement from the boredom and depression of real life. Literature of *vision*, such as the work of Kafka and Borges, offers an alternative view of reality, a new and usually disturbing perspective against which to measure the old. While the literature of vision is primarily expressive, that of *revision* is didactic. Authors anticipate not merely reaction — an engagement of the reader's emotions — but action, in accordance with their plans for 'revising reality, for shaping futures' (p. 56); Ursula Le Guin's *The Dispossessed* and C.S. Lewis's 'planetary' trilogy are amongst the examples Hume discusses. Works in the final category, the literature of *disillusionment*, propose that reality is unknowable, and this type is marked, amongst other things, by ambivalence (as in *Gulliver's Travels*), by a recognition of our limitations as human animals (in Jack London's *Call of the Wild* and Saint-Exupéry's *The Little Prince*), and by an awareness of the inadequacy of communication (in Calvino's *The Castle of Crossed Destinies* and Lewis Carroll's *The Hunting of the Shark*).

Hume's adoption of a wide perspective on fantasy, as opposed to the narrowly exclusive approach of, say, Todorov's *The Fantastic*, is valuable. The book offers interesting comments on individual texts, and examples are always appropriate and helpful. There are many thought-provoking observations, while the author's adaptation of Frye's *mythoi* and modes as a grid to show where fantasy is likely to be present has indeed the potential to increase scholarly ability to 'handle fantasy.' On the whole, however, Hume's book leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction. The problem is two-fold: it lies, firstly, in the absence of a consistent system for analysis and categorisation, and secondly, in the decision to focus on an unprovable and irrefutable factor, the presumed effect of the fantastic work on the reader's thought and action.

Hume begins her analysis with a model of the literary communication process which extends that of Abrams (artist — work, with its own 'universe' — audience) by adding two elements, the actual world of the writer (World-1) and that of the audience (World-2), so that the model now has five elements. Since fantasy is defined in terms of 'departure from consensus reality,' one might expect to find the definition accommodated within the model (for instance, in the obvious link between those two worlds and the model (for instance, in the obvious link between those two worlds and the 'universe' of the text), but the theoretical component is not followed through. Despite a claim that the approach involves all five elements, analysis leads always and only to one point: the work's effect on the reader's perception of the actual world (World-2 of the model). But even within this limited scope, the approach is far from systematic. Of the four central analytical chapters, the first discusses one genre of escape literature after another in seemingly random order, though with emphasis on effect. In the second, the literature of vision is grouped according to whether its fantastic representation is 'additive, subtractive [or] contrastive' (p. 83) — that is to say, on the basis of the author's specific way of altering the world of reality. The chapter 'Literature of Revision' deliberately applies a different categorisation scheme, distinguishing between works that focus on man and those that focus on the universe. Clearly there is no consistent and theoretically-justified pattern here to serve as a guide for future researchers.

The main problem with the book, however, is the author's reliance on that most debatable of components, the effect on the reader. Here, too, the lack of a theoretical framework is sorely felt. Hume's concern is not the implied reader, whose response might reasonably be postulated by a close study of the text (and indeed, the problematic term 'reader' is simply ignored), but an actual person whose world view may be altered by the reading. Yet in the absence of a controlled empirical experiment, how can one judge the accuracy of statements like 'Nonetheless, those who enjoy [Vonnegut's] books like the feelings induced by joining him in his low-key indignation' (p. 100) or 'On us as readers, the effect of subtractive works is often very compelling. We do not feel that its commentary on our own world is as optional as the commentary from a purely additive fantasy' (p. 94)? One can merely agree or disagree, on the basis of personal experience or postulations — yet judgements of this kind form the basis for the major categorisation scheme proposed here.

Towards the end of the study, in Chapter 7, Hume acknowledges that 'fantasy is not some form of energy which can traverse the void between two minds. A vehicle is necessary — the literary work' (p. 149). At this late stage, other elements of the model, especially aspects of the 'universe,' are brought into play, and the useful tabulation of Frye's *mythoi* and modes is drawn up.

Long before this, however, many readers will have abandoned the book in frustration, whether at the absence of a consistent scheme or a systematic theoretical framework, at the constant need to accept the author's personal judgements as universally applicable, or merely at the minor annoyance of Hume's assumption that writers in general may be referred to as 'he.' (E.A. MARSLAND, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

***VORSTAND DER VEREINIGUNG, Hrsg. *Textsorten und literarische Gattungen. Dokumentation des Germanistentages in Hamburg vom 1. bis 4. April 1979*. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag 1983. Pp. 735. No price**

Seit der im Titel angesprochenen Germanistentagung, über die anschließende Fertigstellung des umfangreichen Manuskriptes, die zögernde Drucklegung und Auslieferung des Bandes, bis zur gegenwärtigen Besprechung sind einige Jahre vergangen, genauer ein rundes Jahrzehnt. Und da ist es schon fraglich, ob nach diesem Zeitraum eine Rezension, die auch in *Germanistik*, wo der Band nur aufgeführt wurde, nicht zu finden ist, überhaupt noch sinnvoll sein kann. Der Verfasser ist offensichtlich der Meinung, und dazu die folgenden Beobachtungen.

Wie im Vorwort des umfangreichen Readers mitgeteilt wird, bietet die vorliegende Vortragsammlung dem Leser den Stand der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis vom Frühjahr 1979. Sicherlich, in der Dokumentation des damaligen Forschungsstandes allein kann schon die Bedeutung des Bandes gesehen werden, doch nicht nur das, der Band reflektiert außerdem den Höhepunkt und den Abschluß germanistischer Forschungsperspektiven und Methodologien, die aus heutiger Sicht vielleicht mit dem Begriff eines ausdifferenzierenden optimistischen Pluralismus zu erfassen sind, Forschungsrichtungen also, in denen — besonders im Bereich der linguistischen Poetik — der Geist der Naturwissenschaften noch spukte und man der Auffassung war, die literarischen Textphänomene auf der Grundlage mikroanalytischer Untersuchungen im Zusammenhang ausgefeilter Terminologien und Thesen fassen zu können. Und so finden sich dann auch in diesem Bereich linguistischer Analysen der poetischen Sprache eine Vielzahl instrumentaler Begriffe und Formeln, so beispielsweise — um nur einige aufzuführen — 'Inkohärenz', 'Semiosfähigkeit', 'entautomatisierte Sprache', 'symmetrische und regelmäßige Anordnung der grammatischen Oppositionen', 'sprachliche Abweichung', 'graduelle Modifikation des Zeichengebrauchs als funktionale Verschiebung innerhalb natürlicher Zeichenbildungsprozesse', 'Differenzqualitäten' usw. In diesem Zusammenhang hat der Band hinsichtlich der Probleme *Textsorten und*

literarische Gattungen als Dokument seine besondere Berechtigung, die im Grunde erst aus der heutigen Distanz erkannt werden kann.

Der Band enthält 44 Beiträge. Nach den einleitenden Plenumsvorträgen 'Text oder Gedicht?' (Helmut Heißenbüttel), 'Über Textsorten und andere Textklassen' (Hugo Sieger) und 'Historisch-strukturelle Rekurrenz als Gattungs-/Textsortenkriterium' (Horst Steinmetz) folgen die 5 bis 6 Vorträge der Sektionen 'Linguistische Differenzierung von Textsorten', 'Theorie literarischer Gattungen', 'Probleme der Gattungsgeschichtsschreibung' und 'Geschichtliche Ausprägungen literarischer Gattungen' vom Mittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert in den Sektionen IV bis VI. Die letzte Sektion beschäftigt sich mit 'Textsorten und Gattungen unter didaktischem Aspekt' und schließlich ein Beitrag zum literarischen Dokumentarfilm des Fernsehens.

Natürlich ist es im vorliegenden Rahmen nicht möglich, den Bereich des entwickelten Problemfeldes auch nur andeutungsweise zu skizzieren und hinsichtlich der verschiedenen methodischen Ansätze kritisch zu befragen. Der Umfang und die Vielfalt des ausgebreiteten Wissens und der Kenntnisse verbieten dieses Unternehmen. Einige Bemerkungen, die die einleitend angeordneten Forschungsperspektiven betreffen, lassen sich jedoch auch hier mitteilen. Zu diesem Zweck beschränke ich mich auf die einleitenden Plenumsvorträge, die in gewisser Weise den Bereich der in den Sektionen vorgestellten Einzeluntersuchungen abgrenzen.

Dabei kommen im wesentlichen zwei Perspektiven zur Geltung. Auf der einen Seite wird die Auffassung vertreten, daß die Genese literarischer Text zu immer komplizierteren, die Besonderheiten der verschiedenen Textsorten (z.B. Märchen, Geschichte, Reportage, Parabel, Anekdote usw.) untereinander vermischenden Textformen führt. Auf der anderen Seite, auf der die überwiegende Mehrzahl der Vertreter der damaligen linguistischen Poetik stand, motiviert die Auffassung, daß sich Textphänomene und — funktionen, wenn auch graduell verschieden, mittels linguistischer Instrumentarien erfassen lassen.

Heißenbüttel ist als Vertreter der experimentellen Literatur offensichtlich dem ersten Standpunkt verpflichtet. Im Blickwinkel eines 'ästhetischen und kulturellen Pluralismus' (p. 22) plädiert er für die strukturelle und funktionale Verschränkung von Textsorten, um die Vielfalt der sich immer wieder verändernden literarischen Absichten zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Sieger und Steinmetz dagegen bemühen sich um das Herausarbeiten möglicher Begriffsansätze, mittels derer Textsorten und Gattungskriterien beschrieben werden könnten. Dabei geht es Sieger um das Erheben bestimmter Texttypologien und Steinmetz um die Darstellung von 'Rekurrenzen der Werkstrukturen', die es dem Literaturhistoriker ermöglichen,

'konventionelle Gattungsstrukturen' (p. 78) zu erfassen. Überwiegend in der Optik der zweiten Richtung liefern nun die anschließenden Vorträge der 6 Sektionen Detailanalysen.

In den vergangenen Jahren ist der Optimismus jener damaligen linguistischen Poetik recht stark gedämpft worden. Auch haben wir inzwischen eingesehen, daß das Arsenal der Kunst- und Literaturmittel keineswegs endlos ist, was Heißenbüttel offenbar noch annahm, sondern begrenzt, weshalb Wiederholungen unvermeidlich sind. Dennoch: als Dokumentation der hier skizzierten Forschungsrichtung hat der vorliegende Sammelband auch heute noch seinen Wert, und deshalb ist er aus Bibliotheken wohl kaum noch hinweg zu denken. (HOLGER A. PAUSCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*ADENA ROSMARIN. *The Power of Genre*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986. Pp. 260. US\$26.00

Adena Rosmarin takes issue with those who believe that attributions of genre are 'potentially verifiable or, at least, refutable' (p. 26). Neither empirical nor *a priori* theories of genre can ground critical judgements that are, in the last analysis, acts of will. Instead, she favours 'an expressly deductive genre criticism ... [that] would make its reader aware of its premises and, simultaneously, convince him of their explanatory power' (p. 24). Unlike representational concepts of genre that conceal or deny their constitutive nature, a 'deductive' theory,

places constitutive or constructive power in the genre, and defines the genre neither "historically" nor "theoretically" but in terms of its use in critical explanation. The genre is the critic's heuristic tool, his chosen or defined way of persuading his audience to see the literary text in all its previously inexplicable and "literary" fullness and then to relate this text to those that are similar or, more precisely, to those that may be similarly explained (p. 25).

While traditional theories of genre attempt to limit interpretation by appeals to the 'truth,' a deductive theory would extend interpretation by making persuasion the final court of appeal.

Two criteria are given for persuasiveness: rigor of definition and originality of application, criteria Rosmarin adapts from Gombrich's famous dictum, 'making comes before matching.' As a schema, a genre selects and reorders data from an object text according to its own deductive principles (p. 21). The critic proceeds thus:

Let us define dramatic monologues as poems that invite their readers to distinguish the characterized speaker's meaning from the poem's.

Let us discuss "Andrea del Sarto" as a dramatic monologue.

Let us discuss "Andrea del Sarto" as inviting its readers to distinguish the speaker's meaning from the poem's (p. 46).

The critic employs a chain of syllogisms to deduce traits stated or implied by the posited genre (p. 41). Because this schema is 'made' from elements of prior texts, it also 'matches' the object it 'repeats with a difference.' Generic schemas act like metaphors by calling attention to similarity across difference, and like metaphors are best when original. Here then is the second basis for 'suasive power': that genre is best 'when the affinities are surprising, when the yoking unite seemingly incongruous matter across seemingly unbridgeable gaps' (p. 25). This theory assumes, like most of the 'representational' theories of genre it is intended to replace, that 1) genres, as distinct categories, mediate between particulars and universals, and that 2) the function of generic criticism is to produce interpretations. But this was not the view of most critics writing before the nineteenth century, and certainly not the view of Aristotle, as implied on page 23. While it offers a rhetorical defense of categorical reasoning, *The Power of Genre* does not really engage concepts of genre predicated on rhetoric. These assume that 1) genres, as evolving and intermingling 'kinds,' mediate social practices, and that 2) the function of generic criticism is to discriminate between the causes and effects of various literary kinds.

Adena Rosmarin is very much aware of limitations in the modern 'epistemological' concept of genre, but rather than abandon the idea of genres as general categories, she prefers to revalue the procrustean consequences of framing literature categorically: '[I]t is precisely the explicit incompleteness of the explaining text that creates the seeming completion or fullness of the text explained' (p. 44). Not all her complexities and contradictions seem intended. Thus, 'Speaking generically ... enables us to exemplify many texts in a single discussion. ... [I]t is not only more economical [than close reading], it is also more suggestive and, thereby, more powerfully convincing' (pp. 43-44). Yet the contrary is also true: 'But the critic also and effectively displays how the texts of a given genre are unlike each other. ... The attempt to explain all or even many poems in terms of a single similarity or genre is a false economy' (p. 47). The 'kinship between syllogistic and metaphoric reasoning' (p. 46) requires that 'consistency of reason' be described as 'the most expedient error' (p. 45). Yet if genres 'constitute' their objects, how can we speak of matching, or

difference, or error? The argument seems to turn on a slippage between defining and extending the schema: it is 'a reasoned way of discovering or, more precisely, defining the particular in the general' (p. 45).

These difficulties result from regarding genres as logical categories and interpretations as representations of the works they criticize. If, on the other hand, we think of genres as *processes*, such paradoxes of difference evaporate: genres differ from categories in that each new instance alters the groupings of which it is a member. By thinking of genres as evolving constructs rather than as general categories, critics would be in a better position to investigate the power of genre to effect historical change. By avoiding the notion of static wholes implied in the 'verbal icon' analogy, they could study generic continuities and discontinuities between works and within the works themselves. Such investigations have already been undertaken by Rosalie Colie (*The Resources of Kind*, 1973), Hans Robert Jauss (*Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, 1982) Alastair Fowler (*Kind's of Literature*, 1982) and by Ralph Cohen ('History and Genre,' *New Literary History* 17:2, 1986).

For example: as an instance of 'literary theory,' *The Power of Genre* participates in an ongoing process currently altering the relation of critical to literary texts. Rosmarin herself underscores 'the question that compels the attention of contemporary literary studies: How can we make explanations of the literary text that are at once reasoned and yet distinctly literary?' (p. 49). By granting 'constitutive power' to critical works, she makes secondary texts primary, thereby elevating the status of criticism within the hierarchy of contemporary genres. She does this by incorporating into literary theory a number of the generic constituents associated with lyric poetry: concerns with originality, reflexivity, self-dramatization, harmony, irony, imagery, and metaphor. While she excludes from criticism the empirical reasoning favoured by New Critics, she shares their concern with defining literary uses of language — and extends them to the language of criticism itself. Like the authors she admires, Adena Rosmarin transforms a genre in order to 'make it new.' Yet this argument's 'suasive power' depends upon notions of literariness derived from nineteenth century theories of poetry. As Clifford Siskin demonstrates in *The Historicity of Romantic Discourse* (1988), there are strong ties between the Romantic lyric, formalist criticism, and American deconstruction. That these historical relations of genre go unremarked in a critical work that claims to be 'aware of itself as such' (p. ix) suggests that this deductive swerve toward lyric begs the question it attempts to frame: Does criticism 'constitute' the poetry, or the poetry the criticism?

These remarks should not be construed as a dismissal of *The Power of Genre*, which effectively works the common ground between formalist and

deconstructive modes of analysis. The elegant critical readings of poems by Wordsworth, Tennyson, Browning, Eliot, and Pound command attention and will be found persuasive by many. They are both less innovative and more convincing than the preliminary remarks on deductive genres might suggest. Adena Rosmarin is a both a close reasoner and a careful reader. (DAVID H. RADCLIFFE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY)

GERALD GILLESPIE. *Ouzhou xiaoshuo de yanhua* (*The Evolution of the European Novel*). Trans. Hu Jialian and Feng Guozhong. Beijing: Sanlian shidian 1985. Pp. v + 168. No price

With the policy of economic reform instated around 1978-79, China has opened the floodgate to all sorts of ideas and trends of thought from the outside world that had been closed off to the country for thirty years. Academia is a natural place to absorb and respond to such influxes eagerly. The flourishing of comparative literature as an academic discipline in present-day China is representative of this phenomenon. Comparative literature as a burgeoning field of study in recent years is indicated by the many translations of Western and Japanese works related to the subject, the formation of national and regional associations of comparative studies, the organization of conferences with national and international participants, and the publication of reference tools, compendiums, and journals. Invitation of foreign scholars to visit universities and live public lectures add a personal dimension to this interaction with the outside world. Gerald Gillespie was invited to visit Peking University in 1985 (Frederic Jameson also visited the campus later the same year). The Chinese translation of the series of lectures delivered by Professor Gillespie in a period of eight weeks was later published as a monograph; it forms the volume under review.

The original series is composed of seven chapters, dealing with the period from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century. Although there is no explicit statement regarding the procedure and the theoretical assumption behind the recount of the evolution, the reader will see a general method of exposition that delineates some nexus of themes and motifs and the fundamental narrative devices as they are associated with the major and minor works of each of the topics or periods concerned. In other words, descriptions of a literary form are often preceded by the examination of the prototypes and followed by references to their metamorphoses in the works of later periods, within the same or different linguistic and territorial boundaries. Besides coming from within the literary system, it appears that the factors considered to cause the change also often come from the socio-

political or historico-philosophical movements. Despite the highly refined style of the lectures, which sometimes has the effect of obfuscating the otherwise lucid expositions, one gets a clear picture of the dynamics of literary relationships of the thematic and literary forms and types. The underlying conception of the novel's evolution presented in the lectures might be described as one that sees the genre as a 'historical becoming' in the Bakhtinian sense, a metamorphosis induced by interaction of the literary and non-literary systems.

Chapter One deals with the varieties of narrative in the Renaissance by placing the 'rise' of the novel, not in early eighteenth century England, but to an earlier date in continental Europe. A quick reference to some major medieval epics and romances gives the background to the main topics of the chapter — the medieval motifs and formulae are to be adopted by the Renaissance writers for their own use. Some generic types — the mirror for the princes, the psychomachia, the educational progress, and the symbolic quest — appear to become important as Renaissance motifs. Three romances by the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I are mentioned to exemplify the theme of the mirror for the princes — the untypicality of these titles seem to show the author's partiality in his mapping of literary history. The *Faerie Queene*, although not a novel per se, anticipates Rabelais in its combined allegorical and encyclopedic drives as a structuring principle of narrative, and its plot-line and situations are to be found in many later quester romances and the *Bildungsromans*. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the Renaissance epics produced immediately before the Baroque era, including the comic-satiric types. Typical of the author's attention to intertextual relations, the 'mad' character in Ariosto's *Orlando* is explained as presenting a new aesthetic complex pointing to Cervantes' study of the structures of the imagination in the seventeenth century.

Chapter Two considers Renaissance fiction as a form with a double capacity: an instrument for cultural critique and poetological self-scrutiny, a capacity that makes the novel the modern medium par excellence. More's *Utopia* and Rabelais' *Gargantua and Pantagruel* first exemplified the novel as an all-embracing and self-renewing mode of discourse. While focusing on these two works, the lecture also alludes to a host of Renaissance psychological romances, historical epics, novels of education, and the texts of journey that foster encyclopedic reviews of religious, metaphysical, social, and scientific ideas of the time. As a prototypical Renaissance novel, More's *Utopia* shows the urban consciousness of the disjunction between real history and romance. It combines didactic treatises with fabulous voyages of discovery. The New World is used as a satirical foil to the Old World and the Utopians are made to carry out the Humanist program for the reform

of European civilization. The double structure of More's narrative is perceptively explained to be interpolated within Rabelais' encyclopedically inclusive comic narrative on Gargantua and Pantagruel, a yet grander framework of ironic juxtaposition, contrast, and exhibits. This work that celebrates gigantism of the vivacious spirit of Humanism taught the French to laugh and to dare to live. It affirmed the Renaissance rebirth against the values of the so-called Middle Ages defined for the reader by contrast with the new age. At the same time it permanently broke the resistance to history by the time-space structures of the romance.

The topic of Renaissance cultivation of the human spirit is picked up in the next lecture which considers the first important bourgeois novels of education and the first picaresque novels associated with the proletarian urban world. For a change of pace, this chapter proceeds with a 'diffused' coverage of many titles representing a network of thematics in distinct genres that reflect urban consciousness in diverse sources of influence, forms of manifestation, and transformations. Many of the manners and styles identifiable in Rabelais' encyclopedic novel as 'urban' and 'bourgeois' are seen to have already emerged in the medieval *Roman de la Rose* (which then influenced Chaucer, Christine de Pizan, and Johannes von Sazs). Wickram's sixteenth century works further provide examples of how the refurbished medieval romances coexisted with the Renaissance subject-matter. Some of Wickram's themes and character types are shared by Lyly, Dedekind, and Sebastian Brant.

Distinguishing the picaresque novel by the first-person narration from a rogue's point of view, the author helpfully points to the fact that the original impulse of the genre is to parody the medieval saint's life and that the tradition of poets' autobiographies also serves as model. Cellini's *Vita* was nearly contemporaneous with *Lazarillo de Tormes* and shared with it the characteristic of narration by the new first-person consciousness. A pattern of 'deviation and erring' that marks the hero's career identified here will be shown to be a central feature of the novel as well as many other types of European narrative (including Dante, Rousseau). *Lazarillo*, which portrays the prototypical delinquent in fiction, exemplifies an 'autobiographical' narrative by a controlled consciousness, a voice of self-recognition. By his narrative, the rogue ironically becomes an artist, and the miscreant, the true critic of social corruption.

Another thematic ramification of the picaresque novels is that many of the authors belonged to the suppressed *converso*, the New Christian segment of the Spanish population. The author's emphasis on this point reaffirms the view that this genre grew out of an ethical and religious critique of literature (as opposed to the aesthetic concerns of Cervantes). Coupled with the

notion of the 'world as theatre' current in sixteenth century Europe, this factor is seen to be bound with, for instance, Alemán's delinquent as both a victim and victimizer (*Gusmán de Alfarache*), and in Quevedo's Baroque sharper Pablo as an actor as well as a spectator on the world stage (*El Buscón*). Such a split is considered to reflect the tension between the threat of cultural hollowness felt in seventeenth century Spain and the need for moral regeneration; the picaresque genre had become an internalized reference for deception and spiritual emptiness. The title character of the anonymous work *Estebanillo González* thematizes the same issue.

This lecture concludes with a brief but instructive delineation of the parallel between narratorial digression and protagonistian truancy. The relationships depicted of the quester narrative of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to the Romantic era seem to betray an underlying dialectic view of literary history. The pattern of erring and peregrination, which we said forms the central theme of the lectures, is perceived to sustain the narrative not only of the picaresque but of such divergent authors from Dante to Rousseau. The *Divine Comedy* may be considered the crucial pre-Renaissance synthesis which traces a quest orbit through the coccyx of Hell to finally regain Heaven, a pattern reflected in Rousseau's autobiography and re-elaborated by Milton in *Paradise Lost* and *Regained*. In comparison, the picaresque genre appears as an ironic reduction of the pattern to the story of the 'wretched self,' a necessary antithesis resulting from the Renaissance preoccupation with the glory of the individual being.

Each of the following three lectures, Chapters Four to Six, deals centrally with a single text, *Don Quixote*, *Simplicissimus*, and *Robinson Crusoe*, respectively, while containing numerous references to other works. *Don Quixote*, a book about books, is discussed in the context of picaresque narration for the replacement of criminal deviation by intellectual folly and the association of folly with the working of the imagination. The question of the mind and the imagination has to do with the Renaissance issues of the uncertainty of knowledge, of human judgment, and the limits of reason and senses. Suspicion of language as a means for representing reality compounds this thematic. Structurally, a narrative deviation is implied once again, but now it is encoded in the author-reader relationship. Referring to the controversy over the question of the book's attack on the cultural norms of Cervantes' Spain (as suggested by Arthur Efron), the author obliquely refutes the view by relating Cervantes' art to the line of Erasmian Humanist wit. The chapter ends with a contemplation of the psychological novel of *La Princesse de Clèves*, a work with a mood opposite to that of the critical humanistic tradition which, nevertheless, reveals a similar concern with the thematic of self-delusion and self-discovery.

Grimmelshausen's *Simplicissimus* combines the encyclopedic humoristic tradition, Cervantine disillusionism, and the picaresque first-person voice as a vehicle for the perspectivism of the authorial mind. It stands as the 'Baroque climax of Renaissance forms' (title of the chapter). This chapter may be considered the highlight of the entire lecture series: the erudition of the author becomes most obvious here and the lecturer's enthusiasm for this enormously complex novel could easily rub off onto the reader/audience (the novel had just been translated into Chinese at the time when the lecture took place). The text is emblematic, visionary, and allegorical. In the form of kaleidoscopic pieces and puzzles, the work is organized by ingenious metaphors which establish a relationship of similarity between seemingly disparate elements. Upon close analysis it further reveals a structural symmetry and circularity. Exposition of the first five books yields a complex of thematics such as art versus nature, structure of labyrinth, deception and dissimulation, and a dense network of numerical, astrological, and mythological motifs connecting to the narrator's life. The explication of the astrological symbolism in relation to the character's and the author's identities is followed by the consideration of the narrative closures as 're-ouverture,' in view of the novel's continuation in Book VI after the announced conclusion of the story in Book V. The *Continuatio* supersedes the primary story of erring and wayfaring with the form of diary; it presents a newer universalism and at the same time the interiorization of discourse. The text is aptly characterized as exhibiting a typical novelistic quality that Hermann Meyer describes as the 'art of quotation' and Bakhtin as 'polyphony' and 'heteroglossia.' Designated as a 'climax' of Baroque works, *Simplicissimus* is given a central position in the periods concerned. Professor Yang Zhouhan in the Preface to the Chinese edition of the lectures observes that it is especially interesting for the Chinese audience to learn that, besides being a period name, Baroque also represents a literary style. It has served as a unifying concept to the talks.

Chapter Six is devoted to *Robinson Crusoe*, a product informed by the literature dealing with the age of exploration after Columbus. Its subject matter is anticipated literarily by the *Continuatio* of Simplex's adventures as well as other tales of shipwreck popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and maybe Defoe's own later books of sea voyage. The lecture examines Crusoe's divagation as education and his spiritual probing, in isolation and upon confrontation with different kinds of his fellow human beings. The examination crystallizes in viewing the errantry across the seas as the search into the groundedness of singular being leading to the discovery of meaningful diversity in Crusoe's maturing sense of the mystery of human evolution and the sense of the working of Providence.

Coming after the essay on *Simplicissimus*, this chapter suffers a feeling of limitedness, not that the lecture is in want of interesting analyses but the material itself would not yield a comparable rich description. It is, however, enhanced by a retrospection of the earlier materials of the lectures that brings out the main notions from a density of diverse ideas and topics heretofore introduced. A division of first-person and third-person narration is seen to have a corresponding division in the psychological, existential, and moral patterns of individual characters' truancy, adventure and pilgrimage. Simplex, combining in one person the triple image of rogue-artist-pilgrim, thus embodies most of the types of 'deviants' who err in life: the artist errs in thoughts, the rogue in criminal wrongdoing, and the pilgrim as mankind errs in its education and self-definition. In a sense the evolution of the characters in the Western novel may be appreciated largely as an adventure of the mind. And the mind thus must also act as guide to the erring errant hero to find a way out of the labyrinth of the world.

If the emphasis put on *Simplicissimus* detracts from the view that the picaresque 'may well serve as a paradigm for the novel as a whole' (Ralph Freedman), the last lecture, Chapter Seven, would restore this view somewhat, albeit in a roundabout way. This chapter discusses the metamorphoses of the delinquent female type in literature from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, covering three aspects in three sections: 'The Iberian Origins of the *Picara*,' 'The Female Delinquent in Northern Europe,' and 'The Roguiness in Modern Literature.' The first section looks at such works as *Justina*, and those in the *Celestina* series, most of which are by the *converso* authors. Here characteristics of the female delinquent are succinctly identified, the main drive of the character discerningly described. The section on the female delinquent in Northern Europe analyzes two primary texts, Grimmelshausen's *Courasche* and Defoe's *Moll Flanders*, giving a closer engagement with the texts. *Courasche*, the source of Brecht's *Mother Courage*, is treated in its own right as a work deserving better recognition. Abhorrent as Courasche's greed and unrepented anti-social life may be, her clinging to freedom may have, rightly or wrongly, a special appeal to modern readers. In contrast, after a life of deception and struggle, Moll gains a renewal through a productive life in a new world. The question of her personal identity, as a marked issue in the text, is seen to have to do with the question of growing individualism of the age.

The last section examines the latter-day *picara* in the three types as the prostitute, the libertine, and the political *Machtwelt*. It takes the topic from the eighteenth century — its manifestations, for instance, as Manon Lescaut, Sades' Justine and Juliette, to the nineteenth century female deviates in

Brentano, Eichendorff, Flaubert, Zola, Fontane, etc. — until the types were absorbed into other narrative structures and the roguess ceased to exist as an independently significant figure in Western literature. Compared with the extremely rich and cadenced discussion of the earlier chapters, this chapter may appear somewhat cursory in its treatment of the topic. The format of the lecture and the huge number of titles concerned make this inevitable.

This review is meant to be about the Chinese translation of the lectures, not the original. But it must be mentioned here that the foregoing abstract of the contents is based on the original English version which the author had kindly made available to me for examination (since the English version has not yet been published I have gone into greater detail in the summary than is usual in a review). It is necessary for me to resort to the original because by reading just the translation I was unable to grasp many of the fine points, although one can sense the general drift of the expositions. Many passages in the book are garbled and the overall coherence and connectivity seen clearly in the original are only vaguely felt. The translation at times perplexes more than it enlightens.

A short explanation of the original may be in order. Although addressed to an audience with a cultural background vastly different from the Western tradition, the lectures are not introductory in nature (if anything, they are the result of accumulated scholarship). Nor are they condescending: the linguistic style can only be described as refined, even involved. While the nature of the subject requires reiteration of common knowledge, old information is never simply given as new but usually set in a fresh context, viewed with a specific frame of reference. References to the central themes and ideas, when repeated, tend to appear by suggestion, in synonyms, or in varied expressions with different shades of meaning. In fact the lectures form a series of *essays*, as the author refers to them at one point — and one probably could take the term in the Montaignian sense as compositions that are elaborate in style even though limited in range.

The virtue of the belletristic style of the original however has become a source of evils in the translation. Generally speaking the basic problem of the translation lies in the obvious mismatch of the author and the translators. The sophisticated style of the original makes it an extremely difficult text to translate. The translators, probably graduate students, seem not to be prepared in background for the subject and their command of Chinese does not appear to be on a par with the control of language displayed in the source text. This is not the place to launch into a full discussion of the translation problems, but a few observations may be offered. Aside from typos and obvious misreadings and misunderstandings,

of which there are many — e.g., 'sentimentalizing of criminals' becomes in back translation something like 'sentimentalism of the criminals' (p. 67); Quixote's 'intellectual folly' is turned into his 'stupidity/slowness in intelligence' (pp. 68-69); 'Hermes figure' and 'hermetic' are rendered simply as 'alchemist' and 'alchemistic' (pp. 92ff). Some general problems may be outlined as follows.

First of all, with the exception of a few cases, no originals of the technical, critical terminology are given. This practice is inconvenient to the reader to say the least, particularly when there still a lack of a standardized translation of literary terms in the language. (Within the volume itself, the term 'courtly' is rendered as *you-ya*, lit. 'graceful-elegant' on p. 7, and as *dian-ya*, lit. 'classic-elegant' on pp. 10ff; while the term 'urbanity', associated supposedly with a quite different mode from the 'courtly' literature, is given confusingly as *wen-ya*, lit. 'gentle-elegant', [p. 43].) The translators sometimes make an effort to supply footnotes to some of the numerous titles, authors, or technical terms mentioned in the lectures. This is laudable and very helpful; such notes in fact are indispensable for the general readership's understanding of the book. But this is done sporadically and arbitrarily (in one instance, the note gives the name of Berthold Auerbach while Erich Auerbach is meant by the text, [p. 61]). The abundance of such allusions in the text apparently constitutes a heavy burden to the translators.

The predicament is not limited to the special vocabulary associated with the technical, semi-technical terms of motifs, thematics, and the like, but extended to stylistic variations in the critical discourse. Variations in phrasing may retain connectivity of thought because of the semantic networking (or relationships in the 'semantic field') in a language. However semantic structures of the surface vocabulary are not always the same in different languages ('equivalents' in two languages may carry different connotation or overtones in changed contexts). Stylistic variations, sustained in cohesion by inherent semantic relationship in the source language, are here transformed into the target language without a similar attendance to their own semantic connectivity and overtones. Thus a carefully knitted network of meaning in the original is sometimes transformed into an aggregate of unrelated words, their semantic ties lost in the translation (or, in such cases as *dian-ya* ['courtly'] and *wen-ya* ['urbanity'], a false connectivity is introduced).

In terms of syntax, the long, complex sentences that are the norm in the original are usually rendered directly; the sentences in Chinese thus become painfully twisted and difficult to make sense of. Rendition of complicated syntactic structures has been a perennial problem for Chinese translators of Western languages. It is to the credit of the two translators that compound-

complex sentences are sometimes broken up and reorganized into simpler patterns, but again such service to the reader is not consistently carried out.

It may be said that the present translation is not entirely adequate in representing the original as its style does not lend easily to translation by inexperienced hands. Considering the short years of China's reinstatement of contact with Western scholarship, the less than satisfactory rendition here is not surprising. Improvement can only come with experience, as the more recent translations have already attested to. Meanwhile one also hopes that the author of the present title will soon publish the manuscript in English so that it may be properly appreciated in its own language. (I would like to dedicate this review to the memory of those massacred on Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989). (KARL S.Y. KAO, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

J.M. BERNSTEIN. *The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism and the Dialectics of Form*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. xxiv + 296. Hardcover US\$35.00, paper \$14.95

J.M. Bernstein is a philosopher by training; his Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh 1975) was on *Kant and Transcendental Realism*. At present he is a lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Essex, and he announces his next book as *Identity and Totality: Interpretation and Representation in Social Theory*. This background qualifies him admirably for the task he undertakes in the present book: a 'philosophical reconstruction' of Lukács' *The Theory of the Novel* as a Marxist theory of the novel. Despite the fact that it predates Lukács' joining the Communist Party in 1918, Bernstein claims that it is 'as a matter of fact if not intention, a Marxist work; or rather, more precisely, a properly Marxist theory of the novel can be excavated' (p. xii) from it. Bernstein cites the fact that leading Marxist critics like Adorno, Benjamin and Goldmann have all made extensive use of Lukács' study, an effect hard to account for in a non-Marxist work. But of course the main piece of evidence must be Bernstein's own argument. This is dense, but always careful and precise (it is a great shame incidentally that the standard of proofreading fails to match; the text is disfigured by many typographical errors and missing words, and the notes are even worse). Despite my initial scepticism, I found the argument ultimately convincing as a Marxist theory in its own terms. Clearly Lukács' text is highly productive for Marxist theory, as this 'remake' shows, but I am not convinced that this reading represents the sole truth about it. The unreconstructed text is still valid, despite Bernstein's powerful 'mastering' of it. It is an immensely suggestive text (to Marxists certainly, but also to non-Marxists like Paul de Man), partly

because it is an 'essay', not a fully articulated system. Lukács himself theorized the essay as well as the novel, and his 'On the Nature and Form of the Essay' (the preface to the collection *Die Seele und die Formen* of 1910) was also a stimulus to Adorno's later piece 'Der Essay als Form' (this too was used as a preface, in this case to his collection *Noten zur Literatur* of 1958). Although Bernstein is very aware of Lukács' ideas about novel-form, I for one would have appreciated more awareness of the form Lukács was using. Bernstein is offering a fully argued system, not an essay, and I was left wondering whether he might not have been better off presenting it as such, rather than as the systematization of an essay. But then, Lukács' essay is an essay at or in theory, and as such might be said to 'invite' completion, like T.S. Eliot's 'Tradition and the Individual Talent,' which has had a similar effect on Anglo-American academic criticism to that of Lukács' piece on Germanic-Marxist aesthetics. What Bernstein is doing for Lukács might then be compared to Leavis' expansion of Eliot's idea of tradition or Frye's articulation of the idea of literature as a 'simultaneous order.' Incidentally, Bernstein's book shows how much the intellectual climate has changed in England since the Leavis era; twenty-five years ago most English critics had not even heard Lukács' name.

Bernstein's argument is much too close and detailed to cover as a whole in a review; it is a work that repays careful, slow reading with insights on nearly every page. Let me simply pick out two issues for discussion in the hope that they will be illustrative of the book's approach. The first is Bernstein's 'historical correction to Lukács's own argument ... I wish to displace *Don Quixote* as the founding moment of the novel, and to replace it with Descartes' *Discourse*' (p. 153). Besides being a fairly surprising claim in itself, this also knocks out the prop under Lukács' basic argument in Part II of *The Theory of the Novel*. But for Bernstein Part II is the bad part anyway, because of Lukács' 'adoption of the unhistorical, neo-Kantian methodology of constructing ideal types' (p. 153). Bernstein is referring to the distinction between the novel-type where the hero's soul is narrower than the world — examples by Cervantes, Sterne, Dickens, Gogol and Balzac, who all show demonically obsessed characters — and the type where the hero's soul is broader — Lukács' examples are Niels Lyhne and Oblomov, characters who cannot realize themselves in action. As often in reading the essay, one immediately wants to put in more and better examples — here perhaps the artist heroes of Modernism which Lukács could not have been aware of in 1915. Bernstein's overall strategy is to validate Part I as Marxist and criticize Part II as neo-Kantian (this contrasts with the usual reading of the whole essay as Hegelian). Thus his rewriting of Part II is much more radical: he practically stands Lukács on his head by arguing that *Don Quixote*

(Lukács' basic first type) is not a novel and that Descartes' *Discourse on Method* is. However, Bernstein does concede that 'a novel can be excavated from the bulk of *Don Quixote*' (p. 154) — interestingly, this is a verbal parallel to his 'excavation' of a Marxist theory from Lukács' essay. But overall, Bernstein prefers to see Cervantes as 'a literary "modernist" with respect to the models and "canons", of the chivalric romance' (p. 155), that is, as the last of the old rather than the first of the new. That position he reserves for Descartes' *Discourse*, to which he devotes what are to me some of the most brilliant pages in the book, showing that he can read philosophy 'novelistically' as successfully as he can read the novel philosophically (the discussions of individual authors like Flaubert, Kafka or Mann are usually short but always suggestive). Just as the 'Cervantine' theory of the novel sees the genre as a combination of picaresque and romance elements, so in Bernstein's 'Cartesian' theory of the novel the genre is created from two others: fable and autobiography. It is, in fact, 'the Fable of Autobiography' (p. 160), containing 'an unresolved tension between the anonymity and universality of the fable and the singularity of the autobiographical narrative' (p. 163). The relation between the crisis of Reason (universal) and the crisis of the Self (autobiographical) is the focus of Bernstein's analysis, showing how the isolated individual becomes the only ground for reality: 'The problematic individual is the formal narrative equivalent of an ideological ontology which by liberating the self from the past and the community makes all selves necessarily problematic' (p. 172).

The last chapter of the book, 'Practical Reason: Marxism and Modernism,' is an important contribution to the ongoing debate about realism and modernism. Bernstein provides a cogent Cartesian reading of this debate, arguing that the 'theoretical modernists' (Barthes, Heath, Josipovici, and Said are given as examples) and the 'naïve realists' (John Bayley, Irish [sic] Murdoch and the later Lukács) are committing symmetrically opposed errors through attachment either to the subject or the object pole of Cartesian dualism. All the 'theoretical modernists' have done, according to Bernstein, is this: 'In place of the Cartesian subject ... whose whole being is to think, we now have the writing subject whose being is to write' (p. 234). The 'naïve realists,' on the other hand, ignore 'the conventional components of representation' (p. 238). The modernists see modernism as the revealed truth of the essential autonomy of all literature from reality (Bernstein points out effectively how this undermines their attack on the realist text), while the realists argue either that modernism is good because it *extends* realism into new areas, especially psychological, or that it is bad because it *departs from* realism. The pages analyzing this

'double misreading' are among the best and the most timely in the book, and might help to lift debate beyond this sterile opposition.

In general, Bernstein's approach is much tougher and more rigorous than Lukács', but the ending produces a characteristically early-Lukácsian mixture of nostalgia and hope. First the nostalgia: 'By viewing the novel against the background of the epic we are able to recognize the dimensions of collective storytelling we have lost' (p. 266). Then the visionary hope of a new age: '[T]he truth of Marxist theory is a political and narrative truth; its writing addresses us as possible members of a future collective subjectivity; our self-recognition in the story we hear, our grasping of our past and future in terms of the story told is an act of political identification by which we begin to become who we might be' (pp. 266-7). The age of Capitalism, the age of the novel, becomes an unhappy interim between the lost and the coming wholeness. Lukács' 1915 story, which Bernstein falls back on here, is in some ways similar to the Eliot-Leavis story (conceived at roughly the same period) of the dissociation of sensibility, the loss of organic community, the ugliness, misery and alienation of the modern age. The respective hopes of Eliot and Leavis — Christianity and the Cambridge English School — were not the early Lukács', but the vision of capitalist modernity was essentially the same. This connection was suggested to me by Bernstein's actual ending, a quotation within a quotation. Gadamer, defining praxis as solidarity, quotes Heraclitus: 'The logos is common to all, but people behave as if each had a private reason. Does this have to remain this way?' (p. 267). Bernstein does not mention that this is also the epigraph to Eliot's *Four Quartets*. Eliot too wanted to lay down the burden of the isolated self, but the kind of reintegration he envisaged was Christian reconciliation. The ending of Lukács' essay is much closer to Eliot: he quotes Fichte as saying that the novel is the form of the epoch of absolute sinfulness, declares roundly that Dostoevsky did not write novels (i.e. he does to Dostoevsky what Bernstein does to Cervantes — perhaps these exclusions are hazards of a philosophical approach to the novel) and that his work might delineate the form of a renewed epic. This reflects the apocalyptic-religious tone of the whole essay, which Bernstein hardly acknowledges, any more than he acknowledges the essay form. In fact a reader of Bernstein who had not read Lukács would be in for quite a shock if he or she turned from one to the other, for Bernstein only sounds the Messianic note at the end, where it seems oddly incongruous: in Lukács it sounds all the way through, and is essential to its integrity as a text as well as marking its historical moment, in the midst of Great War apocalypticism, the Dostoevsky cult of the 1910's, etc. Lukács' essay offers a strange ideological mixture, and religion is definitely part of it as well as Kant, Hegel, and Marx. This is what finally leaves me uneasy

about Bernstein's 'excavation' or 'reconstruction' of Lukács — the aspects that he leaves out of account. Clearly he is a very gifted philosopher, well capable, as no doubt he will show, of constructing his own fully independent theory. Brilliant as it is, this book still leaves me wanting to 'reconstruct' my impression of Lukács' original text. (GRAHAM GOOD, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA)

'BARBARA KORTE. *Techniken der Schlussgebung im Roman: Eine Untersuchung englisch- und deutschsprachiger Romane*. Frankfurt/Bern/New York: Peter Lang 1985. Pp. 385. US\$22.50

Since its discovery as a subject for criticism by Barbara Herrnstein Smith in *Poetic Closure* (1968) some twenty years ago, the question of how literary works end has attracted increasing attention. The determination of certain works as 'open' or 'closed' and the problems of interpretation posed by such texts had previously been investigated by Robert Martin Adams (*Strains of Discord* 1958), Umberto Eco (*Opera aperta* 1962), and Alan Friedman (*The Turn of the Novel* 1966), each of whom employed these terms in a somewhat different way. Subsequently, Frank Kermode contemplated conclusions philosophically and speculatively in *The Sense of an Ending* (1967), where the narrative modes are treated as virtually emblematic of the organization of human temporal experience. While B.H. Smith had approached closure through lyric poetry and largely from its formal and psychological sides, David H. Richter in *Fable's End* (1974) stressed the power of conclusions to shape genre by defining the kinship between the 18th century apologue and the modern fable.

The issues of consonance between beginning, middle, and end raised by Kermode have been explored more recently by D.A. Miller in *Narrative and Its Discontents* (1981) which, following certain French structuralist models, analyzes the tensions between the 'narratable' and the 'non-narratable,' and again, in the same year, by Marianna Torgovnick in *Closure in the Novel*, more traditionally literary, in orientation and emphasising 'adequacy' and 'appropriateness' to what preceded as the criteria for judging endings. It is against the background of these and many other studies in both English and German listed in her extensive bibliography that Barbara Korte's detailed investigation, *Techniken der Schlussgebung im Roman*, must be seen.

Dissatisfied with the imprecise meanings that have continued to attach to the terms open and closed and seeking to avoid the fragmentation implicit in intrinsic (*werkimmanent*) approaches through coherence, Barbara Korte has endeavoured to establish principles governing the conclusion