

The second volume under review is, to my mind, a much more rigorous and far-reaching piece of work. It consists in an attempt to apply the analytical techniques of V.V. Propp to the literary 'folk-tales' of Puškin and Žukovskij. Gordon is exhaustive and rigorous in her approach to the analysis, in which she produces Proppian formulae to characterise the composition not only of the literary folk-tales which are the subject of the study, but also of the tales – whether of literary or folk origin – which served as sources for them. The result is that Gordon is able to draw some revealing conclusions about the genre of the artistic folk-tale as opposed to its home-spun model. Thus, whereas in the folk-tale the sequence of functions is constant, 'bei den Kunstmärchen hingegen zeigt sich eine durch diese Gattung bedingte Auflösung der Märchenstruktur' (p. 209). The beauty of the formulae developed by Propp lies in the fact that they permit the nature of a genre to be defined with precision. Thus, Gordon notes, apropos Puškin's magic tales, 'Aus den 16 nicht vorhandenen Strukturelementen ist das Fehlen von A [Schädigung] oder α [Mangelsituation] entscheidend. Dadurch wird das Schema des Zaubermärchens endgültig aufgelöst' (p. 209).

Both of the volumes reviewed are in the form of off-set printed typescript. In Gordon's case the errors are minimal, while Herdmann's text contains numerous typos, especially in the Russian quotations. At least one of the studies – that by Gordon – constitutes research to which all subsequent students of the topic will perforce return. (J. DOUGLAS CLAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA)

*VIRGIL NEMOIANU. *The Taming of Romanticism: European Literature and the Age of Biedermeier*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1984. Pp. ix + 5 + 304. US\$25.00

Few terms in the history of literary periodization can have been more troublesome than 'romanticism.' Push that button, and the response you trigger in scholars – not to mention the 'general reader' – will vary wildly from one national literature to the next, from generation to generation, and from theory to theory. Yet we have come a long way from the despair of A.O. Lovejoy, who some sixty years ago urged us to discard the term altogether. Scholars following in the footsteps of Wellek have identified a small cluster of general characteristics that seem to recur with predictable frequency in the major European liter-

atures of the decades following 1790. Wellek focused on the vision of an organic unity of nature expressed through a poetry of myth and symbol; M.H. Abrams traced the secularization of the biblical pattern of Paradise, Fall, and Redemption; Morse Peckham, Henry Renak, Lilian Furst, and others have offered further suggestions. But large questions remained, prominent among them the relationship between high romanticism in England and Germany from the time of the French Revolution to Waterloo and that typological reflection of it that seemed to follow after 1815, as the shadow of reality, in most of the other national literatures of Europe.

In his often brilliant and impressively learned book, Virgil Nemoianu offers a generally lucid account and persuasive theory of what he calls 'the taming of romanticism' as a phenomenon permeating European literature between 1815 and 1848. Nemoianu proposes as a model the relationship between high romanticism in Germany and the age of Biedermeier that followed. With the common sense that is characteristic of the book, he does not insist on the label, which probably stands small chance of being accepted by French or English literary scholars to designate their literatures in the period under discussion. But as far as its substance is concerned, the situation in Germany provides an excellent and often exemplary model for the rest of Europe.

The opening chapter on 'The Dynamics of the Romantic Period' accepts as a base the Wellek-Abrams understanding of high romanticism and goes on, using the work of Friedrich Sengle, to show how later romanticism, or Biedermeier, became weaker and relativized as it domesticated the original romantic secularization. Nemoianu notes four aspects of the Biedermeier 'retreat' from romanticism: the turn to history; the relaxation of integrative unity; adaptation and compromise of the original romantic absolutes; and ironic relativization of the original philosophical shapes. It is the thesis of the book that these avenues of retreat constitute a paradigm of late romanticism in much the same manner as does Abrams's model for high romanticism in Germany and England; and, moreover, that the widespread appeal to a vanished romanticism provides a common reference point for writers of that epigonal generation. Indeed, the keenly felt absence of the romantic past justifies the central idyllism that unifies the age of Biedermeier. It is this theory that Nemoianu tests in the following chapters, which turn first (chs. 2-4) to a series of national literatures and then (chs. 5-6) to two genres characteristic of them all.

Chapter 2 seeks 'Support for an English Biedermeier' in the perception that a similar pattern emerged in Germany and England after 1815. First, the marked change in attitude of high-romantic leaders like

Friedrich Schlegel, Tieck, and Schelling is paralleled by the development of Coleridge and Wordsworth in particular, but also Byron and Keats. The emergence of transitional figures like Hoffmann and Eichendorff recurs in the appearance of Lamb, DeQuincey, Carlyle, Hazlitt, Peacock, and others usually regarded as English romantics. Finally, the complementary relationship between Biedermeier and the politically rebellious *Vormärz*, which gave way to poetic realism, can be observed also in the transition to Victorian realism in England. Nemoianu singles out Jane Austen and Walter Scott for more detailed discussion as examples that can be most easily explained as representatives of English Biedermeier.

In France the situation is conspicuously different. Because the movement sets in three decades later, 'the French romantics of the 1820s and 1830s had no reason to write exactly like the Blakes and Hölderlins' (p. 118). Indeed, it is Nemoianu's bold (though not wholly convincing) argument that the French equivalent to German high romanticism should be sought in the writings of Saint-Just and De Sade. But the limitations and vagueness of Lamartine, the quaint coyness of Sainte-Beuve, the inverted pattern of Fall-Redemption-Fall in Vigny's *Cinq-Mars*, and the picturesque color along with the melodramatic episodes *sans morale* in the theater of Hugo are characteristics that bring them close to such contemporaries as Mörike and Grabbe.

The rapid survey of Eastern European Romanticism makes use of Alexander Gershenkron's economic substitution theory as a model to explain the dislocation, or telescoping, of romanticism in the Romanian, Hungarian, and Czech literatures of the period, which tend to leap directly from pre-romanticism to late romanticism or Biedermeier, skipping altogether anything resembling high romanticism. Nemoianu discusses Pushkin's ironic melancholy and Gogol's despair as typical Russian examples, while Mickiewicz's pervasive anguish or Slowacki's brilliant dissonances make the same case for Polish 'romanticism.'

The Biedermeier inability to sustain the force of romantic integration leads to the radical contradictions of the grotesque, which finds its appropriate literary form in the popular genre of tragicomedy, for which Nemoianu adduces the work of Musset, Slowacki, Grabbe, and Büchner. The other representative genre of the age, the historical novel, exemplifies the shift from integrative wholeness to Biedermeier consolation. It is the characteristic of the historical novel to seek to accommodate the high romantic ideals to the historical reality exposed by nineteenth-century scholarship. Nemoianu discriminates carefully between Scott's *Antiquary*, which is a repository of high romantic motifs, or *Redgauntlet*, which can be read as a transformation of the

romantic *Bildungsroman*, and such later works as Manzoni's *I Promessi Sposi*, which goes beyond Scott in its insistence on documentary accuracy and the shattered idyll, and Stifter's *Witiko*, which is forced in a manner approaching Victorianism to displace all energy from the idyllic world in order to preserve its arduously achieved aesthetic symmetry.

Nemoianu offers so much that it seems churlish to quibble. The discussion of the social and cultural background is often too eclectic to be useful; the author himself concedes (p. 13) that he enumerates characteristics 'almost at random' (p. 13) from a 'few scattered facts' (p. 69). Inevitably mistakes intrude into this random assortment: e.g., Philippe Pinel's major work, done in the eighteenth century and published in 1800, can hardly be cited (p. 8) as an example of Biedermeier science; the first experimental balloon flights were made in pre-revolutionary France (1783) and hence are scarcely symptomatic of the Biedermeier search for controlled adventure (p. 11); Philipp Otto Runge, who died in 1810, can hardly be called 'slightly earlier' than the pre-Raphaelites (p. 22). Early death might well have been a *fact* in the romantic age, but a fact cannot be called a 'norm' (p. 27). The discussions of authors, works, and entire literatures (e.g., 2-4 pages each for Romanian, Hungarian, and Czech romanticism!) are often so brief that the author must resort to assertion instead of argument — especially regrettable in the case of those exotic literatures that Nemoianu knows in the original unfamiliar to most scholars. Nemoianu also displays a kind of theoretical trinitarianism in his tendency to divide all ideas, like Caesar's Gaul, into three parts: three reasons for distrusting the literary scholars of the 1930s (p. 4); 'three important things' that happened around 1815 (p. 43); 'three things' revealed by the investigation of Scott's novels (p. 205); 'three main areas' in which Manzoni goes beyond Scott (p. 209); 'three main things' that happened to historical novelists over four decades (p. 230); and elsewhere.

In sum, however, Nemoianu presents a plausible model for European literature from 1815 to 1848 — a model whose usefulness can be tested by applying it to literatures that the author does not treat: notably the Danish Golden Age after 1800 or the Netherlandic literature of Bilderdijk, Hildebrand, and their contemporaries. His book is clearly and gracefully written, with felicitous phrases displacing critical jargon (even though the author's command of recent critical theory is evident). The knowledgeable first-hand work with texts in a variety of languages and from a variety of European literatures reminds us what comparative literature at its best can achieve. I can think of no higher compliment than to say that this book deserves not only its place in

a series (Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature) graced by several titles from Harry Levin but also the dust-jacket tribute from René Wellek. (THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY)

*W. WARREN WAGAR. *Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982. Pp. xiii + 241. US\$24.50

For W. Warren Wagar's purposes, the most significant date in the 'History of Doomsday' (to quote from the title of Chapter 2 of *Terminal Visions*) is 1826. In that year Mary Shelley published *The Last Man*, 'the first major example of secular eschatology in literature' (p. 13). But Wagar's subject matter — a complete account of secular visions of the end of the world in Western culture — begins in 1805 with the publication of *Le dernier Homme* by Jean-Baptiste Cousin de Grainville. On the basis of having read some 300 titles published in the period 1805 to 1980 Wagar provides a compellingly logical and extremely thorough five-part analysis of the types and ultimate import of this increasingly popular species of fiction.

In Part One, 'The Dream of Last Things,' an account of the theological, critical, sociological, historical and futurological writings on matters millennial, eschatological and apocalyptic is followed by the history of future doomsdays. Most of the illuminating categories that Wagar establishes fall into three and historically it seems that there are three main periods. During the romantic era a number of 'anti-Crusoe,' 'last man' stories appeared which demonstrate 'man's ultimate weakness before the titanic forces of nature' (p. 17). The years between 1890 and 1914, when the realm of speculative literature was dominated by H. G. Wells, see a second resurgence when 'almost every sort of world's end story that one finds in later years was written, published, and accepted by a wide reading public' (p. 20). But if before 1914 some imagined natural catastrophe was responsible for the end of the world, in the period following it is man himself who is most often the cause, whether by means of devastating wars or, as is increasingly the case, by accident. At the same time, in the years since the second World War, numerous writers, most notably J. G. Ballard, have treated the theme of macrocosmic catastrophe as 'symbolic of psychic disaster' (p. 28). Continually, the output of end-of-the-world stories has accelerated as the publication of speculative fiction has doubled decade by decade since 1950.

Secular accounts of the end of the world, of course, transform, or otherwise draw upon, earlier religious and mythical accounts. In Part Two, 'Archetypes,' Wagar discusses the 'Urwelt of myth and legend' (p. 30) and the essential distinction between the cyclical view of history, associated for the most part with agrarian civilizations, and the earlier linear idea of history that Wagar believes 'arose among nomadic peoples' (p. 43) and that Christianity reinforced. It is the linear conception that has influenced most traditional visions of the endtime in Western culture. While the Book of Revelation, 'a warehouse catalogue of calamities' (p. 53), is the key source of ideas and images, Genesis has also inspired visions of new Adams and Eves. Such analogical tales make use of the second of Wagar's 'three modes of secularization' (p. 60).

More three-part groupings arise in Part Three, 'The Etiology of Doom-saying.' The three motivating causes for the writer are fear of death, fear of nature, or fear of man. Examples, to the point of 'overkill' here as elsewhere, are given for each category. In the context of 'three views of nature' (man's 'lost home,' 'nature as man's to exploit,' 'nature as 'indifferent to human aspiration' [pp. 86-7]), 'Terminal fictions imagining disasters visited on man by nature can be sorted into three broad categories': 'the entropic romance,' stories of natural disasters such as collision with a comet and 'stories of man's overthrow by rival life-forms' (p. 92). In the case of man-induced catastrophe (where a current mood of optimism seems to prevail in so far as a majority of writers envisage some kind of post-holocaust survival and renewal) complications arise having to do with the author's world view since there are three explanations as to why man acts as he does. It may be due to 'nature, culture, or original sin' (p. 106).

In Part Four, 'The War of the World Views,' Wagar gets to the fundamental question of what particular world view propagandistically underlies a particular terminal fiction. Drawing on his earlier work, *World Views: A Study in Comparative History* (1977), Wagar posits three collective and often competing world views that have successively held sway since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The world view of romanticism he finds underlying Edenic post-holocaust utopias, the work of Ray Bradbury, and Christian speculative fiction. The world view of positivism (to which the bulk of science fiction adheres), epitomized by Prometheus, finds expression in the work of Verne, Asimov and, perhaps surprisingly, Michael Moorcock. The world view of irrationalism, which dates in Europe from the 1920s but which has only permeated the Anglo-American consciousness in the last twenty years or so, informs the work of Čapek, Vonnegut, Lem, Ballard and

Doris Lessing. Because of the secular mysticism, or 'problematic gnosis' (Robert Galbreath's term quoted on p. 181) in the case of Lessing, to which these writers are drawn, irrationalism is often difficult to distinguish from romanticism.

But it is the presence or absence of 'Aftermaths' (the title of Part Five) that provides the best clue to 'the underlying meaning of the world's end tale' (p. 185). Again three kinds may be distinguished. There are ends without aftermaths (Mary Shelley's *The Last Man* would be an example), ends that are but part of a process of cyclical return, and ends that liberate. The first two possibilities 'reflect a conserving temperament and an ironic sensibility that may wear the ideological armor of any of the great world views' (pp. 185-6).

The third category, however, to which Waggar devotes his final chapter, bespeaks a radical openness. He notes that 'well over two thirds of the narratives he studied foresee no blind alleys, and no return trips. In this great majority, there are survivors, with a future that may be better or worse than the era just ended, but a future that will be different, because the endtime came' (p. 195). Waggar suggests that the writers of secular apocalypses are in a position comparable to that of 'the early Christians who wrote the New Testament' and who 'sensed, but could express only in mythic imagery, ... the immanence of the end of an epoch, the epoch of Helleno-Roman paganism' (p. 196). Writers like J. G. Ballard – and, by way of demonstration, Waggar provides a fine account of his fiction – may, then, be bearing witness to the current immanence of a similar (positive?) world transformation. In spite of the fact that our endtime, as Waggar reminds us in his 'Personal Preface,' is especially dangerous, a better world may follow.

My chief quarrel with Waggar's challenging, not to say apocalyptic, conclusion may seem banal. It is certainly true that many fictional world endings turn out to be provisional, not real endings at all. But surely the simple fictional interest in what happens next would compel many writers to envisage various kinds of aftermath. After all, an ultimate end or total nothingness, as Samuel Beckett's work conclusively demonstrates, is impossible to imagine.

Inevitably, in a book of the kind that Waggar has undertaken, a reader is bound to note works that have been omitted. Given Waggar's stated admiration for the work of James Blish, I was surprised that *Black Easter* and the aftermath sequel, *The Day After Judgment*, receive no mention. And while Blish's *Cities in Flight* is mentioned as an example of Spenglerian cyclical return, Waggar omits to point out that, at the conclusion of that tetralogy, the hero, John Amalfi, allows for the possibility of an aftermath that will escape the enclosing repetition of

Spenglerian cycles. But now I am merely quibbling. The bulk of Waggar's study is convincingly and elegantly presented in a smooth and leisurely prose style that nicely counterpoints his subject matter. Three cheers would be in order, or perhaps three apocalyptic trumpet blasts.

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* *Zur Geschichtlichkeit der Moderne: Der Begriff der literarischen Moderne in Theorie und Deutung*. Ulrich Fülleborn zum 60. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Theo Elm und Gerd Hemmerich. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1982. Pp. 328. DM78.00

Just at the same time as the debate in the American academic world about the term 'postmodernism' and its possible descriptive categories is receiving ever increasing attention – a discussion which has also found its echo in Europe,¹ just at this very moment has appeared a Festschrift in the German academic world which takes up the problem of modernism. It is the present volume offered in honour of Ulrich Fülleborn, himself intensively engaged in the study of modern German literature. An added attraction of the work is its very topicality; for even though the name, apparently a reflection of a new developing consciousness, implies the idea of a clearly determinable and definable historical period, the great uncertainties in the discussion about the temporal or thematic demarcation of the dawning period of postmodernism reveal that, despite – or possibly because – of the extensive literature dealing with the concept of modernism, its perimeters and contents still have not been clearly defined. In this it shows the fate of all terms used to describe historical or literary periods. But now,

¹ Ihab Hassan, mainly since the publication of *The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press 1971), is generally considered as one of the most important promoters of the concept of postmodernism. An outline of the research is to be found in Ihab Hassan, 'The Critic as Innovator: The Tutzing Statement in X Frames,' *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 22 (1977) 47-63. In Jean François Lyotard, *La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit 1979), the discussion has been carried over into Europe and has been recently taken up by Jürgen Habermas in Germany: 'Der Eintritt in die Postmoderne,' *Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken* 421 (1983) 752-61. The article is an additional contribution to that which he had already exposed in his English essay, 'Modernity versus Postmodernity,' *The New German Critique* 22 (1981) 3-14.

at the very least, some kind of consensus about the period's most dominant features and its allocation to a specific historical era is very necessary.

The reader's curiosity is certainly increased by the editors' preface where they state that the contributions reflect 'was als Moderne und Modernität mit Fug und Recht sich bezeichnen läßt' (p. 18). The difference between the two terms 'Moderne' and 'Modernität' is not made prominent by the editors. They seem to attribute one of them — but one still does not know which one — to modernism as a descriptive category and the other one to modernism as a period term. One can say then that the articles dealing with literature from the 18th to the 20th century implicitly reveal the breadth of the historical dimension the editors seem to attribute to modernism, whereas the poems of two representatives of German modern poetry, Helmut Heissenbüttel and Walter Helmut Fritz, which prelude the Festschrift, might be considered as the representative practice of what modernism in its semantical dimension is. But one has the impression that the two terms are still more. They are like a mirror in which the contributions of both parts of the Festschrift, those of the first more theoretical part as well as those of the historical part, come to reflect themselves. Showing modernism in its very poetic practice they are at the same time the thematical horizon, the framework, from which the critics draw their topics. In other words, the critics involved do not only speak of modernism but their very discourse is an eminently modern one.

The assumption that modernism begins with the appearance of science and technology and that the development of art and literature is a pure reaction to it, as Gerd Hemmerich in his introductory article does, is a specifically modern point of view, seemingly established as a permanent feature in the 19th century when science became the explicit model for organizing human understanding and imagination. In order to avoid a *circulus vitiosus* one must then first reexamine whether this feature is really distinctive enough to allow a periodization. If it is, an epoch-making change seems to be about to happen, for it is becoming increasingly clear that the predominance of the scientific discourse is nearing its end. The pleading of Erhard Geissler² addressed to poets and writers for a reconsideration of science in the form of molecular biology, furnishes proof of it. The problem of the starting point of modernism still remains to be cleared up. The determination

of this starting point is indeed based on the concept of science, for science in itself is neither immutable nor can its relationship to art and literature be described as a one-way-dependency, as Hemmerich does in his essay. Science in itself changes according to the dictates of scientific development while simultaneously the poet's receptivity and literary forms change in order to receive their 'strange sister.' Horst Thomé³ has made a useful beginning in the elaboration of a more discriminating descriptive model for this interaction, a model that allows, when brought into a wider application, a more precise periodization.

Kurt Wölfel applies another modern concept of literature suggested by the poets of the 19th century themselves, that is the subject's loss of his identity as a sign of pathological disorder. He develops this idea in a convincing theoretical model, a 'Poetik des Spaziergangs' (p. 69), established in a comparative study of the early writings of Kafka and Goethe's 'Leiden des jungen Werthers.' His starting point is the thesis that 'die Pathologie, die das Frühwerk Kafkas vergegenwärtigt, zum erstenmal in den 'Leiden des jungen Werthers' poetische Gestalt gewinnt, daß der Jugendroman Goethes, von der Problematik individueller Selbstgewißheit handelnd, das erste große Werk der literarischen Moderne in Deutschland sei' (p. 73). Goethe is, indeed, in so many points our contemporary, but perhaps not in this one. For if it is true that Werther's attitude to nature at the end of the novel resembles the disintegrated attitude of what Kafka will later call a 'sich in die Büsche schlagen' there is at least one great difference between the two attitudes that has to be taken into consideration. In the eyes of Werther, nature is the irrevocable point of identification and its loss implies death; for Kafka's characters, it is just the opposite, they begin to live when nature is excluded from their lives. So Werther is indeed pathological at the end, not so Kafka's subjects whose loss of classical identity is a sign of a construction of a new one. Wölfel suggests it himself when he says that Kafka 'macht zum eigentlichen Thema die Bewegung und den Selbstbezug dessen, der sich bewegt; und analog dazu thematisiert er dann auch nicht die Landschaft als das Angeschaute, sondern das Anschauen und den Selbstbezug dessen, der anschaut' (p. 74).

In his article about a 'Theorie des Zitierens,' Peter Horst Neumann stresses the idea of an intertextual reading which Wölfel demonstrates in his own study of the 'Werther' based on Karl Philipp Moritz's in-

2 Erhard Geissler, 'Zu einigen Aspekten des Verhältnisses von Molekularbiologie und Kunst,' *Weimarer Beiträge* 10 (1981) 126-43

3 Horst Thomé, *Roman und Naturwissenschaft: Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte der deutschen Klassik* (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, Las Vegas: Peter Lang Verlag 1978)

terpretation in his novel 'Anton Reiser.' Starting from an experience of modern texts, where he recognizes an 'augenfällige[n] Überreichtum an Anspielungen' (p. 52), Neumann propagates a poetic of the citation. He considers that citations are inevitable in a text as they are proof of a creative mind, a creative appropriation of the 'difference.' In this sense he reads the 'einzige Selbstzitat' (p. 47) of God which is man. This conception of the relationship of God and mankind leads him finally to a theological understanding of the citation. Even if the reader might not accept this part of his thesis he can nevertheless accept the other one where he proves the irrevocable identity of citation and originality. In the second part of his article, Neumann proposes an interesting scheme for the systematization of the citation where he places it between the allusion and the epigraph. It allows the 'Typologie der Zitiertweisen und aller bekannten Zitat-Formen' (p. 50). One can recognize in the model the two concepts by which Herman Meyer⁴ characterizes every citation, that is the quality of assimilation and of dissimulation. Neumann transforms them skilfully into new operational concepts for a classification of the citation. This first approach to a systematization should be continued and this Neumann seems to promise himself (p. 51). The model should then be extended by a functional description of the citation, as Susan Stewart⁵ proposes in a stimulating article not mentioned by Neumann. It should furthermore be completed by a sociological viewpoint, but not in the merely static sense of Meyer. For him the citations reflect 'Umfang und Charakter der literarischen Bildung des Publikums' (Meyer, p. 23). It should take into consideration the fact that intertextuality only works meaningfully if the reader recognizes the citation as such; something which depends on his social, cultural, historical background. Finally the model should be integrated into a functional linguistic theory of the intertextuality as elaborated, for example, by the Greinassian school.

One could say that the contribution of 'A. Cicaluccio,' alias Dietrich Harth, anticipates in practice such a model. It is a brilliant article about the after-life of Don Quijote and at the same time a poetic of the novel itself, radiating with the 'pleasure of the text,' the pleasure of reading, the pleasure of writing – and the pleasure of concealing. For he feigns a typical writing practice peculiar to the 17th and 18th centuries when

pretending to be the translator, annotator, and editor of a text written by a certain 'A. Cicaluccio' in 'Mikromikronisch,' the imaginary 'language' of the 'princesa micromicon,' alias Dorothea of 'Don Quijote.' Other allusions can be found in the article which thus gives a concrete example of the 'production de sens' of the citation when it is understood as an intertextual notion. Pointing it out on the level of the 'écriture' of the novels quoted and putting it at the same time into practice in his own reading, Harth proceeds to a real semiotic practice still rare in German literary criticism, where reading becomes rewriting. He shows the 'gewaltige Amplifikation einer Person, die allen Prinzipien der modernen Arbeitsteilung spottet' (p. 223), making Don Quijote appear in all countries and in all times. On the one hand, it proves his madness which, on the other hand, has to be considered as the very principle of his life (p. 224) and of the life of the novel itself as a genre. So 'Don Quijote' becomes the novel of the novel, the poetry of the poetry (p. 225), embracing all texts and first of all at its very deep structure, its 'Königstext' (p. 228), Kafka's cross-grained reading of it. This result is not so astonishing as it might seem at first glance and a reading of Kafka's 'Die Sorge des Hausvaters' could certainly confirm it. One realizes indeed that Odradek is a resurrection of Don Quijote but he has today the simplicity of Sancho. In this double identity he finally becomes the master of his master by surviving him, just as Don Quijote makes us forget Cervantes (p. 218).

There is another author who comes close to Kafka in his very similar way of writing. It is Georg Christoph Lichtenberg in his imperturbably factual descriptions of the functioning of the guillotine. Gerhard Neumann studies them from the point of view of their argumentative context and recognizes 'eine Tradition, die, schon von Goethe vertreten, im 20. Jahrhundert – von Georg Heym über Kafka bis zu Enzensberger – ihre schärfste Ausprägung findet und erst heute (mit dem von Horkheimer/Adorno geprägten Begriff) als Einsicht in die "Dialektik der Aufklärung" zulänglich beschrieben werden kann' (p. 94). For the guillotine is the 'Darstellung der gleichzeitigen Geburt und Beschädigung des bürgerlichen Subjekts in der Nichtbewältigung der Differenz zwischen familialer, das heißt privater, und politischer, das heißt öffentlicher, Rollenfindung, zwischen kreatürlicher Selbstverfälschung und allgemein verbindlicher Definition durch die Anderen' (p. 103). The guillotine can only defend the individual in a general way, that is in imposing the idea of a right and a false individuality defined by the Bill of Rights of 1789 (p. 96). By this thorough argumentation he succeeds in correcting, as is his aim, the established image of the famous poet and scientist of the 18th century, 'dieses Bild des der Revo-

4 Herman Meyer, *Das Zitat in der Erzählkunst: Zur Geschichte und Poetik des europäischen Romans* (Stuttgart: J. Fink Stuttgart 1961) 12

5 Susan Stewart, 'The Pickpocket: A Study in Tradition and Allusion,' *Modern Language Notes* 95 (1980) 1127-54

lution verständnislos gegenüberstehenden konservativen Lichtenberg' (p. 94). He is near to the recent and open thesis of Albrecht Schöne published the same year as the Festschrift. Schöne⁶ considers the participation of Lichtenberg in the revolutionary period as that of an experimental mind. Lichtenberg observed the events as if they were a scientific experiment. There are indeed fragments which sustain this thesis. But one must see what Lichtenberg understood by an experimental mind, and then, his attitude becomes more than that of an observer. It reveals itself to be an utmost contemporary way of perception based on the principle of forming hypotheses as found in modern scientific theory. Heissenbüttel⁷ has already described the literary-philosophical thinking of Lichtenberg as being quite near to that of the 20th century. Neumann's confirms this thesis from a sociological point of view.

Lichtenberg stands thus in the same tradition as Heine and Büchner, whose 'Rolle der die Moderne bestimmenden Subjektivität' (p. 155), as Ulfert Ricklefs puts it, is analysed by Ricklefs and Theo Elm respectively. Whereas Ricklefs develops the thesis of Heine's 'Rede vom Welttrib als Antwort auf die Problemlage ... , die durch die idealistische Spekulation und ihre Voraussetzungen geschaffen war' (p. 155) and understands Heine's disillusion, the 'Illusionismus,' as the beginning of the modern conception of the role of subjectivity, Elm shows in his article how the dialectics of subjectivity have become in the 19th century an antinomy between 'endgeschichtlich-privater Regression und geschichtlich-politischem Utopismus' (p. 169). He finds it represented as well as discussed in Büchner's 'Dantons Tod' (p. 170). The drama reflects thereby its own historical position which leads Büchner to open its dramatic form to a 'Konzeption einer "offenen," antieleologischen Dramatik' signaling 'ein hermeneutisches und ästhetisches Bewußtsein, das erst der modernen Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts geläufig ist' (p. 178).

So far no mention has been made of the contribution of Anthony Stephens contained, as one of four articles, in the first, more theoretical section of the Festschrift whose discussion came to its end with the review of Neumann's article. His thesis concerning the 'lyrische

Ich' is to be taken up here, for it will throw light on the way of considering the relationship of history and subjectivity which a good deal of all the articles deal with.

Stephens starts with a careful critical outline of the known and already older theories relating to the 'lyrische Ich.' He refuses Walther Killy's rejection of it as well as Kasper H. Spinner's defense, criticizes the absolute value Käte Hamburger attributes to it, and the psychological significance it gets in Karl Pestalozzi's study; he represents the confusion of the concept in the discussion of East German scholars and resumes his critique with the reproach that one has been upset till now by something that could be called the ' "organischer" Trugschluß, 'der Glaube nämlich, daß das lyrische Ich zu einer bestimmten Stunde durch Dante oder Schiller oder Keats oder Rimbaud ins Leben gerufen worden sei' (p. 57). It is certainly correct that these 'classical' approaches to the concept of the 'lyrische Ich' do not offer a satisfying theoretical description, but Stephens' definition is no remedy either. His thesis is indeed that the 'lyrische Ich' is a creation of literary criticism: 'Erst die Literaturwissenschaft aber entwickelte aus dieser zwischen etwa 1870 und 1945 unter Lyrikern recht häufig anzutreffenden Überzeugung [i.e. of the separation of the biographical and the poetic subject — S.B.] die heterogenen Ansätze zu einer Theorie des lyrischen Ich' (p. 58). Stephens thus separates 'le mot et la chose,' projects all history onto the name and confers an immutable eternity to the literary fact which he considers as the 'immer prinzipiell vorhandenen Fähigkeit eines lyrischen Ich, sich selber im positiven oder negativen Sinne dramatisch zu gestalten' (p. 59). So it has no importance whether the subject of the poetic discourse is double or even multiple or whether it is looking for an authenticity (see p. 65). Often poets themselves make no difference between fact and word and they themselves try to unify this diversity; and Stephens cites Celan as an example. If, however, there is a poet today whose poetry rigorously disproves this thesis it is Paul Celan. The entire passage from the 'Meridian,' quoted only in part by Stephens, would have shown that the relationship of the identity of the self to that which is foreign to it is one of the most difficult and complicated aspects of Celan's poetry; perhaps the most difficult from which all the other incomprehensible passages may be elucidated. A more detailed analysis would have demonstrated that Celan by no means reduces this complexity. A close reading of the passage of the 'Meridian' and of Celan's poetry in general shows that the dissociation of the poetic subject cannot be understood anymore as a mere dramatization of an originally unified subject but that the very status of the subject has changed. It is from its very

6 Albrecht Schöne, *Aufklärung aus dem Geist der Experimentalphysik: Lichtenbergsche Konjunktur* (München: C.H. Beck 1982) 108

7 Helmut Heissenbüttel, 'Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Der erste Autor des 20. Jahrhunderts?', in *Aufklärung über Lichtenberg*, mit Beiträgen von H. Heissenbüttel et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1974) 76-92

'origine' irrefutably a plural one, into which a completely different subject – and Celan says that all things and men can become such another subject – is implicated as a part of its own identity. If, of course, the critical concept of the 'lyrische Ich' changes, the literary fact itself changes. Things and words can neither be separated from one another nor from history. This might be said for a good deal of the other contributions, too. They describe the respective historical situations of a literary form without showing in what way they change the literary form itself. History works by changing men and their expressions, and with it literature itself. At the very moment, such a historical change is becoming obvious, and it is a radical one. The poetry of Celan furnishes proof alongside other poets. Traditional concepts are no longer able to describe the new identity of men. Modified or new descriptive concepts, however, have been developed for poetry by critics such as Julia Kristeva, Henri Meschonnic, or Karlheinz Stierle.⁸ So different as their theories may be they all have in common the understanding of the poetic subject as 'l'expérience dialectique ... dans le procès de la signifiante' (Kristeva, p. 81).

Poets in general immediately recognize these changes even if their writing is as different as that of Hermann Hesse and Franz Kafka. Beda Allemann exposes in his article dealing with the reception of Kafka by Hermann Hesse and Thomas Mann, Hesse's sympathetic understanding due to his own preoccupation with the problems of literary expression; like Kafka he was in his way a 'Sprachkünstler' (p. 203); whereas Mann was absorbed by his own poetic vision of the world into which he integrated Kafka immediately. The protagonist K. of 'Das Schloß' becomes for him a 'weiter entwickel[te]r' Tonio Kröger, 'dessen Sehnsucht nach den "Wohnen der Gewöhnlichkeit" bei Kafka eben eine Wendung ins Religiöse erhalten habe' (p. 266). Mann's religious understanding of 'Das Schloß' has as its main influence Max Brod's mediation.

Oskar Seidlin represents precisely another aspect of this personal vision of the world developed by Thomas Mann in the novel *Doktor Faustus*. Adrian Leverkühn lives in an ambiguity between order and

extreme formlessness which he realizes in his music; Seidlin sees there an analogy, even a parallel ('Gleichsetzung') to the German history during the Nazi regime (see p. 296).

Two other poets are represented by Bernhard Böschstein in the way in which they integrate Ungaretti's poetry into their own poetic vision. They are the poets Ingeborg Bachmann and Paul Celan who each translate different poems of Ungaretti for their respective purposes. Bernhard Böschstein is the first to compare the translations, to speak of Celan's special translation, and to seek an approach to all three poets together. At the same time the reader appreciates the remarks concerning Ungaretti's cycle 'Terra promessa,' translated by Celan, something which has seldom been analysed. Following Böschstein, Bachmann chooses for her translation poems in different cycles which exhibit a 'monotone, wortlose Stille unter den Wörtern, das, was vor der Zeit und nach der Zeit laut wird' (p. 309). Her choice renders therefore the image of an Ungaretti not as a poet of the Italian poetic continuity, but as a representative of European modernism, whose poems are near to a prose writing (see p. 308). Celan for his part integrates him in a similar way into his own poetic vision which, however, is not so far from the late Ungaretti who, in his last works, has changed in such a way as to bring him near to the German poet. The terms of death and exile are new now and may also have persuaded Celan to translate these beautiful poems. Böschstein furthermore points out the creative act translation is for Celan. He changes the syntax and grammatical categories, he especially transforms attributes into nouns. Böschstein recognizes there the expression of a desire to name in order to commemorate facts. That is surely one reason, but the poetic system of Celan's poetry suggests still others which show the severity of the poet's work who must first create the place where he stays and speaks from.

In other contributions, the reader might find a detailed analysis of the work of an author or of a certain historical period especially characterized by the impact of tradition and modernism. Wolfgang Witkowski shows in a convincing microscopic interpretation of Goethe's *Iphigenie* in comparison with Schiller's *Braut von Messina* how modernism, conceived as the moral autonomy, is still being defended by Goethe, whereas it is completely accepted twenty years later so that Schiller's problem becomes to ask what man can do with his new moral freedom (see p. 133). The answer is to be found, as far as Witkowski is concerned, in the person of Cesar in the last scenes of the drama, where he achieves the personal perfection of the 'Erhabenheit' and even surpasses it in a synthesis with 'der schönen Anmut' (p. 129).

8 Julia Kristeva, *La Révolution du langage poétique: L'Avant-garde à la fin du 19^e siècle. Lautréamont et Mallarmé* (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1974); Henri Meschonnic, *Pour la Poétique I - IV* (Paris: Gallimard 1970); *Le Signe et le poème* (Paris: Gallimard 1975); *Critique du rythme: Anthropologie historique du langage* (Paris: Verdier 1982); Karlheinz Stierle, 'Die Identität des Gedichts – Hölderlin als Paradigma,' in *Identität*, ed. O. Marquardt and K. Stierle. Poetik und Hermeneutik VIII (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1979) 505-52

Whereas Goethe's and Schiller's struggle is not to harmonize tradition and modernism, but to transform traditional values into new conceptions, Grillparzer and Stifter are described by Herbert Seidler and Jean-Louis Bandet as two authors looking for a reconciliation between the two. But if one proceeds to a closer reading of Grillparzer's trilogy 'Das goldene Vließ' for instance, one must realize that the static symbol of the 'Vließ' cannot cover any more the discrepancy between such different traditions as the baroque form of representation (see p. 186), the psychological motivation of the characters (see p. 188), and the consciousness of history (see p. 192). Facts and gestures are dissociated, and history itself prevents them from converging into a new or old classical harmony. The weight of history paralyzes every spontaneous gesture and man cannot but repeat his first act again and again. Greek myth is finally transformed into the modern myth of time in its specific sense of the destructive power of history. The dramatic form itself is destroyed by it, and it becomes not only a drama speaking of time, but makes visible through its new epic elements time itself moving through the drama, almost as a *persona dramatis*. Instead of trying to refer Grillparzer to the idea of a classical continuity, as it is generally done, one could propose to read him in the perspective of a historical break or rupture thus bringing him into line with Peter Szondi's *Theorie des modernen Dramas*. It would at the same time allow the correction of Szondi's thesis that 'Das erste große Dokument dieser Beschäftigung mit der Zeit ... kein Werk der Dramatik [ist], sondern ... Flauberts "L'Éducation Sentimentale."'⁹ And if Szondi considers Wilder's 'The Long Christmas Dinner' as a successful representation of time in the dramatic art (Szondi, p. 148), one should not forget that more than one hundred years before, in Grillparzer's trilogy, it had found a most complex concretization.

The impact of an epoch with tradition and modernism is described in the contributions of Gerhard Schulz, Helmut Kreuzer, and Gustave Siebenmann. The articles of Schulz and Kreuzer echo each other from a distance of one hundred years; whereas Schulz points out the inextricable interference of political, economic, and literary tendencies in the period between 1789 and 1815, Kreuzer describes the confusing interaction of politics and literature in the years of the twenties during the Weimarer Republik. In the former's article: new economic orientations, the struggle of the poets, writers, and philosophers for a cultur-

ally unified Germany, the encounter of different literary periods such as 'Aufklärung, Sturm und Drang, Klassik' (p. 144), and the concept of 'romanticism' as their continuity in a historically changed situation (p. 146); in the latter's: the political influence of American, Marxist, and Fascist movements in interweaving literary tendencies of the Traditionalists, Expressionists, Dadaists, and the representatives of the 'Neue Sachlichkeit.'

Siebenmann reveals the same chaos in the Iberoromanian literature of the fin de siècle. But he enters into a very detailed analysis of the concept of modernism clarifying its different meanings in the different geographical parts of Romania, in the different periods, and explaining it in terms of the European influence and its own historical context. It is summarized as follows: "Zusammenfassend können wir sagen, daß der gleiche Terminus "modernismo" eine universelle Kulturepoche (Neustzeit) [sic], eine ästhetische Struktur (Modernität), eine theologische Bewegung und wenigstens vier verschiedene literarische Strömungen innerhalb der Iberoromania bezeichnet" (p. 239). Siebenmann enters then into a detailed explanation of Spanish-American modernism, as seen in the poetic work of Rubén Darío, discusses the extra-literary conditions of its appearance exhibited by Angel Rama, and compares it finally to the French Symbolist movement and its European forms. But in this latter discussion, he unfortunately relates his detailed knowledge of Darío's poetry not to the French poets themselves but to their very general and in the meantime outdated description by Claude Vigée, published for the first time in 1955 and not in 1962, as Siebenmann seems to suggest. For Vigée, the French modern tradition is characterized by the negation of reality. But critics such as Julia Kristeva, Karlheinz Stierle, and even Jean-Paul Sartre, André Guyaux, and Shoshana Felman¹⁰ have shown that neither for Mallarmé nor for Rimbaud is negation an end in itself but a function to call the poetic word into life; so that the conviction of Spanish-American modernism 'daß das Wort wirklicher sei als das Leben' (p. 255) does not prove its singularity, as Siebenmann suggests, but signalizes precisely the continuity between not only French but also European and Spanish-American modernism. The difference appears to be in the rela-

⁹ Peter Szondi, *Theorie des modernen Dramas* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1969) 147

¹⁰ Julia Kristeva, loc. cit.; Karlheinz Stierle, 'Position and Negation in Mallarmé's "Prose pour Des Esseintes,"' *Yale French Studies* 54 (1977) 96-117; Jean Paul Sartre, 'L'Engagement de Mallarmé,' *Obliques* 18-19. Numéro spécial Sartre, 169-94; André Guyaux, 'Poétique du glissement,' *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* 1-2. Lectures de Rimbaud (1982) 185-213; Shoshana Felman, *La Folie et la chose littéraire* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1978) 99-120

tionship between poetry and reality not, that is to say, after the completion of the writing but in the foregoing encounter of the poet with the non-verbal world. Mallarmé tries to eliminate it in order to give to poetry its own real 'lieu,' Rimbaud on the contrary enters into it to transform it through the poetic word, and Spanish-American modernists are not far from him. One can apply García Lorca's comparison of Góngora and Mallarmé to modernist poetry in Hispano-America and say that it is 'más fuerte y aporta una riqueza verbal que Mallarmé desconoce.'¹¹ Nevertheless, the contribution of Siebenmann is of utmost interest in this Festschrift, as it opens up the larger comparative field necessary to studies dealing with the concept of modernism.

Looking back to the articles, whose intention was to settle and clarify the concept of modernism and its history, it appears that modernism, when the author himself is aware of his identity as a modern writer, is always perceived as a 'rupture.' Every modern text then posits its own modernism, destroys that of his antecedents, and determines its own tradition, just as Hans Robert Jauss has shown in the case of the constitution of medieval literary genres.¹² Under this formalistic aspect, modernism cannot be temporally delimited. It functions as a theme or a motive which can appear both anytime and anywhere. That is the way the contributors to the Festschrift understand it. But the articles show that modernism is more than a mere literary theme or a historical period, it is a special form of encountering the world of the book, in other words, it is the reader's own standpoint. Modernism has become a mental attitude and with that an operational concept producing its own sense. There is no doubt that the reader today is in the situation of modernism in the sense Sartre has given to the notion of being 'en situation.' The concept itself has been affected by history. Modern reading carries in itself the notion of the 'rupture' as a generator of sense. But then it should be a challenge for criticism to maintain disharmony, too. The consciousness of this specific encounter with literature is one of the signs of a modern attitude — if it is not already a sign of a postmodern mind. The problem is resolved. It is a great merit of the articles to stimulate the reader to rethink the

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concept of modernism and the Festschrift must certainly be considered as a reference work for scholars studying the subject. (SIEGHILD BOGUMIL, RUHR-UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM)

*KAREN FORSYTH, '*Ariadne auf Naxos*' by Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Richard Strauss: *Its Genesis and Meaning*. New York: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. 291. US\$49.95

In this study of the third of Hugo von Hofmannsthal's and Richard Strauss's six operatic collaborations, Karen Forsyth claims that 'the stumbling-block of *Ariadne* criticism' is 'the issue of artistic unity' (p. 6). 'A way out of this critical impasse,' she claims, 'is ... the genetic approach' (p. 6), or the study of the process by which the opera came into being. In the case of *Ariadne auf Naxos*, of course, there are two operas to be considered: the 1912 version, which was appended to a performance of Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*; and the revised 1916 version, which was written to be performed on its own. Most *Ariadne* criticism blurs the distinction between these two versions or focuses upon the latter of the two, the one which is performed more frequently. Forsyth stresses the necessity of differentiating between the two versions, arguing that this is the advantage of the genetic approach: 'the genesis helps to sort out critical tangles because it draws attention to the existence and relationship of the two versions of *Ariadne*' (p. 7).

The central argument and metaphor of Forsyth's study is that 'the genesis of *Ariadne auf Naxos* is largely one of stratification' (p. 6). As one intention, or stratum, was laid over another in the long and often difficult process of composition and revision, the result was a work which 'was built up of different, sometimes contradictory, levels. This gave rise to a number of "faults"' (p. 15).

Drawing heavily upon Hofmannsthal's initial *Scenarium* and unpublished notes, Forsyth observes that Hofmannsthal's original intention, or substratum, was to compose an opera which would be an historically accurate recreation of a Molièresque divertissement, taking the place of the original divertissement, 'Le Ballet des Nations,' in a performance of *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*. In the beginning, he regarded the project as a slight interim work, or '"Zwischenarbeit"' (p. 8), which would not only give him the opportunity to collaborate both with Max Reinhardt in the production of a play and with Richard Strauss in the composition of an opera, but would permit him to practise certain

¹¹ Federico García Lorca, 'La imagen poética en Don Luis de Góngora,' in *Federico García Lorca: Obras completas*, ed. Arturo del Hoyo (Madrid: Aguilar 1957) 65-88

¹² Hans Robert Jauss, 'Theorie der Gattungen und Literatur des Mittelalters,' in *Grundriss der romanischen Literaturen des Mittelalters*, Vol. 1, ed. H.R. Jauss and E. Köhler (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag 1972) 107-38

aspects of libretto writing, particularly the craft of composing a libretto consisting of a series of set numbers in the Mozartean vein. The use of the conventions of *opera seria* and *opera buffa* arose from the desire to be historically accurate, although the device of placing the two groups on stage at the same time was Hofmannsthal's own invention. 'The underlying structure of the *Szenarium*' is thus of 'a very simple allegory of two opposing forces which unite at the end' (p. 31).

Forsyth argues that when Hofmannsthal came to write the actual libretto, however, 'he was strongly tempted to produce a lyric drama instead and ... this was then superimposed on the earlier plan' (p. 55). A work which, judging from the *Szenarium*, was intended 'to be simple, historical, authentic, and impersonal' (p. 39) now became increasingly complex, moral, lyric and personal, and it was 'this shift [which] accounts for some of the faults in the libretto' (p. 109). These faults were exacerbated in the case of the 1912 version by the time pressure under which the work was written, and in the case of both versions by the fact that Strauss did not have a clear understanding of the ideas underlying Hofmannsthal's work, either as he originally intended them or as he subsequently developed them. Extrapolating from the experience of *Ariadne*, Forsyth observes the following 'distinct pattern' in the genesis of three of Hofmannsthal's and Strauss's operas, *Ariadne*, *Die Frau ohne Schatten*, and *Die Ägyptische Helena*: 'Hofmannsthal took something originally light-hearted or ironical too seriously, jeopardized the form of the work and left his composer floundering and dissatisfied' (p. 266). This is a reiteration of Roman Roland's earlier observation in relation to the two *Ariadnes* and *Die Frau ohne Schatten*:

Tous les pastiches: ce ne serait rien encore; mais Hofmannsthal, esclave de sa virtuosité, finit par les prendre au sérieux. Et Strauss ne le peut pas. (p. 266)

The primary danger with the genetic approach which Forsyth undertakes is that it runs the risk of committing the intentional fallacy, which is to ascribe to a work features which the author has already claimed are there. Forsyth dismisses this possibility with the rejoinder: 'the intentional fallacy, that *bête noire* of the genetic method, is hard to commit with *Ariadne* for there is scarcely one intention that did not leave its mark' (p. 6). This is, of course, an example of circular reasoning, and it is incumbent upon the author to illustrate in the remainder of her study that the features which she claims to exist *a priori* are in fact objectively verifiable from an analysis of the text. On the whole, Forsyth does manage to do this in a convincing manner. By means of textual illustrations, she points out the problems caused by the acce-

tion of one stratum upon another: the discrepancies in the character of Bacchus and in the reactions of the nymphs to him; the difficulties caused by the opera's having two female leads; the ambiguities in the character of Zerbinetta; the sensationalism and 'over-exquisite spirituality' (p. 95) in the treatment of Ariadne and her relationship with Bacchus; and the injustice done to the characters of the *commedia dell'arte* world 'by judging it according to a morality which is alien to it' (p. 101). In general, her illustrations drawn from the libretto are more persuasive than her illustrations from the score; her musical analyses are occasionally marred by subjective iconicity, as when she interprets a common dotted rhythm as having 'the effect of a cheeky smile' (p. 149). Nevertheless, her argument that the music, too, exhibits faults in the form of a "'stylistic progression" from archaizing miniatures through pastiche to a Romanticism which doesn't quite succeed in parodying itself' is well supported and, as Forsyth rightly claims, is a feature of the score which 'has not been remarked upon in previous critical studies' (p. 180).

If Forsyth's work has any serious flaw it is that the genetic approach she espouses does not allow the critic to illuminate or interpret aspects of a work which have not been previously identified by the author. In the case of Forsyth's study, this deficiency takes the form of giving short shrift to the 1916 version of *Ariadne*, the one which is in fact generally regarded as the definitive and final version of the opera. Indeed, only a relatively small proportion of her book (fifty pages out of a total of nearly three hundred) is devoted to the *Vorspiel* which Hofmannsthal wrote especially for the 1916 version and which occupies a third of that version's total performance time. Although Forsyth comments that 'the full ingenuity of the motif treatment in the *Vorspiel* cannot be appreciated by anyone who does not know the *Oper* very well indeed' (p. 242), the relationship between the *Vorspiel* and the *Oper* surely is more complex, interesting and worthy of detailed study than the few examples she supplies of this treatment would lead a reader to suspect.

This caveat aside, however, Forsyth's study may be recommended as a solid, conventional approach to the literary analysis of opera, written in a clear and well-organized manner and based upon careful scholarship and a thorough familiarity with the material at hand. Although there is more to *Ariadne auf Naxos* than can be addressed by the genetic approach alone, it is difficult to disagree with Forsyth's conclusion that *Ariadne's* 'much-praised ambiguity is often only a result of the accretions of meaning and intention that went into its genesis' (p. 191). While this reviewer would argue that the sources of the am-

biguities of a work are irrelevant to the evaluation of their effectiveness, since they exist in the finished work whatever their ancestry, it seems clear that within its self-imposed limits, Forsyth's study has proved its point. (CAROLYN ROBERTS FINLAY, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA)

*WOLFGANG PAULSEN und HELMUT G. HERMANN, eds. *Sinn aus Unsinn: Dada International*. Bern and München: Francke Verlag 1982 (12. Arheimer Kolloquium zur deutschen Literatur). Pp. 303. SF60.00, DM68.00

I opened this volume with scepticism – asking myself: How does anybody dare come up with three hundred more pages about a topic which has been covered in dozens of books and hundreds of essays? A further reason for scepticism: experience has shown that most colloquia produce little information which is new and worthwhile. Why this is so can easily be explained. An ambitious colleague feels that his prestige needs a boost; he applies for and obtains money to finance a colloquium; he invites some expert scholars in the field, some friends, and some people who might be useful to him in the future, advertises the event widely and, later on, edits the papers. Sometimes these papers read well, having been written for oral delivery, but most of the time they contain little (if any) new information. Some are, in fact, not worth the paper they are printed on.

Paulsen's and Hermann's volume is an exception to the rule. This book contains more source material about dadaism than has appeared elsewhere since about 1975. Evidently, Paulsen has invited experts only, and most of these experts have not just handed in their papers, but substantial scholarly studies on which their oral papers had been based. Richard Shepard's contribution on 'Dada and Futurism' with its 158 footnotes, for example, could not have been read out in less than three hours.

The volume contains 14 essays arranged in three sections: I. 'Zu den Grundlagen'; II. 'Dada in Zürich, Berlin und Hannover'; III. 'Ausstrahlungen Dadas'. Three fascinating essays make up the first section. A.J. Peter Froehlich ('Reaktionen des Publikums auf Vorführungen nach abstrakten Vorlagen') analyses the reaction of the audience when, for instance, Kurt Schwitters read his 'Ursonate'. One can distinguish 6 stages: At first, the public is flabbergasted (1), but people keep themselves in check (2); the tension mounts (3); some persons lose their self-control (4); the others keep silent for a few moments longer (5), then

there is a general explosion of laughter (6). Once the laughter has subsided, people continue listening with genuine pleasure and enthusiasm.

Richard Shepard's comparative study presents a detailed analysis of the relations between Futurism and Dadaism. He has a tendency to take dadaists too much at their word (for instance Tristan Tzara, p. 46). Anton Kaes ('Vertremdung als Verfahren: Film und Dada') describes those few films which were influenced directly by dadaism.

All of the 6 essays in part II are well written; two I find less informative and too speculative: Erdmute Wenzel White on Hugo Ball ('Das Wunder der Geisteszwiebel: Hugo Ball. Eine Studie zur Paradoxologie') and Meredith McClain on Kurt Schwitters ('Merz, ein Weg zum Wissen. Relativität und Komplimentarität in Kurt Schwitters' Weltanschauung'). While Christopher Middleton had analysed the political views of the Zürich dadaists, Rudolf E. Kuenzli ('Dada gegen den Ersten Weltkrieg: Die Dadaisten in Zürich') tries to find out just how far they were pacifists. Georg Grosz' political views come under scrutiny in an extensive and well illustrated paper by Martin Kane ('Georg Grosz und die Politisierung des Berliner Dada'). Stephen C. Foster ('Johannes Baader: Kunst und Kulturkritik') takes issue with Richard Huelsenbeck and Georges Hugnet who are responsible for the negative view we take of Baader. The 'Oberdada' was not a lunatic, but a political activist and a gifted artist; the ten illustrations certainly support Foster's arguments. Friedhelm Lach ('Sinn aus Unsinn – Überlegungen zur Schwitters-Interpretation') reflects on the several ways in which Schwitters' writings can be interpreted.

The five essays of part III are concerned with international literary relations. Marjorie L. Hoover ('Dada und das russische Theater') points out that there was a 'dadaistischer Geist' in Russia until 1923, but that, in fact, it did not emanate from the Zürich or Berlin movements. Eric M. Beekman ('Dada in Holland') informs us about Theo Van Doesburg (Pseudonym of C.E.M. Küpper), his periodical *De Stijl* and his relations with Schwitters and other dadaists. What dadaists thought of America is the topic of Karl Riha ('Amerika im Kopf der Dadaisten'), while Dickran Tashjian ('Dada in Amerika: Sein Verhältnis zu *The Little Review*') proves that the editors of *The Little Review*, Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap, not only risked publishing Joyce's *Ulysses*, but were just as willing to spread dadaism in the USA. A most interesting study (with numerous illustrations and plates) on 'Fluxus-Kästen und Dada-Konstruktionen' by Michel Oren concludes this volume which no scholar in the field can afford to miss. (ARMIN ARNOLD, MCGILL UNIVERSITY)

*BETSY BOWDEN. *Performed Literature: Words and Music by Bob Dylan*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982. Pp. x + 239. US\$18.95

Betsy Bowden's *Performed Literature: Words and Music by Bob Dylan* is an attempt to establish a 'vocabulary and methodology for analysis of performed literature' (p. 14) and to demonstrate this methodology by examining twenty-three renditions of eleven songs by American folk-singer and songwriter Bob Dylan. Drawing her material from commercial recordings and bootleg tapes, Bowden first examines the text of a song and then one or more performances of the same song. She does not attempt to analyze all aspects of performance, such as the visual aspects, for instance, but concentrates upon the interaction of words and music.

In the course of attempting to develop 'criteria for the close analysis and aesthetics of oral performance' (pp. 127-8), Bowden returns several times to 'the issues of subjective judgment and the limits of analysis' (p. 126). Calling her approach 'New Critical,' insofar as she is concerned with 'what a text means to a reader, not what the elusive author intended to put into the text' (p. 73), she summarizes her overall attitude in the following remarks:

My approach to Dylan's work has so far been New Critical: I have analyzed what occurs in between a revolving black plastic disk and the eardrum-connected cells of my own brain. ...

But close analysis, in the end, cannot be separated from subjective aesthetic judgment. In processing those sounds, my brain cells of necessity apply what Michael Owen Jones terms the "ohh-ahhh/ugh-yuck complex." I analyze not all that I hear, that is, but rather what I like and don't like hearing. ... (p. 72)

At another point, she admits:

... mine may well not be the only possible interpretation of the sounds. But there are valid critical advantages to analyzing thoroughly one's own responses rather than pretending — as (mostly male) scholars so often have — that absolute objectivity is a valid goal or even a possible one in literary criticism. (p. 62)

For Bowden, then, scientific objectivity and literary analysis are fundamentally incompatible endeavours. Consequently, two major flaws underlie her study which make it difficult or impossible for her to realize the full potential of many of her ideas, and which deny them wider applicability. These are the subjectivity of her approach, and the impression arising from her apparent ignorance of the descriptive techniques

of linguistics and musicology, and sometimes even of the structure of music itself.

Reviewing a book which espouses the 'ohh-ahhh/ugh-yuck,' or 'subjective aesthetic judgment,' school of literary criticism places this particular reader in a critical quandary, for I must admit a fundamental antipathy to the subjective approach. Not only do I believe that objectivity is a valid and indeed a necessary goal of literary criticism, but, not being a 'mostly male' but an entirely female literary scholar, I also represent the implication that a critic's preference for subjectivity or objectivity is a matter of gender. Although subjectivity, under the guise of a 'close reading,' is a familiar feature of much literary criticism and is indeed sometimes a valid approach to certain literary texts, I believe that it is not the most rewarding approach to the texts Bowden analyzes here. Instead of arguing for or against the validity of subjectivity as a critical response, I will restrict myself to pointing out its deficiencies in the instance of this particular book.

One of the major difficulties with the subjective approach is that it often tells the reader more about the author than about the works under discussion; Bowden's analyses frequently fall victim to this danger. For example, the third stanza of Dylan's song 'She Belongs to Me':

She never stumbles, she got no place to fall
She never stumbles, she got no place to fall
She's nobody's child, the law can't touch her at all

is explicated in a way which tells us much about Bowden's attitudes towards politics and male-female relationships, but very little about the meaning of Dylan's cryptic lyrics:

The tangled negatives of the third stanza, again describing "she," leave the artist even less subject to human limitations. "She got no place to fall" remains particularly enigmatic, seeming visual until one tries to picture it: even perched solidly on that pedestal, a woman would have a place to fall to. The image upsets earthbound notions of space, like the point in Dante's *Inferno* where down becomes up. "She's nobody's child" evokes the prophecy that Macbeth will be slain by man not born of woman, as well as the virgin births of Jesus and other deities. Finally, her freedom from "the law" suggests the Old Testament and, more forcibly for most of Dylan's audience, America's military draft and parking meters and compulsory education, which one could no more avoid than enter life as nobody's child. (p. 32)

In addition, her attributing references to the Old Testament, Dante's

Inferno and Shakespeare's *Macbeth* to these lines sounds more like a gratuitous demonstration of her own erudition than a valid reading of Dylan's text, for she does not substantiate these interpretations by integrating them into any conceptual structure or by identifying their function within the song as a whole. The apparent creativity and insight involved in such free interpretation is misleading: if a text is allowed to mean or refer to anything that any reader wants it to mean, then language is failing in its communicative function and has ceased to mean anything at all.

Bowden takes her subjective approach to an extreme when she includes mishearings of texts in her interpretations. At one point in her examination of 'Isis,' for example, she interprets two mishearings of a line as if they were actual parts of the ambiguities of the text itself:

Two more examples of words merged in performance occur in the line of "Isis" that is published as "Blinded by sleep and in need of a bed." Before a song-book came out, I transcribed this line as "Lightly asleep ...," and Greil Marcus hears it clearly as "... in need of a bath" (personal communication, 1 November 1977). The printed line condenses already established patterns of imagery, but so would these possible alternate understandings. "Lightly," like "right" in the second stanza, puns: a lightly sleeping Isis combines the light and dark much else. Isis's freedom from socially defined propriety. She can bathe without plumbing, soap, protein conditioner for those annoying split ends, or even effort: she can keep on sleeping there in her meadow until the creek again rises to meet her. (p. 52)

Apparently, Bowden's defence for her use of mishearings would be that the work of art which she is analyzing is the performance, which certainly contains unclear words, rather than the written text. This is insufficient. To show that mishearings such as those discussed in her analysis of 'Isis' were actually a part of the structure of the work, one would have to show that only those mishearings which were analyzed and which supposedly had meaning in the song's context were possible. Bowden's analysis of 'Isis' fails this test miserably. At least the following words and phrases are phonetically more similar to the textual 'blinded' than is Bowden's 'lightly':

blinder	grinder	finder	binder	climber
blind her	grind her	find her	bind her	liner

Similarly, if we can mishear 'bed' as 'bath,' we can equally or more

easily mishear it as 'bet,' 'beige,' 'beg,' 'bat,' 'badge,' 'bag,' 'bawd,' 'bod,' 'baize,' 'bathe,' or 'bass' (either pronunciation). If one mishearing is admitted, then there are no grounds for excluding the others. If other verbal interpretations of sounds are equally possible, then the analyst is once again selecting those which fit her subjective preconceptions, thereby forcing the performance to mean what she chooses.

Bowden's subjectivity becomes an insurmountable liability when she combines it with serious imprecision in recording both words and music. Her difficulties with words cause fewer problems and can be described quite briefly, but her problems with music are more deeply rooted and more destructive.


Bowden eschews phonetic notation in favour of a kind of *ad hoc* spelling pronunciation: *ur* for [ər], *ay* for [e], *oh* for [o], and so forth. While this does not detract from her interpretations to nearly the same degree as does her subjectivity, it sometimes makes it difficult to determine just what pronunciation the performer used, especially where vowels are involved: 'the two phrases "rolling stone" and "diamond ring" share the sounds of *r* and *ing* and *ohn*, ...' (p. 93). Occasionally Bowden seems unable to separate phonetic substance from standard spelling, as when she considers it worthy of comment that Dylan pronounces *-ory* in *memory* and *-ery* in *cannery* 'identically' (p. 37), despite the fact that virtually any native speaker of North American English will do the same.

This carelessness in recording the performed word is a minor annoyance, but Bowden's treatment of musical data is so incomplete that it hides from her much of the structure she intends to analyze. In her third appendix, entitled 'Practical Suggestions for Analysis of Performance,' she describes and illustrates the methods she used to transcribe what she heard when she listened to Dylan's music. As 'methodological examples,' which, incredibly, she claims have been 'somewhat formalized,' she provides 'two sketches ... from my notes to myself as I listened to each song' (p. 214). Quoted below is an example from her notes to 'Isis.' Sketched lines represent the sounds of different musical instruments where 'direction of line suggests direction of musical pitch' (p. 214). As Bowden explains, 'the solid line shows violin. The broken line shows harmonica; dashes farther apart indicate a screechier, less melodic harmonica than those spaced closer together' (p. 214):

9... been mad



In her notes to the 1974 tour version of 'It Ain't Me, Babe,' Bowden uses letters instead: 'v ... for vocal effects, g ... for lead guitar, k ... for keyboard. Again, direction of the line indicates approximate direction of musical pitch' (pp. 214-15):

And anyway I'm not ay-lone 

The imprecision of this sort of 'notation' is so overwhelming as to suggest that Bowden knows little about musical structure. From her notes it is not possible to ascertain whether a song is in a major or minor key, to determine the tempo, rhythm, or meter, to identify tonic, dominant and subdominant harmonies, or even to read the melody. Her notation goes beyond imprecision into absurdity in the second sketch quoted above, where the sound of a keyboard is represented by a line which doubles back on itself like a child's drawing of a pig's tail. Bowden seems unaware that her notation is in fact a graph in which the vertical axis represents movement in pitch and the horizontal axis represents movement in time. Thus, a line such as this one represents an impossibility, for it indicates not only that a keyboard instrument can produce infinitely small gradations of pitch, but also that sounds are capable of moving backwards in time.

Not surprisingly, the fundamentals of musical structure play almost no part in her analyses, despite the fact that they generate some of her most enlightening observations on the occasions when they are used. A case in point appears in her discussion of 'Hard Rain,' where she comments on the use of seven-measure phrases where eight would be expected:

The seven measures per line go on and on, line after line ... A listener expects eight musical measures; the incomplete seven-measure structure reinforces the lyrics' warnings that something unknown is about to arrive. Poetic images join with truncated musical lines to file without protest toward headlong destruction. (p. 15)

Although her subjective interpretation can be quarrelled with, there can be little doubt that the shortened phrases are a structural contributor to the song's meaning.

It would seem to this reviewer that analysis of literary data, no less than scientific data, can be more revealing if the data are first collected and organized in a manner which is internally consistent, sufficiently precise, and in accordance with observable phenomena. When dealing with literature in musical performance, at least two forms of data provide material for analysis. In the absence of scores, these are the sound of the sung text and the sound of the performed music. Although there is no agreed method of transcribing every sound that exists in the world, methods of transcribing these two have already been developed and have attained a considerable level of sophistication: phonetic notation and musical notation. Any analyst who is unable or unwilling to use these tools surely puts himself or herself at a serious and unnecessary disadvantage. This is especially true in the case of the material Bowden is examining here: language which falls squarely in the context of colloquial American speech and music which falls squarely in the Western European tradition. Yet Bowden advises fellow performance analysts as follows:

In your notes to yourself, use what you know; don't strain to employ conventions you're unfamiliar with (e.g. notation, linguistic transcription), for you're likely to forget what such marks mean. (pp. 213-14)

This argument is certainly questionable; surely remembering a notational system is not an excessively onerous task. Although Bowden recognizes the relative imprecision of her system of sketched lines in comparison to other methods, she nevertheless attempts to justify its use by saying, 'such a system is less precise and, therefore, perhaps more true to musical nature than is Western-classical-music notation' (p. 213). The absurdity of equating imprecision with truth, one hopes, need not be belaboured.

If one may define a methodology as a set of interpretative techniques which are the logical consequence of a consistent conceptual scheme, then we must conclude that Bowden's work neither proposes nor uses a methodology as such, despite her avowed purpose of establishing one. Although she arrives at several interesting or potentially interesting generalizations and concepts, such as her observation that perhaps the difference between texts intended to be read and texts intended to be sung is that 'successful literature intended for oral performance somehow [tends to] use more binary oppositions than does other literature' (p. 163) and that 'in a song, as distinguished from a poem, linear development of imagery is not needed for artistic coherence' (p. 42), at no point does she attempt to develop a conceptual basis for these

generalizations or to explain what it could be about the essential nature of musical structure which would influence literary structures in these ways. Dismissing the objectivity necessary for such an enterprise, she instead relies upon personal emotional responses, even espousing incomplete knowledge of notational tools which would increase the precision and completeness of her observations.

It is difficult to take seriously any so-called methodology which uses ignorance and imprecision as the basis of its investigations. As a catalogue of the emotional responses of an articulate, enthusiastic and 'absolutely typical' (p. 3) Dylan fan to a number of Dylan's songs, *Performed Literature* may be of interest to other Dylan aficionados, who can compare their emotional responses to those of the author. Her work is based upon an obvious familiarity with and love for the traditions and manifestations of American folk music, and often offers interesting insights from this personal perspective. As a serious presentation of critical methods for the analysis of sung literature in musical performance, however, it falls well short of the mark. (CAROLYN ROBERTS FINLAY, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA)

*DUOWE W. FOKKEMA. *Literary History, Modernism and Post-Modernism*. The Harvard University Erasmus Lectures, Spring 1983. Utrecht publications in general and comparative literature, Vol. 19. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1984. Hardcover US\$20.00, paperback US\$10.00

This highly compact and highly illuminating little book contains the author's Erasmus lectures on the civilisation of the Netherlands, delivered at Harvard University in March 1983. It is concerned with the establishment of an adequate conceptual framework for the writing of twentieth-century literary history (Chapter I) and with Modernism and Post-Modernism in their general West European and American context (Chapters II and III). The book deals *exclusively* with narrative and with the general aesthetic, rather than specifically narratological, principles of these two modes of writing. The theoretical background is that of Formalism, the Prague School, Soviet Semiotics and contemporary communication models (Jakobson, Eco).

The author begins with the general notion of a semantic code and goes on to identify five types of codes determining any text: linguistic, general literary, generic, period or group code and authorial idiolect (pp. 8-9). Since generic codes are transformed by period/group

codes, they cannot serve as a basis for a literary history of the twentieth century. Our century also manifests the coexistence of several conflicting literary codes, so that period codes are not a viable basis either. The best unit for a transnational literary history of the twentieth century is provided therefore by group codes, 'code[s] designed by a group of writers often belonging to a particular generation, literary movement or current, and acknowledged by their contemporary and later readers' (p. 11). Such codes are to be identified through a contrastive analysis, both synchronic and diachronic, e.g. Modernism vs. Realism (diachronic) and Modernism vs. Surrealism (synchronic). Contrastive analysis will also help us identify the shared and the opposing features of two successive codes (Modernism and Post-Modernism). Bearing in mind that all codes have syntactic and semantic features, any group code defined by the literary historian will have to include its preferred or dominant *compositional arrangements*, as well as its *central themes*. The pragmatic dimension is left out, being concerned not with texts but with the readers' use of them.

The *compositional* principles of Modernism and Post-Modernism are defined in Chapters II and III in terms of an underlying aesthetic principle and its manifestations in four textual dimensions, involving the textually inscribed relation of text to author, reader, code and social context. The *thematic* principles are defined in terms of a semantic universe, its fields (segments) and their hierarchy. Fokkema's principal conclusions are as follows: the main *compositional* convention of Modernism involves 'the selection of hypothetical constructions expressing uncertainty and provisionality' (p. 15) (this is manifested by texts which are not definitive in their form and have no well constructed plots); by epistemological doubt regarding the possibility of any general explanation of human behaviour; by linguistic skepticism; and by the abundance of *Leerstellen* which require active participation on the part of the reader. The past is recovered by means of a non-chronological memory. The central dominant *semantic* field of modern narrative involves awareness (self, 'I', thinking subject), detachment and observation, coupled with tentative, strictly personal judgements and interpretations.

The major *compositional* convention in the code of Post-Modernism involves 'quasi non-selection ... a rejection of discriminating hierarchies, and a refusal to distinguish between truth and fiction, past and present, relevant and irrelevant' (p. 42). This principle is manifested by texts with multiple or arbitrary beginnings and endings, with internal discontinuity and incoherence. Every attempt at explanation, even of individual facts, based on logic or 'world knowledge' is reject-

ed or parodied, and meaning turns out to consist of nothing but the recycling of semantic waste, mere words or clichés. Post-Modern narratives abound in metatextual comments referring to the underlying code and warning the reader not to try to find any deep sense in the text or code. The reader is explicitly and forcefully addressed, allowed to choose between alternative endings and sometimes turned into the main character of the narrative. At the centre of the *semantic* universe of Post-Modernism stand the fields of (random) inclusiveness and assimilation, while psychological considerations (awareness, etc.) are removed or polemicalised against. Endless perceptions and data of the world are absorbed without any attempt at judgement or sense-making. Disorderly inclusiveness is manifested in the semantic features of /+poly/, /+pan/ and in such images as the labyrinth, library, encyclopedia and the flood of verbiage coming from the mass media, including film and photography.

Fokkema's book is a brilliant demonstration of the advantages of a principled and theoretically well-founded approach to descriptive poetics, and especially to literary historiography. Previous attempts to describe the central features of Post-Modernism, such as those by Hassan, Zavarzadeh and even Lodge, were based on induction and intuition and ended up with an unordered enumeration of heterogeneous elements. They cannot answer the basic questions: why these kinds of features and not others? how are they interrelated? how can one contrast them with those of other group codes? Fokkema's description, on the other hand, proceeds from a series of well considered and well formulated assumptions about the nature of codes and communications and follows their coordinates. With Fokkema's models, one becomes immediately aware of the parallelism between forms of expression (composition) and forms of content (thematics) within each code, as well as of the differences between the two codes in terms of the pairs of oppositions described above. This procedure has also convinced the present reader that there are indeed very real differences between Modernism and Post-Modernism. There are several additional advantages to Fokkema's procedure. The utilisation of the general categories of forms of expression and forms of content enables a comparison with the codes of Modernism and Post-Modernism in other types of literary discourse such as drama and poetry, and in other media, such as film and painting. The description and comparison of the two systems of literary norms according to a clear semiotic model of features and their interrelations enables also a disciplined representation of the inner structure of each code (dominant and subordinate, obligatory and excluded features), and of their diachronic differences

(inversion, deletion, intensification, rehierarchisation of features). Following the ideas of the Prague school, Fokkema represents the inner working of the literary code in terms of a relation of centre and periphery, rather than of binary opposition, between its constitutive features. This procedure is indeed the better one, since components on the thematic level may be heterogeneous in their nature (for example, the semantic fields of awareness, agriculture and industry, pp. 34-5), and therefore not amenable to opposition on the +/- level, as they do not share an invariant. Finally, and probably most important, Fokkema is to be commended for his componential analysis of the themes of narrative texts in terms of a semantic universe, its fields, zones and their hierarchy. This method, first employed by the Tartu School, has been almost entirely neglected in the West, and yet it provides the only presently available way out of the impasse of thematic studies, avoiding the sterile alternatives of a mere listing of key notions and of arbitrary, quasi philosophical interpretations. Let us hope that this method will find wider use in narrative studies. Its potential is great indeed.

On the critical side, one may raise several queries and reservations, all relating to specific details of the argument, rather than to its overall design. I was somewhat puzzled to see the group code defined initially with respect to the reader (p. 9). Such a code determines or underlies the *creation* of the text, and only secondly the reader's mode of reception of the text, as Fokkema himself says on pages 11 and 14 ('sender's code'). The term 'group code' is definitely preferable to 'sociocode,' because of the latter's association with social language varieties which are irrelevant here. The group of writers who design the new code will obviously have to be defined by means other than the code designed by it, to avoid circularity. Such means could be manifestos, journals, members' claims to form a group distinct from others, and so on. The 'metalingual comment' characterising the text-code relation in Modernism (p. 17) might better be called 'meta-coded,' since not the language system but aspects of the literary code are involved. Moreover, it seems to me that meta-textual comments made outside the literary works should not be placed on the same footing as internal ones, and that the proliferation of such comments *inside* the narrative is one feature which distinguishes Post-Modernism from Modernism. The semantic universe is defined not in terms of surface words or lexemes, but in terms of notions or sèmes, and this could have been made clearer (p. 50). Concerning the distinction between the thematic and the compositional, it seems that the demarcation lines between the two are sometimes fluid, especially as regards the rela-

tion between text and social context. The distribution of features among the four dimensions of the compositional aspect (text-syntax) can be carried out in more than one way. I had some difficulty with the text-author category, which seems to me to include architectonic textual features falling under the classical *dispositio*. I would therefore suggest that the model of the compositional aspect be expanded to include five, rather than four, dimensions in the spirit of Jakobson's standard schema of communication. We will thus have text-author, encompassing the inscribed author role, i.e. narrator (which would then be symmetrical with the inscribed reader role); text architectonics, encompassing such phenomena as double openings and endings or fragmentation; and the three other dimensions of reader, code and social context.

As regards the specific texts and features mentioned in the discussion of Modernism and Post-Modernism, we have noted that Fokkema chose to couch his argument in terms of a general aesthetic rather than specifically narratological framework. The next logical step would be to try and translate from one into the other, the aesthetic principles serving also as explanation for the choice of specific narrative procedures and for their change. However, this translation cannot always assume the form of one for one equivalence, but only of a high degree of correlation. Borges, for example, is still traditional as regards the system of narration he employs, and his post-modernity resides principally in his thematics. Another point is this: Modernism and Post-Modernism, seen in isolation, contrast with each other rather sharply. However, if one bears in mind that the prevalent modes of narrative writing in the 40s and 50s – both on the continent and in the U.S. – were more 'realistic,' one could also argue that with all its differences and innovations Post-Modernism is in a way a resumption of the same anti-realistic ethos, first embodied in the Modernism of the twenties. (On this point see Bernd Schäbler's recent study *Amerikanische Metafiction im Kontext der europäischen Moderne* [1983].)

The choice of authors used to exemplify Modernism and Post-Modernism is appropriate and convincing, but this reader would have liked to have seen a more extensive discussion of Proust and Faulkner (hypothetical constructs, awareness) and of the nouveau nouveau roman (Simon, Ricardou). On the other hand, it is quite probable that such a discussion is not available in the present study because its initial focus was on Dutch literature, where these authors may have been less influential than Gide or Mann. One other aspect which could have been given more prominence in the definition of Post-Modernism is that of *textuality*, including inter- and meta-textuality, and the process of semiosis governed by the logic of the signifiant. In fact, this aspect

figures prominently in the discussion of the compositional principles of Post-Modernism and of the Dutch writers, but not in the definitions themselves. Maybe one could say that the quasi non-selectivity (text-syntax) and the random inclusiveness and assimilation of data (text-semantics) in Post-Modernism involve primarily *textual* or verbal or semantic data. Analogously, subjectivity (awareness, detachment) could be said to be negated in Post-Modernism by non-organised *textual* self-generation. This would enable us to argue that Realism as a group code concentrated on the narrated domain, Modernism on the system of narration (consciousness, self) and Post-Modernism problematises the very distinction narration/narrated and concentrates instead on the textual in all its ramifications. But once again one should realise that Modernism is by now a closed phenomenon on which we have a certain historical perspective, while Post-Modernism is living and evolving in front of our eyes. What is more, it may be the case that Post-Modernism, seen on an international scale, is simply a more diverse phenomenon than Modernism, and that an attempt to go beyond the fundamental features indicated in Fokkema's study will unduly narrow or fragment the scope of the discussion.

All these minor queries notwithstanding, Fokkema's book is an excellent study, representing one of the best contrastive analyses of Modernism and Post-Modernism currently available in any language. It is an absolute 'must' for anyone seriously concerned with international literary historiography of our century. (URI MARGOLIN, THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*BARBARA HILL RIGNEY. *Liith's Daughters: Women and Religion in Contemporary Fiction*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press 1982. Pp. 120. US\$47.50

During the past decade, feminist theology has been elaborating a powerful connection with feminist poetry and fiction. The connection, and not simply an expression of the traditional interlace of literature and religion, issues from the central concern in both areas with language and story. While feminist theologians have been inventing new structures for belief, claiming, as Mary Daly does, that 'To exist humanly is to name the self, the world, and God,' feminist literary critics have been documenting the consequences of female exclusion from the symbolic orders of language; while literary critics have been confronting

the theoretical consequences of an orthodoxy in which signification itself and access to language are seen as a function of gender, feminist theologians have been dealing with the not entirely dissimilar fact that the Jewish God 'gave Adam rather than Eve the power to name the world's inhabitants.' The shared point of concern between literary critics and theologians, is that God's initial exclusion has been re-enacted in assertions of cultural authority ever since. It is, precisely, linguistic. Patriarchal theologians of every stripe are 'quick to point out,' as Elaine Pagels writes in *The Gnostic Gospels* (1979), 'that God is not to be considered in sexual terms at all,' but the fact is that 'the actual language they use daily in worship and prayer conveys a different message: who, growing up with Jewish or Christian tradition, has escaped the distinct impression that God is *masculine*?' An idea of the transcendental signifier may have had to wait for a new Adam to name it, but it has been with us, linking power, divine authority, gender and language since the date of creation, or at least since, sitting, pen in hand, at the original scene of writing, the cultural scribe drafted *Genesis*. The exclusion which has made Church history monolithically patristic is very like that which has discouraged women from attempting the pen. Even Freud's unfriendly account of the development of ritual affirms it: transposing values from one patriarchal order to another, he sees ritual as the neurotic product of the Oedipal struggle, and so as an account of relations between fathers and sons.

Modern feminism has long recognized the paralyzing power of the dominant mythology, and although it has always been easier to talk about religious institutions than about the religious construction of reality, about hierarchy than about language, links between feminist literature and feminist theology are not new, as Elizabeth Cady Stanton's *The Woman's Bible* (1985) and Charlotte Perkins Gilman's *His Religion and Hers: A Study of the Faith of Our Fathers and the Work of Our Mothers* (1923) remind us. The new feminist theologians, however, have been systematically conflating the disciplines, aiming to alter the asymmetrical design of theology and to find expressive form and language for women's spiritual experience, and to do so by making works of the literary imagination, some found, some made, their texts. Works such as Atwood's *Surfacing* (1976), Lessing's *Four-Gated City* (1970), Rich's and Levertov's poetry, no longer the preserve of 'Women and Literature' courses, appear now in courses on 'Women and Religion.'

The best known critical work of this kind is Carol P. Christ's *Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest* (1980). This is literary criticism which claims validity as theological argument, which, to quote one of its early reviewers, 'articulates methodologically' what

the literary texts themselves 'express poetically.' Taking as its point of departure the 'story theology' of Stephen Crites and Michael Novak, it outlines what it calls a 'religion and literature approach' to its texts. Reality, it maintains — that is, the experience of what Carol Christ calls 'the great powers' — is brought into relation to the human by means of the stories we tell about it. 'Women's stories,' she writes, asserting this as a point in a *theological* argument, 'have not been told' (*Diving Deep*, p. 1). For women's own accounts of their spiritual experience Carol Christ looks to the new feminist literature. The startling cross-over between literature and religion is entirely intentional: justice cannot be done to such a novel as Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*, she wrote in *Signs* in 1976 (Carol P. Christ, 'Margaret Atwood: The Surfacing of Women's Spiritual Quest and Vision,' *Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 2, ii [Winter 1976] p. 316), unless its critics 'move into an area at the junction of religion and literature,' and what this critic sees as true of the novel she sees as true of every kind of 'story': 'The new stories that women tell each other in conversation with each other,' she writes, 'in consciousness raising, and in fiction, poetry, and other literary forms are key sources for discovering the shape of women's spiritual quest. Indeed, as Naomi Goldenberg has said, fiction and poetry written by women may come to be viewed as "sacred texts" of a new spiritual consciousness.' Though this statement may seem odd to those who have studied women's writing from other perspectives, or to those whose studies of sacred texts have focused on canonized scriptures, it is a logical development of the perspective on women's quest that I will be developing in this book' (*Diving Deep*, p. 12). Carol Christ identifies a *genre* in feminist writing, the novel of spiritual quest, distinguishing this from the novel of 'social quest.' (The distinction has been influential: it is to be found, for instance, in Francine Duplessix Gray's introduction to the Virago edition of Atwood's *Surfacing*.) Novels of spiritual quest, made equivalent of 'canonized scriptures,' provide Carol Christ with new models of spiritual experience and with a new feminist theology: she posits an essential spiritual connection between women and nature, for one thing, and proposes an updated 'goddess worship' for another.

This is to claim a radically direct connection between art and life: the argument here is as remote from conventional aesthetic modes of criticism as possible. It is also to propose an absolute distinction between the male and the female imagination. For Carol Christ, the symbolic order, as we have it, is masculine. Her conclusions, like her method, have provoked no shortage of dissent: Judith Plaskow disputes her view of women and nature, arguing quite sensibly that it

romanticises a limiting patriarchal cliché (see Judith Plaskow, 'On Carol Christ on Margaret Atwood: Some Theological Reflections,' *Signs* [Winter 1976] p. 331), and others have opposed her arguments about the goddess. Barbara Hill Rigney's *Lilith's Daughters* is also, to a considerable extent, written in response to Carol Christ, whose name it mentions frequently. Rigney discusses several of the same works, addresses the same central issue (that is, of the kind of significance to be given to their mythologies), offers a more precisely literary approach to her texts, and argues for a response to myth and symbol in feminist literature that issues not from an idea of absolute difference but from the common sense.

Rigney examines the function in several feminist writers of four key Christian archetypes – those of Christ, Mary, the garden, and Eve. She takes 'religion' as a theme in her authors' texts, and she reads the archetypes literarily, as items in a system of meaning. Her archetypal figures comprise the common inheritance – they are derived from the canonical tradition in both literature and religion – and what Rigney observes is feminist revisions of them. In the works of her subjects – Margaret Atwood, Doris Lessing, Toni Morrison, Mary Gordon, Harriette Arnow, Annie Dillard, Margaret Laurence, Kate Chopin, Margaret Drabble – she documents appropriation and subversion. In their new contexts, these figures become 'political symbols.' Treated romantically, Christ is, Rigney argues, an emblem for a specifically female victimization – Toni Morrison's witch-like Sula is, by this argument, a 'clearly defined and self-conscious Christ figure' (p. 7); treated ironically, the figures suggest female victimization transcended, as in Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*. In the works Rigney discusses, the Mary of Christian tradition is seen as a patriarchal projection, the good girl the system of dominance requires, and some of the texts Rigney treats (Arnow, for instance), oppose her submissive power with that of the independent matriarchal figures she displaced in religious history. Similarly, the figure of the garden, as it is woven into contemporary feminist literature, is not the taming space of tradition, but an emblem for separate female life or for an antitechnological feminist utopia. And Eve, a multiply charged figure in Rigney's readings of feminist texts, is an existential woman, a figure whose 'progress from innocence to knowledge, from a world of myth into a world of reality' suggests 'the archetypal journey implicit in the contemporary feminist novel' (p. 9). The value of Rigney's book lies in its implicit address to the question of what kind of significance should be given to the myths and symbols of these texts. She prefers 'literary analysis' to 'theological treatise' (p. 3), and she sees the revision of inherited religious figures as hav-

ing a dominantly political sense, the works in which they occur as a 'literature of protest' whose intentional erosion of the traditional, paralyzing significances of inherited archetypes is an instrument of freedom. Her emblematic Eve represents her difference from such readings as Carol Christ's: this figure, as she is recreated by works of the contemporary feminist imagination, is, Rigney says, not 'the goddess or the myth figure,' but an 'existentialist' (p. 9) woman who confronts the real circumstances of her life with irony, reason, and engagement.

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ERRATA

Recent issues of the *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/Revue Canadienne de Littérature Comparée* contain two regrettable oversights; to justify the proverbial *Tücke des Objektes*, both involve the Modern Language Association of America. In the first case, the group of statements by Anna Balakian, Thomas M. Greene, Milan V. Dimić, and David S. Reynolds, published under the heading 'The Specificity of the Literary Text: A Discussion' (Vol. xiii, no. 2, pp. 215-37), was printed without the footnote explaining that these are written versions of presentations made in Chicago at a session of the Modern Language Association of America, during the December annual meeting of 1985. I apologize for this oversight to the authors, and the Association.

In the second case, in a review of *The Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing*, ed. by James J. Murphy (Vol. xii, no. 3, pp. 494-8), we have stated that the publisher is The Modern Writing Association of America, instead of the Modern Language Association of America. I can only hope that the printer's imps, feared by the Romantics, will visit somewhere else for a while.