

*JOSEPH P. STRELKA, ed. *Literary Criticism and Philosophy*. Yearbook of Comparative Criticism, Vol. 10. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1983. Pp. x + 259. US\$17.95

A volume whose title makes the claim this one's does owes to itself and its readers a certain reticence as to its goals. The 'philosophy' in question here is drawn on the one hand from some aspects of German hermeneutics, and on the other from some elements in Anglo-American New Criticism (though Russian Formalism is not slighted). The connecting link is Aristotle. In today's critical atmosphere this may strike some readers as mildly eccentric, to say the least. Nothing daunted, Strelka's preface assures us that it is Roman Ingarden who has successfully — or at least 'more clearly than ever before' — established 'the identity of the literary work of art' (p. vii), and that this establishment 'has not been seriously challenged,' though the preface does allow that such scholars as E. D. Hirsch, Jr. and Paul Ricoeur have done work complementing that of the Polish philosopher.

The general intention of this volume (though some of the essays do not entirely conform), as well as its tone, is surely set at the outset by Morris Weitz's lead-off essay, 'Literature and Philosophy: Sense or Nonsense' (pp. 3-40), whose beginning plays somewhat invidiously (because without warning) at once on the Wittgensteinian and on the common-sense meaning of the word 'nonsense':

Is there really anything new to be said about the relation between literature and philosophy? Of course, one can always invent a new piece of nonsense. Certain contemporary styles of literary criticism and theory prove the point; the ever-present possibility of nonsense provides a virtual guarantee of novelty. (p. 3)

Weitz himself, therefore, while transgressing 'the limits of sense by trying to say what can only be shown' (a reference to Wittgenstein, though here only implicit, to which he will return at the end [pp. 33-8]), will avoid 'that kind of prevalent nonsense that violates both the syntax and the semantics of intelligible critical discourse' (p. 3). Judging by what follows, the author has in mind such critical discourses as deconstruction, semiotics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, feminism,

Marxism.... Nonetheless, Strelka calls this collection 'a nice cross section of the most important aspects of the interplay of literary criticism and philosophy' (p. ix). To be sure, a single collection can hardly hope to do justice to all such modes of critical discourse, but then it should be more modest with its claims of achievement and, even if insisting on titling itself 'Literary Criticism and Philosophy,' avoid asserting that it offers anything like 'a nice cross section.' In respect of those exclusions, it is doubtless revealing that the only French author included (Alain Mercier) is not only resolutely un-, not to say, anti-theoretical, but goes out of his way, in an introductory paragraph having nothing to do with the body of his essay, to shunt aside such as Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Tsvetan [sic] Todorov, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, etc., 'though asserting that he does 'not intent [sic] to neglect these recent developments in literary criticism' (p. 207) (— on the contrary, he does so intend). (Let me say here that my observation of these typos is not intended to ironize at Mercier's expense, but to observe but two of a rather large number of such errors — of which the most serious are 'Rational' for 'Relational' in the running title of Edward Wasiolek's essay [pp. 33-43] and a very odd Greek lettering in Mary E. Grenander's [p. 229]). I hold no special brief for any French critical 'school' or derivation thereof, but a volume with the titular claims of the present one cannot simply dismiss such powerful arguments as they (and the others previously mentioned) represent without seriously undermining its credibility.

Setting that aside, however, the collection emphasizes a tradition that flows from Plato and Aristotle to the German Romantics and later phenomenological criticism on the one hand, and to the 'Aristotelianism' of New Criticism (Richards, Crane, Booth) on the other — this last aspect culminating in the final essay of the collection, 'Macbeth as Diaphorodoty ...' (pp. 224-48), in which Grenander seeks 'to discuss those concepts required for an adequate Aristotelian analysis of *Macbeth*' (p. 225). That essay thus provides one term of a volume whose other is provided by Weitz's: commencing with the Platonic establishment of a gulf between literature and philosophy and Aristotle's attempt to overcome it, arguing that literature can truthfully show us the universals in things by making use of them (not, as philosophy does, by dealing directly with them, by 'grasping' them [pp. 4-6]). Confronted with a viewpoint presented so massively in this volume (with the exception of Wasiolek and, possibly, of Sternberg), it is perhaps idle to wonder whether Aristotle's arguments still remain exemplary of the relation between 'philosophy' and 'literature' (only Gado wonders about the status of philosophy, though Weitz does so in or-

der to reassert the 'traditional' view), or whether, Weitz's frequent assertion to the contrary, 'what we call literature' can unproblematically be equated with what Plato (and/or Aristotle) 'calls (a species of) poetry' (p. 4). In a volume whose contributors make frequent appeal to 'history', one cannot help but wonder by what sleight of mind 'literature' becomes exempt from any kind of historical change (though *that* note is hardly confined only to this collection).

In this way, Weitz's own essay first discusses the traditionally argued relation between philosophy (concerned with understanding, with '[true or false] doctrines about what is, may be, or should be' [p. 7]) and literature (which shows, makes, practices that of which – perhaps – philosophy only speaks), without ever considering whether these two activities, and the 'traditional' conceptions of them, may not themselves be enfolded in some process of transformation called 'history'. Views of their separate functions from Plato to Croce and Richards, or of their conjoint meaning from Aristotle to Sidney and then Coleridge, are presented as evidence of a kind of historical dualism of metadiscourses (taken chiefly from the English tradition, here) which take the unchanging discourses of philosophy and literature as their object. The second half of the essay uses the same technique of running through a number of examples to consider the question of philosophy *in* literature (pp. 20–39). Thus the Greek tragedians show us that tragedy always and undeniably refers to some 'tragic fact in the world of man's existence,' about whose nature we may disagree but which is certainly *there*, in the world outside tragedy, a fact whose denial by Greek philosophy shows us 'a striking victory of literature over philosophy' (pp. 23–4). After reaching Shakespeare and deciding that he is 'a philosophical poet, not a poet with a philosophy' (p. 25), the essay works through a discussion of *Othello* and, arriving at Keats's 'negative capability,' decides that literature essentially deals with the irreducible complexities of the world, in all their irreducibility, while philosophy 'seeks a truth that reduces these complexities to universal formulas and which thereby attains a knowledge relieved of doubts' (p. 29). These are the extremes, and some literature, he avers, makes 'as direct a statement about the essences of things as [does] traditional philosophy' (p. 30). Philosophy's deficiency, therefore, is that it only offers the one.

Unlike Strelka, Weitz admits that he has 'hardly scratched the surface' (p. 32), and he concludes with a discussion of Wittgenstein, seen as radically opposed to Weitz, since the philosopher submits that philosophy is merely a language game projecting one kind of activity, of which literature would be just another, playing at the 'creation of

possible worlds' (p. 37). They would, then, be again quite separate, and to write of either of them would be a nonsense because we would be within the sense-making of yet another language game. The whole subject, Weitz insists, is thus only redeemable if we accept the traditional view of philosophy as wisdom, of which we may then say, without exactly knowing what it is, that 'it may even be what is proprietary to literature' (p. 38). Philosophy after Wittgenstein has excluded itself from such concerns. Weitz's plea (the last paper he wrote before his death) is as intelligent a defense of the traditional view of literature as any and, finally, it makes no further claim – even if, the assertion obliges us to 'fall back on the paradigms' (p. 38). The essay, then, is an avowedly tautological argument in favour of the tradition. If I have discussed it at rather greater length than I intend to discuss the others in the collection, that is not to belittle those others, but partly because they do not for the most part deal so directly with the subject announced by the title, and chiefly because it fundamentally characterizes the volume. All the essays are determined to remain with, or to clarify issues of the 'tradition.'

Kurt Mueller-Vollmer thus begins his 'Understanding and Interpretation...' (pp. 41–64) with an appeal to the 'behavioral and social sciences,' as enabling us to return to 'traditional modes of interpretation' and to push back the overwhelming 'tide of structuralist and post-structuralist methodologies.' Noting that these other human sciences have turned to a more 'traditional' hermeneutics in order to *renou* their fields, his article argues that literary criticism should also seek to renew its use of the concept of interpretation. The aim is 'to clarify some of the intricacies and notorious confusions surrounding the concepts of understanding and interpretation' and then 'to prepare the ground' for a 'literary hermeneutics' making use of 'valid' elements from the tradition, while at the same time, presumably, expelling these confusions and 'remaining open to new developments in literary and other fields' (p. 42). The principal urge is to distinguish between understanding (tacit) and interpretation (explicit), and to find a means to accommodate both. This gross over-simplification of the essay's argument has the advantage of showing how it fits into the literature/philosophy combination/opposition (though presumably it would tend to make criticism philosophy, since 'understanding' will have to do with the 'hermeneutic competence' of practitioners and recipients of literature while interpretation will have to do with critical competence – though there is an interpretation before articulation, [p. 59]). The essay makes the distinction by means of a review of modern meanings of hermeneutics (Gadamer and others) and a rapid 'history': Kant, Schleiermacher,

Droysen, Boeckh, Dilthey. Literary hermeneutics, it is concluded, is 'the theory and study of the art of interpretation.' As such it provides a context for all and any 'school of criticism,' and is not merely a method among others – always provided it remains aware 'of its own discursive situation' (p. 60). A claim of this kind can explain why Strelka feels justified in presenting this collection as a good cross section.

In his essay, "'Actualization" and "Concretization" as Heuristic Devices...' (pp. 65-77), John Fizer considers how these two concepts, formulated by Ingarden, make possible (against the claims of such as Lacan, Derrida, and particularly Foucault' [p. 65] – yet again!) the neutralization of subjectivity and particular context in interpretation, and the practical communication of intersubjectively comprehensible knowledge. They can lead, he asserts, to the 'strictly descriptive' reconstruction of the 'artistic datum' on the one hand (shades of Hirsch's 'meaning') and to the objective study of 'aesthetic concretizations' (p. 75) (recalling Hirsch's 'significance'). The presentation of Ingarden is continued in Eugene Falk's article, 'Ingarden's Conception of Aesthetic Values in Literature' (pp. 78-85), an essay which, in concluding the collection's first section ('Basic Philosophical Foundations of Literary Criticism'), does what it says.

The second section of the collection, 'Philosophical Concepts and Implications in Literary Criticism,' is similarly composed of four essays. Jürgen Naehrer warns against the oversimplified application to literature of categories drawn from philosophy and, partly through an analysis of Rüdiger Bubner's work (also highlighted by Mueller-Vollmer), shows the 'possibilities and limitations' of the relationship between the two fields (p. 102) ('Philosophical Concepts in Literary Criticism' [pp. 80-112]). One of the limitations is that already suggested by Weitz: in consequence of which literary-critical 'users' of philosophy should avoid reducing literature's 'contradictory' element (p. 108), its expression of negative capability (with which a practice such as Adorno's 'negative dialectics' is inherently sympathetic [p. 108]). Robert Magliola, through a discussion of Heideggerian '*Eigentlichkeit*' ('authenticity') and '*Enfall*' ('fancy') again takes up the distinction between understanding ('a prereflective at-oneness of critics and text' and interpretation, now as 'the phenomenological description of understanding' [p. 116]), based this time in the threefold distinction between questions concerning the forestructures which provide the place from where interpretation is at all possible, textual aspects providing the matter with which it is concerned, and interpretation proper, the conjoining of these, which provides meaning (pp. 113-31).

In Search of the Pure Relational Context' (pp. 132-44), Edward Wasio-

lek pursues the course of certain contemporary critics (notably Hartman, De Man, and Hillis Miller) in what he views as their further development of the New Critics' 'philosophizing of criticism' (p. 133). He views their quest for an ever-open interpretation as at best disingenuous since, if nothing else, the point of interpretative arrival and departure is always, perhaps momentarily but nonetheless comprehensibly fixed – for otherwise their own writing could not be read: it would indeed be the nonsense asserted by Weitz. Thus a distinction is made between 'final meaning' as 'always deferred' and 'determinate meaning' which is made by the system of interpretation (p. 140). 'Facts,' that is to say, whether literary or other, are always unfinished, but any given understanding of them 'is determinate and finished at a particular time' (p. 141). In the longest essay of the collection, Meir Sternberg discusses the concepts of 'Mimesis and Motivation' (pp. 145-88), presented as philosophical categories applied to literature as (in his subtitle) 'The Two Faces of Fictional Coherence.' Again, the initial meaning of the terms is specified by a quick return to Aristotle, but above all, this time, by a long critique of Russian Formalist views (in particular Shklovsky is held to have misunderstood that "motivation" forms the basis of representational art' [p. 151]) and of such more recent avatars as Genette and Culler. 'Motivation' is the category that links art and reality, explaining elements of the latter in terms of the system of 'the fictive reality that objectifies them' (p. 145). It is a category concerning means-end, the 'teleology' of the text itself, and is not to be confused, as so many have (notably Genette and Culler), with forms and conditions of intelligibility' and the question of coherence (p. 163). Like Naehrer, but through a precise analysis of specific and central 'philosophical concepts,' Sternberg is concerned to distinguish between right and wrong use, or rather to sort out 'the ill-assorted approaches to literary structure and coherence' that are 'bundled into' these concepts, and then to use them clearly to explore 'the nexus of fiction and function in the literary text' (p. 146), showing how that can work in practice.

The last section of the volume, concerned with 'Philosophical Concepts and Implications within the Literary Work of Art,' contains three essays. The first, most general one, Frank Gado's 'Toward a Definition of the Philosophical in Literature' (pp. 191-206), discusses how unsatisfactorily a number of philosophers and critics have viewed the matter, and reaches a similar conclusion to that of Weitz's article: that 'great literature' may be philosophical, may bear philosophical meaning, but does not possess a singular philosophy; it does not analyze, but answers a question with a story that only expands the dimensions

of the question' (p. 206). Alain Mercier discusses the relation of literary critics to esoterism (as philosophy) in the Romantic and Symbolist movements in poetry, seeking to show both previous criticism's inadequacy to the prevalence of esoteric philosophy in a number of 'central' texts, and how it can be rectified by retrieval of proper methodological tools, drawn from quite a catalogue of writers on 'analytical thought.' Unfortunately, in this article at least, Mercier seems to be mostly congratulating himself on his ability to compile long lists of names, as he explains the aims of his earlier books (pp. 207-23). Despite its rather artificial first paragraph, dismissing certain kinds of criticism (especially those that 'go so far as to deny the very existence of literature,' [p. 207] — horrors!), one is hard put to understand the inclusion of this essay. Presumably the editor was gradually trying to narrow the field of consideration: from Gado's general treatment of philosophy in literature, to Mercier's more particular attempt to treat a particular philosophy in the literature of a particular period, and then to philosophy in one text. Mercier's does not work. The third place is, however, occupied by Grenander's already-mentioned essay on 'Macbeth as Diaphorodry: Notes toward the Definition of a Form' (pp. 224-48). Through a broadening of Aristotle's categories (notably including considerations from the *Nicomachean Ethics*), this essay tries 'to develop some aesthetic principles that have not heretofore been formulated' (p. 224), as these are required by *Macbeth*, resistant to earlier analyses that confined themselves to the *Poetics* alone. Thus is invented the term, 'diaphorodry,' to mean (in brief) a work that causes 'grief and concern over human destruction' to be followed by a subsequent relaxation of tension (p. 229). This is opposed to the pity and fear aroused by tragedy, and, the author feels, enables us to attain a better understanding of the play and of Macbeth's 'moral character' and its decay (pp. 235-46).

The collection thus goes from the very broad claims we have seen to what is intended as a demonstration of how 'philosophy,' or at least the application of 'philosophical categories' enables the elaboration of new critical categories and a new understanding of specific works. The exclusions are, however, far wider than it avows, and its generally conservative approach both to literature and to literary hermeneutics seems unlikely to convince those who are not already convinced of its values. On the other hand, its occasionally overly shrill attacks on critical discourses it takes to be inimical will probably put off the unconvinced. The rather ponderous tone of a number of the articles does not enhance its readability either. All of this is rather a pity, for the object of its title is an enticing one. (TIMOTHY J. REISS, EMORY UNIVERSITY)

*RENÉ WELLEK. *Four Critics: Croce, Valéry, Lukács, and Ingarden*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press 1981. Pp. viii + 92. US\$12.50

The latest volume of René Wellek's four-volume work, *A History of Modern Criticism*, was published in 1969. It closes the survey of the subject with the late nineteenth century. Clearly, as definitive as the whole enterprise is, it is also unfinished for the time being. The author has since published several individual papers on twentieth-century literary critics, such as Blackmur, Brooks, Burke, Curtius, Ransom, Spitzer, Wimsatt, Winters, and others. If and when the continuation of the *History* appears, these papers will surely form chapters of the new volume, just as the four essays published in the present slim collection will.

The four papers were read at a lecture series in the fall of 1979 at the University of Washington, which accounts for the occasionally subjective rhetoric. They assess the activity and significance of a handful of twentieth-century literary critics from four distinctly different countries of Europe — critics who have proposed quite divergent approaches to the literary work. The brief introduction to the volume compares the four and locates their place in the confusing web of interrelations of the modern world. Thus, Croce, who refuses to recognize any significant difference between author, work, and reader, is juxtaposed with Valéry, who rigorously separates these three components of literary communication. Similarly, Lukács, who searches for social reality in the literary work, is placed next to Ingarden, who emphasizes the work and its effect on the reader. The dominating attitudes of the four critics (intuitive psychology, Cartesian philosophy, Marxist criticism, and semiotic-receptionalist tendencies, respectively) are as recognizable as are other possible interrelations. For example: the striking analogy between the blatantly subjective Croce and the equally subjective Lukács, who pretended to be the proponent of a pseudo-objective trend (Marxism); or, the shared antipsychologism and anti-historicism of Valéry and Ingarden. The individual chapters also provide reference to the intellectual interactions and influence of the four critics, especially of Croce and Ingarden.

It is naturally quite possible to argue with Wellek on details, maybe even on major ones. It is very doubtful, however, that his overall interpretations could be refuted by more convincing or novel evidence than those presented by the author. Wellek's knowledge of the subject is based on all major writings of the critics, and takes into con-

sideration their individual developments through the decades of their activity. What is probably equally fascinating is the information that the reader gains from the essays about Welles's own changing views on writers, literature, and criticism.

With Welles's essays from the late 1950s and the 1960s in mind, it is interesting to find an increasing rejection of literary categories, genres, and history in his more recent writings, including those in the present volume. In *Theory of Literature*, and in the papers 'Literary Theory, Criticism, and History,' 'Term and Concept of Literary Criticism' and 'Evolution in Literary History,' Welles asserted the value of critical and genre categories, and was only slightly ill at ease with literary history. Now he appreciates Croce's subjectivism and Valéry's refusal of historicism. He has also revised his view of other critics who may just receive a brief reference in the volume, such as Walter Benjamin, whom Welles appropriately termed 'an obscure, allusive writer' in 1969, while in *Four Critics* he places Benjamin, although not without reservation, next to Lukács as the 'most important Marxist critic outside of Russia' (p. 37).

This is not to say that Welles has lost his sense for that kind of rationalistic critical insight that he demonstrated in his essays about a quarter of century ago. He has always been hard on Lukács: now that he is analyzing Lukács' works more in depth than ever, his criticism is actually more complex and balanced than it used to be. Also, he points out Valéry's inherent inconsistencies: a dissociation from the idea of literary communication on the one hand and, on the other, a weakness for being moved emotionally by certain literary works. Yet, on the whole, there are traces in Welles's new volume of a submission to critical relativism. It is ironic that this phenomenon may also be found in the overall philosophy of the same pseudo-scientific fad in literary theorizing that Welles has so convincingly and consistently criticized in his recent essays and lectures.

We can but hope that the fifth and perhaps also sixth volume of *A History of Modern Criticism* will be published some time. Even if they never materialize, however, professor Welles has already made an indelible mark on twentieth-century criticism in his numerous papers published during the past two decades. It may easily be that the fundamental principles on which the unwritten last volume is based will prove to be different from those of the earlier volumes. Even so, this unique enterprise has been virtually completed. The essays in the present volume, written by a member of the classical generation of American comparatists, still provide refreshing readings and a sharp, thoroughly well-informed perspective which is particularly welcome

in our time of arid theoretical Dadaism. (GEORGE BISZTRAY, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

* EDMOND CROS. *Théorie et pratique sociocritiques*. Montpellier: C.E.R.S., coll. 'Études sociocritiques' 26 Paris: Éditions Sociales, coll. 'Problèmes' 1983. Pp. 276. FF98.00

En partie constitué d'analyses déjà publiées (en majorité dans la revue *Imprévue* du Centre d'Études et de Recherches Socio-critiques de l'Université Paul Valéry à Montpellier, en France, centre dont l'auteur de *Théorie et pratique sociocritiques* est le directeur, l'ouvrage que nous offre l'hispaniste Edmond Cros constitue une étude dont on ne saurait trop souligner l'importance. Il marque à la fois un développement et un tournant dans le domaine des études littéraires en général, et dans celui de la sociologie de la littérature en particulier, ou plus exactement, de la sociocritique. On devrait plutôt parler en termes d'études culturelles, car il n'est pas seulement question de 'littérature' ici. Le travail d'Edmond Cros s'insère résolument dans un réflexion globale sur la production culturelle, ou plus précisément, il (ré)inscrit le domaine du littéraire à l'intérieur de l'unité de la culture, comme dirait Bakhtin. La cohérence et l'économie générale que l'encadrement théorique rigoureux confère à l'ensemble constitué par cet ouvrage dynamique, feront pâlir de nombreux comparatistes et soi-disant interdisciplinaires.

La première partie, 'Propositions théoriques,' est à la fois un rapide mais judicieux tour d'horizon de l'état des études sociologiques de la littérature depuis 1960 et une minutieuse mise au point théorique et méthodologique. L'auteur y postule 'la nécessité de proposer une théorie fondée sur la définition préalable d'un objet d'étude spécifique différent de celui que s'est donnée [sic] jusqu'ici la sociologie de la littérature, ce qui implique la constitution d'une nouvelle discipline, et afin d'éviter toute confusion, de nouvelles dénominations' (p. 9). Tout en précisant et en redéfinissant de nombreux concepts et leurs usages à l'intérieur d'une visée spécifiquement sociocritique — qui en sort elle-même redéfinie — Edmond Cros est particulièrement sensible (il n'est malheureusement pas possible de passer ici en revue tous les détails de la riche discussion qui nous est offerte), par exemple, à certaines théories de L. Goldmann (le généticien, non le structuraliste), aux propos de M. Pécheux et à la discussion historico-linguistique de R. Robin (en reprochant toutefois à Pécheux de rester au niveau de l'énoncia-

tion, et à celui-ci ainsi qu'à Robin de ne pas prendre suffisamment en considération la spécificité du texte littéraire), aux travaux de M. Foucault sur le discours, aux méthodes d'analyse de P. Bourdieu en sociologie, ainsi qu'à quelques-uns des aspects de la problématique de L. Althusser (les A.I.E.) et à certaines notions de base de la psychanalyse freudienne (non lacanisée). Et il illustre chacune de ses propositions majeures par des exemples tirés du répertoire du Siècle d'Or espagnol (*Guzmán de Alfarache* de Mateo Alemán, *El buscón* de Francisco de Quevedo) et du Mexique moderne (entre autres, *La muerte de Artemio Cruz* de Carlos Fuentes), ainsi que par des exemples cinématographiques (en particulier *Citizen Kane* d'Orson Welles et *Baisers volés* de François Truffaut).

Si on veut fonder une approche critique de l'objet culturel sur une philosophie du langage, il convient de souligner avec l'auteur que parmi d'autres centres de sélection, le texte ne sélectionne pas ses signes dans le langage mais dans l'ensemble des expressions sémiotiques qui ont été acquises/proposées par des sujets collectif (p. 85). Ces affirmations sont de parfaits exemples du degré auquel l'ensemble de la réflexion théorique d'Edmond Cros est traversé, voire saturé de données provenant de Mikhail Bakhtin, c'est-à-dire, surtout du Bakhtin médiévisiste et du théoricien du roman, même si Cros renvoie essentiellement au Bakhtin le socio-linguiste et à son *Marxisme et la philosophie du langage*. L'objectif visé, admirablement circonscrit, est de travailler certains éléments de la textualité pour en privilégier le travail d'écriture et en spécifier le problème des pratiques discursives. On se doit de préciser tout de suite, au sujet de 'texte' et d'écriture chez Cros, qu'il n'est nullement question d'opérer des recoupements avec les postulats de la déconstruction de J. Derrida et encore moins de ses avatars nord-américains en critique littéraire. Long est le chemin parcouru depuis les premières données telquelliennes sur la textualité en termes de 'travail du texte', espèce de *Textarbeit* calquée sur le *Traumarbeit* freudien, avec tout ce que l'analogue comporte lorsque l'on sait que l'inconscient avait déjà subi l'analyse de Lacan... Ce fut l'erreur originelle d'«intertextualité», *proton pseudos* notionnel malgré lui lorsque J. Kristeva renvoyait à l'époque à idéologème et dialogisme chez Bakhtin. Elle signalait l'inscription de la pratique littéraire dans une problématique de la *productivité textuelle*. Or une des thèses principales d'Edmond Cros est que les structures de médiation qui interviennent entre d'une part les structures de société et, d'autres part les structures textuelles sont... de nature discursive, qu'il s'agisse de textes cultures (les traditions gestuelles et langagières de la fête carnavalesque, codes de symbolisation de pratiques sociales, par exemple) ou de discours spécifiques de

sujets transindividuels' (p. 102). Il réinscrit l'idéologème de Bakhtin ensemble avec sa notion du dialogique dans les spécificités discursives de la *production du texte*. L'idéologème y retrouve des propriétés textuelles particulières par la notion d'*idéosème*: 'j'appellerai idéosème relevant d'une pratique idéologique tout phénomène textuel qui produit cet effet — celui de reproduire les diverses interactions entre différents discours coexistants dans une même instance sociale donnée' (p. 74). Dès lors, on entrevoit chez Cros une distinction entre *intertextualité* et *interdiscursivité*. Tout élément de structures mentales qui peut soit relever de l'interdiscours, soit lorsqu'il est matérialisé dans un texte, de l'intertextualité, tout matériau langagier, tout référent subira [un] double travail de transformation avant de se retrouver codé dans les structures textuelles' (p. 98). Dans le cas du *Buscón*, explique l'auteur, 'les codes de transformation de la sémosis sont constitués par deux pratiques sociales (Carnaval/Inquisition) investies sous la forme de pratiques textuelles' (p. 98).

En prolongeant la différence que Claude Duchet faisait naguère entre profondeur et épaisseur, l'opposition génio-texte/phéno-texte n'est pas pour Cros un problème de structures profondes et de surface à l'instar de la grammaire générative de Chomsky. Il s'agit, fort différemment et en se démarquant des postulats de J. Kristeva, d'un

parallélisme rigoureux entre deux états de l'énonciation qui est particulière à un texte; [le génio-texte] opère avec des catégories non grammaticalisées en ce sens que cette énonciation n'est pas encore mise en formule. Elle n'est pas une structure mais appelée à le devenir en se structurant elle-même dans les différentes réalisations phénotextuelles d'un même texte... [II] n'existe donc que dans ces réalisations multiples et concrètes que sont les phénotextes et correspond à une abstraction que reconstruit l'analyste. (p. 110)

Le génio-texte n'existe ainsi que dans la matérialisation textuelle, le phéno-texte. Dans la même veine analytique, il redéfinit le concept de *narratologie* dont il offre un survol, rapide mais consciencieux, depuis les Formalistes russes jusqu'à Mieke Bal, en passant par Barthes, Todorov, Ricardou, Genette. La thèse centrale ici est que la narrativité dépend de la coexistence inhérente du récit du texte:

la 'fable' n'est pas le *matériau* qui sert à la formulation du sujet mais le *produit* de celui-ci. La réalité première est celle du texte, celui-ci ne reproduit pas un modèle qui pourrait être fictif ou réel, mais, plus exactement *produit* un récit; le récit lui-même n'organise pas une *histoire* qui serait antérieure à ce qu'il dit mais tout au contraire se laisse ramener à elle. (p. 136)

Ainsi, continue-t-il, l'on ne saurait confondre l'instance idéologique avec l'instance narrative; il n'y a pas de prééminence existentielle du récit sur le texte. Le récit n'a pas davantage de sens en dehors du texte; le centre de programmation narrative n'est pas dans le récit mais le texte' (p. 136).

S'affranchissant des (fausses) frontières conventionnelles de la littérature, Edmond Cros fait éclater les contraintes artificielles des figures formalistes et (néo-)structuralistes de toute catégorie notionnelle de 'littérarité', 'textualité' et 'narrativité' sont comprises l'une par rapport à l'autre et Cros leur restitue toute leur teneur sociale et historique. Si le récit n'est qu'une catégorie textuelle, 'phénotextuelle', précise-t-il (p. 153), ainsi, le champ dit 'littéraire' du textuel n'a plus de sens ni de pertinence, ni pour la théorie ni pour la critique, puisque la pratique textuelle elle-même comprend, par exemple, le 'cinématographique', et renvoie par là-même à l'ensemble des pratiques artistiques dans le domaine de la production culturelle. La notion même de *texte* et sa science, la *textologie*, en sortent définitivement et radicalement modifiées.

La deuxième partie du livre, 'De la théorie à la pratique', est située d'analyses détaillées – certaines déjà publiées, d'autres inédites – à l'égard desquelles le lecteur appréciera la rigueur méthodologique, vera des chapitres sur le cinéma américain des années trente (*Scarface* la littérature contemporaine mexicaine (en s'appuyant sur *La región más transparente* de Carlos Fuentes et *El laberinto de soledad* d'Octavio Paz), sur ce qu'Edmond Cros appelle la formation sociale et le discours figuratif chez M. Alemán, ainsi que deux études sur *El buscón* et *La hora de todos* (F. de Quevedo), et un chapitre sur la fête comme espace de l'affrontement social.

Bref, en plus de sa remarquable mise en application, il s'agit d'un vaste projet théorique sur la spécificité socialement *discursive* du texte – théorisation sensiblement écartée jusqu'à présent (c'est ce que l'auteur reproche en tous cas) des préoccupations des sociologues de la littérature et des propos en sociocritique. Il sera salutaire, en particulier pour les comparatistes, de constater que Cros relève un défi justement 'comparatiste' en prolongeant les prémisses de Bakhtin, lorsque celui-ci soulignait que l'esthétique de l'œuvre d'art littéraire 'a absolument besoin de définitions réciproques avec les autres domaines, dans l'unité de la culture' ('Le Problème du contenu, du matériau et de la forme...', *Esthétique et théorie du roman*). C'est là un défi qui n'a précisément pas été relevé par l'ensemble de la discipline de la littérature com-

parée et qui, en outre, est très souvent étouffé par les propos critiques au sujet de Bakhtin lui-même. Si *Théorie et pratique sociocritiques* pose véritablement ce que le théoricien soviétique appelait 'les fondements théoriques d'une science dans [le] domaine de la culture et de la création culturelle, tout en conservant à son objet toute sa complexité, sa plénitude et son originalité' (cf. Bakhtin, op. cit.), c'est en ceci que l'ouvrage d'Edmond Cros renvoie la critique littéraire en situation nécessairement *dialoguée* dans l'ensemble social des pratiques ressortissants aux autres domaines de la culture.

Il nous reste à formuler les modalités d'un programme qui mette en place une politique effective de décloisonnement des études culturelles et de leur objet critique. (M.-PIERRETTE MALCZYNSKI, UNIVERSITÉ DE VARSOVIE)

*PIERRE JOZSA – JACQUES LEENHARDT, *Lire la Lecture: Essai de sociologie de la lecture*. Paris: Sycomore 1982. Pp. 420. FF120.00

Le lecteur des textes dits littéraires tient un discours en partie exprimé, partié et écrit, en partie mental. Les fragments de ce discours se télescopent dans la pratique culturelle, tout en se rapportant à des textes concrets. On a pris ce discours du lecteur longtemps pour une rétroaction, et on l'a qualifié plus ou moins explicitement de 'passif'.

Il est certain que ce discours se distingue par sa *structure*. Il manque de cohésion à tous égards. Un feuillet critique dans un quotidien en fait partie au même titre qu'une conversation de table, une note reproduit même plus, qu'il va engranger dans sa mémoire ou effacer. Il est bien moins certain que la nature et la voix de ce discours se distinguent essentiellement de celui des écrits dits littéraires. Tout commentaire prolonge un texte. Tout prolongement peut être creusé d'un nouveau texte, écrit par le lecteur, ou un autre. Et qui plus est: ce discours, sous sa forme mentale et dans sa totalité comme par ses moments particuliers, peut appeler – de fait, précéder – certains textes. Le discours du lecteur fait donc partie d'un processus dynamique perpétuel dont énonciation et réception sont des moments 'intervertissables'. Il s'agit d'un tout, d'une énonciation-réception – en mouvement, accomplie par un seul grand lecteur/auteur collectif *des* textes. La voix de la lecture est active, sa nature est identique avec celle de l'écriture, les deux, ensemble, constituent une pratique culturelle.

Une des conséquences de ce nouveau *modèle* du littéraire est qu'on renonce à continuer des analyses en 'sens unique,' allant de l'auteur vers le texte, du texte vers le lecteur, et on consacre plus d'attention au vecteur opposé de la dynamique qui procède du potentiel actif des publics. Une des voies d'exploration possibles de ce vecteur est un renouvellement de la sociologie de la lecture, à travers une sociologie des publics.

Dans le passé, en effet, en faisant appel au rôle auxiliaire de la psychologie et dans une perspective des communications, des chercheurs aussi perspicaces que Nicole Robine, Robert Escarpit, Jean Hassenford-er, Alphonse Silbermann, et bien d'autres, ont examiné combien de lecteurs lisaient combien de textes, quels textes dans quelles conditions et pourquoi. De nombreuses études d'analyse de contenu, à la suite surtout des américains Bernard Berelson, Almond et Verba, ont mis l'accent sur les motivations des lecteurs. Pourtant il ne pouvait s'agir que d'un premier effort de saisir le lecteur en nous, le sujet énonciataire-énonciateur qui se greffe sur un sujet locutaire-locuteur et qui se par-ticularise dans un seul discours, dit littéraire, dont le sujet s'appelle lecteur-auteur.

Le livre de Pierre Jozsa et de Jacques Leenhardt, *Lire la Lecture*, laisse entendre maintenant le discours de certains publics, révèle même une part arcanée, car normalement inaudible, latente, néanmoins existante, active, de ce discours.

Jozsa et Leenhardt ont conduit une très longue enquête, en comparant la réception critique et publique de deux livres à succès certain, du roman français de Georges Perec, *Les Choses* et du roman hongrois *Le Cimetière de rouille* de Endre Fejes, dans les deux pays. Après avoir relevé les critiques, Jozsa et Leenhardt ont donné les deux romans à lire à des échantillons de population urbaine 'engagés dans le circuit de travail de la société industrielle,' en tenant compte des variables d'âge, jeunes) de scolarisation (longue, courte), des couches sociales différentes, nommées: ingénieurs, paraintellectuels (= 'travaillant à la charnière de l'invention scientifique et culturelle de la rentabilisation'), employés, techniciens, ouvriers et petits commerçants. Par la suite, Jozsa et Leenhardt ont administré un questionnaire ouvert, constituant, au fond, un test projectif, ayant trait au contenu des livres. Les questions visaient des prises de position sur des thèmes généraux permettant à inférer 'la structure des valeurs constituant l'arrière-fond des réponses.' Après un traitement par ordinateur et une interprétation approfondie, dont l'exposition s'étale sur plusieurs centaines de pages, les auteurs ont pu cerner trois systèmes de lecture: la lecture 'phénoménale' qui se situe 'de plain pied avec une réalité conçue

comme normale,' 'a priori raisonnable,' appelé un 'possibilisme raisonnable' (Système I), la lecture 'évaluative' (où se développe soit une 'condamnation pratique,' réaliste, au nom 'des valeurs faisant fonction idéal' dans toute société industrialisée occidentale de nos jours (II A), soit une condamnation éthique (violente) (II b). Finalement la lecture 'synthétique,' ou 'sociologique' (III) qui tente, dans chaque cas, de situer les actes ou les jugements par rapport à l'environnement et à la causalité sociale, 'd'établir des rapports entre les comportements et les systèmes de contrainte plutôt que de juger ces comportements.'

Résultats assez surprenants: 1) ces systèmes de lecture ne s'articulent pas sur les variables sociologiques, mais constituent des entités (groupements) de mentalités culturelles, dans une société comme dans l'autre. 2) Le système III manque en Hongrie, tandis que les systèmes I et II existent dans les deux pays.

En fait deux interprétations de cette dernière différence culturelle seraient concevables, mais les auteurs optent pour l'une de ces deux à teinte lukascienne: ils repèrent la capacité des hongrois de lier les attitudes aux *personnes*, à leur 'vraie source,' et ils relèvent la particularité de la lecture française: de projeter des stéréotypes d'idées générales – historiquement déterminées, avant tout la fameuse 'Liberté' de la Grande Révolution, donc des abstractions – sur les textes. La lecture française serait donc *romanesque*, la lecture hongroise *post-romanesque*, *épique*. On pourrait cependant penser que de prendre des romans pour des romans, et les identifications psycho-sociales pour des lectures naïves qui se situent *en-deça* du romanesque serait un jugement aussi valable, et on ne voit pas très bien à quel titre place-t-on ce qui est en-deça, dans un au-delà. Malgré cette conclusion interprétative contestable, *Lire la Lecture* est un livre qui marque un tournant dans les études littéraires. Il prouve empiriquement que l'hypothèse de l'activité lectrice, dont nous parlions au début de ce compte rendu, est valide. Le lecteur est la source vive d'un discours. La communication littéraire est inter-discursive et elle est conditionnée par l'histoire. (STÉPHANE SARKANY, UNIVERSITÉ DE PROVENCE ET CARLETON UNIVERSITY)

*JÜRGEN E. MÜLLER. *Literaturwissenschaftliche Rezeptionstheorien und empirische Rezeptionsforschung. Mit einem Forschungsmodell, erläutert am Paradigma des französischen Populärromans*. Frankfurt a.M./Berr: Lang 1981. Pp. 277. SF53.00

The book under review deals with a relevant subject in present liter-

ary theory, namely the relation between reception theory and empirical research. Therefore, one might have expected that it would have elicited wide interest. On the contrary, as far as I know, it has remained nearly unnoticed. It has not been referred to in publications by scholars working in the same field and it appeared on the desk of the reviewer only some weeks ago. After having read it carefully, this reviewer can explain the unexpected behavior of the 'forum' as follows. It is an interesting but unbalanced book which must be a disappointment to both representatives of reception aesthetics and scholars doing empirical research – in particular to the latter. Intellectually brought up in Konstanz with Jauf and Luckmann, and later working in Bochum with Gumbrecht and Stierle, the author has embraced the methodological presuppositions of the sociology of knowledge, a choice which is not in the least surprising. This choice implies a reflexion on phenomenology and social philosophy as well as a criticism of the methods of social psychology.

In the first part of the book, which in my opinion is rather strong, the author is dealing with various conceptions of reception aesthetics (I agree with his decision to use the terms 'reception aesthetics' and 'reception theory' as synonyms). He also traces the historical background which has been decisive for reception theory. In a highly persuasive way, the author analyses the objectives and epistemological presuppositions of nineteenth-century positivistic historicism, the school of Dilthey, Marxism, phenomenology, Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism, the sociology of literature, structuralist stylistics (Riffaterre) and the hermeneutics of Jauf. With respect to each ap- proach the author inquires whether it offers conditions and possibilities for empirical reception research. He has to conclude that the aims of Dilthey offer resistance to a transformation into empirical research and that this is the case with Marxist theory (Lukács) as well – in both cases because of a substantialist conception of literature. Being interested only in monocausal explanations the positivist-historicist approach prevents the possibilities for empirical research. With respect to phenomenology, Müller differentiates between Ingarden and Iser. Ingarden's conception of value tends to be an objective one and includes the postulate of one adequate concretization. This makes empirical research superfluous. Iser, on the contrary, integrates the pragmatic aspect in his theory. He has gone very far in analysing the act of reading, so that it seems to be but a step to transform his theoretical insights into an empirical project. Iser refuses, however, to submit his theory of the implied reader to empirical validation and to investigate social-historical processes. Russian Formalism and Czech Structural-

ism offer a series of points of contact with empirical research. Especially, the link which Mukarovský – although still in an intuitive way – establishes between the literary system and social strata requires empirical research and interdisciplinary cooperation.

Although on the surface it might be expected that the sociology of literature would be pre-eminently suited for work on an empirical basis, this cannot be said at all. The sociology of literature is not a homogeneous discipline. The empirical branch of it (Fügen, Silbermann, Escarpit) naturally cannot refuse empirical validation, but the weakness of that branch consists in its not taking into account the aesthetic elements of a literary text so that it is not compatible with the problems reception theory is coping with.

Riffaterre, it is true, offers a design for empirical research, but, with the introduction of his super-reader, he is excluding the historical reader.

Finally the author deals with the hermeneutic contribution of Jauss whose 'descriptive' position he analyses by way of a comparison with the 'normative' point of view of the East German reception theory. The author can easily agree with the conception of Jauf, because his own frame of reference – the sociology of knowledge – is the same as that of the founder of reception aesthetics. Although the latter holds an extremely sceptical opinion with respect to empirical research, the concept of the lifeworld horizon of expectations forms a link with Müller's own ideas.

After having finished this erudite introduction which covers about half the book, the reader is looking forward with great interest to part two, dealing with empirical research. He will notice, however, with disappointment that the author obviously does not master fully the developments in the field. A writer of a book published in 1981 cannot allow himself to mention neither N. Groeben nor S.J. Schmidt. Another rather disappointing surprise is the fact that the author appears to have great reservations with respect to empirical reception analysis. He immediately mentions its limitations and warns us not to cherish too great expectations about it. He even speaks of a heavy 'loss' which would be the price of empirical research.

In the opinion of the author, reception aesthetics and empirical reception analysis belong to different universes of discourse. Empirical research cannot be used for the operationalization of aspects of reception aesthetics but only for the sake of 'pädagogische Veranschaulichung.' A critical discussion is devoted to the work of Hillmann, Viehoff, Sommer, Jackson, Schmidtchen, and Frey.

Next, the author presents the results of his own empirical project:

informants had to decide on the fictional/pragmatic character of a conversational situation. In the experiment the variable consisted of the way of presentation: the informants were confronted with a written and with a recorded version. The advantages of this experiment in comparison with those of others referred to is not clear to the reviewer; nor is it evident why the limitations mentioned above are not applicable in this case.

Finally, as a makeweight of 23 pages in spite of the subtitle (*Mit einem Forschungsmodell, erläutert am Paradigma des französischen Populärromans*), which promises far more, a second research project is presented, dealing with a novel of Jules Verne. It consists mainly of an interpretation by Müller himself inquiring into the division of knowledge among the characters according to their social positions. Not uninteresting, but the empirical status is unclear, if not absent.

My conclusion must be that *Literaturwissenschaftliche Rezeptionstheorien und empirische Rezeptionsforschung* does not encourage empirical work. The author states explicitly that an operationalization of reception aesthetic categories into social-psychological research procedures is impossible and that the only possibility for an empirical point of view is 'Fragen an die Theorien zu richten' (p. 226). The arguments for this decision are rather weak. (ELRUD IBSCH, FREE UNIVERSITY, AMSTERDAM)

*MICHAEL CLARK. *Michel Foucault An Annotated Bibliography: Tool Kit for a New Age*. New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc. 1983. Pp. xlix + 608. US\$60.00

It is over thirty years since Foucault published his first major work (*Maladie mentale et personnalité* [Paris: P.U.F. 1954]). In the intervening years the germ of an interdisciplinary scope present in his early work has developed into a veritable tree of knowledge with roots touching almost all the disciplines encountered in the humanities and the social sciences. No comparatist can be sure he does not need access to Foucault's works and most have recourse to them at one time or another in their investigations of the circumstances and significance of literary production.

Michael Clark has come to the aid of many scholars in many disciplines with this the first comprehensive annotated bibliography of writings by and about Foucault. In his own way he has attempted, singlehandedly, to do for Foucault what Contat and Rybalka, myself,

and others have undertaken for Sartre. The result is an impressive and useful addition to the scholar's reference shelf. The book is not without its flaws, some of them serious in a work of reference, and many of them avoidable; but this should not detract from the value of the enterprise Clark has accomplished.

The bibliographical part of the book is prefaced by an extended essay which is a sensitive and cogent presentation of Foucault's life and intellectual development as well as being a succinct chronological guide to his publications. This essay is well worth reading in its own right for its clear grasp of Foucault's theoretical and analytical peregrinations.

The bibliography proper is exceptionally well-organised and cross-referenced. It is also handsomely provided with a rousing coda of five useful indices: author, book, article (by title), journal, and topic respectively. Mr. Clark has arranged the bibliographical entries into twelve sections, of which the first five deal exclusively with Foucault's own contributions divided as follows: Section A, books and monographs; B, prefaces, translations, books edited; C, essays and review-articles; D, reviews; E, interviews, miscellaneous. The second and most extensive part of the bibliography is entitled 'Secondary Works.' For those wishing to know more, at a glance so to speak, of the critical reception of Foucault's various theories, this is a most valuable guide. Most of the major entries include accurate and well-stated résumés of the arguments in the books or articles listed.

The inadequacies of Mr. Clark's book are of two distinct kinds: those which beset every bibliography however carefully prepared, i.e. necessary incompleteness and typing errors; and those which are the result of basic archival research left undone. Examples of the first category are the misprint '*Politique-Hédo* 274' on page 96 which should read '*Politique-Hédo* 247' and the appearance of a mysterious M. Baron both in the index and in the corpus of the bibliography — the writer in question is Jean-Pierre Barou. Similarly the review of *Surveiller et punir* by Max Gallo (see p. 213) in *L'Express* is to be found on pp. 31-32 of that journal and not on pp. 65-66 as indicated by Mr. Clark; the *N.R.F.* review of the same work by Jean Blot was published in 1975 and not in 1979 (p. 218).

Fralties of this kind are the common risk which bibliographers accept. One may look stupid and careless when they are pointed out; one was not necessarily either stupid or careless not to have caught them on the hazardous journey from typescript to published book. However, the errors and lacunae which are the direct result of archival work left undone are another matter altogether. The very first sentence of Mr. Clark's preface is breathtaking in its boldness or its naive

presumption; it deserves to be quoted in full if only as an object-lesson to future would-be compilers:

This bibliography lists all of the material published by or about Michel Foucault in English and French through 1981 and major items published in 1982 or scheduled to appear in 1983. (p. ix)

Well, it doesn't. One particularly fruitful, and basic, archival source, the *Service de presse* of Éditions Gallimard, has not been consulted. In one morning's reading of the six or seven foolscap dossiers devoted to Foucault (Gallimard scrupulously maintain critical dossiers on all their authors), I found literally hundreds of articles, reviews, studies, interviews not mentioned by Clark. The major publication of 1982 was *Le Désordre des familles* (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard 1982, coll. Archives) jointly edited by Arlette Farge and Michel Foucault and devoted to the *lettres de cachet* which were used to imprison selected trouble-makers during the *ancien régime*. Mr. Clark makes no mention whatever of this work, or of its critical reception. On the friendly assumption that Mr. Clark's attention was drawn to this book too late for him to include it, it may be fairer or more instructive to consider an earlier publication. Foucault's *Surveiller et punir* was published by Gallimard in 1975. Among the many articles not included by Clark which are of significant value to scholars (and I am ignoring the ephemera of the French dailies, as has Mr. Clark), one may mention:

Pierre Daix, 'Du bon usage de la prison à celui des sciences humaines,' *Quotidien de Paris* (14 mars 1975) p. 11;

Alain Schifres, 'Foucault l'archipel carcéral,' *Réalités* (juillet 1975) pp. 62-67, 90;

Rabi, 'La Société disciplinaire,' *L'Arche* (août 1975) p. 47;

J. Postel, 'Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison de Michel Foucault,' *L'Évolution Psychiatrique* 3 (1975) pp. 667-71.

The reception of other works by Foucault, including his collaboration for the film *Moi, Pierre Rivière...*, suffers from the same neglect of elementary bibliographical research. This is a great pity since what Mr. Clark has achieved is very worthwhile indeed. For the comparatist this book may well fill an awkward gap in the reference library; for the Foucault specialist a visit to Paris is still required. (ROBERT WILCOCKS, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

*DOMINICK LACAPRA. *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983. Pp. 352. \$39.50 hardcover, \$15.95 paper

In this collection of essays, Dominick LaCapra undertakes a redefinition of intellectual history as a distinct subdiscipline, concerned with the 'history of the situated uses of language constitutive of significant texts' (p. 19). As its subtitle suggests, the basis for this rethinking of intellectual history is the primacy which LaCapra accords to texts and to the historian's activity in reading them. The unifying concern of the volume is the relationship between texts and the various contexts on which they bear or in the light of which they can be interpreted. This problematic is first discussed in the opening theoretical chapter and then explored, from an avowedly deconstructive perspective, through a commentary on the work of other theorists — Hayden White, Ricoeur, Habermas, Sartre, Marx, and Bakhtin.

LaCapra's discussion of the relationship between texts and contexts concerns the historian's own text as much as it does those texts which are the object of his study. Such self-reflexivity is part of LaCapra's deconstructive stance, but it is also motivated by an explicit political concern with the critical, as distinct from the purely scholarly, role of the historian: part of this rethinking of history-writing is to replace the traditional image of the historian as 'judicious statesman' or 'just judge' by that of the 'intellectual historian' who is not only a scholar, but also an intellectual — 'with the elements of contestation and even of carnivalization inhering in that role' (p. 17). In keeping with this view of the historian's dual role, LaCapra's reflection on the practice of intellectual history is inseparable from his exploration of certain topics which serve to situate his own practice in a broader political context — notably, his attempt to supplement Derrida's theory of 'différance' with Habermas' critical theory, and Bakhtin's concept of carnivalization.

Central to LaCapra's critique of current historiographical practice is the distinction which he draws between a 'documentary' and a 'dialogic' approach to historical understanding. The former, which LaCapra sees as still dominant among historians, tends to minimise, if not to blindly ignore, both the historical distance between interpreter and text, and the non-identity between text and empirical reality. His aim being to reconstruct the past, the documentary historian considers source texts exclusively in terms of their 'factual or literal dimensions involving reference to empirical reality' (p. 30), or he interprets the text as simply an index or symptom of a particular context which determines its meaning (the writer's intentions, his biography, his *œuvre*, society,

culture, discursive practice ...). Although LaCapra's definition of the documentary blurs the distinction between reference and context, and ignores the differences between various types of documents (e.g. representational, discursive), as well as those between intellectual history and, for example, the *histoire-traités-et-batailles* of traditional political history, it does allow him to bring together a variety of current practices and to criticise them under a common focus. Of course, the intrinsic history of ideas (Lovejoy), synoptic content analysis of particular texts, the interpretation of a text in the light of a single context (e.g. Janik and Toulmin's *Wittgenstein's Vienna* [1973]), the treatment of a text as an instance of an underlying discursive practice (Foucault), are widely differing procedures and are not always based on the same epistemological premises. But, as LaCapra shows, they do have the fact in common that they ignore the problem of how particular ideas or statements about reality function within specific texts. For the same reason, they also fail to appreciate the different ways in which a text may be as much critical as symptomatic or indicative of any particular context.

The 'dialogic' approach which LaCapra poses as a corrective to the documentary fallacy takes its starting point in the difference between a text and its contexts, and centres on the 'worklike' or 'performative' aspects of the text, considered as a supplement to reality which it simultaneously reproduces and transforms. When seen as both document and work, the text can 'render less dogmatic the concept of reality' (p. 26). The interaction of the documentary and the worklike is repeated in the historian's interpretation of his source texts. Once he abandons the documentary approach, the historian is obliged to engage in a self-conscious act of interpretation, an act which LaCapra presents as a 'performing art' (p. 63) and as a creative dialogue between text and interpreter. Ideally, this dialogue should take the form of an exploration of the 'unthought' of the text considered. LaCapra himself exemplifies this practice in focusing his treatment of other theorists on their blind spots: for example, White's failure to appreciate the carnivalesque elements in irony, Ricoeur's failure to question the purity of philosophical discourse, Habermas' failure to 'provide a "deconstructive" critique of the categories of work and interaction' (p. 157).

LaCapra's theory of text — the basis of his programme for intellectual history — claims to be valid for all texts and pertinent for historians in general. Yet, in practice, it would seem that for LaCapra, though all texts are texts, some are more so than others. In one of his rare definitions of the term, he describes 'text' as a 'situated use of language marked by a tense interaction between mutually implicated yet at times

contestatory tendencies' (p. 26). Granted that there are always at least two mutually implicated tendencies at work in a text, why should their interaction necessarily be 'tense'? Does the existence of difference (as between text and reality) always imply the presence of 'tension', 'ambivalence', 'dialogue', 'carnivalization' — all positively charged and proliferating terms in LaCapra's work? He obviates the problem of the general applicability of his concept of text by choosing to concentrate only on 'significant texts' or 'especially significant texts' (p. 28), also called 'complex texts' (p. 14), 'first-rate' texts (p. 340), 'great texts' (p. 28); at times, reference is restricted to 'significant modern works' (p. 45), by which is principally implied the work of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud. It is curious that, in a work where contestation and marginality are so valorised, the canon of great works, and indeed the concept of 'greatness' itself, should go basically unquestioned. Moreover, LaCapra argues that the treatment of 'great texts' should concentrate on precisely those elements which constitute their greatness. Implying that great texts are somehow essentially different from ordinary ones, he criticises those approaches which concern themselves with minor or insignificant aspects of major writers, or which 'domesticate them by emphasizing their commonality with lesser works or with ordinary beliefs, desires, tensions, and values' (p. 28). What makes these texts great, what makes them texts *par excellence* for LaCapra, is — perhaps not unpredictably — their self-contestation, their linguistic self-consciousness, and the extent to which they render essentialist claims problematic.

LaCapra's concern seems to be less with language as used than with language as thematised. Thus, despite the centrality of language as a topic in his work, and the value he accords to linguistic self-consciousness, his treatment of questions of style and rhetoric is disappointing. The rhetoric of *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, he argues, 'involves an actively performative use of language that attempts to affect the course of events' (p. 280); however, his subsequent analysis of Marx's rhetoric uses categories which are primarily psychological, not rhetorical and ultimately goes no farther than identifying the general presence of 'polemical parody', with its performative, indeed carnivalesque, use of language' (p. 281). In this way, LaCapra's timely critique of purely documentary approaches to non-literary texts results, in its turn, in a restrictive approach where 'textual' becomes synonymous with 'ambivalence', 'contestation', 'undecidability'. LaCapra himself recognises the existence of 'manifestly documentary texts' and "'weak" or second-rate' texts (p. 339) which are worthy of study for the way in which they use *topoi* and literary conventions to convey information about life. Un-

fortunately, it is difficult to see how such a no less non-documentary study might fruitfully be carried out within the limits of his normative definition of the textual.

This recognition of the limits of LaCapra's approach, which are perhaps inherent in his deconstructive starting point, should not be allowed to detract from the value of his attempts to open up a new, transdisciplinary, and non-formalist study of texts, and to reassert the importance of 'criticism' and its relations to scholarship. The reader might long for more critical distinctions between different forms of disavowal and contestation, and between different types of document and forms of history-writing. But the nature and the sheer scope of his concerns, together with the limitations of the essay form, make it inevitable that this work raises – and provokes – more questions than it is ready to provide answers for. (ANN RIGNEY, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

*WALTER FALK. *Handbuch der literaturwissenschaftlichen Komponentenanalyse: Theorie, Operationen, Praxis einer Methode der Neuen Epochenforschung*. In Zusammenarbeit mit den Mitgliedern eines Marburger Forschungsseminars. Beiträge zur neuen Epochenforschung, Bd 3. Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York: Peter Lang Verlag 1983. Pp. 227. SF56.-00

Das vorliegende Buch beruht auf der Arbeit eines Marburger Forschungsseminars (1973-77) und verwendet Erfahrungen, die von den Mitgliedern dieses Seminars durch 'ihre eigene komponentenanalytische Praxis' (p. 10) gesammelt wurden. Es will als Versuch gelten, die Methode der Komponentenanalyse (oder das komponentenanalytische Verfahren) in allen wichtigen Momenten derart vorzuführen, daß sie von Nicht-Eingeweihten übernommen werden kann. Die Komponentenanalyse wird verstanden als 'ein strukturelles Verfahren, das dazu dient, das Sinnganze eines Phänomens rational zugänglich und auf einen epochalen Zusammenhang beziehbar zu machen' (p. 9). Ihr Zweck besteht darin, hören wir, 'zu den überindividuellen Verhältnissen einer Epochenstruktur vorzustoßen auf dem Weg einer intensiven Durchdringung einer individuellen Gestalt ...' (p. 14). Drei gegenseitig sich ergänzende Aspekte werden in der Darlegung berücksichtigt: ein theoretischer, ein operationeller und ein praktischer Aspekt. Die drei Aspekte werden zweimal thematisiert, zuerst im Hinblick auf die einfacheren Verhältnisse der Einzelanalyse, dann hinsichtlich der komplizierteren Sachverhalte der Epochenbestimmung. Daraus

ergibt sich der zweigleedrige Aufbau des Handbuches. Nach einem einleitenden Kapitel über den Zweck der Komponentenanalyse folgen jeweils vier Kapitel unter dem Überbegriff 'Einzelanalyse' und 'Epochenbestimmung'. Jeweils drei Kapitel befassen sich mit der Theorie der Komponentenanalyse, den komponentenanalytischen Operationen und konkreten Beispielen aus der neueren deutschen Literatur (George, Hofmannsthal, Th. Mann, Trakl, Benn). Bei der Einzelanalyse kommt ein Kapitel über komponentenanalytische Komplikationen hinzu, bei der Epochenbestimmung eines über Hypothesen zur europäischen Potentialgeschichte.

Das Begriffs-Instrumentarium dieses Buches ist beeindruckend, desgleichen die straffe Systematisierung des Ganzen und die ins Detail gehende Aufdeckung der einzelnen Arbeitsschritte. Im Rahmen der Einzelanalyse vollzieht sich der Prozeß in drei Hauptabschnitten. Im ersten Abschnitt bedient man sich traditioneller Mittel, um von der ersten Lektüre über die nötige Reflexion zu einer Gehaltssynthese zu gelangen. Im zweiten Abschnitt setzt die eigentliche komponentenanalytische Analyse ein. Hier wird versucht, die Gehaltssynthese in drei Komponententitel umzusetzen und somit zu verifizieren. Dabei kann es zur Erweiterungslektüre und Revision der komponentenanalytischen Hypothese kommen. Im dritten Abschnitt erfolgt dann die Kontrollelektüre und Bildung der Strukturformel. Bei der Epochenbestimmung wird auf die Erkenntnisse der 'Neuen Epochenforschung' zurückgegriffen. (Um den Lesern einen Einblick zu geben, sei festgehalten, daß Th. Manns *Der kleine Herr Friedemann* beispielsweise ins 'egotistische Zeitalter' gehört, und zwar in die Ära der Evolution, die Periode des Reproduktionismus und Phase des Reflexismus). In diesem zweiten Teil des komponentenanalytischen Verfahrens hat man sich zunächst um die Bildung einer Periodenhypothese zu bemühen. Im Anschluß daran wird die komponentenanalytische Prüfung dieser Hypothese vollzogen, die Phasenbestimmung, Kontrolle und Erweiterung.

Nach diesem methodologischen Aufwand enttäuscht die Lektüre der angeführten Beispiele. Die Ausführungen zu Georges Gedicht 'Komm in den totesagten Park ...' (von F. Massoud und H. Willig) sind beispielsweise völlig unzureichend. Sie werden der künstlerischen Leistung nicht gerecht und lassen vieles außer acht, das in mehr traditionellen Untersuchungen aufgezeigt werden würde. Etwas feinfühlicher geht der Interpret (W. Falk) von Trakls 'Verfall' vor, doch kann sich der Rezensent nicht des Eindrucks erwehren, daß in diesen Beispielen bei der Durchführung des rigorosen Abstraktionsprozesses das Kunstwerk nicht zu seinem Recht kommt. Auf den ästhetischen Zustand wird nicht eingegangen, und die Mittel, die im Schaffens-

prozeß zur Anwendung kamen, bleiben unerörtert; es wird nur immer um das 'Sinnanze' und die 'Strukturformel' gerungen. (SIGFRID HOEFFERT, UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO).

*RAPHAËL CÉLIS, ed. *Littérature et musique*. Colloque octobre 1981. Bruxelles: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis 1982. Pp. 193. FF110.00

In his editorial preface, Raphaël Célis says this collection of articles is the result of a combined effort of several scholars 'à interroger l'affinité spécifique de l'art des lettres et de l'art des sons' (p. 10). However, not all articles do in fact treat specific affinities, and only one does so systematically or thoroughly. If one did not seek to consider these articles as specific applications of a comparative methodology, then one might be able to praise them as exploratory and potentially innovation-provoking meditations; indeed, Célis himself uses the term *méditation* in introducing two of them (pp. 10-11). And if one were dealing with a solidly established area of literary study in imminent danger of methodological stagnation, then there would be a grave need for exploratory revaluations. Unfortunately, the area of music and literature has not as yet been graced with anything like a paradigm from which to launch explorations towards another. Interdisciplinary studies, particularly those involving music, have too often been an excuse for downright irresponsible conjecturing. Only by a careful application of clearly delineated *tertium comparationis* can one avoid the dangers inherent in musical-literary studies as they stand at present.

Jean-Louis Cupers admirably fulfills even the most rigorous of methodological demands in his 'Approches musicales de Charles Dickens: Etudes comparatives et comparatisme musico-littéraire' (pp. 15-56). Cupers, as he himself makes clear (pp. 17-18), places his methodology on the solid foundations laid by Ulrich Weisstein and Stephen Scher at the 1xth Congress of the International Association of Comparative Literature, when they both warned against the danger of tracing loose, metaphorical affinities between two arts. From this beginning, Cupers pursues the following series of musical-literary analyses of the novels of Dickens, with a focus on *The Mystery of Edwin Drood*: first, Cupers considers Dickens' own encounters with composers and other musicians; second, he touches on the novelist's allusions to music in *Edwin Drood*; he then critically examines several attempts at applying the 'ap-proche analogique' to the novels of Dickens. But, it is in the last two

sections of the study that Cupers takes up the more promising formal and structural approaches: in one of these sections, entitled 'Perspectives dickensiennes: Méthodes contrapuntiques,' Cupers examines Dickens' occasional use of overlapping dialogue; in another, entitled 'L'Approche architectonique,' he demonstrates how specific references to musical form and composers in the text of *Edwin Drood* have subtle but crucial links with the narrative and the characters of the novel. These last two approaches, particularly as Cupers effects them, are of practical interest and, even, application.

Two, among the remaining articles of the book, seek to establish comparisons that seem somewhat insubstantial or, at best, still left open to question by the authors' arguments. Yet, the partial attention to method found in each is not without merit. In the best of these essays, Raphaël Célis' contribution to his collection, 'L'Art et l'aspiration à l'unité "magique" de la vie dans le romantisme allemand: Méditations sur les affinités destinales des Kreisleriana d'E. T. A. Hoffmann et de R. Schumann' (pp. 111-37), the author uses as his *tertium comparationis* the related concepts of the 'fragment,' the 'aporie,' and the 'dénégation': that is to say, the Romantic aesthetic of the unfinished which results from the artist's chronic self-questioning and consequent denial of the efficacy of his art and its conventions. In the works of Schumann, traditional harmony and forms are ignored or abused; in those of Hoffmann, conventional narrative lines are broken by digressions or 'fractures.' While the parallel that the author seeks to establish remains open to further discussion, his essay — in spite of the fact that its title announces it as a *méditation* — does have the virtue of specificity. Further, Célis' article demonstrates that elements from contemporary approaches, like structuralism, can make practical contributions to the examination of affinities between two works of art if it is developed from a single, clear point of comparison. Another essay, Roman Wald-Lasowski's 'Écriture et piano: Gide, Barthes, Chopin' (pp. 161-71), goes to the opposite extreme of attempting too little, by establishing various tenuous links between the notebooks of Gide and the nocturnes and preludes of Chopin. The least unsolid relations established by Wald-Lasowski are, first, the simple biographical fact that Gide, in his journals, mentions playing the piano works of Chopin regularly; the second is the perhaps undevelopable notion that the nocturnes and preludes, like the journals, are 'œuvre de confidence, intimiste' (p. 171). Here again, the comparison is considerably less satisfying than that of Célis, but, like the latter, it does have the advantage of being specific. Raymond Court's 'Artaud et Stravinsky' (pp. 139-57) differs from the other essays in that it seeks to establish a substantial affinity, but fails

to carry it through in all its methodological implications. Court sets up a promising comparison between the practical achievements of Stravinsky and the theoretical goals set by Artaud. It was not Artaud, in spoken theatre, argues Court, but Stravinsky, in musical theatre, who brought back on the stage the aura of ritual and the stylized gestures, which were advocated in the theories of the former and which had been so long banished by realistic and naturalistic trends of the nineteenth century. But, the author of this article makes the cardinal omission from any consideration of musical-dramatic collaborations: he considers only the composer and ignores the other collaborators. In discussing *L'Histoire du soldat* (1918), for example, Court fails to consider the contributions of the librettist Ramuz – or those of Cocteau and Danielou for *Oedipus Rex*; what is more devastating, considering the emphasis Court places on movements and gestures, this scholar fails to discuss documents, which might be extant, concerning the choreography of Nijinsky for *Le Sacre du printemps* or that of Nijzhinka for *Les Noces*.

While the three articles just mentioned contain an occasional or incomplete application of a comparative method, the remaining three essays in the collection can only in all justice be considered as theoretical *méditations*; the first two to be discussed are the very ones introduced by Célis under that term. Perhaps, the most successful of these is Roger Dragonetti's 'Le Mariage des arts au Moyen Âge' (pp. 59-73), an interesting examination of several Medieval beliefs that offer general points of comparison: first, he observes that the numbers of mathematics form a link between music, with its acoustical quantifications, and grammar, with its case numbers; second, that correctness of pitch and harmony in music corresponded to a similar concern with accuracy in pronunciation and articulation. Since no real affinities between specific works are (or perhaps could be) established, Dragonetti's essay remains in the realm of speculation. Jean-Pol Madou makes similar contributions to musical-literary theory when, in his 'Langue, mythe, musique: Rousseau, Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Lévi-Strauss' (pp. 75-110), he examines, from what seems to be a largely structuralist perspective, the concepts of Rousseau, Nietzsche, Mallarmé, and Lévi-Strauss, as well as Plato and Hegel. As can be seen by the list of authors, Madou lacks Dragonetti's historical tact or focus. Nevertheless, the reader may well find some of Madou's explorations not without their interest: for example, his mention of Plato's elaboration of the Pythagorean concept of the ideal existence of numbers behind the flux of sound in music and, by extension, in poetry. Jean-Louis Cornille's 'Medusina: La Voix, l'opéra' (pp. 173-92) is an exuberant arti-

cle treating the Paris *Opéra* in the style and terms of Roland Barthes. Cornille never, however, develops his insights into anything like an argument. One section, for example, begins with the provocative paradox 'L'Opéra est muet' (p. 176), but the author then proceeds to qualify the paradox away.

With the exception of the article by Cupers, and only segments of several others, these approaches to an understanding of the affinities of literature and music function on the rarified plane of meditations. Whatever else might be their efficacy and value, comparatists will find few possibilities for what they most need in the area of musical-literary studies: examples of the application of a cautious methodology. (RODNEY FARNSWORTH, INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY AT FORT WAYNE)

*GERHARD KAISER. *Bilder lesen: Studien zur Literatur und bildenden Kunst*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1981. Pp. 183, 37 illus. DM28.00

The volume, whose title arouses the comparatist's curiosity, turns out to be a collection of miscellaneous pieces of uneven length (from 2 to over 50 pages) written and, with one exception, published during the last ten years. In style and in the underlying approach they range from items prepared for the *feuilleton* section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and entries in exhibition catalogues to scholarly articles that have appeared in *Euphorion* and the *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft*. The focus of attention is largely German – more so in literature than in the other arts. What holds the 'leaves' in this sheaf or anthology together is, unfortunately, not a methodologically sturdy thread but, as it turns out, an ambiguous title and a brief preface which seeks to justify the collection but sounds more like an apology and offers such conceptual gems as the penultimate sentence 'Doch ob Schrift der Bilder oder Sprache der Zeichen: immer und überall sind die letzten Worte stumme Diskontinuitätsmomente, in denen die Systeme der Kunst sich öffnen und in die Bewegung geraten, von der sie reden' (p. 8). Thus, clearly, while *Bilder lesen* offers some food for thought for the specialist in the Comparative Arts and their mutual illumination, the lack of a system implied in the emphasis on 'Beziehungseffekte' rather than 'künstlerische Abhängigkeiten, stilistische Gemeinsamkeiten und ausdrückliche Zitate' (p. 7) is a handicap.

Let us briefly describe, classify and evaluate the ten items Kaiser has assembled between two covers. Only three of them ('Mutter Nacht – Mutter Natur: Anlässlich einer Bildkomposition von Asmus Jacob Carstens,' 'Frau aus Dresden: Ein Gemälde von Franz Radziwill,' and 'Bilder des Massakers – massakrierte Bilder: Zu einer Ausstellung der "Equipo Cronica"') qualify under the title taken literally. In the essay on Carstens, a veritable mini-monograph (pp. 11–51), we have an exemplary iconographic and iconological study illustrating the artistic embodiments of a double topos much in the manner in which, limiting himself by and large to literature, the late Helmut Petriconi pursued his thematological investigations. Written with the help of several art historians duly acknowledged in the 'Anmerkungen' (p. 46), the richly illustrated survey culminates in a fascinating discussion of pictorial versions of the Goethean 'Gang zu den Müttern,' Freudian style. Equally sound, and based precisely on such chains of causality, 'künstlerische Abhängigkeiten' and 'ausdrückliche Zitate' as Kaiser prefatorily disparages, is the close 'reading' of two works by Manuel Valdes and Rafael Solbes (the 'Equipo Cronica' dating from 1974 and entitled, in German translation, 'Augenzeuge' and 'Die Ungeheuer' respectively). In this essay, Kaiser traces these paintings to their ultimate source in Goya and Manet and shows how their creators convey their pacifist message through graphic quotation and caricaturistic distortion.

The remaining long essays in the volume ('*Aquis submersus* – versunkene Kindheit: Ein literaturpsychologischer Versuch über Theodor Storm,' 'Die heilige Musa und die Musen: Himmel, Erde und der Ort der Dichtung bei Gottfried Keller,' and '*Schuch von Wuthenow* oder die Weihe der Kraft: Ein Beitrag zu Theodor Fontane'), comprising, collectively, over half of *Bilder lesen*, have no relevance at all to the Comparative Arts except in so far as, quite sporadically and vaguely, they refer to specific *objets d'art*, and to the extent that the heroes of two works prominently dealt with (Storm's novella *Aquis submersus* and Gottfried Keller's novel *Der grüne Heinrich*) are painters. Otherwise there is no reason for including them in this collection.

This leaves us with two subcategories, which I shall briefly characterize: a pair of 'impressionistic' reflections on German poems (the song of the *Türmer* in Part II of Goethe's *Faust* and Heimito von Doderer's 'Auf die Strudlhofstiege zu Wien') and a diptych on the Japanese theater as experienced by the author during a visit to the Land of the Rising Sun. Goethe's lyric is, with some justification, included because it sings 'von Anschauung statt Erfahrung der Welt' (p. 7); but Doderer's piece, which forms the epigraph to his novel *Die Strudlhofstiege*, finds its place here perversely because, in the author's opinion, it 'ist zuletzt

die Treppe und die Vase, von denen es spricht' (p. 8), i.e., a *Dinggedicht* that is retransformed into the *Ding*.

Of the two pieces on the Japanese theater, 'Sprachlos im No-Theater,' originally published in *Neue Deutsche Hefte*, is the detailed and sensitive account of a performance of this classic genre, whereas its sequel, 'Vater und Sohn auf Japanisch,' reports on a family rehearsal of a Kyogen play and, as its title indicates, suggests a parallel with a cartoon series of E. O. Plauen familiar to those of us who grew up in Germany during the thirties and forties – the *tertium comparationis* being provided by the relationship between a father and his son, treated half-jokingly and half-seriously in both instances.

Seen in its totality, *Bilder lesen*, in spite of the intrinsic value of some of the pieces, is little more than the sum of its parts and considerably less than an integrated whole. Comparatists may well benefit from its perusal but will hardly be tempted to make it required reading for students in their Comparative Arts classes. (ULRICH WEISSTEIN, INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

* WILLIAM ELFORD ROGERS. *The Three Genres and the Interpretation of Lyric*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983. Pp. vii + 277. \$23.50.

Those who, since Croce, object to the usefulness of genre in the practice of critical discourse probably outweigh those who argue that it continues to be indispensable. 'Seul importe le livre,' Maurice Blanchot declared, 'tel qu'il est, loin des genres.'¹ Such an assertion is of course understandable emerging from the kind of culture Blanchot knew, and it presupposes an awareness of genre of an excessive, not to say oppressive, character. Such a belief, however, in the unsullied individuality of the book implies not only ideological limitations, but also inhibits more general and, indeed, historical access to literary problems. If literature is system, surely the system is not coterminous with 'the book.' But the positive implications of Blanchot's observation cannot be ignored. The problem with genre is the word itself. It connotes classification, and precisely as classification it has raised the most problems. As Jonathan Culler demonstrates, genre ought not end in taxonomy but take effect, rather, as motivation, and therefore inform the act by

¹ Maurice Blanchot, *Le Livre à venir* (Paris: Gallimard 1959) 243.

which the reader constructs or concretizes the text.² One may hesitate with E. D. Hirsch, Jr. to say whether genre is more properly *langue* or *parole*.³ That it is a system of signs that guides, if not determines, appropriate judgement is the argument that theorists of genre propose. Without genre, the study of literature runs the risk of not only being a book, but becoming in fact a closed book. The theory of genre has, fortunately, moved 'beyond genre,' and its effects on literary theory (to mention only Frye, Guillén, Hernadi, Lukács, Propp, Staiger, and Todorov) and literary history (to restrict oneself to medieval studies, Jaub and Zumthor) have been of significant and often unquestioned importance.

The major problem that must be addressed by theorists of genre is the ground itself of the theory. After René Wellek's devastating survey of the history of German attempts to come to terms with genre, in particular the means by which the major kinds are essentially distinguishable, most critics would probably choose to abandon all hope, preferring not to enter such dark and well travelled forests again.⁴ The merit of Rogers' enterprise is that it is precisely there, with the admonitions of Wellek and others firmly in mind, that he chooses to set forth. In short, he accepts in advance the objections of Croce, Wellek, and Hirsch to the insufficiencies of genre theory, for if it does not serve the task of interpretation, there is no necessity to retain it in literary discourse. He therefore abandons himself the directions laid out by Hegel, Staiger, and Hernadi and poses the central question that his study would answer: 'If genres are not nothing, if they are not conventions, if they are not regions in logical space, if they are not metaphysical categories, what are they?' (p. 40). To find his answer, he returns to Kant's relational categories, those of substance, causality, and reciprocity, each of which he associates with traditional broad genres of epic, dramatic, lyric.

The other objection that any genre theory must address is the impossibility of evading the limits of the hermeneutic circle. Rogers' solution is to accept the objection and to follow Heidegger's suggestion

'to come into it in the right way' (p. 17). Rogers accepts, therefore, the necessity that understanding is the basis of interpretation. It follows, then, that genre understood as a heuristic model is significant only as an instrument employed in interpretive procedures. The choice of Kant's categories as constitutive of the model is valuable, for the categories are at once *a priori* and 'empty' (*Leer*) and, consequently, their functionality is not realized except as 'they acquire genuine significance ... by their application to an object of experience' (p. 42). The merit of this solution of the problem is that the concept that informs the model is not static, a mere schema that the work corresponds to as flesh to skeleton, but rather 'reflexive.' This would mean that '[i]nterpretation of the concept would emerge only insofar as there is interpretation of the work' (p. 43). The charge that in adapting Kant he must accept all of Kant is avoided by declaring that instead of proposing a metaphysics of genre he is restricting himself to the construction of a model: 'the question is not how things are, but how they are presented' (p. 43). Such a remark suggests Frye's notion of the 'radical of presentation' as the mark of genre, but the difference between Rogers and Frye is fundamental. 'Anatomy' would be precisely the metaphor that Rogers would prefer to avoid.

A reflexive model requires objects of relation. Rogers proposes for each of the genres a particular disposition between what he calls the mind and world of the work. For the interpretation of lyric the disposition of mind and world with one of Kant's categories possesses a special significance, for by implication it seems to reject Jakobson's model of communicative functions and, therefore, poetry as semiotics. If, following Kant's third category, lyric is to be understood as reciprocity, it means that '[t]he interpreted mind of the work ... finds itself in a relationship with [the] world such that it seems that either is determining the other' (pp. 67-8). The lyrical may then be distinguished from the dramatic to the extent

that it is impossible for the lyrical mind to present itself as detached from the lyrical world in the way that it is possible in drama or epic. In interpreted drama, the mind is not given in the world [of the work], but by means of it, and so complete detachment is the rule. ... In epic, the world is given through the mind, as thought, and this implies a different kind of detachment. That is, the mind has only limited possibilities with respect to the world it tells about, for that world is only thought in a mind. (p. 68-9)

The validity of what these distinctions imply is elaborated in Rogers' discussion of what he calls 'the anomalous voice' and 'the impersonal

2 Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1975) 136-7

3 E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1967) 111

4 René Wellek, 'Genre Theory, the Lyric, and Erlebnis,' *Discriminations: Further Concepts in Criticism* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1970) 225-52

lyric.' These are kinds that could be associated respectively with drama and epic, and, therefore, the distinctions that Rogers draws are important for the establishing of his theory. The discussion of the anomalous voice is, in a certain measure, a reply to the limitations of New Critical use of the speaker that would suggest that the poem originates as 'dramatic utterance' (p. 80). Rogers argues that poems of this kind are characterized by a 'doubleteness' of voice' (p. 81), shared by both speaker and author who mutually generate the reciprocity that belongs to lyric. In this instance, the author is the mind of the work who enters into reciprocal relation with the speaker's world through empathy. Through a series of brilliant analyses of Yeats, Blake, and Dickinson, by shifting interpretive emphasis away from the speaker and the implications of drama, and also by recuperating the author that the speaker's voice gradually symbolizes (pp. 102-3), Rogers demonstrates how impossible it is for the reader to remain 'outside' the poem. Readers may not, in other words, take the kind of distance attributed to dramatic authors, but we must encounter ourselves in the moment when we become voices' (p. 89). The same holds for the impersonal lyric, for in both kinds 'the mind finds itself in the world it tells about' (p. 104). Thus, anomalous lyric is not dramatic, for 'the dramatic world is *presented* in such a way that it must appear as the cause of the mind of the work' (p. 59). This is the relation of cause and effect. Epic, by telling, presents the work 'as thought in the mind of the narrator' (p. 60). Neither drama nor epic, then, draws the reader into its worlds in the same way as lyric, if for no other reason than that the disposition of mind and world is characterized by finding itself in the world it produces.

The making of genre distinctions, no matter how arduous in itself such a task is, is only preliminary to Rogers' central task which is the construction of a model whose object is to provide 'conceptual knowledge *not* about works, but about *interpretations*' (p. 57). Thus, it is inevitable that he address at some length the hermeneutic impasse that Heidegger elaborates, the invitation to relativism that it offers, and the arguments against the Heideggerian model that Hirsch puts forth. The problem arises as a condition of the hermeneutic exercise, but if the interpretive act is inevitably bound to the subjectivity of the interpreter, there would seem to be little chance of escaping solipsism. Rogers' response to the fundamental problem of meaning, elaborated in his fine, penetrating discussion of Heidegger and Hirsch, invariably resides in process, rather than in the text. But process is not without constraints, and the constraint proposed that would serve as a standard for interpretation would be the subject-matter (p. 145). We ad-

duce subject-matter along Heideggerian lines: 'we understand the text, make that understanding explicit in an interpretive statement, and then discover the subject-matter that is presupposed' (p. 142). It would be abusive, I think, because of the conditions of its discovery, to limit subject-matter to Jakobson's referential function, for it is at once 'the *entities or events in the reader's world to which the text is taken to be referring*' and 'a condition for the possibility of the text' (p. 143). This not only avoids the problematic character of Hirsch's use of type and the location of meaning within the author's consciousness, but also, because of Rogers' arguments in favour of the historicity of the text, makes suggestive use of the dialectics of *Rezeptionsästhetik*.

The notion of subject-matter leads, then, in two related directions. If it is the standard, we need to know the criteria, and these are postulated as adequacy, capacity, and relative perfection. In each instance the interpreter would measure 'the *adequacy of the work to its subject-matter*' (p. 164), whether it is capable of producing meaning (p. 170), and how adaptable the work is (p. 173). Of equal, if perhaps more complex, importance is the interpretation of lyric within an historic context, for it is in this context that the reciprocity of mind and world becomes a hermeneutic problem. Again distinguishing the three genres, at least briefly, he suggests that drama, as a sequence of cause-and-effect, may broadly be understood as a structural order (p. 178); that the technique of the epic is point of view (p. 179); that lyric, because it is characterized by reciprocity, is informed generically by the trope (p. 180). As Rogers argues,

... the concept of "trope" is itself grounded in the concept of a "reciprocal relation," which in our model is associated with interpreted lyric. The concept of "trope" presupposes a whole made up of parts — that is, the comparison made up of its elements. Furthermore, the elements of the comparison necessarily stand in a reciprocal relation with each other. (pp. 180-1)

After this brief summary and re-grounding of his central argument, Rogers concludes his study with a series of judicious and graceful analyses of a number of texts from Spenser to Stevens.

If Rogers' project has one limitation, it is one of his own making. As he observes in a prefatory remark, 'the central issue in hermeneutic theory is the issue of correctness' (p. 7). The merits of thus limiting the range of the problem are, I think, obvious; it raises other problems, however, which are implicit in the post-Kantian tradition. The major difficulty is, I would suggest, its use of history, and it is worth observing that some of Rogers' finest insights are displayed in the final chap-

ter, but they are more a function of his interpretive intelligence, rather than a result of the difference of history. That is to say, the difference of the *trope* is well displayed between Spenser and Stevens, but it is not clearly demonstrated how this is attributable to history. Nor would, it seems to me, Rogers' hermeneutics be sufficient to the problem that medieval writing, for example, poses. The alterity of the past does not become reflectively visible.⁵ It is a limitation of the extent of the theory that one hopes will receive further exploration, for it is crucial to our understanding of any text that does not fall within our historical horizon.

Another limitation of the theory, which is, however, of lesser significance is the definition of lyric that depends upon a difference between the three genres. Epic and drama are treated with such brevity that one has a recurring sense that, had we learned more of how the other genres functioned, it would have made the use of lyric more persuasive. This is not to say that Rogers does not, for the most part, admirably achieve what he proposes to do, and does so with tact, subtlety, and elegance; but rather, that the reader wants to know more about how the other genres might be examined, and how that examination would deepen our understanding of lyric. Although Rogers' primary object is the lyric manifested as poem, he is fully aware that there are novels that 'might better be analyzed as dramatic or lyrical utterances, or even as mixed forms' (p. 59). How his concept of the lyric would fit, for example, with Ralph Freedman's lyrical novel or how he would approach the lyrical in Yeats' drama would be among the tests one might anticipate. To suggest, however, that this is not an important study is not at all my intent; indeed, it is one that no student of hermeneutics, interpretation, genre theory or the lyric can afford to overlook. As a contribution to the study of humane letters, it abundantly and magnificently rewards repeated perusal. (E.D. BLODGETT, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

5 See the title essay of Hans Robert Jauss's *Ästhetik und Modernität der mittelalterlichen Literatur: Gesammelte Aufsätze 1956-1976* (München: Fink 1977) 9-49.

*ZORAN KONSTANTINOVIC, EVA KUSHNER, BÉLA KÖPECEZ, eds. *Evolution of the Novel*. Proceedings of the 19th Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, Innsbruck 1979, Volume 4. Hrsg. von Innsbrucker Gesellschaft zur Pflege der Geisteswissenschaften. Innsbruck: Verlag des Instituts für Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Innsbruck 1982. Pp. 504. SF950.00

Of the eighty-three papers or 'rapports de synthèse' dealing with 'the novel' (although very few tried to characterize this form in comparison to other kinds of fiction, in spite of the taxonomic inclination of now fashionable narratologies), many are about works I did not, and never will read, or about literatures of whose existence I was ignorant, by their own conciseness to assume that the readers knew many things I did not know, about Macedonian literature, for example, about Ishmael Reed ('a gifted young black'), about the image of the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Charles Sealford's German novels, or the aesthetics of science-fiction novels. Was my obstinacy in reading every one of such papers, as all forty-eight of the first volume, seventy-three of the second, and sixty of the third volume of the Innsbruck *Proceedings* – in any way sensible? Would someone else have continued with such unreasonable stubbornness?

Perhaps not. But I think the activity was worthwhile, and very 'comparatist' in nature. What characterizes comparativism is the need to 'go beyond,' beyond linguistic, as well as beyond methodological, spatial, and temporal barriers. I think we must establish the boundaries of 'Comparative Literature' against other literary studies. A few of the papers I read in this volume deal with one work, or with works written in one language, often with no, or at best occasional, reference to other works. Such papers belong to the study of a single literature, not to Comparative Literature. We can, however, say with some irony that they become comparative in their reception by comparatists, who upon reading such papers 'compare' them with other experiences about other texts written in different languages. Individual texts are not, in fact, the object of comparative research, although most comparatists are also specialists in one or several literatures, and as such devote themselves to individual texts or sets of texts. Fortunately so, I must add, because the most imminent danger in comparative research is to lose contact with the texts themselves, that is, with literature in its concreteness. But as a comparatist the scholar does not deal with individual texts, except in relation to the problem of translation. In another sense some papers that appear in this volume, though